ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 1. This case examines issues that arise from statutory language that appears to make the offense of causing a death while knowingly operating a motor vehicle after revocation both a felony and a misdemeanor offense. Such an unusual scenario has generated both a petition and cross-petition for review of the court of appeals' decision.
| 2. Petitioner, Ernesto Lazo Villamil (Villamil), seeks review of a court of appeals' decision affirming a circuit court judgment of conviction and order denying his motion for postconviction relief.1
¶ 3. Villamil asserts that the court of appeals erred because the statutory scheme underlying his conviction and sentence, Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1)(b) (2009-10) and Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4 (eff. March 1, 2012), is ambiguous as to whether he should have been charged with a misdemeanor or a felony. Therefore, he contends that the rule of lenity2 applies and he should have been charged with a misdemeanor, rather than a felony.
¶ 4. He further argues that the statutory scheme is unconstitutional because it violates his rights to both due process and equal protection.3 According to Villamil, the failure of a statute to give fair notice of the proscribed conduct and its consequences violates [8]*8due process. Additionally, he contends that a statute violates his right to equal protection when there is no rational basis for the distinction between misdemeanor and felony penalties.
¶ 5. We conclude that any ambiguity in Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1)(b) (2009-10) and Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4 (eff. March 1, 2012) is clarified by the statutes' legislative history and thus the rule of lenity does not apply. We further determine that the statutory scheme does not violate his rights to either due process or equal protection. Villamil had fair notice that the prohibited conduct of committing a knowing OAR-violation causing death could result in a felony charge and there is no evidence that the charging decision was based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.
f 6. As cross-petitioner, the State seeks review of that part of the court of appeals decision remanding Villamil's case to the circuit court for resentencing. The court of appeals determined that the circuit court failed to consider specific factors enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) (2013-14) at sentencing. The State, however, asserts that the statute is directory, rather than mandatory. Thus, it contends that the sentencing court was not required to consider all of the enumerated factors.
¶ 7. We agree with the court of appeals that Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) is mandatory and that the record at sentencing must demonstrate that the circuit court considered the factors enumerated in the statute.
¶ 8. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals decision and remand to the circuit court for a new [9]*9sentencing hearing because the record fails to demonstrate that the circuit court considered the required factors pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b).
HH
¶ 9. The underlying facts in this case are not in dispute. Villamil drove into the rear of another vehicle, killing the operator of that vehicle. At the scene of the collision, Villamil told the police officer that he did not have a valid driver's license because it had been revoked for an operating while intoxicated offense ("OWI").
¶ 10. Villamil was charged with operating after revocation ("OAR"), causing death, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 343.44(l)(b) and (2)(ar)4.4 Wisconsin Statute § 343.44(l)(b), operating after revocation, provides in relevant part that no person may knowingly operate a motor vehicle after revocation. Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4, provides that a person who violates sub. (l)(b) and causes the death of another person, shall be charged with a misdemeanor, except "if the person knows at the time of the violation that his or her operating privilege has been revoked, the person is guilty of a Class H Felony."
¶ 11. In exchange for his no-contest plea, the State recommended a prison sentence, but agreed not to argue for a particular length of time. During the plea colloquy the circuit court discussed the factual [10]*10basis and elements of the offense. Villamil told the court he was aware that his license had been revoked for an alcohol-related offense.
f 12. Neither the complaint, nor anything else in the record alleged that the collision was related to impaired driving. The accident reconstruction report stated that there was "no evidence to suggest that Mr. Lazo Villamil had diminished driving abilities."
¶ 13. Defense counsel argued for a term of probation with an imposed and stayed sentence because Villamil had already been in the county jail for fifteen months. Counsel's argument highlighted mitigating factors, such as Villamil's completion of treatment and other programming, including obtaining his GED. Additionally, he argued that Villamil met all the requirements to reinstate his license, but was unable to do so because of a change in the law.
f 14. At sentencing, the court considered the seriousness of the offense, the need to protect the public, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. It observed that the felony offense for a knowing violation of OAR-causing death was new and that the statute's purpose was to protect the public from people whose licenses had been revoked. The court further stated that it could not understand why Villamil was driving on the day of the collision. It opined that matters were made worse because he had been twice convicted of drunk driving and previously served time in jail for an OAR conviction.
¶ 15. The sentencing court commented on the continued problem of people driving without a license, and concluded that all it could do "to respond to the needs of the community as best it can under facility of the law" was to impose the maximum term of imprisonment. It concluded that "this is a serious operating [11]*11after revocation" and sentenced Villamil to the maximum sentence of six years, with three years of initial confinement and three years of extended supervision.
¶ 16. Villamil filed a postconviction motion arguing that Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4 is ambiguous and unconstitutional. Additionally, he requested resentenc-ing, asserting that the sentencing court had not provided an adequate explanation of why it imposed the maximum penalty. The circuit court denied Villamil's postconviction motion in its entirety.
¶ 17. The court of appeals determined that the rule of lenity was not applicable and the statutory scheme under which Villamil was convicted and sentenced is constitutional. State v. Villamil, 2016 WI App 61, ¶ 2, 371 Wis. 2d 519, 885 N.W.2d 381. However, the court of appeals remanded for a new sentencing hearing because it concluded that the evidentiary record failed to demonstrate that the circuit court considered the enumerated factors set forth in Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b). Id.
t-H H-1
¶ 18. The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law that we decide independently of the decisions rendered by the circuit court and the court of appeals. State v. Harrison, 2015 WI 5, ¶ 37, 360 Wis. 2d 246, 858 N.W.2d 372.
¶ 19. Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. It is interpreted in the context in which it is used, in relation to the language of surrounding or [12]*12closely-related statutes. Id., ¶ 46. We interpret a statute reasonably in order to avoid absurd results. Id.
¶ 20. A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood in two or more ways by reasonably well-informed persons. Id., ¶ 47. When a statute is ambiguous, we may consult legislative history as part of our statutory analysis. Id., ¶ 51.
¶ 21. We are also tasked with reviewing whether the statutory scheme is unconstitutional. Legislative enactments are presumed constitutional and the party challenging the constitutionality must demonstrate the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 129, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989).
¶ 22. Finally, we are asked to determine whether Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) requires a sentencing court to consider on the record the factors enumerated in the statute. "To determine how a sentencing court satisfies its obligation to consider any applicable sentencing guideline," we must interpret the relevant statutory provision. State v. Grady, 2007 WI 81, ¶ 14, 302 Wis. 2d 80, 734 N.W.2d 364. As set forth above, statutory interpretation is a matter of law we review independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court of appeals. Id.
¶ 23. We will remand for a new sentencing hearing only if the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion at sentencing. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197 (citing McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 278, 182 N.W.2d 512 [13]*13(1971)). A court erroneously exercises its sentencing discretion when it fails to consider factors it is required by statute to consider. LaRocque v. LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 33, 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987).
HH I—I h—t
f 24. We begin by setting forth the relevant statutory language. Villamil was charged with a knowing violation of OAR-causing death, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 343.44(1)(b) and (2)(ar)4. Wisconsin Stat. § 343.44(l)(b), knowingly operating after revocation, provides in relevant part:
No person whose operating privilege has been duly revoked under the laws of this state may knowingly operate a motor vehicle upon any highway in this state during the period of revocation ....
(Emphasis added).
Additionally, Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4. provides:
Any person who violates sub. (l)(b) and, in the course of the violation, causes the death of another person shall be fined not less than $7,500, nor more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year in the county jail or both, except that, if the person knows at the time of the violation that his or her operating privilege has been revoked, the person is guilty of a Class H Felony.
¶ 25. According to Villamil, the statutory scheme is ambiguous because it provides that a person who commits the offense of causing death while knowingly operating a motor vehicle after revocation could be charged with either a misdemeanor or a felony. He asserts that the first part of the statute sets forth a [14]*14misdemeanor sentence with a fine of "not less than $7,500, nor more than $10,000 or imprison[ment] for not more than one year in the county jail or both .. . Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4. However, the second part of the statute classifies the offense as a "Class H felony." Id.
A
¶ 26. The problem that Villamil identifies with Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4. is that "knowledge" of revocation is already required as an element of the misdemeanor charge because a person cannot violate Wis. Stat. § 343.44(l)(b), the offense for operating after revocation, unless he knows that his license has been revoked. Yet, the second part of the statutory provision also contains a knowledge requirement. He asserts that this interaction between the statutes makes the "knowledge" distinction between the misdemeanor and felony charge illusory. Accordingly, Villamil contends that the statute is ambiguous and that the rule of lenity should apply because the same offense is punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony.
¶ 27. The rule of lenity "provides generally that ambiguous penal statutes should be interpreted in favor of the defendant." State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶ 67, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700. However, the rule of lenity applies only if two conditions are met: (1) the penal statute is ambiguous; and (2) we are unable to clarify the intent of the legislature by resort to legislative history. Id.
f 28. It is undisputed that the statute is ambiguous. The State, however, contends that this court should resolve any ambiguity by finding that the knowledge element of the offense of OAR has been impliedly repealed.
[15]*15¶ 29. We agree with the parties that the statute is ambiguous. Here, the interaction between Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1)(b) and Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4 creates ambiguity because the same offense is punishable as either a misdemeanor or a felony. DOC v. Schwarz, 2005 WI 34, ¶ 14, 279 Wis. 2d 223, 693 N.W.2d 703 ("ambiguity can be found ... by the words of the provision as they interact with and relate to other provisions in the statute and to other statutes.") (quotation marks and quoted source omitted).
f 30. Because we determine that the interaction of the statutory scheme renders it ambiguous, we turn next to the relief requested by the parties. First, we do not agree with Villamil that the rule of lenity should be applied in this case. Although the rule of lenity provides generally that ambiguous penal statutes should be interpreted in favor of the defendant, it applies only if a penal statute is ambiguous and "we are unable to clarify the intent of the legislature by resort to legislative history." Cole, 262 Wis. 2d 167, f 67.
¶ 31. Examining the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 343.44 clarifies the intent of the legislature that persons who commit a knowing violation of OAR-causing death be charged with a Class H felony. The Legislative Reference Bureau analysis for 2011 Assembly Bill 80 ("A.B. 80") recognized that under the law as it existed prior to enactment of 2011 Wisconsin Act 113 ("Act 113"), a defendant who committed a knowing OAR violation was guilty of "a Class A misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum fine of $10,000 or a maximum term of imprisonment of nine months or both." See Drafting file for 2011 Wis. Act. 113, Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau of 2011 A.B. 80, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.; see also Wis. [16]*16Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) (2009-10). It explained that A.B. 80 "creates new penalties for [OAR] violations in which the person, in the course of the violation, causes . . . death to another person." LRB Analysis of A.B. 80, p. 2 (emphasis added).
¶ 32. The LRB's analysis additionally observed that under A.B. 80, the penalty is intended to increase if a person committed a knowing violation:
If the person causes the death of another in the course of the OWL or OWS violation, the person: 1) must forfeit not less than $7,500 nor more than $10,000 if the person did not know, respectively, that he or she did not possess a valid operator's license or that his or her operating privilege was suspended; or 2) is guilty of a Class H felony if the person knew. A Class H felony is punishable by a maximum fine of $10,000 or a maximum term of imprisonment of six years or both ... If the person causes the death of another in the course of the OAR violation, the person: 1) must be fined not less than $7,500 nor more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year or both if the person did not know that his or her operating privilege was revoked; or 2) is guilty of a Class H felony if the person knew.
LRB Analysis of A.B. 80 at 2-3 (emphasis added).
¶ 33. Thus, the legislative history clarifies that the legislature intended to write these provisions so that when a person causes the death of another while committing an OAR violation, the penalty would be less severe if the defendant did not know his license was revoked and more severe if he knew.5 Specific to this case, the legislative history shows the legislature's [17]*17intent to treat an OAR-causing death offense as a misdemeanor if the defendant did not know his license had been revoked and as a Class H felony if he knew.
f 34. It appears, however, that the legislature failed to remove the "knowledge" element from the misdemeanor language of Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1)(b) and thus failed to accomplish the first part of this intent. Nevertheless, in his case, Villamil caused the death of another and knew his license had been revoked. The legislative history shows, and Villamil acknowledges, that the legislature intended to treat his offense as a Class H felony. Given this clarification, the rule of lenity cannot be invoked.
B
1 35. The State urges this court to conclude that the knowledge element of the offense of operating after revocation has been impliedly repealed. According to the State, repeal of the element of knowledge in the offense of operating after revocation is implied by the legislative history of Act 113.
¶ 36. Although we agree that the legislative history indicates that the legislature intended to create a misdemeanor offense for persons who did not know their license had been revoked, we are tasked with interpreting the words that the legislature wrote. Kalal explained that " [i]t is the enacted law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding on the public." Id., ¶ 46. Here, the legislature wrote the statutory scheme [18]*18so that knowledge of revocation status is an element of both the misdemeanor and felony provision. As set forth above, in this case Villamil was charged with the felony offense intended by the legislature for a knowing violation of OAR-causing death.
¶ 37. We further observe that implied repeal is a disfavored rule of statutory construction. See, e.g., Heaton v. Larsen, 97 Wis. 2d 379, 392-93 ("Repeals by implication are not favored in the law."). If the legislature desires to create a misdemeanor offense for an unknowing violation, as the legislative history indicates, then the legislature may do so by future amendment of the statutory text. See State v. Reagles, 177 Wis. 2d 168, 176, 501 N.W.2d 861 (1993) ("If a statute fails to cover a particular situation and the omission should be cured, the remedy lies with the legislature, not the courts."). Thus, we decline the State's invitation to rewrite the statute in order to create an offense for an "unknowing" violation and hold the application of Wis. Stat. §§ 343.44(1)(b) and (2)(ar)4. to the language the legislature wrote. See State v. Jadowski, 2004 WI 68, 273 Wis. 2d 418, 680 N.W.2d 810 (it is legislature's broad power to promote the public welfare that authorizes it to create and define criminal offenses).
¶ 38. Accordingly, we agree with the court of appeals that the rule of lenity does note apply here. We hold the application of Wis. Stat. §§ 343.44(1)(b) and (2)(ar)4. to the language the legislature wrote—that the defendant's "knowledge" of his revocation status is an element of both the misdemeanor as well as the felony provision. It was the legislature's intent to apply the more severe penalty to Villamil's offense and he was appropriately charged with a Class H felony.
[19]*19IV
¶ 39. We turn next to Villamil's argument that statutes which prescribe significantly different penalties for the exact same conduct cannot be applied constitutionally. According to Villamil, the failure of a statute to give fair notice of the proscribed conduct and the consequences violates due process. Additionally, he contends that a statute violates equal protection when there is no rational basis for the distinction between misdemeanor and felony penalties.
¶ 40. Our analysis of Villamil's constitutional arguments begins with the observation that legislative enactments are presumed constitutional and the party challenging the constitutionality must prove the statute unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. 152 McManus, Wis. 2d at 129. If possible, we construe the statute to preserve it. State v. Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d 166, 172, 332 N.W.2d 750 (1983).
¶ 41. Due process requires that penal statutes provide fair notice of the conduct they seek to proscribe. State v. Nelson, 2006 WI App 124, ¶ 41, 294 Wis. 2d 578, 718 N.W.2d 168. This notice does not have to be provided with absolute clarity. Id., f 36. Additionally, when considering an equal protection challenge that does not involve a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, "the fundamental determination to be made ... is whether there is arbitrary discrimination in the statute . . . and thus whether there is a rational basis which justifies a difference in rights afforded." In re Joseph E.G., 2001 WI App 29, ¶ 8, 240 Wis. 2d 481, 623 N.W.2d 137.
[20]*20f 42. This court's decision in State v. Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d 205, 378 N.W.2d 691 (1985), guides our analysis of Villamil's constitutional challenge. Cissell asserted, and this court agreed, that the elements of felony abandonment were substantially identical to the elements of misdemeanor failure to support. Id. at 214. He argued that statutes with identical substantive elements but different penalty schemes violate due process and equal protection. Id.
¶ 43. Similar to this case, Cissell contended that the State violated his constitutional rights by charging him with a felony rather than a misdemeanor. Id. Cissell further argued that "disparate sentencing exposures for crimes with identical elements are irrational and arbitrary." Id.
¶ 44. Following United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979), the Cissell court determined that "identical element crimes with different penalties do not violate due process or equal protection." 127 Wis. 2d 215. It explained that the Batchelder court concluded that overlapping criminal statutes with different penalty schemes "do not violate constitutional principles unless the prosecutor selectively bases the charging decision upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Id. (citing Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 125 n.9).
¶ 45. Cissell reasoned that "[T]he fact that the defendant's conduct may be chargeable under either of two statutes does not make prosecution under one or the other statute improper per se . . . ." 127 Wis. 2d 216. It explained that "the focus instead is on whether the prosecutor unjustifiably discriminated against any class of defendants." Id. "Differences in treatment between individuals . . . are determined as a matter of [21]*21prosecutorial discretion. . . . [S]uch discretion is not unconstitutional unless the prosecutor discriminates on the basis of unjustifiable criteria." Id.
¶ 46. Thus, in Cissell we concluded that " [although [the statutes] are identical crimes with different penalties, the state does not deny equal protection or due process by charging defendants with the more serious crime." Id. at 224. This court determined that the statute at issue in Cissell did not violate due process because it "provide[d] adequate notice of the conduct proscribed by the statute and those who must obey it." Id. at 225. We explained that " [i]t also provides a defined standard for those who must enforce the law and adjudicate guilt." Id.
¶ 47. In this case, Villamil makes no suggestion the prosecutor chose to charge him with a felony violation instead of a misdemeanor based upon his race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Accordingly, under Cissell, neither the existence of different penalties for the same violation nor the prosecutor's decision to charge Villamil with a felony violates his rights to due process or equal protection.
¶ 48. Villamil attempts to distinguish the facts of this case from Cissell by arguing that in Cissell there were two different offenses with substantively identical elements, where here there is one offense within the same statutory provision containing two distinct punishments. Although Villamil points to a Utah Supreme Court case as support for this distinction, we are not convinced that a meaningful distinction exists between the circumstances here and those in Cissell. See State v. Williams, 2007 UT 98, ¶ 1, 175 P.2d 1029.
¶ 49. Whether there is one criminal statute or two, both this case and Cissell involve criminal stat[22]*22utes with substantially identical elements where prosecutors have discretion to decide whether they will charge a defendant with a misdemeanor or a felony. Although a defendant could be charged with a misdemeanor instead of a felony for a knowing violation of OAE-causing death, the public is on notice that this offense may be punished as a Class H felony pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 343.44(l)(b) and (2)(ar)4. Because Villamil knew he was operating after his license was revoked, the statutes provide sufficient notice that this violation could be charged as a felony.
¶ 50. Accordingly, we determine that Villamil has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
V
¶ 51. We turn to address the State's cross-petition, which asserts that the sentencing court was not required to consider all of the statutorily enumerated factors on the record.
¶ 52. Wisconsin Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) provides that the court "shall review the record and consider the following":
1. The aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the matter, using the guidelines described in par. (d).
2. The class of vehicle operated by the person.
3. The number of prior convictions of the person for violations of the section within the 5 years preceding the person's arrest.
4. The reason that the person's operating privilege was revoked, or the person was disqualified or ordered out [23]*23of service, including whether the person's operating privilege was revoked for an offense that may be counted under s. 343.307(2).
5. Any convictions for moving violations arising out of the incident or occurrence giving rise to sentencing under this section.
¶ 53. In Grady, this court determined that "a circuit court satisfies its [statutory] obligation when the record of the sentencing hearing demonstrates that the court actually considered the sentencing guidelines and so stated on the record." 302 Wis. 2d 80, ¶ 3. Similar to the statute addressed in Grady, Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) states that "[i]n imposing sentence under par. (ar) or (br) the court shall. . . consider the following," and then lists the specifically identified factors to be considered.6 Villamil asserts that the circuit court failed to address several factors at sentencing.
¶ 54. The State does not dispute that the circuit court failed to enumerate all of the statutorily-enumerated sentencing factors on the record. Instead, it contends that at sentencing Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) should be construed to be directory, rather than mandatory. Although the State acknowledges that the word "shall" is presumed to be mandatory, it asserts that there is no per se rule to determine which way the word is used. See, e.g., State ex rel. Marburry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶ 16, 262 Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 155; State v. R.R.E., 162 Wis. 2d 698, 707, 470 N.W.2d 283 [24]*24(1991). Thus, according to the State, in determining whether the legislature intended "shall" to be mandatory or directory, we should consider the objectives intended to be accomplished by the statute and the potential consequences of each interpretation.
¶ 55. The word "shall" can be construed as directory if "such a construction is 'necessary to carry out the intent of the legislature.' " Warnecke v. Estate of Warnecke, 2006 WI App 62, ¶ 12, 292 Wis. 2d 438, 713 N.W.2d 109 (quoting Karow v. Milwaukee Co. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 263 N.W.2d 214 (1978)). According to the State, interpreting the word "shall" as mandatory leads to an unreasonable result because similar offenses, such as operating while suspended, do not require consideration of these factors. See Wis. Stat. §§ 343.44(1)(a).
¶ 56. However, we agree with the court of appeals that the State's argument underscores that the legislature intended to treat OAR offenses differently. Villamil, 371 Wis. 2d 519, ¶ 26. We do not assume that the legislature chose the word "shall" lightly, but instead assume it intended to require courts to consider the factors under Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b), for a knowing violation of OAR-causing death.
¶ 57. Additionally, this case is distinguishable from other cases in which courts have determined that an interpretation of "shall" as mandatory would lead to an absurd result. See, e.g., In re Paternity of S.A. II, 165 Wis. 2d 530, 534-36, 478 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1991). For example, in child custody matters, Wis. Stat. ch. 767 previously provided that "the court shall incorporate" the terms of a stipulation regarding a modification of placement or custody into a revised order. Id. However, the court of appeals reasoned that the best [25]*25interests of a child are the primary consideration in custody determinations, regardless of the parties' stipulation. Id. Thus, it concluded that it would be an absurd result if "shall" were interpreted to prohibit an examination of the best interests of the child. Id.; see also Eby v. Kozarek, 153 Wis. 2d 75, 80-81, 450 N.W.2d 249 (1990) (use of the word "shall" for statutory time limit was directory because construing the statute as mandatory would lead to an overly harsh result).
f 58. No such consideration applies here. Indeed, all of the factors listed here are relevant to a sentencing decision for a knowing violation of OAR-causing death. These factors, such as aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the class of the vehicle, prior convictions, the reason for revocation, and any convictions for moving violations arising out of the incident are all relevant to punishment for this specific offense. Accordingly, making their consideration mandatory does not lead to an absurd result.
¶ 59. Finally, "support is given to a mandatory interpretation of 'shall' when the legislature uses the words 'shall' and 'may' in a particular statutory section, indicating the legislature was aware of the distinct meanings of the words." State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶ 16, 262 Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 155. In this case, the legislature used the word "shall" with regard to the factors set forth in Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b), but used "may" in Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(c), which provides that "penalties may be enhanced by imprisonment and additional fines . . . ." Thus, "we can infer that the legislature was aware of the different denotations and intended the words to have their precise meanings." State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶ 16. (quotation marks and quoted source omitted).
[26]*26f 60. In light of the above, we conclude that the State has failed to rebut the presumption that "shall" is mandatory here. We thus determine that Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) is mandatory and that the record at sentencing must demonstrate that the circuit court considered the factors enumerated in the statute.
¶ 61. The State does not dispute that the circuit court failed to express its consideration of the statutory factors on the record. Nor does it contend that the circuit court considered those factors, but simply failed to reference Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) on the record. We therefore remand for a new sentencing hearing because the record in this case fails to demonstrate that the court considered the required factors under Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b).
VI
f 62. In sum, we conclude that any ambiguity in Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1)(b) (2009-10) and Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(ar)4 (eff. March 1, 2012) is clarified by the statutes' legislative history and thus the rule of lenity does not apply. We further determine that the statutory scheme does not violate his rights to either due process or equal protection. Because Villamil knew he was operating after his license was revoked, the statutes provide fair notice that the prohibited conduct of committing a knowing OAR-violation causing death could result in a felony charge. There is no evidence that the charging decision was based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.
¶ 63. Additionally, we agree with the court of appeals that Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b) is mandatory [27]*27and that the record at sentencing must demonstrate that the circuit court considered the factors enumerated in the statute.
¶ 64. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals decision and remand to the circuit court for a new sentencing hearing because the record fails to demonstrate that the circuit court considered the required factors pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 343.44(2)(b).
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.