State v. Felix Pedraza Dimas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: September 12, 2002
• Docket: 13-01-00677-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

                                  NUMBER 13-01-00677-CR

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                      CORPUS CHRISTI B EDINBURG

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                       Appellant,

                                                   v.

FELIX PEDRAZA DIMAS,                                                     Appellee.

     On appeal from the 25th District Court of Gonzales County, Texas.

                                   O P I N I O N

                  Before Justices Dorsey, Hinojosa, and Rodriguez

                                 Opinion by Justice Hinojosa

This is an appeal by the State from the trial court=s order granting a motion to quash the indictment filed by appellee, Felix Pedraza Dimas.  By a single point of error, the State contends the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion to quash, because Dimas failed to overcome the presumption of regularity of a prior judgment.  We affirm.

                                                       A.  Facts

On June 21, 2001, Dimas was indicted for the felony offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI).^[1]  The indictment alleged that Dimas had two prior DWI convictions in Liberty County: one on August 7, 1996, and another on October 1, 1998.  Dimas filed a motion to quash the indictment, contending that his rights had been violated at the August 1996 DWI hearing because he did not understand English.  On September 10, 2001, the trial court heard Dimas=s motion to quash.  Dimas testified that at the August 1996 hearing:  (1) he signed a document waiving his rights to an appointed attorney and a jury trial, (2) no one spoke to him in Spanish despite the fact that he communicated to the court almost entirely in Spanish, and (3) no interpreter was provided.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the motion to quash.

                                          B.  Standard of Review

We review a trial court=s ruling on a motion to quash an indictment under an abuse of discretion standard.  Thomas v. State, 621 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); State v. Goldsberry, 14 S.W.3d 770, 772 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref=d).  That is, if a trial court=s ruling is within the zone of reasonable disagreement, we will not disturb its ruling.  Feldman v. State, 71 S.W.3d 738, 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).  The zone of reasonable disagreement involves a situation in which two reasonable men could arrive at different inferences from the same common experience.  Hughes v. State, 24 S.W.3d 833, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

                                                    C.  Analysis

The State contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting Dimas=s motion to quash.  Specifically, the State asserts that Dimas failed to overcome the presumption of regularity of a prior judgment.

A presumption of regularity of a judgment exists absent evidence to the contrary.  Ex parte Wilson, 716 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).  The burden is on the defendant to overcome the presumption by presenting evidence to the contrary.  Id.

At the hearing on the motion to quash, Dimas presented evidence suggesting that his prior conviction was unconstitutional.^[2]  Dimas testified that he did not speak English at the August 1996 DWI hearing, and an interpreter was not provided, causing him to sign documents that he did not understand.

The State further argues that because Dimas signed the papers and did not tell the court that he could not speak English, he waived his rights to an attorney, an interpreter, and a jury trial.  The State cites two cases, Villarreal v. State, 853 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1993, no pet.) and Vasquez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1991, pet. ref=d), in support of its contention that Dimas waived his right to an interpreter when he did not object or file a motion for an interpreter.  See Villarreal, 853 S.W.2d at 171; Vasquez, 819 S.W.2d at 937.  We note that in both of these cases, the defendants were represented by counsel.  See Villarreal, 853 S.W.2d at 170; Vasquez, 819 S.W.2d at 932.

At the August 1996 hearing, Dimas was without counsel or knowledge of the trial system.  See Baltierra v. State, 586 S.W.2d 553, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (an indigent without knowledge of the trial system cannot intentionally and knowingly waive rights).  Therefore, we cannot conclude that he intentionally or knowingly waived his right to an interpreter.

After reviewing the entire record, we conclude the trial court=s ruling is within the zone of reasonable disagreement.  Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting Dimas=s motion to quash the indictment.  We overrule the State=s sole point of error.

We affirm the trial court=s order granting Dimas=s motion to quash the indictment.

FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA

Justice

Do not publish.  Tex. R. App. P. 47.3.

Opinion delivered and filed this the

12^th day of September, 2002.

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^[1] Tex. Pen. Code Ann. '' 49.04(a), 49.09(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2002).

^[2] A person has a constitutional right to an interpreter to help him understand the proceedings.  Baltierra v. State, 586 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).