State v. . Gooding

Supreme Court of North Carolina

State v. . Gooding

139 S.E. 436, 194 N.C. 271, 1927 N.C. LEXIS 67

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedSeptember 28, 1927

StatusPublished

Cited by18 cases

This text of 139 S.E. 436 (State v. . Gooding) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. . Gooding, 139 S.E. 436, 194 N.C. 271, 1927 N.C. LEXIS 67 (N.C. 1927).

Pincite

Opinion

Stagy, C. J.,

after stating the case: There are several reasons why the judgment in this case, from which the defendant appeals, cannot be sustained.

In the first place, the only thing definite and certain about the judgment entered at the September Term, 1925, is the fine of $150 and costs. If the' defendant were not entitled to be discharged upon the payment of this fine and costs, which he may have been, it is clear that under the next sentence, “prayer for judgment continued for twelve months,” no judgment could be entered after the lapse of one year, or twelve months, which expired September, 1926. Therefore, the judgment rendered at the March Term, 1927, is without warrant of law and must be held for naught. S. v. Hilton, 151 N. C., 687.

In the next place, if the case were not off the docket at the March Term, 1927, it may be doubted as to whether the finding that “the condition upon which the prayer was continued has been violated,” without more, is sufficient to warrant the imposition of a road sentence. In S. v. Hardin, 183 N. C., 815, it was said that where judgment in a criminal prosecution has been suspended on condition that the defendant pay costs and remain of good behavior, the term “good behavior,” by correct interpretation, means such conduct as is authorized by the law of the State. In other words, the violation of some criminal law of the State must be made to appear before a defendant can be held to have violated the terms of such suspended judgment.

It is provided by Art. I, see. 11, of the Constitution that in. all criminal prosecutions “every man has the right to be informed of the accusa *273 tion against Mm.” And we apprehend a charge or finding that a defendant has not been of good behavior, or has violated the criminal law of the State, without specifying the nature or cause of the accusation against him, would not warrant the court in proceeding to sentence, even under a suspended judgment. S. v. Everitt, 164 N. C., 399. The record fails to disclose any evidence upon which the court acted.

Again, in Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U. S., 500, Chief Justice Taft, speaking to the constitutionality of an act of the Philippine Legislature, which undertook to prohibit any person, firm, or corporation, engaged in commerce or other activity for profit in the Philippine Islands, from keeping its account books in any language other than English, Spanish, or some local dialect, said “that a statute which requires the doing of an act so indefinitely described that men must guess at its meaning, violates due process of law.” For like reason, and perhaps a stronger one, as it deals directly with the liberty of the citizen, we think it may be said that the enforcement in a criminal prosecution of the provisions of a suspended judgment, which are so indefinite and uncertain as to require the defendant to guess at their meaning, violates due process of law.

Upon the record as presented the defendant is entitled to be discharged.

Error.

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Stagy, C. J.,

after stating the case: There are several reasons why the judgment in this case, from which the defendant appeals, cannot be sustained.

In the first place, the only thing definite and certain about the judgment entered at the September Term, 1925, is the fine of $150 and costs. If the' defendant were not entitled to be discharged upon the payment of this fine and costs, which he may have been, it is clear that under the next sentence, “prayer for judgment continued for twelve months,” no judgment could be entered after the lapse of one year, or twelve months, which expired September, 1926. Therefore, the judgment rendered at the March Term, 1927, is without warrant of law and must be held for naught. S. v. Hilton, 151 N. C., 687.

In the next place, if the case were not off the docket at the March Term, 1927, it may be doubted as to whether the finding that “the condition upon which the prayer was continued has been violated,” without more, is sufficient to warrant the imposition of a road sentence. In S. v. Hardin, 183 N. C., 815, it was said that where judgment in a criminal prosecution has been suspended on condition that the defendant pay costs and remain of good behavior, the term “good behavior,” by correct interpretation, means such conduct as is authorized by the law of the State. In other words, the violation of some criminal law of the State must be made to appear before a defendant can be held to have violated the terms of such suspended judgment.

It is provided by Art. I, see. 11, of the Constitution that in. all criminal prosecutions “every man has the right to be informed of the accusa *273 tion against Mm.” And we apprehend a charge or finding that a defendant has not been of good behavior, or has violated the criminal law of the State, without specifying the nature or cause of the accusation against him, would not warrant the court in proceeding to sentence, even under a suspended judgment. S. v. Everitt, 164 N. C., 399. The record fails to disclose any evidence upon which the court acted.

Again, in Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U. S., 500, Chief Justice Taft, speaking to the constitutionality of an act of the Philippine Legislature, which undertook to prohibit any person, firm, or corporation, engaged in commerce or other activity for profit in the Philippine Islands, from keeping its account books in any language other than English, Spanish, or some local dialect, said “that a statute which requires the doing of an act so indefinitely described that men must guess at its meaning, violates due process of law.” For like reason, and perhaps a stronger one, as it deals directly with the liberty of the citizen, we think it may be said that the enforcement in a criminal prosecution of the provisions of a suspended judgment, which are so indefinite and uncertain as to require the defendant to guess at their meaning, violates due process of law.

Upon the record as presented the defendant is entitled to be discharged.

Error.

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Bluebook (online)

139 S.E. 436, 194 N.C. 271, 1927 N.C. LEXIS 67, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-gooding-nc-1927.

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