Opinion
DiPENTIMA, J.
The defendant, Louis D’Antonio, appeals from the judgments of the trial court revoking his probation pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-32 and sentencing him to serve six months of a previously suspended sentence on the underlying conviction for the motor vehicle offenses. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the court committed plain error when it presided over the revocation of probation hearing after having participated actively in pretrial plea negotiations.1 We reverse the judgments of the trial court.
[685]*685The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s appeal. On October 24, 2000, the defendant, through his public defender, pleaded nolo contendere to two separate charges of operating under the influence on two separate occasions in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a and was sentenced by the court to a total effective term of thirty months of imprisonment, execution suspended after twenty-four months, and one year of probation with special conditions.2 The special conditions of the defendant’s probation were the same with respect to both violations and included, inter alia, substance abuse screening, evaluation and treatment as recommended by the probation officer, a total of 200 hours of community service and no operation of a motor vehicle while the defendant’s operator’s license was under suspension.
On or about October 4, 2001, the defendant was released from prison and began serving his probation. After the defendant refused to participate in an alcohol treatment program, his probation officer applied for arrest warrants for violation of probation on December 10, 2001. On December 11, 2001, the defendant was arraigned on two criminal matters, criminal trespass in the first degree and interfering with an officer,3 respectively, and the court appointed a public defender as his counsel. On December 18, 2001, the defendant was arraigned on the violation of probation matters and denials were entered. At that time, the court appointed the public defender who was handling the defendant’s criminal matters to represent him in the violation of [686]*686probation matters. Thereafter, the court held several scheduled proceedings, often involving both the criminal and the violation of probation matters.
On January 15, 2002, the defendant appeared in court with his counsel and indicated that he wanted to represent himself. The court told the defendant that before allowing him to represent himself, it was going to order a competency examination. On February 27,2002, when the defendant appeared in court with his counsel, the court, Fischer, J., made an uncontested finding of competency based on the competency report in the file.4 Again, the defendant raised the issue of self-representation.5 The court, Fischer, J., allowed the defendant’s counsel to withdraw from the violation of probation and criminal cases, and, on the same date, the defendant filed a pro se appearance in those cases. On March 20, 2002, the court, Clifford, J., the prosecutor and the defendant engaged in an on the record plea discussion.6 [688]*688The defendant refused any offered plea bargain and insisted on exercising his “right for a trial.”
On April 3,2002, the defendant again appeared before Judge Clifford for the violation of probation hearing. Although Judge Clifford recalled having some discussion with the defendant previously in the case,7 he pro[689]*689ceeded to canvass the defendant on the issue of self-representation and advised the defendant of, inter alia, the state’s burden of proof in the case and the defendant’s various constitutional rights. The defendant indicated that he was “prepared to continue” and to “go forward,” and there was no mention by anyone of Judge Clifford’s recusal. Thereafter, the hearing commenced and concluded, and Judge Clifford found that the defendant did violate a condition of his probation and that the beneficial aspects of probation were no longer being served. Judge Clifford sentenced the defendant to the remaining six months of imprisonment previously suspended on the sentence for the underlying motor vehicle offenses.8 This appeal followed.
The defendant claims that his violation of probation hearing was unlawfully conducted by the same judge who conducted plea bargaining on that charge in violation of canon 3 (c) (1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The defendant argues that this deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial pursuant to the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution, and article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut. The defendant contends that the trial judge had a responsibility to recuse himself and, thus, although the defendant did not file a motion to recuse the judge, the error is reviewable under either State v. Golding, 213 [690]*690Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989),9 or the plain error doctrine pursuant to Practice Book § 60-5.
The state argues that we should not review the question of the propriety of the judge’s participation in the probation revocation hearing because it is not properly before us, as the defendant failed to file a motion for the judge’s disqualification pursuant to Practice Book § 1-23.10 The state maintains that neither plain error review nor review under Golding is appropriate. The state contends, moreover, that by failing to raise the issue of Judge Clifford’s disqualification at the hearing, the defendant consented to the judge’s participation under General Statutes § 51-39 (c). Although the state is correct in asserting that this court will not normally review claims that have not been preserved for appeal adequately, we conclude that plain error review is warranted in this case.11
[691]*691“It is well established that plain error review is exercised in only the most limited of circumstances. Such review is reserved for truly extraordinary situations where the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Falcon, 68 Conn. App. 884, 887, 793 A.2d 274, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 924, 797 A.2d 521 (2002). We conclude that plain error review is warranted “because the fairness and integrity of the hearing as well as public confidence in judicial proceedings is involved.” State v. Washington, 39 Conn. App. 175, 179, 664 A.2d 1153 (1995);12 see State v. Falcon, supra, 887 (plain error review warranted because impropriety of court presiding over trial and sentencing after having actively participated in pretrial plea negotiations “is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of the public confidence in the judicial proceedings”).13
[692]
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Opinion
DiPENTIMA, J.
The defendant, Louis D’Antonio, appeals from the judgments of the trial court revoking his probation pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-32 and sentencing him to serve six months of a previously suspended sentence on the underlying conviction for the motor vehicle offenses. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the court committed plain error when it presided over the revocation of probation hearing after having participated actively in pretrial plea negotiations.1 We reverse the judgments of the trial court.
[685]*685The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s appeal. On October 24, 2000, the defendant, through his public defender, pleaded nolo contendere to two separate charges of operating under the influence on two separate occasions in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a and was sentenced by the court to a total effective term of thirty months of imprisonment, execution suspended after twenty-four months, and one year of probation with special conditions.2 The special conditions of the defendant’s probation were the same with respect to both violations and included, inter alia, substance abuse screening, evaluation and treatment as recommended by the probation officer, a total of 200 hours of community service and no operation of a motor vehicle while the defendant’s operator’s license was under suspension.
On or about October 4, 2001, the defendant was released from prison and began serving his probation. After the defendant refused to participate in an alcohol treatment program, his probation officer applied for arrest warrants for violation of probation on December 10, 2001. On December 11, 2001, the defendant was arraigned on two criminal matters, criminal trespass in the first degree and interfering with an officer,3 respectively, and the court appointed a public defender as his counsel. On December 18, 2001, the defendant was arraigned on the violation of probation matters and denials were entered. At that time, the court appointed the public defender who was handling the defendant’s criminal matters to represent him in the violation of [686]*686probation matters. Thereafter, the court held several scheduled proceedings, often involving both the criminal and the violation of probation matters.
On January 15, 2002, the defendant appeared in court with his counsel and indicated that he wanted to represent himself. The court told the defendant that before allowing him to represent himself, it was going to order a competency examination. On February 27,2002, when the defendant appeared in court with his counsel, the court, Fischer, J., made an uncontested finding of competency based on the competency report in the file.4 Again, the defendant raised the issue of self-representation.5 The court, Fischer, J., allowed the defendant’s counsel to withdraw from the violation of probation and criminal cases, and, on the same date, the defendant filed a pro se appearance in those cases. On March 20, 2002, the court, Clifford, J., the prosecutor and the defendant engaged in an on the record plea discussion.6 [688]*688The defendant refused any offered plea bargain and insisted on exercising his “right for a trial.”
On April 3,2002, the defendant again appeared before Judge Clifford for the violation of probation hearing. Although Judge Clifford recalled having some discussion with the defendant previously in the case,7 he pro[689]*689ceeded to canvass the defendant on the issue of self-representation and advised the defendant of, inter alia, the state’s burden of proof in the case and the defendant’s various constitutional rights. The defendant indicated that he was “prepared to continue” and to “go forward,” and there was no mention by anyone of Judge Clifford’s recusal. Thereafter, the hearing commenced and concluded, and Judge Clifford found that the defendant did violate a condition of his probation and that the beneficial aspects of probation were no longer being served. Judge Clifford sentenced the defendant to the remaining six months of imprisonment previously suspended on the sentence for the underlying motor vehicle offenses.8 This appeal followed.
The defendant claims that his violation of probation hearing was unlawfully conducted by the same judge who conducted plea bargaining on that charge in violation of canon 3 (c) (1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The defendant argues that this deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial pursuant to the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution, and article first, § 8, of the constitution of Connecticut. The defendant contends that the trial judge had a responsibility to recuse himself and, thus, although the defendant did not file a motion to recuse the judge, the error is reviewable under either State v. Golding, 213 [690]*690Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989),9 or the plain error doctrine pursuant to Practice Book § 60-5.
The state argues that we should not review the question of the propriety of the judge’s participation in the probation revocation hearing because it is not properly before us, as the defendant failed to file a motion for the judge’s disqualification pursuant to Practice Book § 1-23.10 The state maintains that neither plain error review nor review under Golding is appropriate. The state contends, moreover, that by failing to raise the issue of Judge Clifford’s disqualification at the hearing, the defendant consented to the judge’s participation under General Statutes § 51-39 (c). Although the state is correct in asserting that this court will not normally review claims that have not been preserved for appeal adequately, we conclude that plain error review is warranted in this case.11
[691]*691“It is well established that plain error review is exercised in only the most limited of circumstances. Such review is reserved for truly extraordinary situations where the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceedings.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Falcon, 68 Conn. App. 884, 887, 793 A.2d 274, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 924, 797 A.2d 521 (2002). We conclude that plain error review is warranted “because the fairness and integrity of the hearing as well as public confidence in judicial proceedings is involved.” State v. Washington, 39 Conn. App. 175, 179, 664 A.2d 1153 (1995);12 see State v. Falcon, supra, 887 (plain error review warranted because impropriety of court presiding over trial and sentencing after having actively participated in pretrial plea negotiations “is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of the public confidence in the judicial proceedings”).13
[692]*692“Our Supreme Court has stated that a trial court’s failure to follow the mandatory provisions of a statute prescribing trial procedures or to follow a procedural rule constitutes plain error. . . . Canon 3 [c] (1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The reasonableness standard is an objective one. Thus, the question is not only whether the particular judge is, in fact, impartial but whether a reasonable person would question the judge’s impartiality on the basis of all the circumstances. . . . Even in the absence of actual bias, a judge must disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, because the appearance and the existence of impartiality are both essential elements of a fair exercise of judicial authority.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Falcon, supra, 68 Conn. App. 887-88.
Although pretrial or plea negotiations play a critical role in the criminal justice system, and the disposition of charges after plea discussions is highly desirable, judicial participation in pretrial plea negotiations frequently has been criticized. See State v. Revelo, 256 Conn. 494, 505-506, 775 A.2d 260, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1052, 122 S. Ct. 639, 151 L. Ed. 2d 558 (2001); State v. Falcon, supra, 68 Conn. App. 888; State v. Washington, supra, 39 Conn. App. 180-81. In fact, “many jurisdictions bar judges from active participation in plea negotiations.”14 State v. Revelo, supra, 506 & n.22, citing Fed. [693]*693R. Crim. P. 11 (e) (1), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-7-302 (1) (2000), Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.94A.080 (West 1998).
In Connecticut, however, “[i]t is a common practice . . . for the presiding criminal judge to conduct plea negotiations with the parties. If plea discussions ultimately do not result in a plea agreement, the trial of the case is assigned to a second judge who was not involved in the plea discussions and who is unaware of the terms of any plea bargain offered to the defendant.15 The judge responsible for trying the case also is responsible for sentencing the defendant in the event the defendant is convicted after trial.” State v. Revelo, supra, 256 Conn. 508 n.25. “[A]s long as the defendant is free to reject the plea offer [made after negotiations conducted by one judge] and go to trial before a [second] judge who was not involved in or aware of those negotiations, [the defendant] is not subject to any undue pressure to agree to the plea agreement, and the impartiality of the judge who will sentence him in the event of conviction after trial is not compromised.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 507-508, quoting Safford v. Warden, 223 Conn. 180, 194 n.16, 612 A.2d 1161 (1992).
We conclude that the court committed plain error when it presided over the defendant’s violation of probation hearing after having participated actively in plea [694]*694negotiations with the defendant. The record discloses that during the plea negotiations, the court itself understood that it had participated actively in such a way as to make clear that a different judge would necessarily preside over the defendant’s violation of probation hearing.16 Although it seems unlikely, on the basis of the record, that at the time of the hearing, the court recalled the nature of its previous involvement,17 we need not find, nor do we find, actual bias or prejudice on the part of the court.18 See, e.g., State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 460-61, 680 A.2d 147 (1996); State v. Washington, supra, 39 Conn. App. 182; see State v. Falcon, supra, 68 Conn. App. 889. Because the court presided over the hearing after actively participating in plea negotiations, the appearance of a fair trial was lost.
We disagree with the state’s contention that by failing to raise the issue of Judge Clifford’s disqualification at the violation of probation hearing, the defendant consented to the judge’s participation in the hearing [695]*695pursuant to § 51-39 (c)19 and thereby waived appellate review of the issue. The state’s argument is predicated on cases such as Timm v. Timm, 195 Conn. 202, 487 A.2d 191 (1985), which stated that the failure “to raise the issue of the [judge’s] disqualification either before or during the trial, can be construed as the functional equivalent of ‘consent in open court’ to [the judge’s] presiding over the trial” pursuant to § 51-39 (c). Id., 205. The cases relied on by the state in support of its argument, however, are inapposite.20 None of them renders plain error review of a claimed violation of canon 3 (c) (1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct inappropriate on the basis of § 51-39 (c) where the claimed violation implicates a judge’s responsibility to recuse himself from presiding over a defendant’s trial after [696]*696having participated actively in plea negotiations with the defendant.21 As noted previously, that responsibility has recently been underscored by our Supreme Court and by this court. See, e.g., State v. Revelo, supra, 256 Conn. 506; State v. Falcon, supra, 68 Conn. App. 889.
We conclude that the existence of impartiality might reasonably be questioned and the fairness and integrity of and public confidence in the judicial proceeding affected when a court presides over the violation of probation hearing after having participated actively in plea negotiations. In this case, the appearance of a fair trial has been lost and a new revocation of probation hearing is warranted. See, e.g., State v. Washington, supra, 39 Conn. App. 182; see also State v. Falcon, supra, 68 Conn. App. 889.
The judgments are reversed and the cases are remanded for a new revocation of probation hearing.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.