[Cite as State v. Goodman, 2024-Ohio-3353.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 2024CA0020-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE DARRELL G. GOODMAN COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 2023-CR-0739
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 3, 2024
FLAGG LANZINGER, Judge.
{¶1} Darrell Goodman appeals from the judgment of the Medina County Court of
Common Pleas that denied his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. For the following
reasons, this Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} A grand jury indicted Goodman on four counts of violating a protection order in
violation of R.C. 2917.27(A)(1), and one count of telecommunications harassment in violation of
R.C. 2917.21(A)(1). At his arraignment, the trial court found Goodman indigent and appointed
him counsel.
{¶3} Goodman initially pleaded not guilty. After a change-of-plea hearing before Judge
William F. Hutson, Goodman (with counsel present) pleaded guilty to the charges contained in the
indictment. Judge Hutson ordered a presentence investigation and set the matter for sentencing on 2
January 29, 2024. About three weeks prior to sentencing, Judge Hutson recused himself. The case
was then assigned to Judge Joyce V. Kimbler.
{¶4} Judge Kimbler sentenced Goodman to an aggregate prison term of 30 months.
After sentencing, Goodman filed a one-sentence pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea that
stated: “the Defendant withdraws his plea.” The trial court held a hearing on Goodman’s motion
wherein Goodman was represented by new counsel.
{¶5} At the hearing, Goodman’s new counsel explained that Goodman’s former counsel
assured Goodman that Judge Hutson would “likely” sentence him to community control.
Goodman then spoke on his own behalf, stating that his former counsel told him that Judge Hutson
would “probably” sentence him to community control. Goodman also stated that, based upon his
former counsel’s assurances, he presumed Judge Hutson would sentence him to community control
when he pleaded guilty.
{¶6} After hearing from Goodman and his new counsel, the trial court denied
Goodman’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In its subsequent judgment entry, the trial court
noted that “[i]t appears that Defendant’s motion is merely based on what his counsel informed him
the ‘likely’ sentence would be, and what he ‘probably’ would get.” The trial court concluded that
Goodman failed to present evidence demonstrating that he suffered a manifest injustice that would
warrant a post-sentence withdrawal of his guilty plea. Goodman now appeals the trial court’s
judgment, raising one assignment of error for this Court’s review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED THE DEFENDANT’S POST-SENTENCE MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA. 3
{¶7} In his assignment of error, Goodman argues that the trial court erred when it denied
his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This Court disagrees.
{¶8} Crim.R. 32.1 governs the withdrawal of a guilty plea, providing that:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.
As the Ohio Supreme Court has explained, “[a] defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea of guilty
after the imposition of sentence has the burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice.”
State v. Straley, 2019-Ohio-5206, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261 (1977), paragraph
one of the syllabus. “A ‘manifest injustice’ is a ‘clear or openly unjust act,’ . . . and relates to a
fundamental flaw in the plea proceedings resulting in a miscarriage of justice . . . .” Straley at ¶
14. “A post-sentence withdrawal of a plea is only permissible under extraordinary cases . . . .”
State v. Gordon, 2023-Ohio-2754, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.).
{¶9} “An appellate court reviews a trial court’s order denying a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Manning, 2024-Ohio-1964, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting
State v. Robinson, 2016-Ohio-8444, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.). “An abuse of discretion implies that the trial
court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Manning at ¶ 7, citing Blakemore
v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶10} Here, Goodman argues that extraordinary circumstances existed that warranted a
post-sentence withdrawal of his guilty plea. Goodman argues that “he had certain beliefs and
impressions about his sentence when his case was before Judge Hutson[,]” and that he reasonably
believed Judge Hutson’s sentence “might be favorable and possibly include probation . . . .”
Goodman argues that he did not know Judge Hutson was later going to recuse himself, and that he 4
was put at a “huge disadvantage” by being sentenced by a different judge who—according to
Goodman—was unfamiliar with the case.
{¶11} Goodman’s arguments lack merit. At the change-of-plea hearing, Judge Hutson
advised Goodman of the maximum penalties (including prison time) and confirmed with Goodman
that no one had promised him anything in exchange for his guilty plea. The record reflects that
the State agreed to defer to the trial court on sentencing, and that there was no recommended
sentence. Even if there had been, a trial court is not required to impose a recommended sentence.
State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068, ¶ 39 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Link, 2022-Ohio-2067, ¶ 54 (5th
Dist.) (“A ‘recommended’ sentence is ‘a nonbinding recommendation to the court, which the court
is not required to accept or comment on.’”).
{¶12} Additionally, other than Goodman’s statements at the hearing on his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, there is no indication in the record that Goodman’s former counsel
assured him he would receive community control. See State v. Ford, 2011-Ohio-3527, ¶ 18-24
(3d Dist.) (holding that the defendant’s testimony that he pleaded guilty because his trial counsel
assured him that he would receive a certain sentence did not amount to a manifest injustice that
warranted a post-sentence withdrawal of his plea); State v. Cook, 2011-Ohio-3526, ¶ 18-24 (3d
Dist.) (same). According to Goodman’s own statements, his former counsel simply informed him
that he would “probably” get community control. Counsel’s incorrect prediction as to a
defendant’s sentence, standing alone, does not constitute a manifest injustice. State v. Dunlap,
2020-Ohio-4375, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.) (“[A]ccording to the overwhelming weight of authority, the bare
assertion of the attorney’s prediction of the sentence does not, in and of itself, constitute manifest
injustice.”). 5
{¶13} Moreover, despite Goodman’s argument to the contrary, this Court’s review of the
sentencing transcript indicates that the sentencing judge (Judge Kimbler) was familiar with the
facts of the case. Prior to sentencing, the sentencing judge heard from the victim about the effect
Goodman’s actions had on her and her family. The sentencing judge also heard from Goodman,
who asked for community control instead of prison time, explaining that he was just “asking for a
shot.”
{¶14} The sentencing judge explained that Goodman had “been given multiple shots[,]”
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[Cite as State v. Goodman, 2024-Ohio-3353.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 2024CA0020-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE DARRELL G. GOODMAN COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 2023-CR-0739
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 3, 2024
FLAGG LANZINGER, Judge.
{¶1} Darrell Goodman appeals from the judgment of the Medina County Court of
Common Pleas that denied his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. For the following
reasons, this Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} A grand jury indicted Goodman on four counts of violating a protection order in
violation of R.C. 2917.27(A)(1), and one count of telecommunications harassment in violation of
R.C. 2917.21(A)(1). At his arraignment, the trial court found Goodman indigent and appointed
him counsel.
{¶3} Goodman initially pleaded not guilty. After a change-of-plea hearing before Judge
William F. Hutson, Goodman (with counsel present) pleaded guilty to the charges contained in the
indictment. Judge Hutson ordered a presentence investigation and set the matter for sentencing on 2
January 29, 2024. About three weeks prior to sentencing, Judge Hutson recused himself. The case
was then assigned to Judge Joyce V. Kimbler.
{¶4} Judge Kimbler sentenced Goodman to an aggregate prison term of 30 months.
After sentencing, Goodman filed a one-sentence pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea that
stated: “the Defendant withdraws his plea.” The trial court held a hearing on Goodman’s motion
wherein Goodman was represented by new counsel.
{¶5} At the hearing, Goodman’s new counsel explained that Goodman’s former counsel
assured Goodman that Judge Hutson would “likely” sentence him to community control.
Goodman then spoke on his own behalf, stating that his former counsel told him that Judge Hutson
would “probably” sentence him to community control. Goodman also stated that, based upon his
former counsel’s assurances, he presumed Judge Hutson would sentence him to community control
when he pleaded guilty.
{¶6} After hearing from Goodman and his new counsel, the trial court denied
Goodman’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In its subsequent judgment entry, the trial court
noted that “[i]t appears that Defendant’s motion is merely based on what his counsel informed him
the ‘likely’ sentence would be, and what he ‘probably’ would get.” The trial court concluded that
Goodman failed to present evidence demonstrating that he suffered a manifest injustice that would
warrant a post-sentence withdrawal of his guilty plea. Goodman now appeals the trial court’s
judgment, raising one assignment of error for this Court’s review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED THE DEFENDANT’S POST-SENTENCE MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA. 3
{¶7} In his assignment of error, Goodman argues that the trial court erred when it denied
his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This Court disagrees.
{¶8} Crim.R. 32.1 governs the withdrawal of a guilty plea, providing that:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.
As the Ohio Supreme Court has explained, “[a] defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea of guilty
after the imposition of sentence has the burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice.”
State v. Straley, 2019-Ohio-5206, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261 (1977), paragraph
one of the syllabus. “A ‘manifest injustice’ is a ‘clear or openly unjust act,’ . . . and relates to a
fundamental flaw in the plea proceedings resulting in a miscarriage of justice . . . .” Straley at ¶
14. “A post-sentence withdrawal of a plea is only permissible under extraordinary cases . . . .”
State v. Gordon, 2023-Ohio-2754, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.).
{¶9} “An appellate court reviews a trial court’s order denying a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Manning, 2024-Ohio-1964, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting
State v. Robinson, 2016-Ohio-8444, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.). “An abuse of discretion implies that the trial
court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Manning at ¶ 7, citing Blakemore
v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶10} Here, Goodman argues that extraordinary circumstances existed that warranted a
post-sentence withdrawal of his guilty plea. Goodman argues that “he had certain beliefs and
impressions about his sentence when his case was before Judge Hutson[,]” and that he reasonably
believed Judge Hutson’s sentence “might be favorable and possibly include probation . . . .”
Goodman argues that he did not know Judge Hutson was later going to recuse himself, and that he 4
was put at a “huge disadvantage” by being sentenced by a different judge who—according to
Goodman—was unfamiliar with the case.
{¶11} Goodman’s arguments lack merit. At the change-of-plea hearing, Judge Hutson
advised Goodman of the maximum penalties (including prison time) and confirmed with Goodman
that no one had promised him anything in exchange for his guilty plea. The record reflects that
the State agreed to defer to the trial court on sentencing, and that there was no recommended
sentence. Even if there had been, a trial court is not required to impose a recommended sentence.
State v. Netter, 2024-Ohio-1068, ¶ 39 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Link, 2022-Ohio-2067, ¶ 54 (5th
Dist.) (“A ‘recommended’ sentence is ‘a nonbinding recommendation to the court, which the court
is not required to accept or comment on.’”).
{¶12} Additionally, other than Goodman’s statements at the hearing on his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, there is no indication in the record that Goodman’s former counsel
assured him he would receive community control. See State v. Ford, 2011-Ohio-3527, ¶ 18-24
(3d Dist.) (holding that the defendant’s testimony that he pleaded guilty because his trial counsel
assured him that he would receive a certain sentence did not amount to a manifest injustice that
warranted a post-sentence withdrawal of his plea); State v. Cook, 2011-Ohio-3526, ¶ 18-24 (3d
Dist.) (same). According to Goodman’s own statements, his former counsel simply informed him
that he would “probably” get community control. Counsel’s incorrect prediction as to a
defendant’s sentence, standing alone, does not constitute a manifest injustice. State v. Dunlap,
2020-Ohio-4375, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.) (“[A]ccording to the overwhelming weight of authority, the bare
assertion of the attorney’s prediction of the sentence does not, in and of itself, constitute manifest
injustice.”). 5
{¶13} Moreover, despite Goodman’s argument to the contrary, this Court’s review of the
sentencing transcript indicates that the sentencing judge (Judge Kimbler) was familiar with the
facts of the case. Prior to sentencing, the sentencing judge heard from the victim about the effect
Goodman’s actions had on her and her family. The sentencing judge also heard from Goodman,
who asked for community control instead of prison time, explaining that he was just “asking for a
shot.”
{¶14} The sentencing judge explained that Goodman had “been given multiple shots[,]”
and that “[n]obody could be given any more opportunities than [Goodman had] been given
throughout the years . . . .” The sentencing judge then summarized some of Goodman’s criminal
history, including harassing the victim while on parole, violating bond, and having an outstanding
misdemeanor warrant and a new felony indictment. The sentencing judge indicated that the only
way to convey the seriousness of the underlying offenses to Goodman was to impose a prison
sentence.
{¶15} Simply put, Goodman has not established that this is an extraordinary case where a
manifest injustice occurred that would warrant a post-sentence withdrawal of his guilty plea.
Straley, 2019-Ohio-5206, ¶ 14. Accordingly, this Court concludes that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion when it denied Goodman’s post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Goodman’s assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶16} Goodman’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Medina County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. 6
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JILL FLAGG LANZINGER FOR THE COURT
STEVENSON, P. J. HENSAL, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
MICHAEL J. GOEBL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and STEFANIE H. ZARANEC, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.