State v. Dixon

Court of Appeals of Arizona

State v. Dixon

608 P.2d 64, 125 Ariz. 127, 1980 Ariz. App. LEXIS 470

CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona

DecidedJanuary 7, 1980

DocketNo. 2 CA-CR 1878

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 608 P.2d 64 (State v. Dixon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Dixon, 608 P.2d 64, 125 Ariz. 127, 1980 Ariz. App. LEXIS 470 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).

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Opinion

OPINION

HATHAWAY, Chief Judge.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pled no contest to the crime of criminal damage, a class 6 felony, and admitted a prior felony conviction. He was sentenced to the presumptive sentence of 2.25 years imprisonment in the custody of the' Department of Corrections, as provided in the agreement.

The sole contention on appeal is that the court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea. Appellant attempts to denigrate the validity of his plea because he did not know that it could only be withdrawn to correct a manifest injustice. He would impose a duty upon the trial court, before accepting a plea, to so advise him because the written plea agreement implies a “right” to withdraw a plea. We do not so construe the agreement nor do we find that an inability to withdraw a plea is a consequence of which the court must advise. The record reflects a voluntary, knowing and intelligent plea. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion as no manifest injustice was shown.

Affirmed.

HOWARD and RICHMOND, JJ., concur.

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OPINION

HATHAWAY, Chief Judge.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pled no contest to the crime of criminal damage, a class 6 felony, and admitted a prior felony conviction. He was sentenced to the presumptive sentence of 2.25 years imprisonment in the custody of the' Department of Corrections, as provided in the agreement.

The sole contention on appeal is that the court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea. Appellant attempts to denigrate the validity of his plea because he did not know that it could only be withdrawn to correct a manifest injustice. He would impose a duty upon the trial court, before accepting a plea, to so advise him because the written plea agreement implies a “right” to withdraw a plea. We do not so construe the agreement nor do we find that an inability to withdraw a plea is a consequence of which the court must advise. The record reflects a voluntary, knowing and intelligent plea. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion as no manifest injustice was shown.

Affirmed.

HOWARD and RICHMOND, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

608 P.2d 64, 125 Ariz. 127, 1980 Ariz. App. LEXIS 470, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-dixon-arizctapp-1980.

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