State v. Glenn

2026 Ohio 1063

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 25, 2026
• Docket: CT2025-0094
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Glenn, 2026-Ohio-1063.]

COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2025-0094

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2025-0416 MICHAEL H. GLENN, Judgment: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: March 25, 2026

BEFORE: Robert G. Montgomery; Kevin W. Popham; David M. Gormley, Judges

APPEARANCES: JOSEPH A. PALMER, for Plaintiff-Appellee; APRIL F. CAMPBELL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Montgomery, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Michael Glenn, appeals from the decision of the

Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to an aggregate term of sixty

months in prison. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM in Part and REVERSE in Part.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

{¶2} Defendant-Appellant, Michael Glenn (“Appellant”), was previously

incarcerated for an aggravated robbery conviction out of Muskingum County. On

February 6, 2024, at the conclusion of his prison term, he was placed on post-release

control for a period of five years. On February 7, 2024, Appellant reviewed and signed

his standard conditions of APA supervision. {¶3} On May 6, 2025, Appellant was released from the Zanesville City Jail and

transported to Cairn Recovery Services, a residential treatment program. He was verbally

instructed to complete the program and was advised that his supervising officer would

meet with him the following week to place him on electronic monitoring. However, on

May 10, 2025, Appellant absconded the Cairn Recovery program without staff permission

or APA authority. On May 13, 2025, Appellant's parole officer attempted to contact him

at various numbers but did not reach him. Appellant was declared a violator at large.1

{¶4} On May 23, 2025, around 11:25 a.m., a patrolling Zanesville police officer

observed a vehicle leaving a known drug house on Nancy Avenue in Zanesville. The officer

followed the car, and then conducted a traffic stop after the vehicle ran a stop sign.

Officers later discovered that Appellant, a front seat passenger in the car, had an

outstanding warrant for escape. Appellant attempted to flee the scene and ran through

yards and jumped a wall. The officers and a K-9 unit chased Appellant, and an officer

eventually took him down to the ground.

{¶5} During his apprehension, Appellant informed officers that he had a pistol

on his person inside his hoodie pocket. Appellant’s prior conviction for aggravated

robbery made him ineligible to possess a firearm. Officers searched Appellant and found

a Crown Royal bag in his hoodie pocket containing a black Smith & Wesson 9mm

handgun, a hypodermic syringe, and digital scales. The pistol had three rounds in the

magazine, and it was later determined to be operable. The K-9 also discovered

ammunition in the vehicle.2

1 These facts relate solely to the escape charge, case number CR2025-0373 (“373”).

2 These facts are related solely to the additional charges (not the escape charge), in case number

CR2025-0416 (“416”). {¶6} Appellant was charged with multiple counts,3 initially pled not guilty, but

later agreed to change his plea pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. Appellant

agreed to plead guilty to one count of escape in case 373, a fourth-degree felony, and in

case 416, he pled guilty to four counts – one count of having a weapon while under

disability, one count of carrying a concealed weapon, one count of improper handling of

a firearm, and one count of obstructing official business with a firearm specification. The

State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts and proceed on only one firearm

specification rather than multiple firearm specifications. The parties jointly

recommended an aggregate sentence of sixty months’ incarceration for both cases. There

was no agreement regarding post-release control.

{¶7} Thereafter, the Court imposed the agreed-upon aggregate 60-month prison

sentence, as was jointly recommended by both parties. The Court issued two separate

Judgment Entries, one for case 373 and one for case 416. In both Entries, the trial court

imposed: (1) the remaining post-release control time from the previous aggravated

robbery conviction (CR2014-0083) to run consecutively to the sentence imposed in the

respective Entry; and (2) post-release control upon the conclusion of the sentence

imposed in the respective Entry. Appellant timely appealed and asserts two assignments

of error.

3 A Muskingum County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for fourth-degree felony escape in Case No.

CR2025-0373. In Case No. CR2025-0416, the grand jury indicted Appellant with two counts of third-degree felony weapons while under disability, fourth-degree felony carrying a concealed weapon, fourth degree felony improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, fifth-degree felony obstruction of official business, and first-degree misdemeanor falsification. Each of those offenses, except the misdemeanor, contained a one-year firearm specification. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶8} “I. APPELLANT'S GUN OFFENSES, COUNT ONE (HAVING A WEAPON WHILE UNDER DISABILITY), COUNT THREE (CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON), AND COUNT FOUR (IMPROPER HANDLING OF FIREARMS IN A MOTOR VEHICLE), MERGED.”

{¶9} “II. GLENN'S SENTENCE WAS CONTRARY TO LAW: THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE AND IMPOSE THE EXACT AMOUNT OF TIME OF GLENN'S POST-RELEASE CONTROL, BUT IT DID NOT. AND GLENN'S POST-RELEASE CONTROL SANCTION COULD BE IMPOSED ONLY ON ONE CASE, NOT BOTH.”

ANALYSIS

Merger of Gun Offenses – Plain Error

{¶10} In the first assignment of error, Appellant claims the trial court erred in

failing to discuss merger of offenses and claims his gun offenses should have merged. We

disagree.

{¶11} Initially, we note that an allied-offenses claim is consistent with an

admission of guilt and therefore is not necessarily waived by pleading guilty to offenses

that might be allied offenses of similar import. State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 19;

State v. Folk, 2020-Ohio-4373, ¶ 22. However, because Appellant failed to raise this

argument before the trial court, Appellant forfeited the right to assert such argument on

appeal for sentencing purposes unless he demonstrates plain error. Rogers, supra; State

v. Black, 2016-Ohio-383. In Rogers, the Court stated:

An accused's failure to raise the issue of allied offenses of similar import in

the trial court forfeits all but plain error, and a forfeited error is not

reversible error unless it affected the outcome of the proceeding and

reversal is necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice.

Accordingly, an accused has the burden to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the convictions are for allied offenses of similar import

committed with the same conduct and without a separate animus; and,

absent that showing, the accused cannot demonstrate that the trial court's

failure to inquire whether the convictions merge for purposes of sentencing

was plain error.

Id., at 387.

{¶12} The Ohio Supreme Court has stressed that "[t]he elements of the plain-error

doctrine are conjunctive: all three must apply to justify an appellate court's intervention."

State v. Bailey, 2024-Ohio-4407, ¶ 9, citing Barnes, at 27. Said elements include: (1) an

error; (2) the error is obvious; and (3) a reasonable probability exists that the error caused

prejudice and affected the outcome of the proceeding. Id., at ¶ 8, 10, and 14, citing State

v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22. Thus, to demonstrate plain error, Appellant must

demonstrate that the gun offenses are allied offenses of similar import. In turn, R.C.

2941.25, Ohio's allied-offense statute, provides:

(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to

constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or

information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may

be convicted of only one.

(B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more offenses of

dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of

the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus to

each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such

offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them. {¶13} In Ruff, the Ohio Supreme Court clarified that the defendant’s conduct is

important and must be examined in addition to the animus and the import. State v. Ruff, 2015-

Ohio-995, syllabus; State v. Ryan, 2012-Ohio-1265, ¶ 48. The Court held the following:

1. In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import

within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must evaluate three separate

factors - the conduct, the animus, and the import.

2. Two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the meaning

of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant's conduct constitutes offenses

involving separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense is

separate and identifiable.

3. Under R.C. 2941.25(B), a defendant whose conduct supports

multiple offenses may be convicted of all the offenses if any one of the

following is true: (1) the conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar import,

(2) the conduct shows that the offenses were committed separately, or (3)

the conduct shows that the offenses were committed with separate animus.

(emphasis added).

Ruff, syllabus.

{¶14} Here, it is well-settled that the offenses of carrying a concealed weapon

(“CCW”) and improper handling of a firearm are committed by different conduct and are

not allied offenses. State v. Sawyer, 2020 Ohio App. LEXIS 1366; State v. Walker, 2010-

Ohio-2125, ¶¶ 19-21. Each offense can be committed without committing the other. Id.

A CCW conviction does not require the firearm to be loaded, while improper handling of

a firearm in a vehicle (“improper handling”) conviction does require that the firearm be

loaded. Id. Improper handling addresses transport or possession while in a motor vehicle, but motor vehicles are not necessarily a part of a CCW conviction. Id; State v.

Philpott, 2020-Ohio-5267, ¶ 83 (holding that the offense of carrying a concealed weapon

does not merge with offense of improper handling of firearms in a motor vehicle);

Sawyer, at *6. Because each offense may be committed without committing the other,

the offenses are not allied offenses of similar import.

{¶15} Turning to whether the offense of having a weapon while under disability

merges with CCW, we conclude the offenses do not merge under the facts of this case. In

Rice, the Ohio Supreme Court held that these two offenses are not allied offenses of

similar import because each offense may be committed separately and/or with a separate

animus. State v. Rice, 69 Ohio St.2d 422 (1982); State v. Lyons, 2017-Ohio-4385, ¶ 39

(7th Dist.) (defendant’s conduct of acquiring the firearm and concealing it in his

waistband resulted in two different offenses that were committed separately and with a

separate animus); Ryan, supra, at ¶ 53 (the offense of having a weapon while under a

disability occurred when appellant purchased the weapon, well before he encountered the

officer; appellant later concealed the gun from the officer’s view and this is when the

carrying a concealed weapon offense took place such that the offenses did not merge).

{¶16} The intent, or animus, necessary to commit the crime of CCW, “is to carry

or conceal on the person or ready at hand, a deadly weapon or dangerous ordinance. The

gist of the offense is concealment. The gravamen of the offense of having a weapon while

under disability is to ‘knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use’ a weapon while under legal

disability.” Rice, at 427; Lyons, at ¶ 40. There is a different mental state required for

both. Rice, at 427. Here, Appellant, a person under disability, acquired a handgun

sometime before concealing it on his person. Thus, the elements of proof for having a

weapon while under disability were satisfied when Appellant acquired the firearm. His subsequent conduct of concealing the handgun constituted a separate and distinct act

from initially acquiring the weapon. See Lyons, supra; State v. Young, 2011-Ohio-747, ¶

49 (2d Dist.).

{¶17} Similarly, having a weapon while under legal disability is completely

dissimilar from improper handling. As set forth, having a weapon under legal disability

is knowingly acquiring or having a weapon when the individual is not permitted to have

one, while improper handling requires that the gun be transported in a motor vehicle and

requires that the firearm be loaded. The elements of each offense are distinct. Because

Appellant cannot establish that the gun offenses are allied offenses of similar import, said

offenses do not merge for purposes of sentencing.

{¶18} Moreover, the parties jointly agreed on a recommended sentence prior to

Appellant’s guilty pleas. Generally, a jointly recommended sentence is not subject to

review on appeal pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1).4 State v. Sergent, 2016-Ohio-2696.

Here, because we conclude that Appellant’s gun offenses are not allied offenses of similar

import subject to merger, and the aggregate sentence is well within the statutory

guidelines for the offenses, the jointly recommended sentence is authorized by law and

not subject to review on appeal. Accordingly, we find no plain error. Appellant’s first

assignment of error is overruled.

4 R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) states: “A sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to review under

this section if the sentence is authorized by law, has been recommended jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing judge.” If all three conditions are met, the defendant may not appeal the sentence. State v. Underwood, 2010-Ohio-1, ¶¶ 19-21. Post-Release Control Sanctions

{¶19} In the second assignment of error, Appellant argues (1) the trial court was

required to determine the exact amount of time of Appellant’s post-release control

sanction, and did not; and (2) the trial court was authorized to impose additional prison

time as a post-release-control sanction for only one case, not both cases, as reflected in

the two separate Judgment Entries.

{¶20} Regarding the first argument, the sentencing transcript and corresponding

Entry reveals that the Court terminated Appellant’s post-release control, finding him no

longer amenable. The Court imposed a prison term equal in length to the number of days

still remaining on Appellant’s post-release control period in his aggravated robbery case,

stating: “It’s believed to be over a thousand days.” Sent. Tr., at p. 23. The Court did not

calculate or indicate the exact amount of time Appellant was to serve. The State concurs

with Appellant that the trial court should calculate the exact amount of time remaining to

be served for post-release control related to Appellant’s aggravated robbery conviction.

{¶21} Appellant’s second argument likewise has merit. Under R.C. 2929.141, the

trial court is authorized to terminate a defendant’s post-release control and impose a

prison term up to the amount remaining on his post-release control or 12 months in

prison, whichever was greater, as a penalty for the defendant’s violations. State v.

Evilsizor, 2018-Ohio-3599, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.). Thus, Appellant argues the statute's “plain

language” authorizes the imposition of just one prison term as a post-release-control

sanction because he was on post-release-control supervision in just one case. Again, the

State concedes and agrees that remand is necessary for the trial court to impose a single

prison term in just one of Appellant’s cases as a sanction for his commission of a new

felony offense while he was under post-release-control supervision for a prior felony conviction. As such, we reverse and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing

consistent with this Opinion.

CONCLUSION

{¶22} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled. Appellant’s second

assignment of error is sustained, and the matter is reversed and remanded to the trial

court for proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The trial court shall conduct a new

sentencing hearing.

{¶23} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the

Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas is Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part.

{¶24} Costs to Appellant.

By: Montgomery, P.J.

Popham, J. and

Gormley, J. concur.