OPINION
FOLEY, Judge.
At the omnibus hearing, the trial court suppressed evidence of marijuana, paraphernalia, and receipts seized from defendant’s bedroom and living room during execution of a search warrant. We reverse.
FACTS
Rochester Police Officer John Paul Jones learned from an informant’s tip that re[14]*14spondent Welden Eggler was growing marijuana in his apartment. He investigated and observed on two separate occasions a marijuana plant in the kitchen window of respondent’s apartment.
An affidavit for a search warrant prepared by Jones contained the following: (1) the names of the officers involved in the investigation; (2) affiant’s familiarity as a narcotics officer with marijuana plants; (3) the dates of observation; (4) the address of the apartment; and (5) the affiant’s belief that the observed object was in fact a marijuana plant. The magistrate issued a warrant authorizing search and seizure of “marijuana plants and/or harvested marijuana,” “any other controlled substances” and “rent receipts, utility bills, correspondence or any other documents verifying the occupancy of the residence by a certain person(s).”
In executing the warrant the officers seized the observed marijuana plant in the kitchen. They thereafter continued the search in the living room and bedroom of respondent’s apartment, seizing a marijuana pipe, a bag of green vegetable matter, a tray of paraphernalia and a J.C. Penney’s receipt made out to Eggler in the living room and paraphernalia, two plastic bags containing dry marijuana plants and a tax statement in the bedroom. Altogether, approximately six ounces of marijuana were seized.
Eggler was charged with unlawful possession of over 1.5 ounces of marijuana, a felony.
At the omnibus hearing Eggler moved to suppress the items seized. The trial court ordered all evidence seized from the living room and bedroom suppressed because: “The overbroad scope of the search beyond the kitchen tainted the search.” The marijuana plant in the kitchen was ruled admissible. The trial court also denied Eggler’s motion to dismiss charges for lack of probable cause and bound him over for trial on the felony charge. The State appeals the suppression order.
ISSUES
1. Has the State shown that suppression of evidence seized in the bedroom and living room will have a critical impact on the trial?
2. Did the trial court err in its determination that the search warrant did not include evidence seized in the bedroom and living room of respondent’s apartment?
ANALYSIS
Before this court can reverse a trial court’s pretrial determination, the State must demonstrate “clearly and unequivocally that the trial court has erred in its judgment and that, unless reversed, the error will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial.” State v. Webber, 262 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Minn.1977); State v. Whelan, 350 N.W.2d 414, 416 (Minn.Ct.App.1984).
1. The trial court’s suppression of evidence seized in the living room and bedroom will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial. The receipt found in the living room and the tax statement found in the bedroom both verify defendant’s address as that specified in the search warrant. More importantly, without the marijuana seized from the bedroom and living room the State would be left with only a small amount of marijuana seized in the kitchen as evidence, possession of which could reduce the charge from a felony to a petty misdemeanor.1
2. Defendant concedes there was probable cause to issue a search warrant to seize the observed marijuana plant. However, he argues the supporting affidavit contained no facts showing that probable cause existed to search the remainder of the apartment for “any other controlled substances.” Thus, he concludes the warrant had to be limited to the plant identified [15]*15in the affidavit. This is too narrow a view of the supporting affidavit. The purpose of a supporting affidavit is to provide facts and circumstances from which a magistrate may independently determine whether probable cause exists to issue the warrant. Although a finding of probable cause may not be made on conclusory statements contained in the supporting affidavit, that is not the case here. Sufficient facts were stated in the affidavit to support the officers belief that marijuana was on the premises. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965).
Defendant contends that the State’s reliance on a “bare bones” affidavit flies in the face of the constitutional standard of probable cause. He cites two cases, People v. McGill, 187 Colo. 65, 528 P.2d 386 (1974), and State v. Helmka, 86 Wash.2d 91, 542 P.2d 115 (1975), with facts strikingly similar to those presented here. In McGill and Helmka, officers observed marijuana plants growing in apartment windows and thereafter applied for search warrants. In their supporting affidavits were facts identifying the observed plants. In addition, each affidavit contained a conclusory statement that marijuana was being used, kept, sold, or otherwise disposed of at the residences involved. Defendant argues the absence of such a statement in the affidavit here is fatal to a finding that probable cause exists to search his entire apartment. This argument is not persuasive. A close reading of McGill and Helmka reveals that the factual setting in both affidavits are identical to those in the present case. The mere fact that Officer Jones did not include in his affidavit a conclusory statement similar to those in McGill and Helmka does not affect its sufficiency which requires facts, not an affiant’s unsupported belief to establish probable cause.
In performing her neutral and detached function, the magistrate is to arrive at her probable cause determination in a common-sense and practical manner. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). She is entitled to draw common-sense and reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances given. Id. at 244, 103 S.Ct. at 2335; Novak v. State, 349 N.W.2d 830 (Minn.1984).
When a magistrate determines that probable cause exists, a reviewing court, be it trial or appellate, may not thereafter engage in a hypertechnical examination of the affidavit. In State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265 (Minn.1985), the Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
A magistrate’s determination of probable cause should be “paid great deference by reviewing courts” and a reviewing court should not review that determination de novo. The fourth amendment requires only that the magistrate had a “substantial basis for * * * eoncludpng] that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.” Id. at 236 quoting Jones v. United States,
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OPINION
FOLEY, Judge.
At the omnibus hearing, the trial court suppressed evidence of marijuana, paraphernalia, and receipts seized from defendant’s bedroom and living room during execution of a search warrant. We reverse.
FACTS
Rochester Police Officer John Paul Jones learned from an informant’s tip that re[14]*14spondent Welden Eggler was growing marijuana in his apartment. He investigated and observed on two separate occasions a marijuana plant in the kitchen window of respondent’s apartment.
An affidavit for a search warrant prepared by Jones contained the following: (1) the names of the officers involved in the investigation; (2) affiant’s familiarity as a narcotics officer with marijuana plants; (3) the dates of observation; (4) the address of the apartment; and (5) the affiant’s belief that the observed object was in fact a marijuana plant. The magistrate issued a warrant authorizing search and seizure of “marijuana plants and/or harvested marijuana,” “any other controlled substances” and “rent receipts, utility bills, correspondence or any other documents verifying the occupancy of the residence by a certain person(s).”
In executing the warrant the officers seized the observed marijuana plant in the kitchen. They thereafter continued the search in the living room and bedroom of respondent’s apartment, seizing a marijuana pipe, a bag of green vegetable matter, a tray of paraphernalia and a J.C. Penney’s receipt made out to Eggler in the living room and paraphernalia, two plastic bags containing dry marijuana plants and a tax statement in the bedroom. Altogether, approximately six ounces of marijuana were seized.
Eggler was charged with unlawful possession of over 1.5 ounces of marijuana, a felony.
At the omnibus hearing Eggler moved to suppress the items seized. The trial court ordered all evidence seized from the living room and bedroom suppressed because: “The overbroad scope of the search beyond the kitchen tainted the search.” The marijuana plant in the kitchen was ruled admissible. The trial court also denied Eggler’s motion to dismiss charges for lack of probable cause and bound him over for trial on the felony charge. The State appeals the suppression order.
ISSUES
1. Has the State shown that suppression of evidence seized in the bedroom and living room will have a critical impact on the trial?
2. Did the trial court err in its determination that the search warrant did not include evidence seized in the bedroom and living room of respondent’s apartment?
ANALYSIS
Before this court can reverse a trial court’s pretrial determination, the State must demonstrate “clearly and unequivocally that the trial court has erred in its judgment and that, unless reversed, the error will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial.” State v. Webber, 262 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Minn.1977); State v. Whelan, 350 N.W.2d 414, 416 (Minn.Ct.App.1984).
1. The trial court’s suppression of evidence seized in the living room and bedroom will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial. The receipt found in the living room and the tax statement found in the bedroom both verify defendant’s address as that specified in the search warrant. More importantly, without the marijuana seized from the bedroom and living room the State would be left with only a small amount of marijuana seized in the kitchen as evidence, possession of which could reduce the charge from a felony to a petty misdemeanor.1
2. Defendant concedes there was probable cause to issue a search warrant to seize the observed marijuana plant. However, he argues the supporting affidavit contained no facts showing that probable cause existed to search the remainder of the apartment for “any other controlled substances.” Thus, he concludes the warrant had to be limited to the plant identified [15]*15in the affidavit. This is too narrow a view of the supporting affidavit. The purpose of a supporting affidavit is to provide facts and circumstances from which a magistrate may independently determine whether probable cause exists to issue the warrant. Although a finding of probable cause may not be made on conclusory statements contained in the supporting affidavit, that is not the case here. Sufficient facts were stated in the affidavit to support the officers belief that marijuana was on the premises. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965).
Defendant contends that the State’s reliance on a “bare bones” affidavit flies in the face of the constitutional standard of probable cause. He cites two cases, People v. McGill, 187 Colo. 65, 528 P.2d 386 (1974), and State v. Helmka, 86 Wash.2d 91, 542 P.2d 115 (1975), with facts strikingly similar to those presented here. In McGill and Helmka, officers observed marijuana plants growing in apartment windows and thereafter applied for search warrants. In their supporting affidavits were facts identifying the observed plants. In addition, each affidavit contained a conclusory statement that marijuana was being used, kept, sold, or otherwise disposed of at the residences involved. Defendant argues the absence of such a statement in the affidavit here is fatal to a finding that probable cause exists to search his entire apartment. This argument is not persuasive. A close reading of McGill and Helmka reveals that the factual setting in both affidavits are identical to those in the present case. The mere fact that Officer Jones did not include in his affidavit a conclusory statement similar to those in McGill and Helmka does not affect its sufficiency which requires facts, not an affiant’s unsupported belief to establish probable cause.
In performing her neutral and detached function, the magistrate is to arrive at her probable cause determination in a common-sense and practical manner. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). She is entitled to draw common-sense and reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances given. Id. at 244, 103 S.Ct. at 2335; Novak v. State, 349 N.W.2d 830 (Minn.1984).
When a magistrate determines that probable cause exists, a reviewing court, be it trial or appellate, may not thereafter engage in a hypertechnical examination of the affidavit. In State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265 (Minn.1985), the Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
A magistrate’s determination of probable cause should be “paid great deference by reviewing courts” and a reviewing court should not review that determination de novo. The fourth amendment requires only that the magistrate had a “substantial basis for * * * eoncludpng] that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.” Id. at 236 quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 [80 S.Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697] (1960). In reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit under the totality of the circumstances test, courts must be careful not to review each component of the affidavit in isolation. Even if each component is judged unsubstantial, the components viewed together may reveal in the informant’s tip “an internal coherence that [gives] weight to the whole.” Massachusetts v. Upton, [— U.S. -, -] 104 S.Ct. 2085, 2089 [80 L.Ed.2d 721] (1984). Furthermore, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases should be “largely determined by the preference to be accorded warrants.” Id., quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965).
Id. at 268.
We conclude here that the supporting affidavit supplied ample probable cause upon which the magistrate could rely in issuing the warrant. It is certainly reasonable to infer, given the fact of an observed marijuana plant, that additional plants or processed marijuana might be present in other rooms of the apartment. As noted by one court, “it seems reasonable to infer that persons who grow illegal marijuana plants do so for a purpose other than the [16]*16pursuit of an interest in horticulture.” State v. Helmka at 93, 542 P.2d at 116. The State is entitled to submit all evidence covered by the warrant at trial and permit the jury to draw such inferences as might reasonably flow from that evidence.2 The warrant was not overbroad.
DECISION
The marijuana plant seized from the kitchen as well as all evidence seized in the bedroom and living room of defendant’s apartment is constitutionally admissible at trial.
Reversed.