State v. Gates

912 S.E.2d 673, 321 Ga. 45

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: February 18, 2025
• Docket: S25A0083
• Status: Published

Opinion

321 Ga. 45 FINAL COPY

S25A0083. THE STATE v. GATES.

PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

The trial court granted immunity and dismissed charges for

malice murder and some other crimes against Anthony Gates

related to the shooting death of Ronald Hammock, and the State

appeals. The State argues that the uncontradicted evidence, by way

of a surveillance video, shows that Gates shot Hammock as

Hammock was trying to flee and, therefore, Gates was not

reasonably defending himself. After consideration of the full record

on appeal, we cannot say that there is no evidence to support the

trial court’s conclusion that Gates reasonably believed that shooting

Hammock was necessary to defend himself. Therefore, we affirm.

1. The evidence presented at the immunity hearing.

The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the trial

court’s ruling1 shows the following. On the day of the shooting, Gates

1 See State v. Remy, 308 Ga. 296, 298 (3) (840 SE2d 385) (2020). went to a gas station to buy cigarettes and snacks. When Gates was

at the cash register, Hammock walked behind Gates and stood by

the front door, wearing a hat that said “No F**ks Given.” When

Gates pulled out money to pay for his items, Hammock came up to

him and said, “Are you gonna come up off of that? Come off of that

f**king — I got to have that.” Gates looked around to see if

Hammock was talking to him, and Hammock confirmed as much,

telling Gates, “Yeah, I’m talking to you. Yeah, ni**a.” Gates said he

did not want any problems, but Hammock told him to “shut the f**k

up” before “I knock you out.”

Gates testified that he was scared and felt threatened by the

victim, thinking he was going to be robbed or attacked. Gates hoped

Hammock would leave him alone if he ignored him, so he turned his

back to pay for his items. Hammock then struck Gates hard, and

Gates responded by pulling out his gun.

Video surveillance from the store confirms that Hammock

struck Gates in the head while Gates was turned away from

Hammock. As Gates turned around, Hammock squared up to Gates,

2 as if preparing to fight Gates. Gates pulled out his gun and began

firing immediately. Upon seeing Gates pull out his gun, Hammock

turned and headed toward the exit, but he fell near the front door

after being shot. The investigating officer testified that, based on his

review of the surveillance video and investigation in the case,

Hammock was “shot in the back . . . [a]s he was turning to run.”

Gates returned to the register to gather his items before

leaving the store. Gates testified that he did not want Hammock to

die and that Hammock was responsive and breathing when he left.

Gates stated repeatedly that he shot Hammock in self-defense, he

was afraid for his life, and that his having been shot recently

affected his decision to pull out his firearm. Gates denied shooting

Hammock in retaliation for hitting him. Gates testified that he did

not see Hammock with a gun, and there is no evidence that

Hammock had one.

2. Analysis of the State’s argument.

The State makes one argument on appeal — that Gates’s use

of force was not reasonably necessary and, therefore, he was not

3 entitled to immunity. The State concedes that the victim was the

initial aggressor but argues that the uncontroverted surveillance

video shows that any danger of great bodily injury (or the need to

prevent a forcible felony) had subsided at the time Gates pulled out

his gun because the victim was running away. We disagree.

With some exceptions, a person who uses force in accordance

with OCGA § 16-3-21 is immune from criminal prosecution. See

OCGA § 16-3-24.2. Under OCGA § 16-3-21 (a), a person generally “is

justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death or

great bodily harm . . . if he or she reasonably believes that such force

is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or

herself or a third person or to prevent the commission of a forcible

felony.” This standard contains both subjective and objective

components. See Allen v. State, 317 Ga. 1, 5 (1) (890 SE2d 700)

(2023). On the subjective prong, the defendant must show that he

actually believed that his use of force was necessary. To meet the

objective component, a defendant must show the “circumstances

were such as to excite the fears of a reasonable person that he or a

4 third person faced death or great bodily injury[.]” Id. (citation and

punctuation omitted). Generally, a claim of self-defense or

justification is raised as an affirmative defense at trial, so it is

usually a question for the jury, as the factfinder, to determine

whether or not the evidence shows that the defendant believed it

was necessary to use deadly force to prevent death or great bodily

injury to himself and to determine whether that belief was

reasonable. See, e.g., Young v. State, 272 Ga. 17, 18 (524 SE2d 233)

(1999); Anderson v. State, 245 Ga. 619, 623 (1) (266 SE2d 221)

(1980). At a jury trial, when the defendant presents evidence of self-

defense, the State bears the burden of disproving that defense

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Russell v. State, 319 Ga. 556, 559 (2)

(905 SE2d 578) (2024).

The process is slightly different when a claim of self-defense is

raised in a pre-trial motion for immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2.

In such cases, the trial court sits as the finder of fact, and a

defendant has the burden of proving self-defense by a

preponderance of the evidence. Ellison v. State, 313 Ga. 107, 110

5 (868 SE2d 189) (2022). Just as we accept a jury’s conclusion with

respect to a defendant’s self-defense claim at trial if there is

competent evidence supporting that determination,2 in reviewing

the grant of immunity, we review the evidence in the light most

favorable to the trial court’s ruling and accept the trial court’s

factual findings and credibility determinations “if there is any

evidence to support them.” State v. Remy, 308 Ga. 296, 298 (3) (840

SE2d 385) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis

added).

In so doing, . . . we may consider facts that definitively can be ascertained exclusively by reference to evidence that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of credibility, such as facts indisputably discernible from a videotape. On the other hand, to the extent that legally significant facts were proved by evidence other than the video recording, the trial court as factfinder was entitled to determine the credibility and weight of that other evidence.

Allen, 317 Ga. at 5-6 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2 In reviewing a claim that the jury was wrong to reject a self-defense

claim and find the defendant guilty, “[t]his Court will uphold the jury’s verdict as long as there is some competent evidence, even if contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case.” DeMuro v. State, 317 Ga. 155, 155 (1) (892 SE2d 31) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). 6 Although some of us may have ruled differently than the trial

court did here, we are not the factfinder in this case, and the record

permitted the trial court to conclude that Gates met his burden of

establishing immunity from prosecution. The undisputed evidence

shows that Hammock struck Gates when Gates had his back turned

toward him, and that Gates turned around, pulled out his weapon,

and immediately fired in response. Gates testified that he believed

shooting his gun was necessary to defend himself because Hammock

had threatened to rob Gates and Hammock said he would “knock

out” Gates. The trial court implicitly credited Gates’s testimony

when it ruled in his favor, and the State does not dispute that Gates

actually thought the shooting was necessary to defend himself.

Instead, the State argues that the shooting was not objectively

reasonable because Gates was no longer in danger once he pulled

out his gun. But the State ignores how quickly the events transpired,

as Gates began firing as soon as he turned around. The State also

points to the fact that Hammock was unarmed and was shot in the

back to show that Gates’s use of force was unreasonable. But the

7 State points to no evidence showing that Gates knew before he shot

Hammock that he was unarmed. All Gates knew at the time he fired

his gun was that Hammock had threatened to knock him out and

had struck him in the head. And although the fatal bullet struck

Hammock in the back, Gates began to fire immediately, and the

investigating officer testified that Hammock was shot while

“turning.” The State focuses on frame-by-frame review of the video

to argue that the threat had ended a split-second before Gates shot.

But when a judge considers whether a decision to defend oneself

immediately after being assaulted3 was objectively reasonable, it is

critical to consider the circumstances at the time of the shooting and

not be guided by a post-hoc, time-manipulated, frame-by-frame

review of a recording that does not mirror the realities of the

shooting when it happened. See Willerson v. State, 312 Ga. 369, 373

(1) (863 SE2d 50) (2021) (“[T]he critical factor in a justification

defense is whether a defendant acted with the fear of a reasonable

3 Our caselaw plainly establishes that hands can be deadly weapons. See

Dasher v. State, 285 Ga. 308, 311 (3) (676 SE2d 181) (2009).

8 person under the circumstances.” (citation and punctuation

omitted)). And a reviewing judge must remember that the defendant

does not have the burden on an immunity motion to show without a

doubt that he acted in self-defense; instead, he must merely show by

a preponderance of the evidence that he did so. See State v. Bunn,

288 Ga. 20, 22 (701 SE2d 138) (2010) (“Preponderance of the

evidence means that [the] superior weight of evidence upon issues

involved . . . is [ ] sufficient to incline a reasonable and impartial

mind to one side of the issue rather than the other. [But n]othing in

this standard requires the elimination of all fact disputes as a

matter of law.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). Moreover,

contrary to any argument by the State, the fact that Hammock was

shot in the back is not dispositive as to whether Gates was justified

in using force. Cf. Terry v. State, 243 Ga. 11, 13 (1) (252 SE2d 429)

(1979) (citing case in which self-defense “could be rejected” where

the victim was shot in the back).

The State also argues that we owe no deference to the trial

court’s implicit factual and credibility findings because this Court

9 can also review the surveillance video. The State notes two parts of

Gates’s testimony that it says are contradicted by the surveillance

footage: (1) Gates’s testimony that Hammock never turned from him

after he fired the first shot; and (2) his testimony that he did not

know if Hammock had been shot because Hammock was still “up

and coming.” But there is no evidence that the trial court relied on

this contradicted testimony in assessing whether Gates’s use of force

was objectively reasonable, and our review of the surveillance video

shows no clear error in the trial court’s conclusion on this issue.

Given the victim’s threats and unprovoked action in striking Gates

from behind, it was objectively reasonable for Gates to believe that

the victim would cause him great bodily injury (or death) if Gates

did not defend himself. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to

support the trial court’s determination that Gates met his burden of

proving that he was entitled to immunity from prosecution.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

10 LAGRUA, Justice, concurring specially.

I do not entirely agree with the majority’s characterization of

the facts surrounding the shooting in this case, and I also believe

that, under the circumstances presented here, the trial court should

have denied Gates’s immunity motion and let the jury decide

whether he was “justified in using force which [was] intended or

likely to cause death or great bodily harm.” OCGA § 16-3-21 (a).

Nevertheless, based on our current precedent, I am forced to concur

specially in this case.

The evidence of record, including the surveillance videos from

the convenience store, reflects that, on the night of this incident,

Gates armed himself with a handgun before entering the

convenience store — a handgun he was not legally permitted to have

as a convicted felon.4 While Gates was in the process of checking out

4 At the immunity hearing, Gates testified that he carried this handgun

for “protection” because he had been shot two weeks prior at a nearby club, the Chit Chat, which made him fearful of being shot again. And I recognize that, while I have previously concurred questioning the intent of OCGA § 16-11-138, Gates was permitted to use a weapon if he was acting in his own defense. See Brundage v. State, 320 Ga. 721, 732 (911 SE2d 656) (2025) (LaGrua, J., concurring). 11 and paying for his items, the victim and Gates exchanged words, and

the victim approached Gates. When Gates briefly turned back

toward the cashier, the victim struck Gates one time with an open-

handed slap — a slap which resulted in no injury to Gates.5 After

the victim slapped Gates with an open hand, Gates — without

stumbling or losing his footing — immediately pulled out his

handgun. At that point, the victim turned away, and then — though

Gates testified he reacted purely out of fear and in his own defense

— Gates fired upon the victim twice — once in the victim’s back as

he was running away. After shooting the victim in the back, Gates

stood next to the victim, holding his handgun and speaking words to

the victim we do not know and cannot hear, as no audio recording of

5 This case is distinguishable from the one cited by the majority for the

proposition that hands can be “dangerous weapons.” OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). See Dasher v. State, 285 Ga. 308, 310 (3) (676 SE2d 181) (2009) (observing that the appellants “repeatedly struck the victim about his face and head, causing him to lose consciousness and eventually die”) (citing Wright v. State, 211 Ga. App. 474 (1) (440 SE2d 27) (1993) (“Hands and fists may be deadly weapons depending upon the circumstances, including the extent of the victim’s injuries.”); Kirby v. State, 145 Ga. App. 813, 814-815 (4) (245 SE2d 43) (1978) (“Although fists and feet are not considered deadly weapons . . . , they may be found to be a deadly weapon by the jury depending on the manner and means of their use, the wounds inflicted, etc[.]”) (citation and punctuation omitted)). 12 the shooting exists, and no witnesses testified as to what was said.

Gates then calmly retrieved the items he had purchased, stepped

over the victim who was lying on the floor, exited the store, and

drove away. Gates did not notify law enforcement of what occurred

that night, and he was arrested for the incident three months later.

In the written statement Gates produced during his custodial

interview, Gates said he acted out of fear that night, but he also

admitted he was drunk when this incident occurred, which — in my

view — should have helped inform the trial court’s determination of

whether to grant immunity or leave the question for the jury to

decide after hearing all the evidence in the case. Additionally, Gates

told law enforcement officers during his interview — and repeated

in his written statement — that he had been at the Chit Chat club

the night this incident occurred — the same club where he had been

shot two weeks before — dispelling his argument that he used his

weapon to defend himself that night because of the fear he still

carried from the prior shooting.

Despite this disparaging evidence, there is also evidence that

13 could support the conclusion that the victim intended to rob Gates

that night, and thus, Gates was justified in using deadly force

against him. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1) (“A person commits the

offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults: . . . [w]ith

intent to . . . rob[.]”). See also OCGA § 16-3-21 (a) (“[A] person is

justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death or

great bodily harm only if he or she reasonably believes that such

force is necessary . . . to prevent the commission of a forcible

felony.”). And, as noted by the majority, when a defendant claims

that he or she was justified in using deadly force against a victim

and seeks immunity from criminal prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-

24.2, the trial court, as opposed to the jury, is the finder of fact.

Additionally, “[t]o prevail on a motion for immunity under OCGA §

16-3-24.2,” Ellison v. State, 313 Ga. 107, 110 (868 SE2d 189) (2022),

a defendant is only “required to show by a preponderance of the

evidence that he acted in defense of himself or others,” State v. Remy,

308 Ga. 296, 298 (3) (840 SE2d 385) (2020). Whereas the State, when

seeking to disprove a claim of self-defense, “bears the burden of

14 disproving the [justification] defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Holloway v. State, 320 Ga. 668, 690 (1) (911 SE2d 554) (2025)

(citation and punctuation omitted). See also Mills v. State, 320 Ga.

457, 461 (2) (910 SE2d 143) (2024) (“When a defendant presents

evidence that he was justified in using deadly force, the State bears

the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”)

(citation and punctuation omitted). While I recognize that this

inconsistency in the evidentiary standards is what the law provides

for, in cases where someone has been killed at the hands of another,

the General Assembly could change the preponderance standard to

a clear and convincing one. I also recognize that, when we review

the grant of an immunity motion on appeal, we are bound to “accept

the trial court’s findings with regard to questions of fact and

credibility if there is any evidence to support them.” Remy, 308 Ga.

at 298 (3) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied).

Given these standards, I must concur specially with affirming

the trial court’s ruling here — a ruling which is reflected in a one-

paragraph order containing no findings of fact or conclusions of law.

15 But I must also emphasize that, given the evidence in this case and

the trial court’s own acknowledgment (on more than one occasion)

that the question is “close, very close,” the better ruling would have

been to deny the immunity motion and leave the justification issue

for the jury to decide, particularly on the limited record before the

trial court.

Decided February 18, 2025.

Murder. DeKalb Superior Court. Before Judge Parker-Smith.

Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Andrew W. Turner, Lenny I.

Krick, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney

General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Meghan H. Hill,

Clint C. Malcolm, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.

Daniel H. Petrey, Olivia S. Broussard, for appellee.