Opinion
LAVERY, J.
The defendant, Thyatira U. Drakeford, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after her guilty plea, of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (l).1 On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are necessary for our review of this appeal. On April 21, 1995, the defendant and the victim, Cherry Rodriquez, were patrons at Club Mirage in Rocky Hill. Prior to that date, while they were in high school together, the defendant and the victim had argued. The animosity between the two women had lingered. While they were at Club Mirage, the defendant and the victim encountered one another and exchanged words. During the course of their exchange, the defendant slashed the victim’s face with a sharp object, causing her serious injury. The defendant fled the scene but was later apprehended and confessed to having injured [242]*242the victim. The defendant pleaded not guilty to the information.
Prior to trial, the defendant and the state entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which the defendant would plead guilty to assault in the first degree in return for a sentence of twenty years, suspended after eight years, with five years probation and the opportunity to argue for less prison time. On December 8, 1997, the trial court canvassed the defendant regarding her plea.2 [243]*243During the course of the canvass, the defendant told the trial court that she understood that she was waiving her constitutional rights and that she understood the [244]*244charges against her. When asked if she agreed with the facts related to the charge, the defendant admitted to having slashed the victim’s face, but claimed that she [245]*245had acted in self-defense. The defendant told the trial court that she was pleading guilty because of certain statements that she had given to the police and because she did not think she would prevail at trial. The trial court told the defendant that self-defense was a total defense to the charge of assault in the first degree. The defendant also said that she did not want to proceed to trial. The trial court indicated that the defendant’s plea could be accepted under the Alford doctrine.3 The defendant affirmatively responded that she understood all of the rights she was waiving by pleading under the Alford doctrine. The trial court accepted the defendant’s guilty plea, set a date for sentencing and informed her that she could not come back to court with another attorney or by herself and withdraw the plea unless she had a valid legal reason to do so.
Prior to her being sentenced, the defendant retained private counsel,4 who filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. In her motion, the defendant claimed that her plea was accepted without substantial compliance with Practice Book § 39-195 because she did not fully [246]*246understand the nature of her right to persist in her plea of not guilty and her right to be tried by a jury or a judge. The defendant also claimed that her plea was not voluntary because she believed that no effective defense could be offered on her behalf and that her only alternative was to relinquish her right to trial and to enter a guilty plea. Also, the defendant claimed that the trial court did not ask whether her willingness to plead guilty resulted from prior discussions between the prosecutor and the defendant or her counsel6 as required by Practice Book § 39-20.7
The trial court held a hearing on the defendant’s motion to withdraw on March 11, 1998. After hearing testimony from the defendant and her brother, Jamie Scott, and arguments of counsel, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion. During cross-examination by the state, the defendant admitted that she had discussed self-defense with her counsel prior to making her plea.8 [247]*247The court then imposed a sentence of fifteen years, suspended after five years, with five years of probation. The defendant appealed, claiming the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to withdraw because she did not understand the law in relation to the facts and, therefore, her plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made. The defendant argues that the [248]*248record is devoid of evidence that the trial court or her attorney informed her of the elements of self-defense.
“A guilty plea, once accepted, may be withdrawn only with the permission of the court. State v. Rish, 17 Conn. App. 447, 451, 553 A.2d 1145, cert. denied, 211 Conn. 802, 559 A.2d 1137, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818, 110 S. Ct. 72, 107 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1989). The court is required to permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea upon proof of any ground set forth in Practice Book § 721 [now § 39-27], State v. Collins, 207 Conn. 590, 597, 542 A.2d 1131 (1988); State v. Lasher, 190 Conn. 259, 265, 460 A.2d 970 (1983). Whether such proof is made is a question for the court in its sound discretion, and a denial of permission to withdraw is reversible only if that discretion has been abused. State v. Crenshaw, [210 Conn. 304, 308-309, 554 A.2d 1074 (1989)]; Szarwak v. Warden, 167 Conn. 10, 23, 355 A.2d 49 (1974).” State v. Morant, 20 Conn. App. 630, 633, 569 A.2d 1140, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 818, 576 A.2d 547 (1990).
“It is axiomatic that unless a plea of guilty is made knowingly and voluntarily, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore voidable. State v. Childree, 189 Conn. 114, 119, 454 A.2d 1274 (1983). By entering a guilty plea, the defendant waives his constitutional rights to a jury trial and to confront his accusers as well as his privilege against self-incrimination. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 288, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969); State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 542 A.2d 299 (1988). It is well settled that the record must affirmatively disclose that the defendant’s choice was made intelligently and voluntarily. State v. Childree, supra, 120.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ramos, 23 Conn. App. 1, 3-4, 579 A.2d 560 (1990).
The essence of the defendant’s claim on appeal is that her guilty plea was not made voluntarily and intelligently because neither the trial court nor her attorney [249]
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Opinion
LAVERY, J.
The defendant, Thyatira U. Drakeford, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after her guilty plea, of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (l).1 On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are necessary for our review of this appeal. On April 21, 1995, the defendant and the victim, Cherry Rodriquez, were patrons at Club Mirage in Rocky Hill. Prior to that date, while they were in high school together, the defendant and the victim had argued. The animosity between the two women had lingered. While they were at Club Mirage, the defendant and the victim encountered one another and exchanged words. During the course of their exchange, the defendant slashed the victim’s face with a sharp object, causing her serious injury. The defendant fled the scene but was later apprehended and confessed to having injured [242]*242the victim. The defendant pleaded not guilty to the information.
Prior to trial, the defendant and the state entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which the defendant would plead guilty to assault in the first degree in return for a sentence of twenty years, suspended after eight years, with five years probation and the opportunity to argue for less prison time. On December 8, 1997, the trial court canvassed the defendant regarding her plea.2 [243]*243During the course of the canvass, the defendant told the trial court that she understood that she was waiving her constitutional rights and that she understood the [244]*244charges against her. When asked if she agreed with the facts related to the charge, the defendant admitted to having slashed the victim’s face, but claimed that she [245]*245had acted in self-defense. The defendant told the trial court that she was pleading guilty because of certain statements that she had given to the police and because she did not think she would prevail at trial. The trial court told the defendant that self-defense was a total defense to the charge of assault in the first degree. The defendant also said that she did not want to proceed to trial. The trial court indicated that the defendant’s plea could be accepted under the Alford doctrine.3 The defendant affirmatively responded that she understood all of the rights she was waiving by pleading under the Alford doctrine. The trial court accepted the defendant’s guilty plea, set a date for sentencing and informed her that she could not come back to court with another attorney or by herself and withdraw the plea unless she had a valid legal reason to do so.
Prior to her being sentenced, the defendant retained private counsel,4 who filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. In her motion, the defendant claimed that her plea was accepted without substantial compliance with Practice Book § 39-195 because she did not fully [246]*246understand the nature of her right to persist in her plea of not guilty and her right to be tried by a jury or a judge. The defendant also claimed that her plea was not voluntary because she believed that no effective defense could be offered on her behalf and that her only alternative was to relinquish her right to trial and to enter a guilty plea. Also, the defendant claimed that the trial court did not ask whether her willingness to plead guilty resulted from prior discussions between the prosecutor and the defendant or her counsel6 as required by Practice Book § 39-20.7
The trial court held a hearing on the defendant’s motion to withdraw on March 11, 1998. After hearing testimony from the defendant and her brother, Jamie Scott, and arguments of counsel, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion. During cross-examination by the state, the defendant admitted that she had discussed self-defense with her counsel prior to making her plea.8 [247]*247The court then imposed a sentence of fifteen years, suspended after five years, with five years of probation. The defendant appealed, claiming the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to withdraw because she did not understand the law in relation to the facts and, therefore, her plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made. The defendant argues that the [248]*248record is devoid of evidence that the trial court or her attorney informed her of the elements of self-defense.
“A guilty plea, once accepted, may be withdrawn only with the permission of the court. State v. Rish, 17 Conn. App. 447, 451, 553 A.2d 1145, cert. denied, 211 Conn. 802, 559 A.2d 1137, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818, 110 S. Ct. 72, 107 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1989). The court is required to permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea upon proof of any ground set forth in Practice Book § 721 [now § 39-27], State v. Collins, 207 Conn. 590, 597, 542 A.2d 1131 (1988); State v. Lasher, 190 Conn. 259, 265, 460 A.2d 970 (1983). Whether such proof is made is a question for the court in its sound discretion, and a denial of permission to withdraw is reversible only if that discretion has been abused. State v. Crenshaw, [210 Conn. 304, 308-309, 554 A.2d 1074 (1989)]; Szarwak v. Warden, 167 Conn. 10, 23, 355 A.2d 49 (1974).” State v. Morant, 20 Conn. App. 630, 633, 569 A.2d 1140, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 818, 576 A.2d 547 (1990).
“It is axiomatic that unless a plea of guilty is made knowingly and voluntarily, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore voidable. State v. Childree, 189 Conn. 114, 119, 454 A.2d 1274 (1983). By entering a guilty plea, the defendant waives his constitutional rights to a jury trial and to confront his accusers as well as his privilege against self-incrimination. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 288, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969); State v. Wright, 207 Conn. 276, 542 A.2d 299 (1988). It is well settled that the record must affirmatively disclose that the defendant’s choice was made intelligently and voluntarily. State v. Childree, supra, 120.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ramos, 23 Conn. App. 1, 3-4, 579 A.2d 560 (1990).
The essence of the defendant’s claim on appeal is that her guilty plea was not made voluntarily and intelligently because neither the trial court nor her attorney [249]*249informed her of the elements of self-defense and, therefore, she did not understand the law in relation to the facts. The defendant, however, has not cited any law to support her contention that the trial court must explain the elements of a defense to a criminal defendant during its canvass of the defendant prior to accepting a guilty plea. The defendant also has not brought to our attention any facts in the record that would lead us to conclude that her trial counsel did not explain the elements of self-defense to her. Indeed, the record indicates that she discussed self-defense with her counsel. See footnote 8. When the trial court told her that self-defense was a total defense to the charge, she said that she understood. In response to the trial court’s canvass, the defendant indicated that she had had enough time to discuss her case with her attorney, a public defender, and that she was satisfied with the legal advice she received. As the defendant correctly noted in her brief to this court, the trial court may presume that defense counsel has explained the nature of the charges to the defendant. State v. Alicea, 41 Conn. App. 47, 56, 674 A.2d 468 (1996). Nothing presented to us by the defendant leads us to conclude that the trial court improperly relied on that presumption.
On the basis of our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court fulfilled the requirements of Practice Book §§ 39-19 and 39-20 when it accepted the defendant’s guilty plea pursuant to the Alford doctrine. The trial court canvassed the defendant in open court. The defendant said that her plea was voluntary and not the result of force or threats. The trial court explained to the defendant the nature of the charge of assault in the first degree, the maximum twenty year sentence and the mandatory minimum five year sentence required by the statute, that the defendant had the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea, the right to be tried [250]*250by a jury or a judge, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and the right not to incriminate herself. In addition, the trial court explained that the defendant had the right to have the state prove her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to present a defense of any kind and that self-defense was a total defense to the charge. When asked, the defendant said that she understood all of the questions that were put to her and that she had no questions.
At the hearing on her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, the defendant testified that she, in fact, had lied about understanding what was going on during the canvass because she was scared and confused. The trial court found the defendant’s testimony to be less than credible. The defendant is a high school graduate, who has worked as a claims representative for one of the major insurance companies in this state. During the canvass, the defendant had no trouble speaking up when asked if she agreed with the facts as the trial court represented them. She told the court that she had, in fact, assaulted the victim but that she had done so in self-defense. The trial court found the defendant to be the type of person who understood the questions put to her and who would have spoken up if she felt that she was forced, threatened or dissatisfied.
The defendant claims that the trial court failed to relate the law with respect to self-defense to the facts of this case. Such explanations are to be given by defense counsel. See State v. Torres, 182 Conn. 176, 184, 438 A.2d 46 (1980). The trial court is not to assume the role of defense counsel unless it is constitutionally required to do so. See State v. Gilnite, 202 Conn. 369, 383-84, 521 A.2d 547 (1987); State v. Brown, 18 Conn. App. 716, 721, 559 A.2d 1179 (1989). The language “an understanding of the law in relation to the facts” pertains to the elements of the crime with which the defendant is charged, not the elements of a defense to the crime. [251]*251State v. Wideman, 38 Conn. App. 581, 585-87, 663 A.2d 409 (1995); see State v. Childree, supra, 189 Conn. 119-21.
We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly canvassed the defendant and did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea, which the trial court found to be voluntarily and intelligently made.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.