OPINION
OLIVER, Judge.
This case is here upon a writ of certio-rari to the Criminal Court of Davidson County issued by order of this Court upon consideration of the State’s petition for such a writ, seeking review and reversal of that court’s judgment quashing a joint indictment against the defendants D’Anna and Bunch. In obedience to the writ, the Criminal Court Clerk of Davidson County has certified and filed in this Court a complete transcript of the record of the proceedings had in this case in Division III of the Davidson County Criminal Court.
According to this record, on June 2, 1972 the Davidson County Grand Jury returned an indictment against D’Anna and Bunch [202]*202containing- eight counts charging them with unlawful possession of marijuana and other drugs and with possessing each of those substances with the intent to manufacture, deliver or sell the same. Thereafter the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the indictment upon the ground that on May 1, 1972, the date set for their requested preliminary hearing in the General Sessions Court, the State entered an order nolle prosequi on each of the warrants against the defendants, over the objection of their counsel, and took the matter before the Grand Jury, thereby depriving them of their right to a preliminary hearing.
Although it nowhere appears in this record, the clear inference is that the warrants upon which the defendants were arrested charged them with some of the drug violations charged in the indictment. The State’s petition for a writ of certiorari recites that D’Anna was arrested on two warrants, one charging him with possession of a controlled substance in violation of T.C.A. § 52-1432 and the other charging him with possession of marijuana for the purpose of resale, and that the warrant upon which Bunch was arrested charged possession of a controlled substance in violation of T.C.A. § 52-1432. The briefs filed here by the State state that such were the warrants upon which the defendants were arrested and that they were released on bond after arrest. In their brief the defendants accept and adopt the State’s statement of the case. So we will assume that those were the offenses charged in the respective warrants.
The trial judge sustained the defendants’ motion and quashed and dismissed the indictment against them, holding that it was “prematurely obtained by the District Attorney General’s Office” and deprived the defendants of their right to a preliminary hearing contrary to Chapter 245 of the Public Acts of 1971, codified as T.C.A. § 40-1131. The Court also held:
“It would appear that in the cause of justice that the proper procedure in this matter would dictate that the warrant was inadvertently nolle prossed and that no injustice would be imposed upon either the State of Tennessee or the defendants by seting aside the nolle prose-qui heretofore entered and placing the said warrant back upon the docket of the General Sessions Court for a preliminary hearing in accordance with Chapter 245 of the Public Acts of 1971.”
In our judgment the action of the trial judge was clearly erroneous and must be reversed.
Whether a pending criminal case is to be discontinued or dismissed upon an order nolle prosequi is a matter addressed to the judgment of the District Attorney General and the court in which the case is then pending. That is, a nolle prosequi can be awarded only by the Attorney General and the court. Scheibler v. Steinburg, 129 Tenn. 614, 617, 167 S.W. 866. A nolle prosequi is a formal entry upon the record, by the plaintiff in a civil suit or the prosecuting officer in a criminal action, by which he declares that he will no further prosecute the case, either as to some of the counts, or some of the defendants, or altogether. State ex rel. Underwood v. Brown, 193 Tenn. 113, 244 S.W.2d 168.
When an unconditional order nolle prosequi is entered after indictment, it is a dismissal of the indictment and no conviction can be had except by beginning a new case against the accused. State ex rel. Hobbs v. Murrell, 170 Tenn. 152, 93 S.W.2d 628. Upon cognate principle, the same rule must necessarily apply to arrest warrants dismissed by the court by an order nolle prosequi upon application of the District Attorney General.
In this case it is of no determinative significance that the State elected to dismiss the original warrants by entry of nolle prosequi orders in the General Sessions Court on the day the preliminary hearing was scheduled. There may be many reasons prompting and fully justify[203]*203ing such action by the State in any given case. The District Attorney General may discover that the original warrant is defective for any number of reasons, or he may find at the last minute that an indispensable prosecution witness has disappeared or that the victim of the crime charged in the warrant refuses to appear and prosecute. Or, as apparently occurred in this case, investigation may indicate that the defendant should be charged with additional similar offenses and that it is advisable and preferable to submit all of them to the Grand Jury. In any event, as noted, whether to enter an order nolle prosequi and dismiss a criminal case is up to the District Attorney General and the court. Obviously, the State, acting through its District Attorney General, had the unquestioned right to commence new prosecutions against the defendants by new warrants or by indictment.
The only function of the Grand Jury with reference to offenses and alleged offenses it investigates is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the person in question committed the offense and should be formally accused thereof by an indictment or presentment and brought to trial. State v. Hudson, Tenn.Cr.App., 487 S.W.2d 672; Shadden v. State, Tenn.Cr.App., 488 S.W.2d 54.
Likewise, the only purpose of a preliminary hearing upon a criminal warrant is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the accused committed the offense charged, T.C.A. §§ 40-1116 and 40-1117, and to fix the amount of bail in bailable offenses, T.C.A. §§ 40-1117 and 40-1119. State v. Hudson, supra; Shadden v. State, supra.
In State v. Hudson, supra, after pointing out that in enacting TCA § 40-1131, with its carefully designed limitation, the Legislature manifestly determined deliberately to preserve the Grand Jury’s vitally essential inquisitorial function, we said:
“Clearly, to permit a preliminary hearing and a redetermination of the question of probable cause after return of an indictment or presentment would be intolerable. If the magistrate or general sessions judge found probable cause it would be an idle gesture adding nothing to the validity or strength of the indictment or presentment.
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OPINION
OLIVER, Judge.
This case is here upon a writ of certio-rari to the Criminal Court of Davidson County issued by order of this Court upon consideration of the State’s petition for such a writ, seeking review and reversal of that court’s judgment quashing a joint indictment against the defendants D’Anna and Bunch. In obedience to the writ, the Criminal Court Clerk of Davidson County has certified and filed in this Court a complete transcript of the record of the proceedings had in this case in Division III of the Davidson County Criminal Court.
According to this record, on June 2, 1972 the Davidson County Grand Jury returned an indictment against D’Anna and Bunch [202]*202containing- eight counts charging them with unlawful possession of marijuana and other drugs and with possessing each of those substances with the intent to manufacture, deliver or sell the same. Thereafter the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the indictment upon the ground that on May 1, 1972, the date set for their requested preliminary hearing in the General Sessions Court, the State entered an order nolle prosequi on each of the warrants against the defendants, over the objection of their counsel, and took the matter before the Grand Jury, thereby depriving them of their right to a preliminary hearing.
Although it nowhere appears in this record, the clear inference is that the warrants upon which the defendants were arrested charged them with some of the drug violations charged in the indictment. The State’s petition for a writ of certiorari recites that D’Anna was arrested on two warrants, one charging him with possession of a controlled substance in violation of T.C.A. § 52-1432 and the other charging him with possession of marijuana for the purpose of resale, and that the warrant upon which Bunch was arrested charged possession of a controlled substance in violation of T.C.A. § 52-1432. The briefs filed here by the State state that such were the warrants upon which the defendants were arrested and that they were released on bond after arrest. In their brief the defendants accept and adopt the State’s statement of the case. So we will assume that those were the offenses charged in the respective warrants.
The trial judge sustained the defendants’ motion and quashed and dismissed the indictment against them, holding that it was “prematurely obtained by the District Attorney General’s Office” and deprived the defendants of their right to a preliminary hearing contrary to Chapter 245 of the Public Acts of 1971, codified as T.C.A. § 40-1131. The Court also held:
“It would appear that in the cause of justice that the proper procedure in this matter would dictate that the warrant was inadvertently nolle prossed and that no injustice would be imposed upon either the State of Tennessee or the defendants by seting aside the nolle prose-qui heretofore entered and placing the said warrant back upon the docket of the General Sessions Court for a preliminary hearing in accordance with Chapter 245 of the Public Acts of 1971.”
In our judgment the action of the trial judge was clearly erroneous and must be reversed.
Whether a pending criminal case is to be discontinued or dismissed upon an order nolle prosequi is a matter addressed to the judgment of the District Attorney General and the court in which the case is then pending. That is, a nolle prosequi can be awarded only by the Attorney General and the court. Scheibler v. Steinburg, 129 Tenn. 614, 617, 167 S.W. 866. A nolle prosequi is a formal entry upon the record, by the plaintiff in a civil suit or the prosecuting officer in a criminal action, by which he declares that he will no further prosecute the case, either as to some of the counts, or some of the defendants, or altogether. State ex rel. Underwood v. Brown, 193 Tenn. 113, 244 S.W.2d 168.
When an unconditional order nolle prosequi is entered after indictment, it is a dismissal of the indictment and no conviction can be had except by beginning a new case against the accused. State ex rel. Hobbs v. Murrell, 170 Tenn. 152, 93 S.W.2d 628. Upon cognate principle, the same rule must necessarily apply to arrest warrants dismissed by the court by an order nolle prosequi upon application of the District Attorney General.
In this case it is of no determinative significance that the State elected to dismiss the original warrants by entry of nolle prosequi orders in the General Sessions Court on the day the preliminary hearing was scheduled. There may be many reasons prompting and fully justify[203]*203ing such action by the State in any given case. The District Attorney General may discover that the original warrant is defective for any number of reasons, or he may find at the last minute that an indispensable prosecution witness has disappeared or that the victim of the crime charged in the warrant refuses to appear and prosecute. Or, as apparently occurred in this case, investigation may indicate that the defendant should be charged with additional similar offenses and that it is advisable and preferable to submit all of them to the Grand Jury. In any event, as noted, whether to enter an order nolle prosequi and dismiss a criminal case is up to the District Attorney General and the court. Obviously, the State, acting through its District Attorney General, had the unquestioned right to commence new prosecutions against the defendants by new warrants or by indictment.
The only function of the Grand Jury with reference to offenses and alleged offenses it investigates is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the person in question committed the offense and should be formally accused thereof by an indictment or presentment and brought to trial. State v. Hudson, Tenn.Cr.App., 487 S.W.2d 672; Shadden v. State, Tenn.Cr.App., 488 S.W.2d 54.
Likewise, the only purpose of a preliminary hearing upon a criminal warrant is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the accused committed the offense charged, T.C.A. §§ 40-1116 and 40-1117, and to fix the amount of bail in bailable offenses, T.C.A. §§ 40-1117 and 40-1119. State v. Hudson, supra; Shadden v. State, supra.
In State v. Hudson, supra, after pointing out that in enacting TCA § 40-1131, with its carefully designed limitation, the Legislature manifestly determined deliberately to preserve the Grand Jury’s vitally essential inquisitorial function, we said:
“Clearly, to permit a preliminary hearing and a redetermination of the question of probable cause after return of an indictment or presentment would be intolerable. If the magistrate or general sessions judge found probable cause it would be an idle gesture adding nothing to the validity or strength of the indictment or presentment. On the other hand, a finding of no probable cause in such a preliminary hearing would not and could not invalidate and vacate the prior presentment or indictment and discharge the accused. The futility of such a procedure is plain.”
Of course, as every lawyer and judge familiar by experience with the pros-ecutorial processes knows, the authority and power of a Grand Jury to consider a case and return a presentment or an indictment upon finding probable cause is in no way interfered with or prevented by the fact that a committing magistrate fails to find probable cause and discharges the accused in a preliminary hearing. It happens frequently. It could not be otherwise without seriously impairing this vital part of the Grand Jury’s function. If the Grand Jury were precluded from investigating an alleged offense previously dismissed upon a preliminary hearing by a committing magistrate because he found no probable cause, such action by the magistrate would amount to acquittal of the accused. Of course, this cannot be.
And in Shadden v. State, supra, after reiterating that this Court and the Supreme Court of this State and federal courts have repeatedly held that a preliminary hearing is not constitutionally required in a criminal prosecution in Tennessee, and that an accused has no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing in this State, this Court said:
“Contrary to the defendant’s insistence, Chapter 245 of the Public Acts of 1971, codified as TCA § 40-1131, added no constitutional dimension to our prelimi[204]*204nary hearing statutes, and added nothing to existing statutes on that subject except to repeal TCA § 40-402 which provided for binding over accused persons arraigned before a committing magistrate during a session of the county Grand Jury. That act, TCA § 40-1131, provides:
'In all criminal cases, prior to presentment and indictment, whether the charge be a misdemeanor or a felony, the accused shall be entitled to a preliminary hearing upon his request therefore [sic], whether the grand jury of the county be in session or not.’
"By the express terms of this statute, the right to a preliminary hearing only exists prior to presentment or indictment.
* * * * * *
“Thus, after the return of the indictment by the Grand Jury, representing its finding of probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged therein, obviously a preliminary hearing to re-determine the same question was not required. Shaw v. State, 164 Tenn. 192, 47 S.W.2d 92.”
So, in this case even if the original warrants had not been dismissed and the preliminary hearing on them had merely been continued from time to time, either by the defendant or by the State or by agreement, and in the meantime the Grand Jury had returned an indictment representing its finding of probable cause to believe the defendants committed the offenses charged therein, obviously a preliminary hearing to re-determine the same question would not have been required. It is no different in this case merely because, for reasons it considered necessary or desirable, the State elected to dismiss the original warrants by nolle prosequi in the General Sessions Court on the day the preliminary hearing was scheduled.
The petition for certiorari is sustained, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, Davidson County Grand Jury indictment number A-9223 is re-instated, and this case is remanded to Division III of the Criminal Court of Davidson County for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
MITCHELL, J., concurs.