State v. Green

409 S.E.2d 785, 306 S.C. 94, 1991 S.C. LEXIS 209

• Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Decided: October 7, 1991
• Docket: 23492
• Status: Published

Opinions

Gregory, Chief Justice:

Appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. He was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment and fined twenty-five thousand dollars. The only issue before us is whether the Solicitor’s use of peremptory challenges violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. (2d) 69 (1986). The trial judge found no violation. We affirm.

Appellant is a black male. On appeal, he contests the validity of the Solicitor’s race-neutral explanation that he struck two potential black jurors on the ground they were unemployed. Appellant argues this reason is insufficient under Bat-son and this Court’s decision in State v. Tomlin, 299 S.C. 294, 384 S.E. (2d) 707 (1989), because it is not a reason “related to the case to be tried.”

The United States Supreme Court recently issued its decision in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. —, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 114 L. Ed. (2d) 395 (1991), which clarifies the application of Batson in evaluating the Solicitor’s explanation for strikes challenged as racially motivated. Although Hernandez does not address the precise issue before us, we find guidance in the general precepts announced therein.

As discussed in Hernandez, Batson sets forth a three-step process for evaluating claims that a Solicitor used peremptory challenges in a manner violating the Equal Protection Clause. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the Solicitor exercised such challenges on the basis of race. Second, if the requisite showing is made, the burden shifts to the Solicitor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the strikes in question. Third, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has met his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. 500 U.S. at —, 111 S. Ct. at 1865, 114 L. Ed. (2d) at 405.

Focusing on the second step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the Solicitor’s explanation. “Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral.” 500 U.S. at —, 111 S. Ct. at 1866, 114 L. Ed. (2d) at 406. Further,

disparate impact should be given appropriate weight in determining whether the prosecutor acted with a forbidden intent, but it will not be conclusive in the preliminary race-neutrality step of the Batson inquiry.... Equal protection analysis turns on the intended consequences of government classifications. Unless the government actor adopted a criterion with the intent of causing the impact asserted, that impact itself does not violate the principle of race-neutrality.

500 U.S. at —, 111 S. Ct. at 1867, 114 L. Ed. (2d) at 407.

At the third step of the inquiry, assuming the Solicitor’s explanation is facially valid, the trial judge must determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. 500 U.S. at —, 111 S. Ct. at 1868, 114 L. Ed. (2d) at 408. An invidious discriminatory purpose may be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts. Id.1 The trial court’s finding at this stage, however, will largely turn on an evaluation of credibility.

In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence will often be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. As with the state of mind of a juror, evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies “peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” (Citations omitted.)

500 U.S. at —, 111 S. Ct. at 1869, 114 L. Ed. (2d) at 409.

Applying these principles to the issue at hand, we con-elude the fact that the Solicitor’s explanation is not related to the case to be tried does not render it insufficient as a matter of law at stage two of the Batson inquiry. Under Hernandez, unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the reason proffered, it will be deemed race-neutral. We find no inherent discriminatory intent in the Solicitor’s explanation he struck the jurors in question because they were unemployed.

Further, at stage three of the inquiry, unless the trial judge determines the Solicitor’s reason should not be believed based on demeanor or credibility, the defendant must show a discriminatory purpose from the totality of the relevant facts. We conclude the fact the Solicitor’s explanation may be unrelated to the case to be tried does not in itself carry the defendant’s burden of showing a discriminatory purpose. An explanation unrelated to the facts of the case may still reflect the Solicitor’s valid concern with a juror’s sense of social duty or the life experience he or she brings to the case rather than indicate a racially motivated purpose for exercise of the strike. Where, as here, the trial judge finds such a reason credible and the defendant fails to show a discriminatory purpose from the totality of the circumstances, the Solicitor’s strike will be valid at stage three of the Batson inquiry.

Because the trial judge’s findings regarding purposeful discrimination rest largely upon his evaluation of credibility, we will give those findings great deference. 500 U.S. at —, 111 S. Ct. at 1869, 114 L. Ed. (2d) at 409. Accordingly, we affirm the trial judge’s finding the Solicitor’s strikes against the two jurors in question were valid under Batson.

Affirmed.

Harwell and Chandler, JJ., concur. Toal and Finney, JJ., dissenting in separate opinion.

1 For instance, the defendant may show the Solicitor’s facially neutral reason was pretextual because it was not applied evenhandedly. See State v. Oglesby, 298 S.C. 279, 879 S.E. (2d) 891 (1989).