[75]*75
OPINION
ECKERSTROM, Judge.
¶ 1 Following a jury trial, appellant Douglas Eddington was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to sixteen years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues the trial court’s refusal to strike a potential juror for cause requires reversal. He also contends his conviction should be reversed or reduced because the jury received defective instructions regarding second-degree murder and the consideration of lesser offenses. We conclude the court erred in refusing to strike the challenged juror for cause given that he was a peace officer employed by the same office that had investigated the case. Finding no prejudice, however, we affirm.
Background1
¶ 2 After an investigation by the Pima County Sheriffs Department, Eddington and two codefendants were charged with first-degree murder. During voir dire on the first day of trial, a venireman testified he was a Pima County sheriffs deputy and knew between one-thii’d and one-half of the state’s fourteen potential witnesses from the sheriffs department, including the lead detective, Christopher Hogan. The deputy further stated he currently was assigned to provide security at the Pima County Superior Court. He also stated without elaboration that he understood why there were two security officers in the courtroom, a comment which suggested he knew Eddington was being held in custody.2
¶ 3 Based on these facts, Eddington moved the trial court to strike the deputy for cause. The court denied the motion, referring to the deputy’s repeated avowals that he could be a fair and impartial juror and would not treat the testimony of law enforcement officers differently from that of any other witness. “[GJiven the record ... we have in terms of the questions and the responses,” the court concluded, “there’s not sufficient basis to strike him for cause.” Eddington subsequently removed the deputy from the panel by use of a peremptory strike. Eddington was ultimately acquitted of first-degree murder but convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced as noted above. This appeal followed.
Motion to Strike
¶ 4 Eddington contends his conviction should be reversed because the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the deputy for cause. Eddington specifically urged the court to strike the deputy from the venire panel because the deputy “work[ed] for the same agency” as “all the law enforcement witnesses,”3 because he “kn[ew] a third of the witnesses,” and because the deputy was aware Eddington was in custody.4
¶ 5 As a general matter, a trial court must dismiss a juror for cause when “there is [a] reasonable ground to believe that [the] juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict.” Ariz. R.Crim. P. 18.4(b). The party challenging the juror bears the burden of establishing that the juror could not be unbiased and fair. State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 13, 951 P.2d 869, 878 (1997). “In assessing a potential juror’s fairness and impartiality, the trial court has the best opportunity to observe prospective jurors and thereby judge the credibility of each.” State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, ¶ 37, 14 P.3d 997, 1009 (2000). We therefore review a trial [76]*76court’s assessment of that question only for a clear abuse of discretion. Id.
¶ 6 Under the above standards, a peace officer is not automatically barred from serving as a juror. See State v. Hill, 174 Ariz. 313, 319, 321, 848 P.2d 1375, 1381, 1383 (1993) (finding no abuse of discretion in court’s refusal to strike police officer for cause); see also A.R.S. § 21-202(B)(5) (giving peace officers option to be excused from jury service). Although “the impartiality of a potential juror who is personally acquainted with individuals involved in the prosecution is necessarily suspect,” such acquaintances alone are not grounds for automatic disqualification. Hill, 174 Ariz. at 319, 848 P.2d at 1381.
¶ 7 However, any individual is disqualified by law from sitting on a jury if he or she is “interested directly or indirectly in the matter under investigation.” A.R.S. § 21-211(2). We review the applicability of a statutory provision de novo and are not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law. See Reeder v. Johnson, 225 Ariz. 312, ¶ 6, 238 P.3d 123, 125 (App.2010) (appellate court not bound by trial court’s legal conclusions or conclusions on mixed questions of law and fact); State v. Gonzalez, 216 Ariz. 11, ¶ 2, 162 P.3d 650, 651 (App.2007) (questions of statutory application reviewed de novo); see also Lopez v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 177 Ariz. 371, 373-75, 868 P.2d 954, 956-58 (1993) (concluding venirepersons insured by insurer which was a party to the ease had interest in case necessitating disqualification under § 21-211(2) notwithstanding trial court’s finding they could be “fair and impartial”).
¶ 8 We hold that when a peace officer5 is currently employed by the same agency, office, or department that conducted the investigation in a criminal case, that officer has, at minimum, an indirect interest in the case and must therefore be stricken for cause from a venire panel under § 21-211(2).6 In any criminal prosecution, law enforcement officers and prosecutors work together as agents of the state. See State v. Lane, 69 Ariz. 236, 243-44, 211 P.2d 821, 826 (1949) (“Whatever investigation the sheriff made as an agent of the state was made for the benefit of the county attorney as an agent of the state in enabling him to successfully prosecute the offender____”); State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 172 Ariz. 232, 239, 836 P.2d 445, 452 (App.1992) (identifying law enforcement officers as “agent[s] of the state”). Indeed, as our rules of procedure reflect, police investigators often literally serve beside prosecutors in the courtroom in attempting to prove the state’s case. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 9.3(d) (allowing prosecutor “presence of one investigator at counsel table”); e.g., State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 483, 917 P.2d 200, 212 (1996) (detective was Rule 9.3(d) investigator seated at counsel table); State v. Williams, 183 Ariz. 368, 379, 904 P.2d 437, 448 (1995) (two investigating detectives from different police agencies seated at counsel table).
¶ 9 Although prosecutors and peace officers alike have a broad interest in attaining justice in every case, see State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, ¶ 33, 969 P.2d 1184, 1192 (1998), peace officers, like prosecutors, also have a particular interest in seeing that the criminal cases their offices have investigated and developed are successfully prosecuted. Our jurisprudence recognizes that law enforcement can often become a “ ‘competitive enterprise,’ ” just like any other human endeavor. State v. Watting, 104 Ariz. 354, 358, 453 P.2d 500, 504 (1969), quoting Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958). If nothing else, a prosecution that results in a conviction closes a case and thereby conserves a police department’s limited resources. Officers therefore have some interest in any investigation in which their own department has an institutional interest. And, in such event, they should be removed from a jury for cause, just as a deputy county attorney who works in [77]*77the same office as the prosecutor should be removed from a jury panel. See People v. Terry, 30 Cal.App.4th 97, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 729, 732 (1994).
¶ 10 Peace officers also have some interest in matters investigated by their own departments arising from their role as an employee of the organization that has a stake in the outcome of the case. The same considerations noted in Terry regarding prosecutors serving as jurors apply equally to peace officers called to judge their colleagues’ work and credibility: When a ease has been investigated and referred for prosecution by one’s own employer, a peace officer serving as a juror might feel reluctant to join an adverse verdict because the ease has been “brought by a fellow [investigator] from his own office” and presumptively “supervised by his own superior.” 35 Cal.Rptr.2d at 731; see also Tate v. People, 125 Colo. 527, 247 P.2d 665, 670-71 (1952) (noting special deputy sheriff “would be presumed to be under ordinary allegiance to his superior, the sheriff,” a material witness in case).7
¶ 11 By the above standards, the deputy’s interests in these proceedings were especially pronounced. He had a professional relationship with more of the state’s witnesses than he could precisely count — including the lead homicide detective, who both testified as a state’s witness and sat at the prosecutor’s table during portions of the trial. If seated as a juror, the deputy would necessarily be forced to judge the credibility and conduct of his eoworkers, a role with potential consequences for his future working relationships. Disqualifying people with such professional entanglements and presumed allegiances was one of the clear purposes behind § 21-211(2). See § 21-211(3) (disqualifying certain “[pier-sons related by consanguinity or affinity” to parties); see also Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 245 Pa.Super. 88, 369 A.2d 307, 308-09 (1976) (concluding police detective should have been dismissed for cause given totality of circumstances, including fact that detective knew several police witnesses and worked for same department); cf. State v. Davis, 137 Ariz. 551, 555, 559-60, 672 P.2d 480, 484, 488-89 (App.1983) (upholding refusal to strike civilian police assistant for cause, emphasizing “he was not acquainted with the police officers in this case”).
¶ 12 By broadly excluding people “interested directly or indirectly in the matter under investigation,” § 21-211(2) removes from the jury venire those whose financial or professional self-interest may compete with the interests of justice.8 Contrary to the suggestion of our concurring colleague, § 21-211(2) does not give a trial court discretion to consider whether a venireperson with a direct or indirect interest may nonetheless serve fairly and impartially. Rather, it states that such a person “shall be disqualified.” 9 Thus, although we do not question the sincerity of the deputy’s avowals of impartiality or the trial court’s implicit trust in those avowals, such avowals do not render a venireperson with a direct or indirect interest in the matter eligible to sit on the jury. [78]*78We likewise accept, and defer to, the trial court’s express and implicit findings on the nature of the deputy’s relationships to the witnesses and investigating agency. But, for the reasons stated above, we cannot agree with, nor need we defer to, the trial court’s legal conclusion that the deputy had no interest, direct or indirect, in the outcome of a case investigated by his office. See Lopez, 177 Ariz. at 373-75, 868 P.2d at 956-58 (reversing trial court and concluding insurance policyholders had direct interest in case and were therefore disqualified under § 21-211(2) when verdict could affect their premiums).
¶ 13 Our concurring colleague maintains that A.R.S. § 21-202(B)(5) expresses a legislative intent at odds with disqualifying a peace officer pursuant to § 21-211(2). But § 21-202(B)(5) merely provides peace officers the right to be excused from jury service at their discretion upon application. No language in that provision suggests that any class of citizens is exempt from the requirements for jury service set forth in § 21-211, including peace officers who choose to serve. And although we agree that § 21-202(B)(5) contemplates that peace officers are generally eligible for jury service, nothing in our analysis limits peace officers’ rights to participate injury service in all cases, civil or criminal, wherein their employer has no direct or indirect interest.
¶ 14 The concurring opinion also suggests that we have announced a new rule not contemplated by either our legislature or our supreme court. But the legislature, not this court, enacted § 21-211(2), which renders any person ineligible for jury service who has a direct or indirect interest in the case in question. And, assuming arguendo our supreme court has the constitutional authority to override legislation directed at the trial process, nothing in our supreme court’s own rule relating to juror challenges, or the historical modifications to that rule, suggests any intention to modify or supplant § 21-211(2). See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 18.4; see also Seisinger v. Siebel, 220 Ariz. 85, ¶ 8, 203 P.3d 483, 487 (2009) (supreme court recognizes “statutory enactments that supplement rather than conflict with rules” promulgated by judicial branch).
¶ 15 For all the above reasons, we conclude a peace officer has, at a minimum, an indirect interest in the outcome of a criminal investigation conducted by his employer. The trial court therefore erred when it denied Eddington’s motion to strike the deputy from the venire panel.10
¶ 16 In evaluating the deputy’s fitness to serve as a juror here, we are also concerned by the deputy’s awareness of Eddington’s in-custody status. Contrary to the prosecutor’s suggestion below, this was neither common knowledge nor a trivial fact. Indeed, criminal defendants have a constitutional right to appear in non-jail attire precisely to avoid reminding the jury of a defendant’s in-custody status — knowledge that would create an “unacceptable risk” that the presumption of innocence will be eroded. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). If forcing a criminal defendant to appear before a jury in jail attire erodes the presumption of innocence sufficiently to violate the defendant’s right to due process, we are skeptical that a trial court retains the discretion to empanel jurors who are aware of a defendant’s in-custody status, especially given the ease with which a venireperson may be replaced at that early stage in the proceedings. Cf. State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 35, 906 P.2d 542, 568 (1995) (finding motion for mistrial based on witnesses’ testimony exposing defendant’s custodial status properly denied when information “not prejudicial” in context of case).
¶ 17 The trial court’s reasoning in rejecting the motion to strike suggests the court may have believed it lacked the discretion to strike the deputy once he sincerely avowed his impartiality. Indeed, a potential juror’s inability to “render a fair and impartial verdict” is the only criterion articulated under Rule 18.4(b) for excusing a juror for [79]*79cause. But we emphasize that our courts retain broad discretion under that rale to determine “[w]hen there is [a] reasonable ground to believe” that a venireperson could not be fair and impartial notwithstanding the venireperson’s own sincere belief to the contrary. See State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, ¶ 50, 116 P.3d 1193, 1208 (2005) (assuming juror sincere about being able to apply law, trial court “could have reasonably determined that the juror’s views would substantially impair his ability to deliberate impartially”). Thus, even if our legislature had not provided additional eligibility requirements for jury service in § 21-211(2) pertinent to this case, the trial court was not obligated under Rule 18.4(b) to retain the deputy on the venire panel merely because he had testified sincerely that he believed he could be fair and impartial.
¶ 18 Although we find Eddington’s motion to strike should have been granted, the trial court’s ruling is nevertheless subject to harmless error review. See State v. Garza, 216 Ariz. 56, ¶ 32, 163 P.3d 1006, 1015 (2007); State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, ¶ 28, 68 P.3d 418, 424 (2003). “Reversal is not required if a fair and impartial jury was ultimately empanelled.” Garza, 216 Ariz. 56, ¶ 32, 163 P.3d at 1015; accord State v. Kuhs, 223 Ariz. 376, ¶ 27, 224 P.3d 192, 198 (2010). The state argues the error was harmless because Eddington was ultimately tried by a fair and impartial jury. We agree.
¶ 19 Eddington contends he was prejudiced because his use of a peremptory strike on the deputy prevented him from striking a juror who worked as an engineer for Raytheon and had rendered a guilty verdict in another ease. Although these details may have made this juror less appealing to Eddington, they in no way suggested the juror was biased or could not serve as a fair and impartial trier of fact. Cf. State v. MacDonald, 110 Ariz. 152, 153-54, 515 P.2d 1172, 1173-74 (1973) (finding no prejudice when defendant merely argued “peremptory challenges are very valuable” and was prevented from “exercising his peremptory challenges to his best advantage”). “[W]hen a defendant secures an impartial jury, even through the curative use of a peremptory challenge, a conviction by that jury will not have prejudiced that defendant.” Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, ¶ 31, 68 P.3d at 425. Because Eddington has not articulated beyond mere speculation how the trial court’s error affected the outcome of the case, we find the error harmless.
¶20 We recognize that in order to preserve an appellate claim that a trial court erred in failing to strike a venireperson for cause, a defendant must use a peremptory strike to remove that person from the panel. State v. Rubio, 219 Ariz. 177, ¶ 12, 195 P.3d 214, 218 (App.2008). Thus, under all but the most extraordinary circumstances, defendants will be unable, as here, to show prejudice and secure any relief arising from a trial court’s erroneous failure to strike a venireperson for cause. See Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, ¶ 31, 68 P.3d at 425 (acknowledging near impossibility of determining effect on trial when defendant uses peremptory strike to remove juror challenged for cause). For this reason, an appellate challenge to a trial court's failure to strike a potential juror for cause would, in most criminal eases, evade review if we routinely declined to reach such claims in every case wherein we found no prejudice from the error. We think the better practice is to address such claims on their merits when, as here, we can provide our trial courts important guidance in so doing.
Jury Instructions
¶ 21 Eddington contends he is entitled to appellate relief because the trial court gave three erroneous jury instructions, all of which he failed to challenge below. Because he did not properly allege these errors in the trial court when they could have been corrected, see Ariz. R.Crim. P. 21.3(e), Eddington has forfeited appellate review for all but fundamental error. See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, ¶¶ 19-20, 115 P.3d 601, 607-08 (2005). Under this more restrictive standard, a defendant bears the burden of establishing that error occurred, that the error was fundamental, and that it resulted in prejudice. Id. ¶ 20.
¶ 22 A principal reason for applying the fundamental error standard of review [80]*80is to discourage defendants from attempting to use a curable error as a “ ‘hole card’ ” on appeal in the event they are dissatisfied with the results of their trial. Id. ¶ 19, quoting State v. Valdez, 160 Ariz. 9, 13, 770 P.2d 313, 317 (1989), overruled on other grounds by Krone v. Hotham, 181 Ariz. 364, 890 P.2d 1149 (1995). So, although Eddington is correct that erroneous jury instructions may often be characterized as fundamental error, e.g., State v. Schad, 142 Ariz. 619, 621, 691 P.2d 710, 712 (1984), it is also the case that defendants will seldom obtain appellate relief on the basis of defective instructions to which they raised no objection in the trial court. State v. Gomez, 211 Ariz. 494, ¶ 20, 123 P.3d 1131, 1136 (2005). A particular showing of prejudice is required. Id. ¶ 21.
Second-Degree Murder
¶ 23 The trial court defined second-degree murder with the following instruction:
The crime of second degree murder requires proof of one of the following:
1. The defendant intentionally caused the death of another person; or
2. The defendant caused the death of another person by conduct which the defendant knew would cause death or serious physical injury; or
3. Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, the defendant recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of death and thereby caused the death of another person. The risk must be such that disregarding it was a gross deviation from what a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would have done; or
4. The defendant intentionally, knowingly or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of death and caused the death of another person.
The court then clarified that “recklessly” as used in the above instruction “means that a defendant is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that conduct will result in the death of another,” adding, “The risk must be such that disregarding it is a gross deviation from what a reasonable person would do in the situation.”
¶24 Eddington now contends the fourth point listed above was erroneous. In his view, this portion of the instruction “inserted a fourth way of committing second degree murder, which reemphasized the third way (extreme indifference recklessness).” It follows, he claims, that the instruction confused jurors by “including] the terms intentional or knowing, which are not elements of extreme indifference second degree murder.” He also maintains the instruction was deficient because “it neglect[ed] to include the ‘gross deviation’ language required for extreme indifference second degree murder.” All these arguments rest on an inaccurate characterization and isolated reading of the provision in question.
¶25 Reading this instruction in its overall context, as we must, see State ex rel. Thomas v. Granville, 211 Ariz. 468, ¶ 8, 123 P.3d 662, 665 (2005), we find that it correctly stated the law, even though the fourth enumerated point was unnecessary and arguably inadvisable. Contrary to Eddington’s interpretation, this fourth provision neither “reemphasized” second-degree murder with extreme indifference to human life nor defined a new, “fictional” offense. Rather, it simply restated the three ways of committing second-degree murder. The statements regarding mens rea therefore were accurate. Second-degree murder can be committed by “intentionally ... [or] knowing[ly] causing] the death of another person,” as the challenged provision states. See AR.S. § 13-1104(A)(1), (2). What distinguishes this crime from first-degree murder, as the trial court correctly noted elsewhere in its instructions, is that it lacks the element of premeditation. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1104(A), 13-1105(A)(1).
¶ 26 As to the fourth point’s definition of reckless second-degree murder under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, see § 13-1104(A)(3), this, too, was a correct statement of the law when read together with the trial court’s instructions as a whole. See State v. Schrock, 149 Ariz. 433, 440, 719 P.2d 1049, 1056 (1986). Eddington claims the repetition of the elements of reck[81]*81less second-degree murder did not “include that the deviation must be a gross deviation.” But he overlooks that, immediately after reading the challenged provision, the court instructed the jurors that a guilty verdict based on reckless second-degree murder required them to find the defendant’s disregard for the risk of death represented a “gross deviation” from reasonable standards of behavior. See A.R.S. §§ 13 — 105(10)(c), 13-1104(A)(3).
¶ 27 Eddington further criticizes the instruction because it omitted the word “thereby” in the fourth point, which he claims implied “the conduct d[id] not necessarily have to be connected to the mental state.” But the instruction implied nothing of the sort. In summarizing the three ways of committing second-degree murder, the trial court merely omitted this word to avoid the flawed syntax that would result from saying the offense could be committed by “intentionally or knowingly ... thereby causing the death of another person.” It was apparent in context that any reckless conduct must have been the cause of death for the jury to pronounce guilt. Thus, despite the formal differences between the third and fourth points, the jury was able to reach a legally correct decision on the second-degree murder charge. See Granville, 211 Ariz. 468, ¶ 8, 123 P.3d at 665.
¶ 28 Although the fourth provision may be criticized for its redundancy, it correctly set forth the applicable law when read in conjunction with the court’s other instructions. Accordingly, we find no error, fundamental or otherwise, that would entitle Eddington to relief.11
Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter
¶29 The trial court instructed the jury that second-degree murder and heat-of-passion manslaughter12 were both lesser-in-eluded offenses of first-degree murder. In an instruction fashioned from State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437, 438, 924 P.2d 441, 442 (1996), the court then told the jurors they must not consider the lesser manslaughter offense unless they either acquitted Eddington of the greater offense of second-degree murder or were unable to reach a verdict after deliberation. We found no error in the use of the LeBlanc instruction as applied to second-degree murder and heat-of-passion manslaughter in State v. Garcia, 220 Ariz. 49, ¶¶ 3, 6-8, 202 P.3d 514, 515, 516-17 (App.2008).
¶ 30 Eddington claims, however, that Garcia was wrongly decided and that LeBlanc does not apply to second-degree murder and heat-of-passion manslaughter because the latter is not truly a lesser-included offense of the former. See Peak v. Acuña, 203 Ariz. 83, ¶¶ 5-6, 50 P.3d 833, 834-35 (2002) (holding heat-of-passion manslaughter not lesser-in-eluded offense of second-degree murder for double jeopardy purposes). The manslaughter offense, he points out, is comprised of the same elements as second-degree murder but has the additional elements — or “circumstance[s],” as the court described them in Peak — of being caused by a sudden quarrel or heat of passion that is the result of adequate provocation. 203 Ariz. 83, ¶ 6, 50 P.3d at 834. Thus, he claims, as applied here, the LeBlanc instruction “prevented the jury from properly considering whether [Eddington] was guilty of second-degree murder or manslaughter.”
¶ 31 This argument is logically compelling, given that we presume juries follow instructions, LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. at 439, 924 P.2d at 443, and a jury literally following the LeBlanc instruction would never reach the issue of adequate provocation in order to find a defendant guilty of manslaughter under § 13-1103(A)(2) rather than second-degree [82]*82murder. See Garcia, 220 Ariz. 49, ¶¶ 6-7, 202 P.3d at 516 (acknowledging logic of argument against applying LeBlanc instruction to heat-of-passion manslaughter). But, although the point Eddington raises is academically interesting and may warrant future clarification by our supreme court, we need not resolve it here, given the fundamental-error posture of this case.
¶ 32 Even if we assume it was error to give the LeBlanc instruction as to heat-of-passion manslaughter, the jury was aware both from defense counsel’s argument and from the trial court’s instructions that, if the murder was the result of a sudden quarrel or the heat of passion stemming from adequate provocation by the victim, Eddington would be guilty of the less serious offense of manslaughter, not second-degree murder. The jury was instructed pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-115(B) as follows: “If you determine that the defendant is guilty of either second degree murder or manslaughter by sudden quarrel or heat of passion but you have a reasonable doubt as to which it was, you must find the defendant guilty of manslaughter by sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” The lesser offense was therefore in jurors’ minds when they rendered their verdict on second-degree murder, and they had been clearly instructed that adequate provocation would be a ground for finding Eddington not guilty of the offense of which he was convicted. Cf. Garcia, 220 Ariz. 49, ¶ 7, 202 P.3d at 516 (presuming jury would not disregard definition of manslaughter when rendering verdict on second-degree murder). Accordingly, we do not find the instruction here resulted in prejudice.
¶ 33 Given this lack of prejudice, we need not address Eddington’s additional arguments based on his alternative contentions that (1) inadequate provocation is an element of second-degree murder or (2) adequate provocation is an affirmative defense that a defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence. Assuming Eddington is correct on either point, the jury’s verdict here included an implicit finding that the murder was not the result of adequate provocation. And, as to the second point specifically, he was not prejudiced to the extent the trial court’s instructions relieved him of his burden of proof. Cf. State v. Valverde, 220 Ariz. 582, ¶ 17, 208 P.3d 233, 237 (2009) (finding no prejudice in failure to instruct jury regarding defendant’s burden of proving self-defense). Moreover, Eddington’s failure to support his prejudice argument in his opening brief with citations to the record provides an independent ground to reject his claims. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 31.13(c)(1)(vi) (requiring appellant to provide citation to record for each contention raised).13 Because he has not discharged his burden of showing prejudice pursuant to Henderson, we deny relief.
Manslaughter
¶34 The trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the lesser offense of manslaughter only if it acquitted Eddington of first- and second-degree murder and heat-of-passion manslaughter or if, after a full consideration of the facts, it was unable to reach a verdict on these three offenses. The court then provided the following manslaughter instruction:
The crime of manslaughter requires proof that the defendant:
1. caused the death of another person; and
2. was aware of and showed a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death.
The above definition of recklessly applies to this offense.
Second degree murder and manslaughter may both result from recklessness. The difference is that the culpable recklessness involved in manslaughter is less than the culpable recklessness involved in second degree murder.
If you determine that the defendant is guilty of either second degree murder or manslaughter but you have a reasonable doubt as to which it was, you must find the defendant guilty of manslaughter.
¶ 35 Eddington contends the trial court “prejudicially misstated the law by errone[83]*83ously defining reckless manslaughter as a lesser included offense of heat of passion manslaughter.” He alleges he suffered prejudice, specifically, because “the jury was instructed that it had to either acquit [or hang] on heat of passion manslaughter ... before it could consider reckless manslaughter,” when jurors should have been “permitted ... and instructed to ... consider both forms of manslaughter at the same time.”
¶ 36 But we find no prejudice here. The jury was properly instructed that manslaughter is a lesser-ineluded offense of reckless second-degree murder. See State v. Valenzuela, 194 Ariz. 404, ¶ 11, 984 P.2d 12, 14-15 (1999). The jury was also made aware that second-degree murder and manslaughter are similar offenses and that, to find Eddington guilty of the greater offense, all jurors had to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of second-degree murder rather than manslaughter. The record thus suggests the jury necessarily considered the elements of manslaughter pursuant to AR.S. § 13-1103(A)(1) when it found Eddington guilty of second-degree murder.
¶ 37 To the extent the trial court erred in informing the jurors they first had to consider heat-of-passion manslaughter before they could consider reckless manslaughter, any such error did not affect the verdict. Cf. State v. White, 144 Ariz. 245, 247, 697 P.2d 328, 330 (1985) (jury necessarily rejects all lesser-ineluded offenses by convicting of greatest offense). Thus, no prejudice has been shown on the record before us.
Disposition
¶ 38 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Eddington’s conviction and sentence.
CONCURRING: GARYE L. VÁSQUEZ, Presiding Judge.