Celebrezze, C.J.
I
At issue in the first instance is whether the prosecutor’s comment in closing argument that the state’s evidence is “uncontradicted” is a comment on the accused’s failure to take the stand and consequently a violation of the accused’s right against self-incrimination.
During closing argument, the prosecutor made several remarks which appellee characterizes as impermissible references to his failure to testify. Specifically, the record reveals the remarks were as follows:
“Force, ladies and gentlemen. This was not a consensual affair. I believe the evidence is quite clear on that. We have nothing to contradict. There is no evidence that’s come forth in this trial that I know of, to contradict.”
“Mr. DeYan: Objection.
“The Court: Overruled.
<<* * *
“* * * We’re concerned with the 12th, into the 13th, and there were only two people in that apartment, and there is no evidence to contradict that.
“Mr. DeVan: Objection.
“The Court: Overruled.”
In Griffin v. California (1965), 380 U.S. 609 [32 O.O.2d 437], the Supreme Court ruled as prejudicial direct comments upon the accused’s failure to take the stand. In so holding, the court recognized that to allow such comments would penalize an accused for exercising his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Mindful of that principle, this court stated in State v. Lytle (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 391, at 404 [2 O.O.3d 495]:
“We find no fault with the state’s closing argument. The comments by the prosecutor did not focus attention on the silence of the appellant, but rather reminded the jury that the state’s case had not been rebutted. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that appellant’s failure to testify should not be considered for any purpose. * * *” Accord State v. Lockett (1976), 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, at 65 [3 O.O.3d 27], reversed on other grounds (1978), 438 U.S. 586; State v. Wade (1978), 53 Ohio St. 2d 182, at 186 [7 O.O.3d 362]; and State v. Moritz (1980), 63 Ohio St. 2d 150, at 158 [17 O.O.3d 92].
Further, this court in State v. Lane (1976), 49 Ohio St. 2d 77, stated, at 86 [3 O.O.3d 45]:
“* * * Thus, the prosecution is not prevented from commenting upon the failure, on the part of the defense, to offer any other evidence in support of its case. * * *”
Finally, in State v. Cooper (1977), 52 Ohio St. 2d 163 [6 O.O.3d 377], this court held:
“A helpful test in determining whether the above comment improperly indicated that the defendant failed to testify on his own behalf at trial is to determine * * whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a [163]*163comment on the failure of the accused to testify.’ Knowles v. United States (C.A. 10, 1955), 224 F. 2d 168, 170.” Id. at 173.
The thrust of appellee’s contention is that he was the only potential witness in a position to contradict the victim’s testimony. As a result, appellee argues that references to uncontradicted evidence necessarily focus attention on the failure of the accused to take the stand. We disagree.
As the cases indicate, a prosecutor is allowed to comment upon the relative strength of the state’s case, which includes commenting upon the fact that the state’s case has not been rebutted. That is precisely the nature of the prosecutor’s comments in the case at bar. Here, the questioned remarks concern evidence that was uncontradicted not only by virtue of the fact that appellee did not testify, but also by any evidence whatsoever. In this context, the prosecutor’s comments were permissible matters for closing argument.
Moreover, the jury was instructed not to consider the appellee’s failure to testify for any purpose. While this instruction may not purge the error occasioned by a direct comment on an accused’s failure to testify, it must generally be presumed that the jury followed the instructions of the trial judge. Thus, a reference by the prosecutor in closing argument to uncontradicted evidence is not a comment on the accused’s failure to testify where the comment is directed to the strength of the state’s evidence and not to the silence of the accused, and the jury is instructed not to consider the accused’s failure to testify for any purpose.
Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the judgment of the court of appeals below which granted appellee a new trial on the basis of the prosecutor’s comment on the accused’s silence.
II
Appellee’s proposition of law number four states: “The Rape Victim Shield Law violates due process when its application prevents cross-examination concerning an alleged rape victim’s sexual activity where her hospital records document her involvement in sexual intercourse two days before the alleged rape, but where upon voir dire she had denied [sic] any sexual activity for ten days before the alleged rape.”
Appellee maintains that the trial court should have allowed examination of the victim concerning her prior sexual activity with persons other than the appellee. Appellee allegedly could produce evidence that the victim had sexual intercourse approximately two days prior to her confrontation with appellee, whereas the victim had previously testified on a preliminary matter that she had had sexual intercourse no earlier than ten days prior to having sexual intercourse with appellee. Appellee’s position is that the failure of the trial court to allow such cross-examination under the authority of R.C. 2907.02 compromises appellee’s constitutional right to confront his accusers.
R.C. 2907.02(D) states in part:
“Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual activity, opinion evidence of the victim’s sexual activity, and reputation evidence of the vie[164]*164tim’s sexual activity shall not be admitted under this section unless it involves evidence of the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease, or the victim’s past sexual activity with the offender, and only to the extent that the court finds that the evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value.”
Evidence of the victim’s prior sexual activity with a person other than the defendant is inadmissible unless it relates to the “origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease * * *.” In the case at bar, appellee is seeking to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior sexual activity with one other than appellee in an attempt to impeach her credibility. R.C. 2907.02 clearly prohibits such an impeachment technique by rendering inadmissible the evidence of the victim’s prior sexual activity when offered for its relevance to the victim’s credibility.
In State v. Gardner (1979), 59 Ohio St. 2d 14 [13 O.O.3d 8], we held that an accused’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was not absolute and, under the proper circumstances, would give way to appropriate legitimate state interests.1 We recognized the legitimate state interests advanced by R.C. 2907.02(D) in
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Celebrezze, C.J.
I
At issue in the first instance is whether the prosecutor’s comment in closing argument that the state’s evidence is “uncontradicted” is a comment on the accused’s failure to take the stand and consequently a violation of the accused’s right against self-incrimination.
During closing argument, the prosecutor made several remarks which appellee characterizes as impermissible references to his failure to testify. Specifically, the record reveals the remarks were as follows:
“Force, ladies and gentlemen. This was not a consensual affair. I believe the evidence is quite clear on that. We have nothing to contradict. There is no evidence that’s come forth in this trial that I know of, to contradict.”
“Mr. DeYan: Objection.
“The Court: Overruled.
<<* * *
“* * * We’re concerned with the 12th, into the 13th, and there were only two people in that apartment, and there is no evidence to contradict that.
“Mr. DeVan: Objection.
“The Court: Overruled.”
In Griffin v. California (1965), 380 U.S. 609 [32 O.O.2d 437], the Supreme Court ruled as prejudicial direct comments upon the accused’s failure to take the stand. In so holding, the court recognized that to allow such comments would penalize an accused for exercising his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Mindful of that principle, this court stated in State v. Lytle (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 391, at 404 [2 O.O.3d 495]:
“We find no fault with the state’s closing argument. The comments by the prosecutor did not focus attention on the silence of the appellant, but rather reminded the jury that the state’s case had not been rebutted. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that appellant’s failure to testify should not be considered for any purpose. * * *” Accord State v. Lockett (1976), 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, at 65 [3 O.O.3d 27], reversed on other grounds (1978), 438 U.S. 586; State v. Wade (1978), 53 Ohio St. 2d 182, at 186 [7 O.O.3d 362]; and State v. Moritz (1980), 63 Ohio St. 2d 150, at 158 [17 O.O.3d 92].
Further, this court in State v. Lane (1976), 49 Ohio St. 2d 77, stated, at 86 [3 O.O.3d 45]:
“* * * Thus, the prosecution is not prevented from commenting upon the failure, on the part of the defense, to offer any other evidence in support of its case. * * *”
Finally, in State v. Cooper (1977), 52 Ohio St. 2d 163 [6 O.O.3d 377], this court held:
“A helpful test in determining whether the above comment improperly indicated that the defendant failed to testify on his own behalf at trial is to determine * * whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a [163]*163comment on the failure of the accused to testify.’ Knowles v. United States (C.A. 10, 1955), 224 F. 2d 168, 170.” Id. at 173.
The thrust of appellee’s contention is that he was the only potential witness in a position to contradict the victim’s testimony. As a result, appellee argues that references to uncontradicted evidence necessarily focus attention on the failure of the accused to take the stand. We disagree.
As the cases indicate, a prosecutor is allowed to comment upon the relative strength of the state’s case, which includes commenting upon the fact that the state’s case has not been rebutted. That is precisely the nature of the prosecutor’s comments in the case at bar. Here, the questioned remarks concern evidence that was uncontradicted not only by virtue of the fact that appellee did not testify, but also by any evidence whatsoever. In this context, the prosecutor’s comments were permissible matters for closing argument.
Moreover, the jury was instructed not to consider the appellee’s failure to testify for any purpose. While this instruction may not purge the error occasioned by a direct comment on an accused’s failure to testify, it must generally be presumed that the jury followed the instructions of the trial judge. Thus, a reference by the prosecutor in closing argument to uncontradicted evidence is not a comment on the accused’s failure to testify where the comment is directed to the strength of the state’s evidence and not to the silence of the accused, and the jury is instructed not to consider the accused’s failure to testify for any purpose.
Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the judgment of the court of appeals below which granted appellee a new trial on the basis of the prosecutor’s comment on the accused’s silence.
II
Appellee’s proposition of law number four states: “The Rape Victim Shield Law violates due process when its application prevents cross-examination concerning an alleged rape victim’s sexual activity where her hospital records document her involvement in sexual intercourse two days before the alleged rape, but where upon voir dire she had denied [sic] any sexual activity for ten days before the alleged rape.”
Appellee maintains that the trial court should have allowed examination of the victim concerning her prior sexual activity with persons other than the appellee. Appellee allegedly could produce evidence that the victim had sexual intercourse approximately two days prior to her confrontation with appellee, whereas the victim had previously testified on a preliminary matter that she had had sexual intercourse no earlier than ten days prior to having sexual intercourse with appellee. Appellee’s position is that the failure of the trial court to allow such cross-examination under the authority of R.C. 2907.02 compromises appellee’s constitutional right to confront his accusers.
R.C. 2907.02(D) states in part:
“Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual activity, opinion evidence of the victim’s sexual activity, and reputation evidence of the vie[164]*164tim’s sexual activity shall not be admitted under this section unless it involves evidence of the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease, or the victim’s past sexual activity with the offender, and only to the extent that the court finds that the evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value.”
Evidence of the victim’s prior sexual activity with a person other than the defendant is inadmissible unless it relates to the “origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease * * *.” In the case at bar, appellee is seeking to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior sexual activity with one other than appellee in an attempt to impeach her credibility. R.C. 2907.02 clearly prohibits such an impeachment technique by rendering inadmissible the evidence of the victim’s prior sexual activity when offered for its relevance to the victim’s credibility.
In State v. Gardner (1979), 59 Ohio St. 2d 14 [13 O.O.3d 8], we held that an accused’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was not absolute and, under the proper circumstances, would give way to appropriate legitimate state interests.1 We recognized the legitimate state interests advanced by R.C. 2907.02(D) in Gardner, supra, at 17-18, to be as follows:
“* * * First, by guarding the complainant’s sexual privacy and protecting her from undue harassment, the law discourages the tendency in rape cases to try the victim rather than the defendant. In line with this, the law may encourage the reporting of rape, thus aiding crime prevention. Finally, by excluding evidence that is unduly inflammatory and prejudicial, while being only marginally probative, the statute is intended to aid in the truth-finding process.”
These then are the state’s interests which must be balanced against appellee’s right to confront his accusers. Without discounting the importance of effective and thorough cross-examination, we believe the balance should be resolved against admission of the evidence proposed by appellee. Appellee concedes that his proposed cross-examination relates only to the veracity of the victim’s testimony concerning when she had sexual intercourse prior to her alleged attack by appellee. Appellee’s theory is that if the victim’s testimony was inconsistent regarding prior sexual activity with a person other than appellee, her testimony that appellee forced her to submit to sexual intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus is suspect.
[165]*165We are unpersuaded that appellee’s confrontation rights mandate that he be allowed to delve into matters so tenuously connected with the truth of the victim’s testimony especially in light of the aforestated state interests to exclude that line of cross-examination. Further, the key fact at issue at trial was whether the victim consented to sexual activity with appellee, not whether she had sexual intercourse two or ten days earlier. Hence, we hold that R.C. 2907.02(D) will render inadmissible evidence of the rape victim’s sexual activity with one other than the accused where the evidence: does not involve the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease, or the victim’s past sexual activity with the offender; is offered simply to impeach the credibility of the victim; and is not material to a fact at issue in the case.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed with respect to this issue.
Ill
The next issue for our consideration is whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow cross-examination of the victim concerning the fact that she had consulted a law firm regarding bringing a civil action against appellee’s former employer. At trial, the prosecutor objected to cross-examining the victim concerning her knowledge of a certain law firm. Appellee’s trial counsel then proffered, in effect, that the victim was contemplating a civil action against appellee’s former employer as a result of the incident between the victim and appellee.2
Evid. R. 611(B) states:
“Cross-examination shall be permitted on all relevant matters and matters affecting credibility.”
It is beyond question that a witness’ bias and prejudice by virtue of pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceeding is a matter affecting credibility under Evid. R. 611(B).3 Appellee contends that the victim’s con[166]*166templated civil action against appellee’s former employer, stemming from the victim’s alleged rape, was a permissible subject of cross-examination since the victim stood to benefit financially from appellee’s conviction. We agree that appellee should have been permitted to elicit testimony regarding the civil action contemplated by the prosecuting witness. In State v. Doughty (Me. 1979), 399 A. 2d 1319, at 1323, the following language appears:
“The general rule is that the pendency of a civil action brought against an accused by a witness in a criminal case is admissible as tending to show interest and bias of the witness to prove a motive to falsify, exaggerate or minimize on his part, in other words, to support a claim that such witness’ testimony may be false or inaccurate, intentional or otherwise. Such evidence may be introduced in cross-examination. * * *
“The rule has been extended to the situation where no civil action has been commenced, but such a suit is or may be contemplated, as in the case of consultation with, or hiring of, an attorney.” See, also, People v. Richmond (1971), 35 Mich. App. 115, 192 N.W. 2d 372, and cases compiled in Annotation, 98 A.L.R. 3d (1980) 1060, Sections 3(b) and 5(b).
In the instant cause, the trial court prevented the jury from considering whether the financial motivation for the victim’s testimony rendered her testimony not credible. It is true that generally the scope of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.4 However, inasmuch as the victim’s testimony was vital to the state’s case and to appellee’s defense, we believe the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow evidence of the contemplated civil suit.5
[167]*167Consequently, we hold that accused is permitted to cross-examine the prosecuting witness as to the witness’ pending or contemplated civil action against the accused, in order to demonstrate any possible bias or prejudice arising out of the witness’ financial interest in the outcome of the prosecution.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals ordering that appellee receive a new trial is affirmed.
IV
The final issue to be addressed is whether the state produced sufficient evidence of sexual conduct to sustain a conviction for rape under R.C. 2907.02.
One of the elements of the offense of rape under R.C. 2907.02 is that the accused engage in sexual conduct with the victim. R.C. 2907.01(A) defines “sexual conduct” as:
“* * * vaginal intercourse between a male and female, and anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons, regardless of sex. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.”
Thus, in order to sustain a conviction on rape charges predicated on either vaginal or anal intercourse, the state is required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused and the victim actually engaged in vaginal or anal intercourse. Under R.C. 2907.01(A), the state may establish vaginal or anal intercourse by proving the slightest degree of penetration.
In the instant case, the only evidence which arguably tends to establish vaginal or anal intercourse is the testimony of the victim. Her testimony in that regard is limited to the statement, “And then we had intercourse a couple times.”
We hold that the state’s evidence on the element of sexual conduct was insufficient to establish that appellee had either vaginal or anal intercourse with the victim. The victim’s testimony was that she and appellee only had “intercourse.” The victim did not testify that she and appellee had sexual intercourse, nor did the victim testify as to any degree of penetration. Inasmuch as one of the accepted definitions of the term “intercourse” relates to sexual intercourse, we could infer from the victim’s testimony that she and [168]*168appellee engaged in sexual intercourse. Two considerations prevent us from drawing that inference. First, in recognition of the state’s burden of proof in criminal cases, we will not draw inferences against the accused from what must be characterized as vague and ambiguous testimony.6 Second, the record is completely devoid of any other evidence from any source that appellee and the victim engaged in “sexual intercourse” on the evening in question.
Consequently, in a rape prosecution where the state’s evidence is essentially the testimony of the victim, and where the victim testifies that she and the accused only had “intercourse” and does not testify as to any degree of vaginal or anal penetration, convictions on charges relating to either vaginal or anal intercourse are based on insufficient evidence. That being the case, judgments of acquittal must be entered as to the two charges of rape which were based on vaginal or anal intercourse.7
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed insofar as it held that appellee’s convictions were sustained by sufficient evidence of sexual conduct.
V
Concluding, we reverse the court of appeals in part and order that judgments of acquittal be entered on the two counts of rape involving vaginal or anal intercourse in the indictment. As to the remaining four counts, we affirm the court of appeals in part and order that appellee receive a new trial on the ground that the trial judge erred in limiting the cross-examination of the prosecuting witness by disallowing testimony regarding the witness’ contemplated civil action against appellee’s former employer which arose from appellee’s allegedly criminal conduct.
Judgment accordingly.
[169]*169W. Brown, Sweeney and C. Brown, JJ., concur.
Locher, Holmes and J. P. Celebrezze, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.