State v. . Grant

Supreme Court of North Carolina

State v. . Grant

10 S.E. 554, 104 N.C. 908

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedSeptember 5, 1889

StatusPublished

Cited by18 cases

This text of 10 S.E. 554 (State v. . Grant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. . Grant, 10 S.E. 554, 104 N.C. 908 (N.C. 1889).

Pincite

Opinion

Shepherd, J.

— after stating the case:

1. We are clearly of the opinion that it was unnecessary to produce the charter in order to prove that the prosecutor was an incorporated company.

In Railroad v. Langton, L. R. 2 Q. B. D., 296, 46 L. J. M. C., 136, “ it was held that it was not necessary to produce the certificate of incorporation of a company, but that the existence of the company was sufficiently proved by evidence that it had carried on business as such.” Roscoe’s Crim. Ev., 868. To the same effect is Whart. Crim. Law, 1828; People v. Swartz, 32 Cal., 160; People v. Davis, 31 *910 Wend., 309; Reed v. State, 15 Ohio, 217, and State v. R. R. Co., 95 N. C., 602.

2. We are also of the opinion that the fact of incorporation need not be alleged where the corporate name is correctly set out in the indictment. We are aware that there is a great diversity of opinion upon this subject in the various States, but we think the better view is that such an allegation is unnecessary. In State v. Bell, 65 N. C., 313, it is said that “the name of the owner of property stolen is not a material part of the offence charged in the indictment, and it is only required to identify the transaction so that the defendant, by proper plea, may protect himself against another prosecution for the same offence. The owner may have a name by reputation, and if it is proved that he is as well known by that name as any other, a charge in -the indictment in that name will be sufficient.” We see no reason whj'- a conviction upon the present indictment would not be a bar to another in which the fact of incorporation is alleged. Here the name is correctly described and there could be but little trouble as to the identification of the prosecutor. In Stanly v. Railroad Co., 89 N. C., 331, it is distinctly decided that such a company may be designated by its corporate name, and that such a description is good upon demurrer. This case cites with approval the language of Maule, J., in Wolfe v. Steamboat Co., 62 E. C. L. R., 103, where he says that such a description of the prosecutor is “not at all out-of the usual form. It impliedly amounts to an allegation that the defendant is a corporate body.”

We have read with interest the terse and pointed brief of the defendant’s counsel, but he has failed to convince us that there was any error in the rulings of the trial Judge.

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Shepherd, J.

— after stating the case:

1. We are clearly of the opinion that it was unnecessary to produce the charter in order to prove that the prosecutor was an incorporated company.

In Railroad v. Langton, L. R. 2 Q. B. D., 296, 46 L. J. M. C., 136, “ it was held that it was not necessary to produce the certificate of incorporation of a company, but that the existence of the company was sufficiently proved by evidence that it had carried on business as such.” Roscoe’s Crim. Ev., 868. To the same effect is Whart. Crim. Law, 1828; People v. Swartz, 32 Cal., 160; People v. Davis, 31 *910 Wend., 309; Reed v. State, 15 Ohio, 217, and State v. R. R. Co., 95 N. C., 602.

2. We are also of the opinion that the fact of incorporation need not be alleged where the corporate name is correctly set out in the indictment. We are aware that there is a great diversity of opinion upon this subject in the various States, but we think the better view is that such an allegation is unnecessary. In State v. Bell, 65 N. C., 313, it is said that “the name of the owner of property stolen is not a material part of the offence charged in the indictment, and it is only required to identify the transaction so that the defendant, by proper plea, may protect himself against another prosecution for the same offence. The owner may have a name by reputation, and if it is proved that he is as well known by that name as any other, a charge in -the indictment in that name will be sufficient.” We see no reason whj'- a conviction upon the present indictment would not be a bar to another in which the fact of incorporation is alleged. Here the name is correctly described and there could be but little trouble as to the identification of the prosecutor. In Stanly v. Railroad Co., 89 N. C., 331, it is distinctly decided that such a company may be designated by its corporate name, and that such a description is good upon demurrer. This case cites with approval the language of Maule, J., in Wolfe v. Steamboat Co., 62 E. C. L. R., 103, where he says that such a description of the prosecutor is “not at all out-of the usual form. It impliedly amounts to an allegation that the defendant is a corporate body.”

We have read with interest the terse and pointed brief of the defendant’s counsel, but he has failed to convince us that there was any error in the rulings of the trial Judge.

Affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

10 S.E. 554, 104 N.C. 908, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-grant-nc-1889.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack