[Cite as State v. Crim, 2025-Ohio-1921.]
COURT OF APPEALS ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: : Hon. Andrew J. King, P.J. Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. Robert G. Montgomery, J. : Hon. Kevin W. Popham, J. -vs- : : WILLIAM ACKER CRIM AKA : Case No. 24-COA-024 WILLIAM ACKER-CRIM : : Defendant - Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 23-CRI-218
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: May 28, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
ANDREZ R. PEREZ BRIAN A. SMITH 110 Cottage Street 123 South Miller Road Third Floor Suite 250 Ashland, OH 44805 Fairlawn, OH 44333 King, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant William Acker Crim, aka William Acker-Crim appeals
the June 4, 2024 judgment of conviction and sentence of the Ashland County Court of
Common Pleas. Plaintiff-Appellee is the State of Ohio. We affirm the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDUARAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} According to the police reports contained in the presentence investigation
in this matter, on August 24, 2023, the Ashland Police Department began an investigation
into allegations that appellant was engaging in sexual conduct with Jane Doe, his
girlfriend's intellectually challenged 14-year-old daughter.
{¶ 3} Both Doe and appellant were interviewed by Ashland Police Department
Detective James Coey. Doe stated appellant had engaged in sexual conduct with her on
many occasions. She stated vaginal intercourse had taken place four or five times and
fellatio had occurred on "more occasions than she could put a number on." Doe stated
these offenses took place in several Ohio locations including Plymouth, Ontario, and
Ashland. She specifically described seven separate offenses to officers.
{¶ 4} Appellant admitted to the same offenses described by Doe. He blamed Doe,
however, stating she had "an odd attraction" to him and was "obsessed" with him.
{¶ 5} On September 15, 2023, the Ashland County Grand Jury returned an
indictment charging appellant with seven counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor
pursuant to R.C. 2907.04(A), felonies of the fourth degree. On April 25, 2024, appellant
pled guilty as charged. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation (PSI) and set
the matter over for sentencing. {¶ 6} Appellant appeared for sentencing on June 3, 2024. The trial court received
and reviewed the PSI, victim impact statements, and heard from appellant, counsel for
appellant, Doe's mother, a family friend of Doe, and the State. The trial court sentenced
appellant to 18 months of incarceration on each count and ordered him to serve the
sentences consecutively for an aggregate prison term of ten and a half years. Appellant
did not object to the imposition of consecutive sentences.
{¶ 7} Appellant timely filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for
consideration. He raises three assignments of error as follow:
I
{¶ 8} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN FAILING TO
MERGE COUNTS ONE THROUGH SEVEN FOR PURPOSES OF SENTENCING AS
ALLIED OFFENSES OF SIMILAR IMPORT PURSUANT TO R.C. 2941.25, IN
VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY UNDER THE
FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION."
II
{¶ 9} "THE FAILURE OF APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL TO SEEK THE
MERGER OF COUNTS ONE THROUGH SEVEN FOR PURPOSES OF SENTENCING,
AS ALLIED OFFENSES OF SIMILAR IMPORT PURSUANT TO R.C. 2941.25,
CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, IN VIOLATION OF
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION
10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION." III
{¶ 10} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN IMPOSING
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES ON APPELLANT, BECAUSE ITS FINDINGS UNDER
R.C.2929.14(C)(4) WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD."
{¶ 11} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court committed
plain error by failing to merge counts one through seven because they are allied offenses.
We disagree.
Applicable Law
{¶ 12} As an initial matter, appellant did not object to the imposition of consecutive
sentences. We therefore review this assignment of error for plain error. An error not raised
in the trial court must be plain error for an appellate court to reverse. State v. Long, 53
Ohio St.2d 91 (1978) at paragraph one of the syllabus; Crim.R. 52(B). In order to prevail
under a plain error analysis, appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the
outcome of the trial clearly would have been different but for the error. Id. at paragraph
two of the syllabus. Notice of plain error "is to be taken with the utmost caution, under
exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice." Id. at
paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶ 13} R.C. 2941.25 governs multiple counts and states the following:
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the
defendant may be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more offenses
of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more
offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a
separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may
contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be
convicted of all of them.
{¶ 14} In State v. Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995, syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio held
the following:
1. In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import within the
meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must evaluate three separate factors—the
conduct, the animus, and the import.
2. Two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the meaning of R.C.
2941.25(B) when the defendant's conduct constitutes offenses involving separate
victims or if the harm that results from each offense is separate and identifiable.
3. Under R.C. 2941.25(B), a defendant whose conduct supports multiple offenses
may be convicted of all the offenses if any one of the following is true: (1) the
conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar import, (2) the conduct shows that the
offenses were committed separately, or (3) the conduct shows that the offenses
were committed with separate animus. {¶ 15} The Ruff court explained at ¶ 26:
At its heart, the allied-offense analysis is dependent upon the facts
of a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses on the defendant's conduct.
The evidence at trial or during a plea or sentencing hearing will reveal
whether the offenses have similar import. When a defendant's
conduct victimizes more than one person, the harm for each person
is separate and distinct, and therefore, the defendant can be
convicted of multiple counts. Also, a defendant's conduct that
constitutes two or more offenses against a single victim can support
multiple convictions if the harm that results from each offense is
separate and identifiable from the harm of the other offense. We
therefore hold that two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist
within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant's conduct
constitutes offenses involving separate victims or if the harm that
results from each offense is separate and identifiable.
The Indictment, Jane Doe's Disclosures, and Appellant's Confessions
{¶ 16} The indictment in this matter charged appellant with seven counts of
unlawful sexual conduct with Jane Doe as follows:
{¶ 17} Count one alleged vaginal intercourse which took place between November
1, 2022 and August 24, 2023 in Ashland County. There is no bill of particulars contained in the record, however, the State argues this count pertains to appellant's confession that
he engaged in vaginal intercourse with Doe in his bedroom at their trailer in Ashland. PSI
at 9.
{¶ 18} Count two also alleged vaginal intercourse which took place between
November 1, 2022 and August 24, 2023 in Ashland County. The State argues this count
pertains to an incident of sexual conduct in the bathroom of Ashland trailer. Doe stated
appellant engaged in vaginal intercourse with her in the bathroom of the Ashland trailer
approximately a week before she ran away. She stated he made her sit on the toilet
afterwards "to get the semen out of her." A police report pertaining to Doe running away
was confirmed by Detective Coey and was dated April 24, 2023. PSI at 8-9.
{¶ 19} Count three alleged fellatio which took place between November 1, 2022
and August 24, 2023 in Ashland County and/or Wayne County, and/or Medina County.
The State argues this count involved sexual conduct in appellant's van. Doe stated
appellant had her go with him to purchase work boots in West Salem and on the way
home, he requested fellatio and Doe complied. PSI at 8.
{¶ 20} Count four alleged vaginal intercourse which took place between June 1,
2022 and March 31, 2023 in Ashland and/or Richland County. The State argues this count
involved appellant engaging in vaginal intercourse with Doe in the bathroom of their
Plymouth home while Doe's mother was at work. PSI at 9.
{¶ 21} Count five alleged vaginal intercourse which took place between June 1,
2022 and March 31, 2023 in Ashland and/or Richland County. The state argues this count
pertains to an incident which took place in the Plymouth home around Christmas. Doe
stated she and appellant returned to the home to get clothing. Appellant stated they returned to get Christmas gifts to take back to Doe's grandmother's where the rest of the
family was celebrating. While at the home they had vaginal intercourse on her sister's
bed. PSI at 7 and 10.
{¶ 22} Count six alleged fellatio which took place on August 24, 2023 in Ashland
and/or Richland County. The state concedes the date of this count is incorrect and should
reflect the same dates as count five as it occurred on the same date, time, and place.
Doe stated appellant performed cunnilingus, and appellant stated Doe performed fellatio
while they were at the Plymouth home to retrieve gifts or clothing. PSI at 7 and 10.
{¶ 23} Count seven alleged vaginal intercourse which took place between June 1,
2022 and March 31, 2023 in Ashland and/or Richland County. The State argues this count
pertains to an incident on March 31, 2023, at Doe's grandmother's home in Ontario while
Doe and appellant were waiting on a delivery for grandmother. Doe stated she and
appellant engaged in vaginal intercourse on the bathroom floor. PSI at 7 and 10.
{¶ 24} During his interview with Detective Coey, appellant confessed to each
incident contained in the indictment. PSI 9-10.
Appellant's Argument
{¶ 25} Appellant argues counts one through seven are allied offenses of similar
import because they were not committed separately and all seven counts involved the
same approximate time period. According to appellant this demonstrates the offenses
were committed with the same animus and motivation. We disagree.
{¶ 26} First, it is well established that distinct forms of sexual activity constitute
separate offenses for sentencing purposes. This court has found different sexual acts
occurring in the same encounter are not allied offenses. State v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-3544 ¶ 50 (5th Dist.) As noted by the Supreme Court of Ohio long before Ruff, "[e]ach act is a
further denigration of the victim's integrity and a further danger to the victim." State v.
Barnes, 68 Ohio St.2d 13, 19 (1981). Thus, the charged acts of vaginal intercourse and
fellatio are not allied offenses.
{¶ 27} Second, appellant argues that because the offenses all occurred during the
same time span, they constitute a "continuing course of conduct" that did not result in
separate and identifiable harm. Brief of appellant at 10. This argument is nonsensical.
Doe described seven separate sexual assaults and appellant confessed to seven
separate sexual assaults. PSI 6-10. The assaults took place in different places and on
different dates. In 1981 the Barnes court recognized that each act results in separate and
identifiable harm.
{¶ 28} We find the charged offenses are different and distinct sexual acts which
were committed separately, and are not allied offenses of similar import. Both Doe and
appellant reported the acts occurred in different homes, different parts of the homes, and
in appellant's van. We therefore find the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to
merge counts one through seven.
{¶ 29} The first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 30} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek merger of counts one through seven.
{¶ 31} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
demonstrate: (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) that counsel's errors
prejudiced the defendant, i.e., a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the
result of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
688 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraphs two and three of the
syllabus. "Reasonable probability" is "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Strickland at 694.
{¶ 32} Given our resolution of appellant's first assignment of error, we find
appellant cannot establish either Strickland prong. Accordingly, we find no fault in
counsel's performance and overrule the second assignment of error.
III
{¶ 33} In his final assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court committed
plain error by imposing consecutive sentences because its consecutive sentence findings
are not supported by the record. We disagree.
{¶ 34} 2929.14(C)(4) governs consecutive sentences. That section states:
(4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions
of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the
prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive
service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to
punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds
any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a
sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18
of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior
offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or
more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual
that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part
of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness
of the offender's conduct.
(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
future crime by the offender.
{¶ 35} "In order to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court is
required to make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing
and incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry, but it has no obligation to state
reasons to support its findings." State v. Newman, 2021-Ohio-2124 ¶ 100 (5th Dist.), citing
State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, syllabus. In other words, the sentencing court does not
have to perform "a word-for-word recitation of the language of the statute." Id. at ¶ 29. "[A]s long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct
analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to support the findings,
consecutive sentences should be upheld." Id. If a sentencing court fails to make the
findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a consecutive sentence imposed is contrary to
law. Id. at ¶ 34.
{¶ 36} Recently, in State v. Glover, 2024-Ohio-5195, the Supreme Court of Ohio
clarified this court's standard of review for consecutive sentences:
Nowhere does the appellate-review statute direct an appellate court
to consider the defendant's aggregate sentence. Rather, the appellate court
must limit its review to the trial court's R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) consecutive-
sentencing findings. In this case, the court of appeals purported to review
the trial court's findings. But much of its analysis focused on its
disagreement with the aggregate sentence. The appellate court
emphasized that Glover's aggregate sentence was "tantamount to a life
sentence," 2023-Ohio-1153, 212 N.E.3d 984, ¶ 59 (1st Dist.), and
determined that it was too harsh when compared with the sentences that
the legislature has prescribed for what the court considered more serious
crimes, id. at ¶ 97-98. To the extent that the court of appeals premised its
holding on its disagreement with Glover's aggregate sentence rather than
its review of the trial court's findings, it erred in doing so.
The statute does not permit an appellate court to simply substitute
its view of an appropriate sentence for that of the trial court. An appellate court's inquiry is limited to a review of the trial court's R.C. 2929.14(C)
findings. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Only when the court of appeals concludes that
the record clearly and convincingly does not support the trial court's findings
or it clearly and convincingly finds that the sentence is contrary to law is it
permitted to modify the trial court's sentence. Id.
Thus, an appellate court may not reverse or modify a trial court's
sentence based on its subjective disagreement with the trial court. And it
may not modify or vacate a sentence on the basis that the trial court abused
its discretion. Rather, the appellate court's review under R.C.
2953.08(G)(2)(a) is limited. It must examine the evidence in the record that
supports the trial court's findings. And it may modify or vacate the sentence
only if it "clearly and convincingly" finds that the evidence does not support
the trial court's R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a).
Though "clear-and-convincing" is typically thought of as an
evidentiary standard, the General Assembly has chosen to use that
standard as the measure for an appellate court's review of a trial court's
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings. As we have explained, "clear and convincing
evidence" is a degree of proof that is greater than a preponderance of the
evidence but less than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard used in
criminal cases. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, 231 N.E.3d 1109, at ¶ 14 (lead
opinion), citing Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954),
paragraph three of the syllabus. The appellate-review statute does not
require that the appellate court conclude that the record supports the trial court's findings before it may affirm the sentence. Rather, the statute only
allows for modification or vacation only when the appellate court "clearly
and convincingly finds" that the evidence does not support the trial court's
findings. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a). "This language is plain and unambiguous
and expresses the General Assembly's intent that appellate courts employ
a deferential standard to the trial court's consecutive-sentence findings.
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) also ensures that an appellate court does not simply
substitute its judgment for that of a trial court." Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851,
231 N.E.3d 1109, at ¶ 15 (lead opinion).
{¶ 37} Glover at ¶¶ 43-46.
{¶ 38} As noted in the first assignment of error, appellant did not object to the
imposition of consecutive sentences and has therefore forfeited all but plain error.
Appellant's Arguments
{¶ 39} Appellant concedes that the trial court made the appropriate R.C. 2929.14
findings to impose consecutive sentences both at the sentencing hearing and in its
sentencing judgment entry. Brief of appellant at 22-23. He argues, however, that his
consecutive sentences are not supported by the record. He cites his limited prior record,
his expression of remorse at sentencing, the lack of the use of force, the fact that Doe
was a teenager, and a "dispute as to the specifics surrounding how the sexual contact
(sic) between [appellant] and [Doe] began" suggesting that somehow Doe was to blame.
Brief of appellant at 25. He further asserts there was no evidence to support a conclusion that Doe was developmentally disabled, and further speculates that the trial court
imposed consecutive sentences out of sympathy for Doe and her mother.
{¶ 40} The trial court agreed that appellant had a minimal prior record, had been
cooperative with law enforcement, and had accepted responsibility by pleading as
charged. Transcript of sentencing at 18-19. But the court further stated:
There is a seriousness here that the Court just cannot ignore.
It didn't start when the victim was 5, but it did start when she was 13
or 14. It continued for a lengthy period of time, usually (sic) a year,
multiple and repeated incidents, multiple acts, each of these acts
require a different animus. They were also committed on multiple and
different occasions, so the Court is finding none of them merge.
Now, as was pointed out, you were a father figure to this child
and with that comes responsibility. It becomes a duty to protect the
child from this very thing and I think you understood that because I
saw a Facebook post that you made where you basically called for
pedophiles to be subject to extreme torture and death.
And really, I think some of them even pertain to this child
about an allegation that somebody was sending this child
inappropriate things and you were doing that all while you were
abusing this child. You were engaging in sex with this child. She was
removed from school at one point because she lied to cover up for
what you were doing. She apparently ran away. She was suicidal. This is something
that she will live with and deal with the rest of her life.
And you add to that she struggled developmentally, maturely,
however you want to phrase it, but she struggled and you knew that
she struggled and you took advantage of that.
You preyed on this child that essentially, I mean, I guess the
way it was phrased is she didn't have a stranger danger button. I
mean, you exposed and utilized that and abused her and now her
life has changed. She hardly speaks. She sleeps all the time. You
have caused a lifetime of pain for her and for the people that care
about her.
And then even after you are arrested on this, you want to see
them. You call her to tell her happy birthday. It's just – there is a
seriousness here that is hard to comprehend, Mr. Crim.
...
The Court is further finding that consecutive sentences are
necessary to punish the offender and protect the public from future
crime and are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the conduct
and the danger posed by the Defendant and that two or more of
these offenses were part of one or more courses of conduct and the
harm caused is so great and so unusual that a single prison term
would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the conduct . . . {¶ 41} Transcript of sentencing 19-22.
{¶ 42} First, contrary to appellant's claim, the record contains evidence to support
Doe's diagnosis. The PSI indicates Doe's mother provided Detective Coey with evidence
of the fact that Doe receives SSI benefits for her condition and a voicemail from Doe's
doctor. PSI at 10-11. Moreover, appellant never challenged Doe's diagnosis.
{¶ 43} Second, there is no evidence in the record to support a conclusion that the
trial court was swayed by any inappropriate consideration such as sympathy, and
appellant points to none.
{¶ 44} Finally, while appellant attempts to minimize his behavior, as quoted above,
the record is replete with support for appellant's consecutive sentences.
{¶ 45} Upon review of the record, we find the trial court made the appropriate
findings and court's imposition of consecutive sentences was supported by the record.
Appellant has therefore failed to demonstrate plain error. Accordingly, the final
assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 46} The judgment of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: King, P.J.
Montgomery, J. and
Popham, J. concur.