State v. Cottingham
This text of State v. Cottingham (State v. Cottingham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA23-715
Filed 17 September 2025
Cumberland County, No. 17CRS062793-250
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
CHARLES LAMONT COTTINGHAM, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 26 October 2022 by Judge
Patrick Thomas Nadolski in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court
of Appeals 20 March 2024.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel Shatz for the defendant-appellant. 1
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Michael T. Henry, for the State.
GORE, Judge.
Defendant Charles Lamont Cottingham appeals judgment entered upon a
jury’s verdict convicting him of first-degree murder for the death of Kristen Lee Stone.
1 After the heard date in this matter, the Appellate Defender was allowed to substitute for
Defendant’s original appointed appellate counsel who had withdrawn after filing Defendant’s principle appellate brief. The Appellate Defender was also allowed to file a reply brief in the Fall 2024, well after the heard date, which we considered in our review. STATE V. COTTINGHAM
Opinion of the Court
I.
On 10 August 2016, fishermen discovered the body of Ms. Stone in the Cape
Fear River in Cumberland County. Defendant was the last person known to have
seen Ms. Stone alive.
Defendant was indicted for Ms. Stone’s murder. A jury convicted Defendant of
first-degree murder. The trial court entered judgment consistent with the jury’s
verdict, sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
Defendant appeals of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27(b) and 15A-1444(a).
II.
Defendant makes three arguments on appeal, which we address in turn.
A. Sufficiency of the State’s Evidence
In his first argument, Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his
motion to dismiss. Specifically, Defendant argues that the State failed to present
sufficient evidence that he murdered Ms. Stone.
In considering a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a trial court must view the
“evidence in the light most favorable to the State,” with any contradictions and
discrepancies resolved in the State’s favor. State v. Turnage, 362 N.C. 491, 493–94
(2008). We review a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss de novo.
State v. Dover, 381 N.C. 535, 547 (2022).
The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, tends to
show as follows:
-2- STATE V. COTTINGHAM
In 2004, Defendant was convicted of felony sexual assault in Alaska and
sentenced to 13 years imprisonment with 7 years suspended and a probation term of
10 years. His conviction was based on evidence that he hired a prostitute for sex,
took her to a remote location, exchanged money for sex, and then strangled her
unconscious after threatening her by knifepoint to retake his money.
In May 2016, Defendant was pulled over by a law enforcement officer in Hoke
County for a traffic violation. During the stop, the officer saw Ms. Stone, a passenger
in Defendant’s car, visibly upset. The officer questions Ms. Stone during the stop out
of Defendant’s presence. Ms. Stone told the officer that Defendant had hired her to
come to his home, he took her to a remote location, and he forced her to perform oral
sex at gun point. The officer found an airsoft pistol resembling a real gun in
Defendant’s back seat. Based on the stop, Defendant was charged with felony sexual
assault and felony kidnapping. If convicted of these crimes, Defendant faced the
possibility that his Alaska probation would be revoked.
On 7 August 2017, prior to Defendant’s trial for the Hoke County incident,
Defendant exchanged texts and phone calls with Ms. Stone. During these
communications, Defendant drove from Fayetteville to a motel in Greenville where
Ms. Stone was staying. Surveillance cameras videoed Defendant’s vehicle pull up to
the motel and Ms. Stone leaving the motel and entering the vehicle. Expert analysis
of cellular tower and phone data showed Defendant’s and Ms. Stone’s cell phones
traveling from Greenville to Fayetteville. Ms. Stone’s phone was eventually turned
-3- STATE V. COTTINGHAM
off and never found. Ms. Stone was not seen alive again.
Three days later, on 10 August 2017, recreational fishermen discovered Ms.
Stone’s body in the Cape Fear River downstream from the Fayetteville Outer Loop
bridge (Interstate 695). There is no evidence that anyone else saw Ms. Stone alive
after Defendant picked her up three days prior at the Greenville motel. Ms. Stone’s
body had evidence of decomposition consistent with being in the river for three days.
There was a zip tie on one of Ms. Stone’s wrists. Defendant’s ex-wife found inside of
her car that Defendant sometimes used a package of zip ties consistent with the zip
tie found on Ms. Stone’s body. After Ms. Stone’s death, Defendant confessed to
someone during a casual conversation that he had killed someone.
In his appellate briefs, Defendant focuses on the uncertainty of the State’s cell
phone and tower data. We conclude, however, that the evidence, aside from the cell
phone and tower data, was sufficient to lead to a reasonable inference that Defendant
murdered Ms. Stone. See State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 452-53 (1988).
B. The State’s Closing Argument
In his second argument, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by not
intervening ex mero motu during certain portions of the State’s closing arguments.
Defendant cites to statements made by the prosecutor suggesting that Defendant was
being untruthful during his trial testimony and that Defendant “shouldn’t get off that
easy” through a conviction of a lesser crime.
We note that Defendant’s trial counsel did not object at trial during the State’s
-4- STATE V. COTTINGHAM
closing argument. The trial court, though, must exercise discretion in deciding
whether to intervene where a prosecutor’s remarks are “extreme and . . . clearly
calculated to prejudice the jury in its deliberations.” State v. Hardy, 299 N.C. 445,
453 (1980).
We conclude that the statements did not rise to the level of gross impropriety
where the trial court could be said to have abused its discretion by failing to intervene.
See, e.g., State v. Duke, 360 N.C. 110, 130 (2005) (prosecutor’s improper statements
were not “so overreaching as to shift the focus of the jury from its fact-finding function
to relying on its own personal prejudices or passions”).
C. Evidence of Defendant’s Pending Charges in Hoke County
In his final argument, Defendant argues that the trial court erred under
Rules 403 and 404 of our Rules of Evidence by allowing the State to introduce
evidence of his charges pending in Hoke County from the 2016 traffic stop.
Under Rule 404, evidence of other crimes committed by Defendant may be
admissible where its relevance is for some reason other than showing Defendant’s
character, such as showing “motive.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2023). See also
State v. Spaugh, 321 N.C.
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