State v. Cox

2025 Ohio 1860

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Cox, 2025-Ohio-1860.]

COURT OF APPEALS FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JUDGES: STATE OF OHIO : Hon. Andrew J. King, P.J. : Hon. Robert G. Montgomery, J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Kevin W. Popham, J. : -vs- : : Case No. 24-CA-00028 LAWRENCE K. COX : : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Fairfield Municipal Court, Case No. 24-CRB-00203

JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part; Reversed in part, Remanded

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 21, 2025

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

JOSEPH M. SABO SCOTT P. WOOD City of Lancaster Law Director's Office Conrad & Wood 136 West Main Street 120 E. Main Street, Ste. 200 Box 1008 Lancaster, OH 43130 Lancaster, OH 43130 [Cite as State v. Cox, 2025-Ohio-1860.]

Popham, J.,

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Lawrence K. Cox (“Cox”) appeals his convictions and

sentences after a bench trial in the Fairfield County Municipal Court.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} Cox is sixty-nine years old and has no prior criminal record. He owned

residences in both Fairfield and Delaware Counties. Cox and his wife lived at the

Delaware County residence from 2000 until 2012, when they moved to the Fairfield

County residence after both lost their jobs. T. at 33 - 34.

{¶3} On February 8, 2024, the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas,

Domestic Relations Division, issued an ex parte civil protection order (“CPO”) in favor of

Cox’s wife. The order applied to both the Fairfield and Delaware County residences and

required Cox to vacate them immediately. T. at 13, 15; State’s Exhibit A.

{¶4} According to Cox, on February 11 and 12, 2024, deputies from the Fairfield

County Sheriff’s Office advised Cox that he was required to leave the property due to the

CPO. T. at 29. When Cox asked to see the order and the deputies were unable to

produce it, the deputies left. Id.

{¶5} On February 13, 2024, deputies returned with the CPO and presented it to

Cox. Their interaction was recorded on body cameras. T. at 7–9, 17–19; State’s Exhibit

B. The video footage shows Cox standing calmly on the porch, wearing shorts, and

attempting to put on a jacket. Deputies instructed him to provide keys and garage door

openers for both residences. State’s Exhibit B at 00:37.

{¶6} Cox remained calm and polite throughout the encounter. He asked whether

the CPO extended to his vehicle and demonstrated how deputies could access the home in the event they lacked keys. Id. at 01:51, 02:13. Cox stated his intention to file for a

similar protection order at the courthouse, using the deputies’ CPO as a template. Id. at

03:19. He also asserted that, as a matter of property and constitutional law, if deputies

returned, they would have to forcibly remove him. Id. at 03:24.

{¶7} The deputies advised Cox that he needed to leave immediately and

requested his house keys. Id. at 03:44. Three deputies accompanied him back inside the

house. Cox told the deputies he intended to violate every part of the order, because he

was “going to go right now to the courthouse….” When asked if he intended to leave, he

responded, “No, I am not leaving.” Id. at 04:19. The sergeant immediately arrested Cox,

who was informed he was being arrested for violating the CPO and was going to jail. Id.

at 04:20. Cox cooperated fully with the deputy’s instructions and offered no resistance.

Id.

{¶8} On February 26, 2024, upon motion by Cox’s attorney, the trial judge

ordered Cox to be evaluated for competency and sanity. The following day, the State

filed an additional charge of Obstructing Official Business in violation of R.C. 2921.31.

{¶9} On May 14, 2024, Cox was found sane and competent to stand trial.

{¶10} On June 11, 2024, a trial to the court was held in this matter. The trial judge

found Cox guilty of Violating a Protection Order in violation of R.C. 2919.27 and

Obstructing Official Business in violation of R.C. 2921.31. For the violation of a protection

order charge, the judge sentenced Cox to 180 days in jail, suspended 63 days, and gave

credit for 117 days of pretrial incarceration. The judge ran the obstructing official business

charge concurrent to the violation of a protection order charge, sentencing Cox to 90 days

of jail time credit. Assignments of Error

{¶11} Cox raises three assignments of error,

{¶12} “I. APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR VIOLATING A PROTECTION

ORDER WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THERE

WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS CONVICTION.”

{¶13} “II. APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL

BUSINESS WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE

EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT HIS CONVICTION.”

{¶14} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT.”

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR I. & II.

{¶15} In his first assignment of error, Cox contends that the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction for violating a protection order and, further his

conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶16} In his second assignment of error, Cox argues that the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction for obstructing official business, and further his

{¶17} Cox’s first and second assignments of error raise common and interrelated

issues; therefore, we will address the arguments together.

Standard of Appellate Review – Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶18} The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury....” This right, along

with the Due Process Clause, requires the State to prove each element of a crime to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509–10 (1995);

Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016).

{¶19} Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law reviewed de novo. State v.

Walker, 2016-Ohio-8295, ¶ 30; State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 13. The review entails

examining the elements of the offense and the evidence presented. State v. Richardson,

2016-Ohio-8448, ¶ 13.

{¶20} In assessing sufficiency, an appellate court does not weigh credibility. State

v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded on other

grounds by constitutional amendment as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102

n.4 (1997); Walker, ¶ 30. The question is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 543 (2001), citing Jenks;

see also Walker, ¶ 31; State v. Poutney, 2018-Ohio-22, ¶ 19.

{¶21} A verdict will be upheld unless “reasonable minds could not reach the

conclusion reached by the trier of fact.” State v. Ketterer, 2006-Ohio-5283, ¶ 94, quoting

State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430 (1997); accord State v. Montgomery, 2016-Ohio-

5487, ¶ 74.

Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, would convince a rational factfinder that Cox was guilty of

violating a protection order and obstructing official business

{¶22} Cox was convicted of violating a protection order in violation of R.C.

2919.27(A)(2), which reads, (A) No person shall recklessly violate the terms of any of the

following:

(1) A protection order issued or consent agreement approved

pursuant to section 2919.26 or 3113.31 of the Revised Code….

{¶23} “A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the

consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person’s

conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is

reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the

consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such

circumstances are likely to exist.” R.C. 2901.22 (C).

{¶24} Here, the protection order issued pursuant to R.C. 3113.31(C) directed Cox

to “IMMEDIATELY VACATE” both residences. (Emphasis in original). This plainly

required him to leave the Fairfield residence without delay.

{¶25} “‘Immediately’ is typically defined as follows: (1) without lapse of time;

without delay; instantly; at once; (2) without intervening medium or agent, concerning or

affecting directly; (3) with no object or space intervening. * * * However, immediately is

not a word capable of a hard and fast definition to every applicable situation. Whether

the action is immediate depends upon the circumstances of the case.” State v. Thornton,

1997 WL 200149 (10th Dist. May 12, 1977) at *2; State v. Martin, 2008-Ohio-1827, ¶ 18

(8th Dist.). See also State v. Thomas, 2005-Ohio-4106, ¶15 (Black’s Law dictionary

defines “immediate” as “[o]ccurring without delay.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004)

764). {¶26} The deputy told Cox to leave immediately. Cox did not request time to

gather belongings but simply refused to leave.

{¶27} Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a reasonable

factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cox recklessly violated the terms of

a protection order issued pursuant to R.C. 3113.31.

{¶28} We therefore find that the State met its burden of production regarding each

element of the offense and, accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support Cox’s

conviction for violating a protection order.

{¶29} Cox was also convicted of Obstructing Official Business in violation of R.C.

2921.31, which states,

(A) No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent,

obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act

within the public official’s official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or

impedes a public official in the performance of the public official’s lawful

duties.

{¶30} To prove obstruction, the State must show an overt act, committed with

obstructive intent, that actually hampers the official. State v. Davis, 2017-Ohio-5613, ¶

37 (2d Dist.). “The proper focus in a prosecution for obstructing official business is on the

defendant's conduct, verbal or physical, and its effect on the public official's ability to

perform the official's lawful duties.” State v. Henry, 2018-Ohio-1128, ¶ 55 (10th Dist.),

quoting State v. Wellman, 2007-Ohio-2953, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.). See also State v. Stancato,

2024-Ohio-2632, ¶ 13 (5th Dist.). {¶31} Needlessly stalling or escalating an investigation is an overt act. State v.

Willey, 2015-Ohio 4572 ¶ 24 (5th Dist.). Additionally, in State v. Florence, 2014-Ohio-

2337, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.), the Court found:

For the purposes of an affirmative act, we have previously found

that moving away from officers, subjecting officers to verbal abuse, and

physically resisting officers was sufficient to convict a defendant of

obstructing official business. State v. Merz, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA97-05-

108, 2000 WL 1051837 (July 31, 2000). Additionally, a defendant's volume

and demeanor making it impossible to investigate a complaint has been

found sufficient to constitute an act for an obstructing official business

conviction. City of Warren v. Lucas, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 99-T-0019,

2000 WL 655446 (May 19, 2000).

Florence at ¶ 12.

{¶32} The body camera video shows that Cox remained calm, and never raised

his voice. Nor did he struggle, become loud, or act in a verbally abusive manner. Cox

simply stated he would not leave, after which he was arrested. Cox followed the deputy’s

directions, was handcuffed, walked outside, and placed into a cruiser without incident.

The State cites to no overt act apart from his disobedience of the CPO to support the

conviction.

{¶33} Because Cox took no affirmative action that impeded the deputies, the

evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for obstructing official business. His

refusal to leave, while sufficient to support the violating a protection order conviction, does not establish the requisite intent to act to prevent, obstruct, or delay the deputies in the

performance of their lawful duties.

Standard of Appellate Review –Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶34} The term “manifest weight of the evidence” relates to persuasion. Eastley

v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. It concerns “the inclination of the greater amount of

credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.”

(Emphasis deleted.) State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), superseded by

constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89,

102 n.4 (1997); State v. Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 26.

{¶35} When reviewing the manifest weight of the evidence, the question is

whether the jury clearly lost its way in resolving conflicts, resulting in a manifest

miscarriage of justice, even if the evidence is legally sufficient. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d

at 386 - 387; State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67 (2001). In this role, an appellate court

acts as a “thirteenth juror” and may disagree with the jury’s assessment of conflicting

testimony. State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800; Thompkins at 387, citing Tibbs v. Florida,

457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982); State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 25.

{¶36} Appellate courts traditionally presume the factfinder’s assessment is

correct, given its ability to observe witnesses’ demeanor, gestures, and tone, all critical

factors in evaluating credibility. Eastley, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21; Seasons Coal Co., Inc.

v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984).

{¶37} However, the Eighth District recently noted in State v. Reillo, 2024-Ohio-

3307, ¶ 20, appeal allowed, 2025-Ohio-705 (Table), that Eastley arguably extended this

presumption from civil to criminal cases. Id. at ¶ 27. The court cautioned that deferring to credibility determinations would collapse the distinction between sufficiency and weight

of the evidence. Reillo at ¶ 23. It observed that if credibility findings were insulated from

review, there would be little reason to raise a manifest-weight challenge. Id. See also

State v. Butler, 2024-Ohio-5879, ¶ 27 (5th Dist.). Thus, acting as a thirteenth juror, the

appellate court reviews credibility de novo. Id.

{¶38} A manifest-weight claim succeeds only in “the exceptional case in which the

evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387,

quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).

{¶39} To reverse a conviction on manifest-weight grounds, all three judges on the

appellate panel must concur. Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 3(B)(3); Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko,

2007-Ohio-4918, ¶¶ 2–4, citing Thompkins, syllabus ¶ 4.

Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the judge clearly lost his way and created

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that Cox’s conviction for violating a protection

order must be reversed and a new trial ordered1

{¶40} Upon review of the entire record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable

inferences as a thirteenth juror, including considering the credibility of witnesses, we

conclude that the judge did not lose his way or create a manifest miscarriage of justice.

{¶41} Cox does not deny that he told the deputies he would not leave the home.

The body camera video corroborates the testimony.

{¶42} The record contains no compelling evidence that weighs heavily against

Cox’s conviction. We find the greater amount of credible evidence produced at trial

supports the judge’s conclusion that Cox violated the protection order. Accordingly, we

1 Because we have found the evidence insufficient to convict Cox of obstructing official business,

his manifest weight argument with respect to his obstructing official business conviction is moot. find no indication that the judge lost his way or ignored substantial evidence in reaching

his decision.

{¶43} Cox’s first assignment of error concerning his conviction and sentence for

violation of a protection order is overruled.

{¶44} Cox’s second assignment of error concerning his conviction and sentence

for obstructing official business is sustained.

III.

{¶45} In his third assignment of error, Cox contends the judge should have

merged the convictions for sentencing as allied offenses of similar import pursuant to R.C.

2941.25.

{¶46} In light of our disposition of Cox’s second assignment of error, we find Cox’s

third assignment of error to be moot.

Conclusion

{¶47} Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2953.07

authorize an appellate court to affirm, reverse, or modify a lower court’s judgment.

{¶48} Cox’s conviction and sentence for violating a protection order are affirmed.

{¶49} Cox’s conviction and sentence for obstructing official business are

reversed. {¶50} The judgment of the Fairfield County Municipal Court is affirmed in part,

reversed in part, and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in

accordance with our opinion and the law.

By Popham, J.,

King, P.J., and

Montgomery, J., concur