[548]*548EDMONDS, J.
Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance. ORS 475.992(4). He assigns error to the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. We reverse.
Officer Brown had a house at 1877 S.E. Main Street under surveillance and sought a search warrant to search it. In his affidavit in support of the warrant, he mistakenly identified the house number as 1837 S.E. Main Street.1 The warrant described the premises to be searched as:
“A green single story house located at 1837 SE Main Street, Roseburg, Oregon, inclusive of any persons or vehicles located thereon.”
The warrant did not refer to the affidavit or any attachments and it gave authority to search to “any police officer of Douglas County.” Brown executed the warrant by searching the house at 1877 S.E. Main Street.
Defendant argues that the warrant authorized a search for a house different than the one searched and, therefore, the search of the house at 1877 S.E. Main Street was unauthorized. See ORS 133.585.2 The state argues that the erroneous address in the search warrant did not render the description of the premises constitutionally defective, because the officer who executed the warrant was also the affiant on [549]*549whose affidavit the warrant was based, and he had personal knowledge of the premises for which he sought authorization to search. It relies on State v. Blackburn/Barber, 266 Or 28, 511 P2d 381 (1973), and State v. Cole, 84 Or App 497, 734 P2d 393 (1987).
In State v. Blackburn/Barber, supra, a search warrant described the premises to be searched as “apartment 2 in the basement” of a specified residence, “said apartment having the letters ECURB on the door.” The affiant who had obtained the warrant was also in charge of executing it. He had obtained his information from an informant who had previously visited the premises and had observed marijuana there. When the warrant was executed, the executing officer observed the number 2 on Blackburn’s room, and that room was searched. The police also searched an unnumbered basement apartment that had the letters “ECURB” on its door. The court said:
“When the officers possessed a warrant which authorized the search of Apartment 2 which had ECURB on the door and there was no such apartment, but there were an Apartment 2 and an unnumbered apartment with ECURB on the door, they could not execute the warrant if real doubt existed as to which was intended. We hold there could be no real doubt as to which of the premises was intended by the warrant and that it could be ascertained with reasonable certainty. No one could have made a mistake or been confused about a word like ECURB, but anyone could easily have made a mistake about a numeral. ECURB was a significant and more unmistakable guide than a mere number.
<<* * * * *
“There was no authority to search any part of the premises except the apartment with ECURB on the door. As a result, the evidence against Blackburn which was seized in his Apartment 2 was properly quashed by the trial court * * 266 Or at 35.
In State v. Cole, supra, a detective obtained a warrant to search premises described as “1560 S.W. Avery Lane, Corvallis.” The warrant was based on an affidavit requesting a warrant to search “1560 S.W. Allen Lane, Corvallis.” The warrant was executed at 1560 S.W. Allen Street. We said:
“In this case, the * * * warrant not only gave an address, it also described the house to be searched. Thomig [the affiant [550]*550and the executing officer] was familiar with the house. Evidence at the suppression hearing showed that there was little if any likelihood that the house could be confused with neighboring property or that the officers would enter property that they had no authority to enter. We conclude that, with the description of the house, the warrant was sufficiently definite to satisfy the requirements of ORS 133.565(2)(b) and Article I, section 9. See State v. Blackburn/Barber, supra. * * *.” 84 Or App at 501.
In State v. Ingram, 104 Or App 389, 802 P2d 656 (1990), we held, under ORS 133.565(2)(b),3 that, if a warrant describes a general category of persons such as “occupants,” the warrant is sufficient if there is probable cause in the affidavit to search all occupants. Conversely, if the person to be searched is described with particularity in the affidavit, the warrant must contain a similar description to comply with the particularity requirements of ORS 133.565(2)(b) and Article I, section 9. In Ingram, the defect in the warrants was not that the executing officer could not tell from the face of the warrant whom he was to search. Rather, the question was whether the description on the face of each warrant was so general that it authorized the search of individuals for whom no probable cause to search existed.
Likewise, in this case, the problem is not that the description on the face of the warrant is so ambiguous that the officer could not determine what premises were authorized to be searched. The warrant specifically describes the address to be searched as 1837 S.E. Main Street. However, unlike in Ingram, this case does not present the issue of whether the warrant meets the particularity requirements of ORS 133.565(2)(b) and Article I, section 9. Rather, the issue is whether there was authority to search premises other than those described in the warrant, when the officer had personal knowledge of the premises that were intended to be searched.
In State v. Devine, 307 Or 341, 768 P2d 913 (1989), [551]*551the court rejected arguments that the “good faith” or “reasonableness” of the officers in searching an apartment were material to the inquiry. The search warrant authorized the search of a dwelling with the number “442” located on it. When the officers who were executing the warrant arrived at the residence, they discovered an apartment located in a garage behind the house. The garage apartment and the house were not attached. The apartment had the number “442 1/2” over the door. The officers searched the apartment and seized controlled substances. The court said:
“The arguments of the parties to the Court of Appeals and to this court have turned on factual questions such as whether the police officers executing the warrant saw or should have seen the numbers ‘442 1/2’ above the door of the separate living area. From the answer to this and similar questions, the parties then argue the merits of an ‘objective’ versus a ‘subjective’ test of the reasonableness of the officers’ actions under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.
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[548]*548EDMONDS, J.
Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance. ORS 475.992(4). He assigns error to the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. We reverse.
Officer Brown had a house at 1877 S.E. Main Street under surveillance and sought a search warrant to search it. In his affidavit in support of the warrant, he mistakenly identified the house number as 1837 S.E. Main Street.1 The warrant described the premises to be searched as:
“A green single story house located at 1837 SE Main Street, Roseburg, Oregon, inclusive of any persons or vehicles located thereon.”
The warrant did not refer to the affidavit or any attachments and it gave authority to search to “any police officer of Douglas County.” Brown executed the warrant by searching the house at 1877 S.E. Main Street.
Defendant argues that the warrant authorized a search for a house different than the one searched and, therefore, the search of the house at 1877 S.E. Main Street was unauthorized. See ORS 133.585.2 The state argues that the erroneous address in the search warrant did not render the description of the premises constitutionally defective, because the officer who executed the warrant was also the affiant on [549]*549whose affidavit the warrant was based, and he had personal knowledge of the premises for which he sought authorization to search. It relies on State v. Blackburn/Barber, 266 Or 28, 511 P2d 381 (1973), and State v. Cole, 84 Or App 497, 734 P2d 393 (1987).
In State v. Blackburn/Barber, supra, a search warrant described the premises to be searched as “apartment 2 in the basement” of a specified residence, “said apartment having the letters ECURB on the door.” The affiant who had obtained the warrant was also in charge of executing it. He had obtained his information from an informant who had previously visited the premises and had observed marijuana there. When the warrant was executed, the executing officer observed the number 2 on Blackburn’s room, and that room was searched. The police also searched an unnumbered basement apartment that had the letters “ECURB” on its door. The court said:
“When the officers possessed a warrant which authorized the search of Apartment 2 which had ECURB on the door and there was no such apartment, but there were an Apartment 2 and an unnumbered apartment with ECURB on the door, they could not execute the warrant if real doubt existed as to which was intended. We hold there could be no real doubt as to which of the premises was intended by the warrant and that it could be ascertained with reasonable certainty. No one could have made a mistake or been confused about a word like ECURB, but anyone could easily have made a mistake about a numeral. ECURB was a significant and more unmistakable guide than a mere number.
<<* * * * *
“There was no authority to search any part of the premises except the apartment with ECURB on the door. As a result, the evidence against Blackburn which was seized in his Apartment 2 was properly quashed by the trial court * * 266 Or at 35.
In State v. Cole, supra, a detective obtained a warrant to search premises described as “1560 S.W. Avery Lane, Corvallis.” The warrant was based on an affidavit requesting a warrant to search “1560 S.W. Allen Lane, Corvallis.” The warrant was executed at 1560 S.W. Allen Street. We said:
“In this case, the * * * warrant not only gave an address, it also described the house to be searched. Thomig [the affiant [550]*550and the executing officer] was familiar with the house. Evidence at the suppression hearing showed that there was little if any likelihood that the house could be confused with neighboring property or that the officers would enter property that they had no authority to enter. We conclude that, with the description of the house, the warrant was sufficiently definite to satisfy the requirements of ORS 133.565(2)(b) and Article I, section 9. See State v. Blackburn/Barber, supra. * * *.” 84 Or App at 501.
In State v. Ingram, 104 Or App 389, 802 P2d 656 (1990), we held, under ORS 133.565(2)(b),3 that, if a warrant describes a general category of persons such as “occupants,” the warrant is sufficient if there is probable cause in the affidavit to search all occupants. Conversely, if the person to be searched is described with particularity in the affidavit, the warrant must contain a similar description to comply with the particularity requirements of ORS 133.565(2)(b) and Article I, section 9. In Ingram, the defect in the warrants was not that the executing officer could not tell from the face of the warrant whom he was to search. Rather, the question was whether the description on the face of each warrant was so general that it authorized the search of individuals for whom no probable cause to search existed.
Likewise, in this case, the problem is not that the description on the face of the warrant is so ambiguous that the officer could not determine what premises were authorized to be searched. The warrant specifically describes the address to be searched as 1837 S.E. Main Street. However, unlike in Ingram, this case does not present the issue of whether the warrant meets the particularity requirements of ORS 133.565(2)(b) and Article I, section 9. Rather, the issue is whether there was authority to search premises other than those described in the warrant, when the officer had personal knowledge of the premises that were intended to be searched.
In State v. Devine, 307 Or 341, 768 P2d 913 (1989), [551]*551the court rejected arguments that the “good faith” or “reasonableness” of the officers in searching an apartment were material to the inquiry. The search warrant authorized the search of a dwelling with the number “442” located on it. When the officers who were executing the warrant arrived at the residence, they discovered an apartment located in a garage behind the house. The garage apartment and the house were not attached. The apartment had the number “442 1/2” over the door. The officers searched the apartment and seized controlled substances. The court said:
“The arguments of the parties to the Court of Appeals and to this court have turned on factual questions such as whether the police officers executing the warrant saw or should have seen the numbers ‘442 1/2’ above the door of the separate living area. From the answer to this and similar questions, the parties then argue the merits of an ‘objective’ versus a ‘subjective’ test of the reasonableness of the officers’ actions under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. We think both sides miss the point.
“The officer’s ‘good faith’ or ‘reasonableness’ had nothing to do with the inquiry. If the defendant’s living quarters really were ‘separate’ — i.e., if defendant really was maintaining a separate household in the space, subject only to the homeowner’s right to enter in emergencies — then those separate premises were not covered by the search warrant. This is the clear lesson of cases like State v. Blackburn/Barber, supra.
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“The warrant in this case authorized only entry into the premises at 442 W. Centennial, a house fully described in the warrant. It did not purport to authorize entry into some other, separately maintained premises, whether inside the house or elsewhere. Absent some justification other than the warrant (and there is no basis in the present record for any other justification), a search of separate premises would have been improper.” 307 Or at 345.
The lesson of Blackburn/Barber and Devine is that the authority of an officer to search premises under a search warrant is wholly circumscribed by the description in the warrant. The warrant requirement is intended to take discretion out of the hands of the police by requiring that determinations of probable cause be made by a neutral, detached magistrate. See State v. Peller, 287 Or 255, 261 n 2, 598 P2d 684 (1979). If we were to accept the state’s argument, an officer would have [552]*552authority to search premises on the basis of his knowledge, even though those premises were not accurately described in either the affidavit or the warrant. As the Supreme Court did in Devine, we reject the suggestion that the executing officer’s good faith or reasonableness has anything to do with the inquiry. If the officer had gone to the address described in the warrant, he would have discovered the error in the description and could have returned to the magistrate to obtain a different warrant. The officer’s independent knowledge cannot cure an erroneous description.
The dissent says:
“I would hold only that the officer’s knowledge of the contents of the affidavit is relevant to whether the affidavit was required to have been attached to the warrant.
“I would uphold the search under the warrant, because the warrant was particular on its face and, although it was latently ambiguous because of an inaccuracy, the affidavit, the contents of which were known to the executing officer, provided objective information establishing for which house the judge found probable cause.” 106 Or App at 556. (Emphasis in original.)
The dissent reaches its result by looking at the description in the affidavit, although it acknowledges that there is no evidence in the record to show that the affidavit was attached to the warrant at the time of execution. Moreover, because the warrant was directed to “any police officer of Douglas County,” there was no assurance that the affiant would be the executing officer. The officer’s knowledge of the contents of the affidavit is irrelevant. The dissent’s analysis would allow an officer to search the premises he meant to search, rather than restricting the scope of the search to the premises for which a neutral magistrate found probable cause to search.
The dissent also says that the warrant was particular on its face, “although it was latently ambiguous because of an inaccuracy.” 106 Or App at 556. In State v. Blackburn/Barber, supra, the court said:
“If, however, a warrant purporting to authorize a search is sufficiently ambiguous that it is impossible to identify with a reasonable degree of certainty the particular premises authorized to be searched, the warrant may not be executed and any search pursuant to it is illegal * * 266 Or at 35.
[553]*553Characterizing the description as “ambiguous” cannot save this warrant. Given the description in the warrant, there is no possibility that a reader could identify with reasonable certainty that the house at 1877 S.E. Main Street was to be searched.
We hold that the search of the house at 1877 S.E. Main Street was unauthorized, because the warrant gave authority to search only a house at 1837 S.E. Main Street. To the extent that State v. Cole, supra, suggests that an officer executing a warrant may rely on his knowledge of the place to be searched, it is overruled. The trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.4