State v. DiStefano

593 A.2d 1351, 1991 R.I. LEXIS 137, 1991 WL 120744

• Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
• Decided: July 2, 1991
• Docket: 90-612-C.A.
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This case comes before the Supreme Court pursuant to a motion filed by the defendants seeking to appeal a Superior Court judgment of conviction. Codefend-ant David DiStefano was found guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon, and co-defendant Michael DiStefano was found guilty of assault and malicious damage to property. The defendants claim that the trial justice committed error (1) by not following the proper procedure for waiving a jury trial, (2) by overlooking and misconceiving material evidence, and (3) by allowing the prosecution to cross-examine David DiStefano with respect to his use of alcoholic beverages on the night of the alleged incident. After hearing the arguments of counsel and reviewing the memoranda submitted by the parties, it is the conclusion of this court that the defendants’ second and third claims lack merit. The following discussion and analysis, therefore, will focus on the defendants’ first contention.

Rule 23(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part: “Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant in open court waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court.” In the case at bar defendants did in fact voluntarily waive their right to a jury trial in open court after having been informed by the trial justice of this right and its serious nature. They did not, nor were they asked, however, to put the waiver in writing.

The purpose of requiring a defendant to execute a written waiver is both to ensure that the defendant is aware of the importance and the significance of the right he or she is waiving and to provide evidence of the defendant’s consent. Although this is a case of first impression in Rhode Island, an examination of decisions from other jurisdictions reveals that criminal rules of court pertaining to jury waiver are often strictly construed. See Rice v. People, 565 P.2d 940, 941 (Colo.1977); Jones v. State, 452 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984); People v. Rimmer, 59 Mich.App. 645, 647-48, 230 N.W.2d 170, 171 (1975); People v. Brown, 57 Mich.App. 568, 571-72, 226 N.W.2d 563, 565 (1975). Additionally it is well-settled that when a statute is free from ambiguity and expresses a clear and definite meaning, we must impart to the words contained therein their plain and obvious meaning. Providence Journal Co. v. Kane, 577 A.2d 661, 664 (R.I.1990); Wilson v. Krasnoff, 560 A.2d 335, 339 (R.I.1989); Kastal v. Hickory House, Inc., 95 R.I. 366, 369, 187 A.2d 262, 264 (1963). Consequently because a rule of court has the full force and effect of law we must accord the rule the same principles of construction. See Letendre v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 74 R.I. 276, 281, 60 A.2d 471, 474 (1948). We conclude, therefore, that the clear and unambiguous rule in this jurisdiction requiring a written jury waiver must be adhered to strictly.

Accordingly the defendants’ appeal is sustained, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial.

WEISBERGER, J., did not participate. SHEA, J., recused himself from the deliberations and the decision on this matter.