[28]*28RICHARDSON, P. J.
Defendant appeals his convictions for aggravated murder, felony murder, intentional murder, first degree robbery and first degree kidnapping. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Defendant’s first assignment of error relates to the testimony of a witness for the state, Darrell Cooper, one of three accomplices. He had entered into a plea agreement and was the only accomplice to testify. Defendant impeached Cooper during cross-examination by eliciting testimony that he had agreed to testify in return for permission to enter his plea in juvenile court. The state rehabilitated Cooper by calling his attorney to testify regarding the agreement and to read the plea agreement into evidence. Conditions of the agreement included that Cooper would honestly disclose to the police and the district attorney all information regarding his accomplices’ criminal activities and that, if he were not truthful in court, any statements he had made could be used against him. Otherwise he would be granted immunity for any crimes he disclosed, other than the murder.1 A portion of the agreement [29]*29requiring Cooper to take a polygraph examination to prove he was truthful was not read into evidence.
Defendant argues that such rehabilitation is impermissible under OEC 609-1(3), which provides:
“Evidence to support or rehabilitate a witness whose credibility has been attacked by evidence of bias or interest shall be limited to evidence showing a lack of bias or interest.”
In our recent decision in State v. Middleton, 61 Or App 680, 658 P2d 555, rev allowed 294 Or 792 (1983), the defendant’s accomplice testified for the state. He was impeached by evidence of prior inconsistent statements and evidence tending to show he changed his story after entering into a plea agreement. The state rehabilitated the witness by eliciting testimony that the conditions of the agreement were that he testify and “pass” a polygraph examination. We held that the agreement was inadmissible to rehabilitate the witness. Relying on OEC 609-1(3), we stated:
[30]*30“* * * The evidence proffered by the prosecutor in this case does not show any ‘lack’ of interest or bias: the witness’ interest is manifest. Rather, the proffered evidence is designed to show that, in spite of the interest he admittedly has, this witness is nonetheless telling the truth. The rule excludes such evidence.” 61 Or App at 684.
We also concluded that the rehabilitation evidence was inadmissible, because it impermissibly included evidence of a polygraph examination. Although in this case there was no mention of a polygraph examination as a condition of the agreement, the first part of the quoted rationale in Middleton applies. A condition of the plea agreement was that Cooper tell the truth. Such evidence does not show “a lack of bias or interest” under the rule, but rather it is designed to show truthfulness despite interest. It was error to permit rehabilitation by evidence of the plea agreement’s condition that the witness tell the truth. The error was not harmless. The veracity of Cooper’s testimony was a key element of the state’s case.
Defendant also assigns as error admission of the testimony of a psychiatrist who had examined him at his attorney’s request. Defendant asserts that it was admitted in violation of the attorney-client privilege. Defendant’s former mother-in-law testified that defendant had an alcohol problem and related an incident of apparent alcohol-induced amnesia within a few weeks of the crimes. Defendant also called an acquaintance who testified that he believed defendant to be an alcoholic. In rebuttal, the state called Dr. Koutsky, a psychiatrist who had examined defendant at defense counsel’s request. He testified to defendant’s alcohol dependency and his claim of alcohol-induced amnesia, stating his conclusion that defendant nevertheless could have acted with a conscious objective to commit the acts at the time in question.
It is not disputed that defendant’s communications to Dr. Koutsky would be protected by the attorney-client privilege absent a waiver of the privilege.2 The question is whether defendant waived the privilege under OEC 511:
[31]*31“A person upon whom ORS 40.225 to 40.295 confer a privilege against disclosure of the confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if the person or the person’s predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication. This section does not apply if the disclosure is itself a privileged communication. Voluntary disclosure does not occur with the mere commencement of litigation or, in the case of a deposition taken for the purpose of perpetuating testimony, until the offering of the deposition as evidence. Voluntary disclosure does occur, as to psychotherapists in the case of a mental or emotional condition and physicians in the case of a physical condition upon the holder’s offering of any person as a witness who testifies as to the condition.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The official legislative commentary elaborates in part:
“* * * A person, merely by disclosing a subject which the person has discussed with an attorney or spouse or doctor, does not waive the applicable privilege; the person must disclose part of the communication itself in order to effect a waiver. * * *
“The one exception to the foregoing principle is contained in the final sentence of the rule. Where the holder of a privilege offers any person as a witness who testifies on the subject of the holder’s physical, mental or emotional condition, all privileges that might protect communications on that subject between the holder and a physician or psychotherapist, as the case may be, are waived. * * * Another example would be a criminal case in which defense counsel considers the use of a mental defense or partial defense. The defendant, at the request of the attorney, may see a number of psychiatrists before finding one who will testify that the defendant was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the crime. If the latter testifies at trial that the defendant was not responsible, under ORE 504 there is no psychotherapist-patient privilege as to any psychotherapist because the mental condition of the defendant is in issue. The non-testifying psychiatrists are still protected by the attorney-client privilege, however, as they are ‘representatives of the lawyer’ under ORE 503. The last sentence of ORE 511 would waive this (and any other) privilege to the extent of permitting the state to inquire of all medical personnel whom the defendant has seen regarding their findings.” Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence 193 (1982). (Emphasis in original.)
[32]*32We conclude that by calling witnesses to testify regarding his problems with alcohol and its effect on him, defendant offered witnesses who “testifie[d] as to the condition” within the meaning of OEC 511. Defendant contends that the testimony he offered was not testimony as to his “mental or emotional condition” and that therefore he did not make “voluntary disclosure” under the rule. The point of defendant’s argument is not entirely clear.
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[28]*28RICHARDSON, P. J.
Defendant appeals his convictions for aggravated murder, felony murder, intentional murder, first degree robbery and first degree kidnapping. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Defendant’s first assignment of error relates to the testimony of a witness for the state, Darrell Cooper, one of three accomplices. He had entered into a plea agreement and was the only accomplice to testify. Defendant impeached Cooper during cross-examination by eliciting testimony that he had agreed to testify in return for permission to enter his plea in juvenile court. The state rehabilitated Cooper by calling his attorney to testify regarding the agreement and to read the plea agreement into evidence. Conditions of the agreement included that Cooper would honestly disclose to the police and the district attorney all information regarding his accomplices’ criminal activities and that, if he were not truthful in court, any statements he had made could be used against him. Otherwise he would be granted immunity for any crimes he disclosed, other than the murder.1 A portion of the agreement [29]*29requiring Cooper to take a polygraph examination to prove he was truthful was not read into evidence.
Defendant argues that such rehabilitation is impermissible under OEC 609-1(3), which provides:
“Evidence to support or rehabilitate a witness whose credibility has been attacked by evidence of bias or interest shall be limited to evidence showing a lack of bias or interest.”
In our recent decision in State v. Middleton, 61 Or App 680, 658 P2d 555, rev allowed 294 Or 792 (1983), the defendant’s accomplice testified for the state. He was impeached by evidence of prior inconsistent statements and evidence tending to show he changed his story after entering into a plea agreement. The state rehabilitated the witness by eliciting testimony that the conditions of the agreement were that he testify and “pass” a polygraph examination. We held that the agreement was inadmissible to rehabilitate the witness. Relying on OEC 609-1(3), we stated:
[30]*30“* * * The evidence proffered by the prosecutor in this case does not show any ‘lack’ of interest or bias: the witness’ interest is manifest. Rather, the proffered evidence is designed to show that, in spite of the interest he admittedly has, this witness is nonetheless telling the truth. The rule excludes such evidence.” 61 Or App at 684.
We also concluded that the rehabilitation evidence was inadmissible, because it impermissibly included evidence of a polygraph examination. Although in this case there was no mention of a polygraph examination as a condition of the agreement, the first part of the quoted rationale in Middleton applies. A condition of the plea agreement was that Cooper tell the truth. Such evidence does not show “a lack of bias or interest” under the rule, but rather it is designed to show truthfulness despite interest. It was error to permit rehabilitation by evidence of the plea agreement’s condition that the witness tell the truth. The error was not harmless. The veracity of Cooper’s testimony was a key element of the state’s case.
Defendant also assigns as error admission of the testimony of a psychiatrist who had examined him at his attorney’s request. Defendant asserts that it was admitted in violation of the attorney-client privilege. Defendant’s former mother-in-law testified that defendant had an alcohol problem and related an incident of apparent alcohol-induced amnesia within a few weeks of the crimes. Defendant also called an acquaintance who testified that he believed defendant to be an alcoholic. In rebuttal, the state called Dr. Koutsky, a psychiatrist who had examined defendant at defense counsel’s request. He testified to defendant’s alcohol dependency and his claim of alcohol-induced amnesia, stating his conclusion that defendant nevertheless could have acted with a conscious objective to commit the acts at the time in question.
It is not disputed that defendant’s communications to Dr. Koutsky would be protected by the attorney-client privilege absent a waiver of the privilege.2 The question is whether defendant waived the privilege under OEC 511:
[31]*31“A person upon whom ORS 40.225 to 40.295 confer a privilege against disclosure of the confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if the person or the person’s predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication. This section does not apply if the disclosure is itself a privileged communication. Voluntary disclosure does not occur with the mere commencement of litigation or, in the case of a deposition taken for the purpose of perpetuating testimony, until the offering of the deposition as evidence. Voluntary disclosure does occur, as to psychotherapists in the case of a mental or emotional condition and physicians in the case of a physical condition upon the holder’s offering of any person as a witness who testifies as to the condition.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The official legislative commentary elaborates in part:
“* * * A person, merely by disclosing a subject which the person has discussed with an attorney or spouse or doctor, does not waive the applicable privilege; the person must disclose part of the communication itself in order to effect a waiver. * * *
“The one exception to the foregoing principle is contained in the final sentence of the rule. Where the holder of a privilege offers any person as a witness who testifies on the subject of the holder’s physical, mental or emotional condition, all privileges that might protect communications on that subject between the holder and a physician or psychotherapist, as the case may be, are waived. * * * Another example would be a criminal case in which defense counsel considers the use of a mental defense or partial defense. The defendant, at the request of the attorney, may see a number of psychiatrists before finding one who will testify that the defendant was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the crime. If the latter testifies at trial that the defendant was not responsible, under ORE 504 there is no psychotherapist-patient privilege as to any psychotherapist because the mental condition of the defendant is in issue. The non-testifying psychiatrists are still protected by the attorney-client privilege, however, as they are ‘representatives of the lawyer’ under ORE 503. The last sentence of ORE 511 would waive this (and any other) privilege to the extent of permitting the state to inquire of all medical personnel whom the defendant has seen regarding their findings.” Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence 193 (1982). (Emphasis in original.)
[32]*32We conclude that by calling witnesses to testify regarding his problems with alcohol and its effect on him, defendant offered witnesses who “testifie[d] as to the condition” within the meaning of OEC 511. Defendant contends that the testimony he offered was not testimony as to his “mental or emotional condition” and that therefore he did not make “voluntary disclosure” under the rule. The point of defendant’s argument is not entirely clear. Defendant’s alcoholism constitutes a “condition,” and whether or not alcohol dependency is classified as “mental or emotional,” alcohol-induced amnesia may be considered “mental.” In essence, he put his alcohol amnesia in issue as a partial defense. Thus we do not accept defendant’s argument that “voluntary disclosure” did not occur.
Defendant next argues that, even if disclosure did occur, the state was nevertheless prevented from calling Dr. Koutsky as its own witness. He apparently relies on the statement in the commentary that non-testifying psychiatrists would be protected under OEC 503 by the attorney-client privilege. However, the last sentence of the commentary makes clear that that privilege may be waived.
Defendant next claims that the consequence of the testimony he elicited would be that the state could “inquire” regarding Dr. Koutsky’s findings but could not call him as a witness. We agree with the state that such an interpretation of the waiver rule is implausible. The waiver of the privilege permitted Dr. Koutsky to be called as a witness, and the court therefore did not err in allowing that.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.