IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA19-369
Filed: 7 January 2020
Macon County, No. 15 CRS 416
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
v.
THOMAS EUGENE CRANE, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 23 October 2018 by Judge
William H. Coward in Macon County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
17 October 2019.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Jonathan J. Evans, for the State-Appellee.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Heidi Reiner, for Defendant-Appellant.
COLLINS, Judge.
Defendant Thomas Eugene Crane raises one evidentiary issue on appeal from
judgment entered upon a jury verdict of guilty of driving while impaired. Because
Defendant has waived appellate review of this issue due to invited error, we dismiss
the appeal.
I. Procedural History
Defendant was issued a citation for driving while impaired on 28 November
2015. He pled no contest to the offense in Macon County District Court on 17 January STATE V. CRANE
Opinion of the Court
2017 and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, suspended for 36 months’
probation. Defendant appealed to Macon County Superior Court. After a jury trial,
the jury found Defendant guilty of driving while impaired. The trial court sentenced
Defendant to 10 months’ imprisonment. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open
court.
II. Factual Background
The State’s evidence tended to show that Defendant was driving a moped on
U.S. Highway 23 on 28 November 2015 at around 8:30 p.m., when he was struck by
a car. When North Carolina State Highway Patrol Trooper Jonathan Gibbs arrived
at the scene of the accident, emergency personnel were talking with Defendant and
preparing to place him in an ambulance. The moped was in the grass to the right
side of the road and was inoperable. Gibbs spoke with Defendant after he had been
placed in the ambulance and noted that Defendant’s eyes were red and glassy and
that he had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. When Gibbs asked Defendant if
he had been drinking, Gibbs admitted to having “some drinks throughout the day.”
Defendant refused to take a portable breath test.
Gibbs also interviewed the driver of the car, who explained that he was driving
about 40 miles per hour in the right lane of the highway when he came upon “a dim
red light” that he believed was a tail light “all of the sudden in the right-hand lane.”
-2- STATE V. CRANE
Although the driver of the car braked and swerved to the left, his car struck the
moped.
Gibbs investigated the crash, making observations of the road and the vehicles
and taking measurements that he later used to create a diagram and a crash report.
Gibbs visited Defendant at the hospital, again detecting an odor of alcohol on his
breath. When Gibbs asked Defendant for the second time if he had been drinking,
Defendant admitted to having “some mixed drinks” and that he “did not stop drinking
until after dark that night.” Gibbs issued Defendant a citation for driving while
impaired. Based upon results of a blood test performed at the hospital, it was later
determined that Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.16 grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of whole blood.
III. Discussion
Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred by admitting into evidence
Gibbs’ testimony about how and where the accident occurred. Defendant contends
that this was improper lay opinion testimony because Gibbs did not witness the
accident, and it was not admissible as expert testimony because Gibbs was not
qualified as an expert in accident reconstruction.
The State argues that Defendant has waived his right to appellate review of
this issue due to invited error. We agree.
-3- STATE V. CRANE
“A defendant is not prejudiced by . . . error resulting from his own conduct.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443 (2018). “Thus, a defendant who invites error has waived
his right to all appellate review concerning the invited error, including plain error
review.” State v. Barber, 147 N.C. App. 69, 74, 554 S.E.2d 413, 416 (2001).
“Statements elicited by a defendant on cross-examination are, even if error, invited
error, by which a defendant cannot be prejudiced as a matter of law.” State v. Gobal,
186 N.C. App. 308, 319, 651 S.E.2d 279, 287 (2007) (citation omitted). Moreover,
where a defendant himself offered testimony that is similar to the testimony from the
witness that defendant challenges on appeal, the defendant has waived his right to
appellate review of any error that may have resulted from the admission of the
challenged testimony. State v. Steen, 226 N.C. App. 568, 576, 739 S.E.2d 869, 876
(2013).
In this case, Defendant challenges the following testimony by Gibbs: (1) the
moped was being driven in the right-hand lane at the time of the collision, and (2) the
tire marks Gibbs observed indicated the point of impact. However, Gibbs did not give
this challenged testimony on direct examination. Gibbs’ testimony on direct
examination about the observations and measurements he made at the scene of the
accident included the following:
[State]: And what happened when you got that call? [Gibbs]: I received a call from our communications center about a motor vehicle accident involving a moped and a car. When I arrived there was first responders, EMS, was
-4- STATE V. CRANE
already on the scene. Whenever I got out I noticed the moped was off to the right of the road, over in the grass. And a car was on up the road past that with its flashers on. When I exited the vehicle, my vehicle, I went up and was talking to EMS. At that time they was working with [Defendant] trying to get him into the ambulance. .... [State]: And after you spoke with the other driver, what happened? [Gibbs]: After that I got the measurements and everything I needed for that wreck. I got the wrecker to come for the moped. The driver of the vehicle 1, Mr. Warner, his vehicle was still -- he was going to have the other, the tow company, Ridgecrest Towing, it was still drivable. He was going to be able to get it to where he could still drive home and not need a wrecker. Once that took place, I left there and went to the hospital to see [Defendant]. ... [State]: And the vehicle, this moped, could you kind of describe it for the jury? [Gibbs]: At the time it was laying, the moped, was laying on its side over in the grass. It was a small, small moped. I think it was a TaoTao 2012 moped. Yes, 2012. And the moped itself would not be drivable in the condition that it was in from the wreck.
During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Gibbs more about his
observations and measurements at the scene of the accident:
[Defense Counsel]: Okay. And did you at some point then create some sort of diagrams that describe in effect the collision? [Gibbs]: A diagram, yes, we -- yes. [Defense Counsel]: And you do one just by hand basically? [Gibbs]: We got one that we do which is – what that’s for
-5- STATE V. CRANE
is it’s at scene measurements diagram, yes.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA19-369
Filed: 7 January 2020
Macon County, No. 15 CRS 416
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
v.
THOMAS EUGENE CRANE, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 23 October 2018 by Judge
William H. Coward in Macon County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
17 October 2019.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Jonathan J. Evans, for the State-Appellee.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Heidi Reiner, for Defendant-Appellant.
COLLINS, Judge.
Defendant Thomas Eugene Crane raises one evidentiary issue on appeal from
judgment entered upon a jury verdict of guilty of driving while impaired. Because
Defendant has waived appellate review of this issue due to invited error, we dismiss
the appeal.
I. Procedural History
Defendant was issued a citation for driving while impaired on 28 November
2015. He pled no contest to the offense in Macon County District Court on 17 January STATE V. CRANE
Opinion of the Court
2017 and was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment, suspended for 36 months’
probation. Defendant appealed to Macon County Superior Court. After a jury trial,
the jury found Defendant guilty of driving while impaired. The trial court sentenced
Defendant to 10 months’ imprisonment. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open
court.
II. Factual Background
The State’s evidence tended to show that Defendant was driving a moped on
U.S. Highway 23 on 28 November 2015 at around 8:30 p.m., when he was struck by
a car. When North Carolina State Highway Patrol Trooper Jonathan Gibbs arrived
at the scene of the accident, emergency personnel were talking with Defendant and
preparing to place him in an ambulance. The moped was in the grass to the right
side of the road and was inoperable. Gibbs spoke with Defendant after he had been
placed in the ambulance and noted that Defendant’s eyes were red and glassy and
that he had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. When Gibbs asked Defendant if
he had been drinking, Gibbs admitted to having “some drinks throughout the day.”
Defendant refused to take a portable breath test.
Gibbs also interviewed the driver of the car, who explained that he was driving
about 40 miles per hour in the right lane of the highway when he came upon “a dim
red light” that he believed was a tail light “all of the sudden in the right-hand lane.”
-2- STATE V. CRANE
Although the driver of the car braked and swerved to the left, his car struck the
moped.
Gibbs investigated the crash, making observations of the road and the vehicles
and taking measurements that he later used to create a diagram and a crash report.
Gibbs visited Defendant at the hospital, again detecting an odor of alcohol on his
breath. When Gibbs asked Defendant for the second time if he had been drinking,
Defendant admitted to having “some mixed drinks” and that he “did not stop drinking
until after dark that night.” Gibbs issued Defendant a citation for driving while
impaired. Based upon results of a blood test performed at the hospital, it was later
determined that Defendant’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.16 grams of alcohol
per 100 milliliters of whole blood.
III. Discussion
Defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred by admitting into evidence
Gibbs’ testimony about how and where the accident occurred. Defendant contends
that this was improper lay opinion testimony because Gibbs did not witness the
accident, and it was not admissible as expert testimony because Gibbs was not
qualified as an expert in accident reconstruction.
The State argues that Defendant has waived his right to appellate review of
this issue due to invited error. We agree.
-3- STATE V. CRANE
“A defendant is not prejudiced by . . . error resulting from his own conduct.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443 (2018). “Thus, a defendant who invites error has waived
his right to all appellate review concerning the invited error, including plain error
review.” State v. Barber, 147 N.C. App. 69, 74, 554 S.E.2d 413, 416 (2001).
“Statements elicited by a defendant on cross-examination are, even if error, invited
error, by which a defendant cannot be prejudiced as a matter of law.” State v. Gobal,
186 N.C. App. 308, 319, 651 S.E.2d 279, 287 (2007) (citation omitted). Moreover,
where a defendant himself offered testimony that is similar to the testimony from the
witness that defendant challenges on appeal, the defendant has waived his right to
appellate review of any error that may have resulted from the admission of the
challenged testimony. State v. Steen, 226 N.C. App. 568, 576, 739 S.E.2d 869, 876
(2013).
In this case, Defendant challenges the following testimony by Gibbs: (1) the
moped was being driven in the right-hand lane at the time of the collision, and (2) the
tire marks Gibbs observed indicated the point of impact. However, Gibbs did not give
this challenged testimony on direct examination. Gibbs’ testimony on direct
examination about the observations and measurements he made at the scene of the
accident included the following:
[State]: And what happened when you got that call? [Gibbs]: I received a call from our communications center about a motor vehicle accident involving a moped and a car. When I arrived there was first responders, EMS, was
-4- STATE V. CRANE
already on the scene. Whenever I got out I noticed the moped was off to the right of the road, over in the grass. And a car was on up the road past that with its flashers on. When I exited the vehicle, my vehicle, I went up and was talking to EMS. At that time they was working with [Defendant] trying to get him into the ambulance. .... [State]: And after you spoke with the other driver, what happened? [Gibbs]: After that I got the measurements and everything I needed for that wreck. I got the wrecker to come for the moped. The driver of the vehicle 1, Mr. Warner, his vehicle was still -- he was going to have the other, the tow company, Ridgecrest Towing, it was still drivable. He was going to be able to get it to where he could still drive home and not need a wrecker. Once that took place, I left there and went to the hospital to see [Defendant]. ... [State]: And the vehicle, this moped, could you kind of describe it for the jury? [Gibbs]: At the time it was laying, the moped, was laying on its side over in the grass. It was a small, small moped. I think it was a TaoTao 2012 moped. Yes, 2012. And the moped itself would not be drivable in the condition that it was in from the wreck.
During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Gibbs more about his
observations and measurements at the scene of the accident:
[Defense Counsel]: Okay. And did you at some point then create some sort of diagrams that describe in effect the collision? [Gibbs]: A diagram, yes, we -- yes. [Defense Counsel]: And you do one just by hand basically? [Gibbs]: We got one that we do which is – what that’s for
-5- STATE V. CRANE
is it’s at scene measurements diagram, yes. [Defense Counsel]: And do you take the same information to create something on some sort of true graphic using some sort of software or something? [Gibbs]: Yes. [Defense Counsel]: And that’s the same data that goes into both graphic depictions of the collision? [Gibbs]: That would be correct. We would use the measurement sheet that we do on the side of the road, it’s just a sketch to, you know, have all the like road width measurements and that stuff to later be entered into the what’s called eCrash. It’s a crash site that we use. [Defense Counsel]: Okay. And was it your conclusion that at the time of the collision the moped was in the middle of the right-hand lane traveling north? [Gibbs]: It was in the right-hand lane, yes, traveling north.
It is apparent from the transcript that the first challenged item of Gibbs’
testimony—that the moped was being driven in the right-hand land at the time of the
collision—was elicited by defense counsel during cross-examination. As a result, even
if it would otherwise have been error to allow Gibbs to testify to the location of the
vehicles in an accident without being tendered as an expert, the error was invited by
Defendant, and thus Defendant cannot be prejudiced as a matter of law. See Gobal,
186 N.C. App. at 319, 651 S.E.2d at 287. See State v. Rivers, 324 N.C. 573, 575-76,
380 S.E.2d 359, 360 (1989) (citation omitted) (holding that defendant waived
appellate review of a challenge to the admissibility of testimony because defense
counsel elicited the testimony during cross-examination of the witness and failed to
object to the testimony at trial). As a result of Defendant’s invited error, he has
-6- STATE V. CRANE
waived appellate review of this testimony, including plain error review. See Barber,
147 N.C. App. at 74, 554 S.E.2d at 416.
The State then asked Defendant on cross-examination about the testimony
that Gibbs had already provided, as elicited by defense counsel:
[State]: And you heard Trooper Gibbs testify that based on his investigation he believed your moped to be in the middle of the lane at the time of the impact, correct, you heard him say that? [Defendant]: That what he said on the stand but that’s not . . . what he told my daughter and I. . . . .... The only conclusion I can draw from why he hit me is that he said he jerked it when he seen me. He had to be over on the shoulder when he first seen me. Because when he jerked it back, that’s when he just barely missed me walking and hit the scooter. [State]: So to be clear, you’re saying that he had to have been off over the white line in order to hit you? [Defendant]: Yes. [State]: Okay. [Defendant]: I’m not saying he had to be but that’s the most logical conclusion that – because I know where I was at. Mr. Gibbs met my daughter and I out at the accident scene after I was released from the hospital. He helped us look for my keys that had flown out of the scooter for an hour, for about a good hour. At that point in time he showed me exactly where the impact had taken place because there was two big black marks right out to the side like that. And I couldn’t understand why they were out to the side. And he said that was where the tire exploded when the impact was made. And it was that far from the white line, not nowhere near the middle of the road.
-7- STATE V. CRANE
Thus, it is also apparent from the transcript that Defendant offered testimony about
Gibbs’ identification of the point of impact based on the tire marks. On rebuttal, the
State echoed Defendant’s testimony when asking Gibbs about his observation of tire
marks:
[State]: Trooper, when you conducted your wreck investigation did you see any tire marks in the roadway at the point of impact?
[Gibbs]: Yes, sir.
[State]: Where were those tire marks?
[Gibbs]: In the center lane, as I diagram[m]ed on a HP-49A that is done at the scene of the investigation.
Defendant cannot now challenge Gibbs’ rebuttal testimony regarding the point
of impact based on the tire marks because Defendant himself had already offered
testimony of similar character. See Steen, 226 N.C. App. at 576, 739 S.E.2d at 876.
Defendant has thus waived appellate review of any error that may have resulted from
the admission of this challenged testimony. See id.
IV. Conclusion
Because any error in admitting the officer’s testimony was invited error,
Defendant waived all review, including plain error review. Accordingly, Defendant’s
appeal is dismissed.
DISMISSED.
Judges ARROWOOD and HAMPSON concur.
-8-