State v. Collins

236 N.W.2d 376, 1975 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1082

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: December 17, 1975
• Docket: 57558
• Status: Published

Opinions

McCORMICK, Justice.

Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for assault with intent to commit rape in violation of § 698.4, The Code. The questions presented are whether the trial court erred (1) in overruling ■ defendant’s motion to dismiss for want of a speedy trial, (2) in overruling his motion for mistrial, (3) in overruling his Miranda objection to testimony of a psychiatrist, and (4) in overruling his motion for directed verdict made at the close of the evidence.

I. The charge in this case was brought by county attorney’s information filed January 28, 1974. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on July 8, 1974, alleging he had been denied his right under § 795.2, The Code, to be brought to trial within 60 days of the filing of the county attorney’s information. The State contended good cause existed for the delay, and the trial court overruled the motion on that ground. Defendant’s trial 'commenced July 17, 1974.

Since defendant was not tried within 60 days after the charge was brought in district court, he was entitled to have the charge dismissed on his timely motion unless the State demonstrated good cause for the delay beyond that period.

Applicable principles are summarized in several recent cases. See, e. g., State v. Albertsen, 228 N.W.2d 94, 97-98 (Iowa 1975). In this ease, we agree with the finding that good cause for delay was ■ shown. The delay was substantially attributable to defendant. The first three months’ delay was caused by compliance with an order of the court sustaining defendant’s motion for mental evaluation. Defendant was admitted to the medical security facility at Oakdale for mental examination and evaluation in February and was not released until April 30,1974. He filed, a demand for speedy trial seven days later, on May 7, 1974. At his arraignment on May 13, 1974, he entered a plea of not guilty. On June 3, 1974, he filed a notice of his intention to rely upon a defense of insanity. § 777.18, The Code. One of the listed witnesses was Dr. Romullo Lara, a psychiatrist who had examined defendant at Oakdale. Two days láter the State filed a notice of additional testimony indicating its intention to call Dr. Lara as a State witness. Additional time was taken by a motion in limine filed by defendant. Further delay was caused by fixing the trial date to accommodate Dr. Lara’s schedule.

Under this record, the trial court did not err in overruling defendant’s motion to dismiss.

II. Defendant’s motion for mistrial resulted from testimony of Dr. Lara as a witness for the State. The witness recited the history taken from defendant. Included in the history was a statement that, “He says * * * he is charged with assault with intent to commit rape, as well as aiding and abetting a jail break.” Later, out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved for mistrial on the ground this testimony improperly referred to an escape charge for which defendant was not then on trial. The trial court overruled the motion but admonished the jury to disregard the challenged testimony.

A trial court has discretion in ruling upon a motion for mistrial. State v. Cage, 218 N.W.2d 582, 586 (Iowa 1974). The limits of that discretion were not exceeded here.

III. A second problem arose during Dr. Lara’s testimony. He testified he did not require defendant as part of the psychiatric examination to relate his version of the events upon which the assault with intent to commit rape charge was based. Nevertheless, he said defendant wished to explain his version of the incident and did so. When Dr. Lara was asked to repeat what defendant told him, defense counsel objected on the ground defendant had not been given Miranda warnings. The objection was overruled, and Dr. Lara repeated defendant’s alleged statements.

The sole issue raised in defendant’s assignment of error is whether statements made by a defendant to a state psychiatrist examining him pursuant to a court order entered upon the defendant’s application are admissible against the defendant at trial when the statements were made without prior Miranda warnings to the defendant by the psychiatrist. Defendant contends Dr. Lara should have advised him of his privilege against self-incrimination before discussing the charge with him. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

In Miranda, the Supreme Court barred the use of statements “stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless [the prosecution] demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” The court added, “By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706. We have held Miranda prohibits law enforcement officials from eliciting incriminating statements by having a third party ask their questions for them. State v. Flaucher, 223 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1974); State v. Cullison, 215 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1974). However, this case does not present that kind of situation. Defendant was not being subjected to custodial interrogation nor was he being questioned in behalf of law enforcement officers. The Miranda warnings were not required. See Ramer v. United States, 411 F.2d 30, 38 (9 Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 965, 90 S.Ct. 445, 24 L.Ed.2d 431 (“We are unwilling to expand the mandate of Miranda to the extent sought by the appellant.”). See generally, Marcus, Pre-Trial Psychiatric Examination: A Conflict With the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 5 Crim.L.Bull., No. 10, 497.

The trial court did not err in overruling defendant’s objection to Dr. Lara’s testimony.

IV. In contending the trial court erred in overruling his motion for directed verdict made after both parties rested, defendant asserts the evidence was insufficient for jury consideration on the element of intent. The same argument was made and rejected in State v. Baskin, 220 N.W.2d 882, 887-888 (Iowa 1974). No useful purpose would be served by reciting the evidence in this case. -It suffices to say that here, as in Baskin, the evidence was sufficient to support a fair inference by the jury that defendant had in mind the procurement of sexual intercourse by the use of such force as was necessary to accomplish his purpose.

The trial court did not err in overruling his motion for directed verdict.

We find no merit in defendant’s assignments of error.

Affirmed.

All Justices concur, except RAWLINGS, J., who concurs specially.