[Cite as State v. Fox, 2014-Ohio-2156.]
COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: : : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. -vs- : : Case No. 13CAA110077 : BRIAN M. COX : : : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 12CR-I- 0081
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 16, 2014
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
CAROL HAMILTON O’BRIEN DAVID H. BIRCH DELAWARE CO. PROSECUTOR 2 West Winter BRIAN J. WALTER Delaware, OH 43015 140 North Sandusky St. Delaware, OH 43015 Delaware County, Case No. 13CAA110077 2
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Appellant Brian Cox appeals from the October 21, 2013 judgment entry of
the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas revoking his community control sanction
and sentencing him to a prison term of 12 months. Appellee is the state of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} A statement of the facts underlying appellant’s criminal convictions is not
necessary to our resolution of this appeal.
{¶3} Appellant was charged by indictment with one count of breaking and
entering pursuant to R.C. 2911.13(A), a felony of the fifth degree, one count of theft in
pursuant to R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a felony of the fifth degree, and one count of
obstructing official business pursuant to R.C. 2921.31(A), a felony of the fifth degree.
Appellant entered pleas of not guilty.
{¶4} On April 26, 2012, appellant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to Count I,
breaking and entering, and the lesser included offense of obstruction official business
as a misdemeanor of the second degree, Count III. Appellee dismissed Count II. The
trial court sentenced appellant to a community control sanction.
{¶5} On June 27, 2013, appellee sought an arrest warrant for appellant based
upon his failure to comply with terms of community control, noting appellant failed to
report for appointments at Adult Court Services and on May 25, 2013 fled from officers
attempting to apprehend him. The arrest warrant was duly issued.
{¶6} On August 8, 2013, appellee filed an Amended Motion on Community
Control Sanction Violation, stating the above violations in addition to “[o]n or around
4/18/13, 5/2/13 and 7/30/13 [appellant] tested positive for marijuana and admitted use” Delaware County, Case No. 13CAA110077 3
and “[appellant] was ordered to complete substance abuse treatment * * * as well as
cognitive behavioral treatment * * *. [Appellant] has been unsuccessfully terminated
from both for lack of attendance.”
{¶7} The trial court held a community control violation hearing on August 8,
2013, after which it re-imposed the community control sanction with the additional
requirement that appellant successfully complete a community-based correctional
facility (CBCF). Appellant was remanded to the Delaware County Jail until a bed
became available.
{¶8} On October 11, 2013, appellee moved to revoke appellant’s community
control sanction on the grounds he was unsuccessfully terminated from the CBCF.
{¶9} A hearing was held on October 17, 2013. Appellant appeared with
counsel and admitted he was terminated from the CBCF. The trial court thereupon
revoked his community control sanction and sentenced him to a prison term of 12
months upon Count I, breaking and entering, and 90 days upon Count III, obstructing
official business, to be served concurrently.
{¶10} Appellant now appeals from the trial court’s Judgment Entry on
Revocation of Community Control Sanctions and Imposition of Sentence filed October
21, 2013.
{¶11} Appellant raises one assignment of error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶12} “I. APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE OHIO Delaware County, Case No. 13CAA110077 4
CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I SECTION 10 WHEN COUNSEL DID NOT PRESENT
EVIDENCE IN MITIGATION AT THE PENALTY PHASE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.”
ANALYSIS
{¶13} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because no mitigating evidence was presented at the community
control revocation hearing. We disagree.
{¶14} To succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness, a defendant must satisfy a two-
prong test. Initially, a defendant must show that trial counsel acted incompetently. See,
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). In assessing such
claims, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might
be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. at 689, citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91,
101, 76 S.Ct. 158 (1955).
{¶15} “There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given
case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in
the same way.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The question is whether counsel acted
“outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690.
{¶16} Even if a defendant shows that counsel was incompetent, the defendant
must then satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test. Under this “actual prejudice”
prong, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Delaware County, Case No. 13CAA110077 5
{¶17} Appellant argues counsel was ineffective in failing to present “mitigating”
evidence at the revocation hearing on the basis of State v. Johnson, 24 Ohio St.3d 87,
89, 494 N.E.2d 1061 (1986), which we find to be inapposite. Johnson is a capital case
in which defense trial counsel failed to present mitigation evidence at the penalty phase,
thereby demonstrating “the complete lack of preparation and zeal on the part of defense
counsel regarding the question of whether their client should live or die * * *.” Id.
{¶18} In the instant case, the circumstances are considerably more limited:
appellant was unquestionably terminated from the CBCF, successful completion of
which being the key requirement of his community control sanction. In short, we fail to
see, and appellant fails to present, what “mitigating” information could possibly have
been offered.
{¶19} Moreover, even if we assume for the sake of argument counsel should
have presented some mitigating evidence on behalf of his client, we find no reasonable
probability the result of the proceeding would have been different. Appellant already
had one bite of the apple, so to speak, because his first round of violations of
community control resulted not in prison but in imposition of the CBCF requirement. We
fail to see how any other action by defense counsel would have brought about a
different result than the inevitable prison term in this case.
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[Cite as State v. Fox, 2014-Ohio-2156.]
COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: : : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. -vs- : : Case No. 13CAA110077 : BRIAN M. COX : : : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 12CR-I- 0081
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 16, 2014
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
CAROL HAMILTON O’BRIEN DAVID H. BIRCH DELAWARE CO. PROSECUTOR 2 West Winter BRIAN J. WALTER Delaware, OH 43015 140 North Sandusky St. Delaware, OH 43015 Delaware County, Case No. 13CAA110077 2
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Appellant Brian Cox appeals from the October 21, 2013 judgment entry of
the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas revoking his community control sanction
and sentencing him to a prison term of 12 months. Appellee is the state of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} A statement of the facts underlying appellant’s criminal convictions is not
necessary to our resolution of this appeal.
{¶3} Appellant was charged by indictment with one count of breaking and
entering pursuant to R.C. 2911.13(A), a felony of the fifth degree, one count of theft in
pursuant to R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a felony of the fifth degree, and one count of
obstructing official business pursuant to R.C. 2921.31(A), a felony of the fifth degree.
Appellant entered pleas of not guilty.
{¶4} On April 26, 2012, appellant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to Count I,
breaking and entering, and the lesser included offense of obstruction official business
as a misdemeanor of the second degree, Count III. Appellee dismissed Count II. The
trial court sentenced appellant to a community control sanction.
{¶5} On June 27, 2013, appellee sought an arrest warrant for appellant based
upon his failure to comply with terms of community control, noting appellant failed to
report for appointments at Adult Court Services and on May 25, 2013 fled from officers
attempting to apprehend him. The arrest warrant was duly issued.
{¶6} On August 8, 2013, appellee filed an Amended Motion on Community
Control Sanction Violation, stating the above violations in addition to “[o]n or around
4/18/13, 5/2/13 and 7/30/13 [appellant] tested positive for marijuana and admitted use” Delaware County, Case No. 13CAA110077 3
and “[appellant] was ordered to complete substance abuse treatment * * * as well as
cognitive behavioral treatment * * *. [Appellant] has been unsuccessfully terminated
from both for lack of attendance.”
{¶7} The trial court held a community control violation hearing on August 8,
2013, after which it re-imposed the community control sanction with the additional
requirement that appellant successfully complete a community-based correctional
facility (CBCF). Appellant was remanded to the Delaware County Jail until a bed
became available.
{¶8} On October 11, 2013, appellee moved to revoke appellant’s community
control sanction on the grounds he was unsuccessfully terminated from the CBCF.
{¶9} A hearing was held on October 17, 2013. Appellant appeared with
counsel and admitted he was terminated from the CBCF. The trial court thereupon
revoked his community control sanction and sentenced him to a prison term of 12
months upon Count I, breaking and entering, and 90 days upon Count III, obstructing
official business, to be served concurrently.
{¶10} Appellant now appeals from the trial court’s Judgment Entry on
Revocation of Community Control Sanctions and Imposition of Sentence filed October
21, 2013.
{¶11} Appellant raises one assignment of error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶12} “I. APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE OHIO Delaware County, Case No. 13CAA110077 4
CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I SECTION 10 WHEN COUNSEL DID NOT PRESENT
EVIDENCE IN MITIGATION AT THE PENALTY PHASE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.”
ANALYSIS
{¶13} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because no mitigating evidence was presented at the community
control revocation hearing. We disagree.
{¶14} To succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness, a defendant must satisfy a two-
prong test. Initially, a defendant must show that trial counsel acted incompetently. See,
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). In assessing such
claims, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might
be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. at 689, citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91,
101, 76 S.Ct. 158 (1955).
{¶15} “There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given
case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in
the same way.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The question is whether counsel acted
“outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690.
{¶16} Even if a defendant shows that counsel was incompetent, the defendant
must then satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test. Under this “actual prejudice”
prong, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Delaware County, Case No. 13CAA110077 5
{¶17} Appellant argues counsel was ineffective in failing to present “mitigating”
evidence at the revocation hearing on the basis of State v. Johnson, 24 Ohio St.3d 87,
89, 494 N.E.2d 1061 (1986), which we find to be inapposite. Johnson is a capital case
in which defense trial counsel failed to present mitigation evidence at the penalty phase,
thereby demonstrating “the complete lack of preparation and zeal on the part of defense
counsel regarding the question of whether their client should live or die * * *.” Id.
{¶18} In the instant case, the circumstances are considerably more limited:
appellant was unquestionably terminated from the CBCF, successful completion of
which being the key requirement of his community control sanction. In short, we fail to
see, and appellant fails to present, what “mitigating” information could possibly have
been offered.
{¶19} Moreover, even if we assume for the sake of argument counsel should
have presented some mitigating evidence on behalf of his client, we find no reasonable
probability the result of the proceeding would have been different. Appellant already
had one bite of the apple, so to speak, because his first round of violations of
community control resulted not in prison but in imposition of the CBCF requirement. We
fail to see how any other action by defense counsel would have brought about a
different result than the inevitable prison term in this case.
{¶20} We find appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel and his
sole assignment of error is overruled. Delaware County, Case No. 13CAA110077 6
CONCLUSION
{¶21} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the
Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Delaney, J. and
Hoffman, P.J.
Farmer, J., concur.