Ness, Justice:
Appellant Ferrell was convicted of possession with intent to distribute phencyclidine (PCP), a Schedule III controlled substance, and was sentenced to three years imprisonment. We affirm.
In the early afternoon of October 13, 1977, Sergeant Walter M. Thompson of the Greenville Police Department received information from a confidential informant illicit drugs were being distributed from an apartment occupied by Phil Mason. On the basis of this information, a warrant was obtained to search the apartment.
[404]*404It is conceded the search warrant for Mason’s apartment was valid, based upon a reliable informant’s tip that he had personally witnessed the distribution of illicit drugs from the premises within the past twenty-four to forty-eight hours. Spinelli v. U. S., 393 U. S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. (2d) 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. (2d) 723 (1964); State v. Winborne, S. C., 254 S. E. (2d) 297 (1979) ; State v. Peters, 271 S. C. 498, 248 S. E. (2d) 475 (1978).
Additionally the informer advised the police that Mason owned a gray Chevrolet Corvette automobile and that he “would probably” be going out to Donaldson Center to pick up more drugs on the evening of the warrant’s execution.
The officers observed a gray Chevrolet Corvette automobile with two occupants travelling from the vicinity of Mason’s apartment in the direction of Donaldson Center. Shortly thereafter, they observed a gray Chevrolet Corvette automobile with Mason and appellant therein drive into the apartment complex parking lot. The officers approached the two men, conducted a brief pat down search of their persons in the cold and rain. The officers then directed the two men to go into Mason’s apartment, where a more thorough search of appellant revealed ninety-nine PCP tablets.
Appellant asserts this second search of his person was improper and the PCP tablets should not have been admitted at his trial. We disagree.
We have no difficulty holding that the initial pat down search conducted in the parking lot fell well within the “stop and frisk” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. See Commonwetlth of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 98 S. Ct. 330, 334, 54 L. Ed. (2d) 331 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. (2d) 889 (1968); State v. Foster, 269 S. C. 373, 237 S. E. (2d) 589 (1977). At the time the officers conducted this search, they were aware of the follow[405]*405ing facts: (1) that illicit drugs had recently been seen and sold in Mason’s apartment; (2) that Mason owned a gray Chevrolet Corvette automobile; (3) that Mason “would probably” be going out to Donaldson Center to pick up more drugs; (4) that a gray Chevrolet Corvette automobile with two occupants had recently been driven from the direction of Mason’s apartment toward Donaldson Center; and (5) that a gray Chevrolet Corvette automobile occupied by Mason and appellant had just pulled up in the parking lot. These specific and articulable facts, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, clearly warranted the conclusion ■that criminal activity might have been afoot.
We have no more difficulty holding that the more thorough search in Mason’s apartment fell within the search incident to a valid custodial arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Police officers may make a search of an arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate control for weapons and destructible evidence without first obtaining a search warrant. See U. S. v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. (2d) 427 (1973); In Re Jones, 264 S. C. 286, 214 S. E. (2d) 816 (1975). The sole prerequisite is that there be a prior arrest supported by probable cause.
When the police officers ordered Mason and appellant out of the parking lot and into Mason’s apartment, they so substantially deprived the two men of their freedom of movement as to constitute a full custodial arrest. Henry v. U. S., 361 U. S. 98, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. (2d) 134 (1959) -1 Clearly the officers’ actions constituted a sufficient show of authority to restrain appellant’s freedom of movement, therefore, the appellant was seized. U. S. v. Palmer, 603 F. (2d) 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). The search in Mason’s apartment being inoident to this arrest, the sole issue is whether it was based upon probable cause.
[406]*406The seizure of the appellant by requiring him to go into Mason’s apartment constituted a seizure of his person. On the facts of this case, considering the existence of probable cause, the very limited intrusion undertaken, and the ready destructibility of the evidence, we cannot say that this search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Certainly the appellant could have been seized and searched at the automobile in the cold and rain. Searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detection. Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 80 S. Ct. 683, 4 L. Ed. (2d) 668 (1960). Similarly here under these circumstances, when the officers’ observations corroborated the minute and detailed facts contained in the warrant this would support a probable cause belief that one or more of the occupants had committed a felony. A felony arrest validly may be made on that basis. [E. g. U. S. ex rel LaBelle v. LaVallee, 517 F. (2d) 750 (2nd Cir. 1975) ; Gullett v. United States, 387 F. (2d) 307 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. den., 390 U. S. 1044, 88 S. Ct. 1645, 20 L. Ed. (2d) 307 (1968); State v. Bell, 263 S. C. 239, 209 S. E. (2d) 890 (1974), cert. den., 420 U. S. 1008, 95 S. Ct. 1453, 43 L. Ed. (2d) 767 (1975)].
•Clearly, all the surrounding circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officers, when measured by the standard appropriate for a reasonable, cautious and prudent officer engaged in a narcotics investigation, indicate that there was probable cause for an arrest.
“Rather than blind worship of cause alone, the law probes for the basis of the officer’s action measuring it by an external standard.” U. S. v. Walker, 246 F. (2d) 519, 528 (7th Cir. 1957).
In making this assessment we do not isolate for independent analysis each factual circumstance, but view the action [407]*407of the arresting officers on the basis of the cumulative effect of such facts in the totality of the circumstances. Jackson v. U. S. 408 F. (2d) 1165 (8th Cir. 1969) ; U. S. v. Williams, 442 F. (2d) 738 (1970). Here the arrest took place outside the apartment, after the officers made a brief “pat down” search in the cold and rain. They had a legal search warrant, and sufficient information from a confidential informer, most of which was corroborated.
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Ness, Justice:
Appellant Ferrell was convicted of possession with intent to distribute phencyclidine (PCP), a Schedule III controlled substance, and was sentenced to three years imprisonment. We affirm.
In the early afternoon of October 13, 1977, Sergeant Walter M. Thompson of the Greenville Police Department received information from a confidential informant illicit drugs were being distributed from an apartment occupied by Phil Mason. On the basis of this information, a warrant was obtained to search the apartment.
[404]*404It is conceded the search warrant for Mason’s apartment was valid, based upon a reliable informant’s tip that he had personally witnessed the distribution of illicit drugs from the premises within the past twenty-four to forty-eight hours. Spinelli v. U. S., 393 U. S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. (2d) 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. (2d) 723 (1964); State v. Winborne, S. C., 254 S. E. (2d) 297 (1979) ; State v. Peters, 271 S. C. 498, 248 S. E. (2d) 475 (1978).
Additionally the informer advised the police that Mason owned a gray Chevrolet Corvette automobile and that he “would probably” be going out to Donaldson Center to pick up more drugs on the evening of the warrant’s execution.
The officers observed a gray Chevrolet Corvette automobile with two occupants travelling from the vicinity of Mason’s apartment in the direction of Donaldson Center. Shortly thereafter, they observed a gray Chevrolet Corvette automobile with Mason and appellant therein drive into the apartment complex parking lot. The officers approached the two men, conducted a brief pat down search of their persons in the cold and rain. The officers then directed the two men to go into Mason’s apartment, where a more thorough search of appellant revealed ninety-nine PCP tablets.
Appellant asserts this second search of his person was improper and the PCP tablets should not have been admitted at his trial. We disagree.
We have no difficulty holding that the initial pat down search conducted in the parking lot fell well within the “stop and frisk” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. See Commonwetlth of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 98 S. Ct. 330, 334, 54 L. Ed. (2d) 331 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. (2d) 889 (1968); State v. Foster, 269 S. C. 373, 237 S. E. (2d) 589 (1977). At the time the officers conducted this search, they were aware of the follow[405]*405ing facts: (1) that illicit drugs had recently been seen and sold in Mason’s apartment; (2) that Mason owned a gray Chevrolet Corvette automobile; (3) that Mason “would probably” be going out to Donaldson Center to pick up more drugs; (4) that a gray Chevrolet Corvette automobile with two occupants had recently been driven from the direction of Mason’s apartment toward Donaldson Center; and (5) that a gray Chevrolet Corvette automobile occupied by Mason and appellant had just pulled up in the parking lot. These specific and articulable facts, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, clearly warranted the conclusion ■that criminal activity might have been afoot.
We have no more difficulty holding that the more thorough search in Mason’s apartment fell within the search incident to a valid custodial arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Police officers may make a search of an arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate control for weapons and destructible evidence without first obtaining a search warrant. See U. S. v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. (2d) 427 (1973); In Re Jones, 264 S. C. 286, 214 S. E. (2d) 816 (1975). The sole prerequisite is that there be a prior arrest supported by probable cause.
When the police officers ordered Mason and appellant out of the parking lot and into Mason’s apartment, they so substantially deprived the two men of their freedom of movement as to constitute a full custodial arrest. Henry v. U. S., 361 U. S. 98, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. (2d) 134 (1959) -1 Clearly the officers’ actions constituted a sufficient show of authority to restrain appellant’s freedom of movement, therefore, the appellant was seized. U. S. v. Palmer, 603 F. (2d) 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). The search in Mason’s apartment being inoident to this arrest, the sole issue is whether it was based upon probable cause.
[406]*406The seizure of the appellant by requiring him to go into Mason’s apartment constituted a seizure of his person. On the facts of this case, considering the existence of probable cause, the very limited intrusion undertaken, and the ready destructibility of the evidence, we cannot say that this search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Certainly the appellant could have been seized and searched at the automobile in the cold and rain. Searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detection. Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 80 S. Ct. 683, 4 L. Ed. (2d) 668 (1960). Similarly here under these circumstances, when the officers’ observations corroborated the minute and detailed facts contained in the warrant this would support a probable cause belief that one or more of the occupants had committed a felony. A felony arrest validly may be made on that basis. [E. g. U. S. ex rel LaBelle v. LaVallee, 517 F. (2d) 750 (2nd Cir. 1975) ; Gullett v. United States, 387 F. (2d) 307 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. den., 390 U. S. 1044, 88 S. Ct. 1645, 20 L. Ed. (2d) 307 (1968); State v. Bell, 263 S. C. 239, 209 S. E. (2d) 890 (1974), cert. den., 420 U. S. 1008, 95 S. Ct. 1453, 43 L. Ed. (2d) 767 (1975)].
•Clearly, all the surrounding circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officers, when measured by the standard appropriate for a reasonable, cautious and prudent officer engaged in a narcotics investigation, indicate that there was probable cause for an arrest.
“Rather than blind worship of cause alone, the law probes for the basis of the officer’s action measuring it by an external standard.” U. S. v. Walker, 246 F. (2d) 519, 528 (7th Cir. 1957).
In making this assessment we do not isolate for independent analysis each factual circumstance, but view the action [407]*407of the arresting officers on the basis of the cumulative effect of such facts in the totality of the circumstances. Jackson v. U. S. 408 F. (2d) 1165 (8th Cir. 1969) ; U. S. v. Williams, 442 F. (2d) 738 (1970). Here the arrest took place outside the apartment, after the officers made a brief “pat down” search in the cold and rain. They had a legal search warrant, and sufficient information from a confidential informer, most of which was corroborated. We would hold the search was incident to a lawful custodial arrest made upon probable cause.2 U. S. v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. (2d) 427 (1979). Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist stated:
“A police officer’s determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search. — , does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation . . .” 94 S. Ct. 477.
Appellant argues that probable cause for arrest existed only as to Mason, if at all, and therefore the arrest and subsequent search of appellant was improper under Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 20 L. Ed. (2d) 917 (1968). Unlike Sibron, the facts here were sufficient to lead the officers to conclude that there was criminal activity; and unlike U. S. v. DiRe, 332 U. S. 581, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. (2d) 210 (1948), the same facts lead to the conclusion that appellant was equally involved as Mason. It is unreasonable to infer that anyone other than a participant would be present. In such a persuasive setting probable cause existed to search all present. U. S. v. Johnson, 475 F. (2d) 977, 980 (1973); State v. DeSimone, 60 N. J. 319, 288 A. (2d) 849 (1972).
[408]*408It is important to distinguish the search in this case from the search of companions in a public place. U. S. v. DiRe, supra. While one is entitled to know wherever he may be “he will [be] free from unreasonable searches,” Katz v. U. S., 389 U. S. 347, 359, 88 S. Ct. 507, 515, 19 L. Ed. (2d) 576 (1967), the test of reasonableness will include place and circumstances.
Moreover, the Fourth Amendment does not forbid the search for evidence simply because the owner, possessor, occupant or visitor of the place to be searched is not a suspect when the search warrant was issued. Whether the third party is suspect or not, the State’s interest in enforcing the criminal law and recovering evidence remains the same. A search warrant is often acquired, early in an investigation, certainly before all the perpetrators are or could be known. Forbidding the search of the third person on the premises could easily result in the disappearance of the evidence.
No more should be required where the warrant issued is for the seizure of criminal evidence on the premises. Here the appellant was on the premises, the criminal evidence was found in his pocket.3 The search was substantially contemporaneous with the arrest.
Under the circumstances in this case, an expectation of privacy by the appellant is not “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Katz v. U. S., 389 U. S. 347, 361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516, 19 L. Ed. (2d) 576 (1967).
Thus even assuming no exigency attended the arrest, the search was proper since it was contemporaneous with the arrest. The officers had probable cause to believe that an offense was being committed and that the appellant was in possession of evidence of the crime at the time of the arrest. The standard of reasonableness does not rise [409]*409or fall on the detached observations of the courts as to whether an exigency existed at the time of the arrest. It must be based on a subjective analysis of the situation confronting the arresting officers.
Based upon the instant operative factual setting we conclude the arrest and search was attended by exigent circumstances. The lawful arrest established the authority to search. We hold .in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a “reasonable” search.
Affirmed.
Lewis, C. J., and Littlejohn, J., concur.
Rhodes and Gregory, JJ., dissent.