[Cite as State v. Coleman, 2018-Ohio-1681.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT LOGAN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 8-17-50
v.
ZACKARIAH J. COLEMAN, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CR16-10-0296
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: April 30, 2018
APPEARANCES:
Linda Gabriele for Appellant
Alice Robinson-Bond for Appellee Case No. 8-17-50
PRESTON, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Zackariah J. Coleman (“Coleman”), appeals the
November 20, 2017 judgment entry of sentence of the Logan County Court of
Common Pleas. We affirm.
{¶2} This case stems from allegations that Coleman sexually abused S.E.—
the daughter of his girlfriend with whom Coleman shared a home—between 2014
and 2015, while S.E. was less than thirteen years of age. On November 8, 2016, the
Logan County Grand Jury indicted Coleman on three counts of gross sexual
imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), third-degree felonies. (Doc. No. 4).
On November 16, 2016, Coleman appeared for arraignment and entered pleas of not
guilty. (Doc. No. 10).
{¶3} The case proceeded to a jury trial on September 26 and 27, 2017. (Sept.
26, 2017 Tr., Vol. I, at 1); (Sept. 27, 2017, Vol. II, at 156). On September 27, 2017,
the jury found Coleman guilty of one count of gross sexual imposition. (Sept. 27,
2017 Tr., Vol. II, at 226-227); (Doc. No. 106). The jury could not reach a
unanimous verdict as to the other two counts of the indictment. (Sept. 27, 2017 Tr.,
Vol. II, at 226-227); (Doc. No. 110). The trial court filed its judgment entry of
conviction on October 2, 2017 finding Coleman guilty of one count of gross sexual
imposition and dismissing the other two counts of the indictment. (Doc. No. 110).
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{¶4} The trial court held a sentencing and a sex-offender registration hearing
on November 2, 2017. (Nov. 2, 2017 Tr. at 1); (Doc. No. 114). The trial court
sentenced Coleman to five years of community control. (Id. at 8); (Id.). The trial
court also classified Coleman as a Tier II sex offender. (Id. at 3); (Id.). The trial
court filed its judgment entries of sentence and sex-offender classification on
November 20, 2017. (Doc. No. 114).
{¶5} Coleman filed a notice of appeal on November 28, 2017. (Doc. No.
118). He raises two assignments of error for our review, which we discuss together.
Assignment of Error No. I
The Verdict of the Trial Court was Not Supported by Sufficient Evidence as the State of Ohio Failed to Prove Each and Every Element of the Crime of Gross Sexual Imposition Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.
Assignment of Error No. II
The Verdict of the Trial Court was Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence as the State of Ohio Failed to Prove Each and Every Element of the Crime of Gross Sexual Imposition Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.
{¶6} In his assignments of error, Coleman argues that his gross-sexual-
imposition conviction is based on insufficient evidence and is against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
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{¶7} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are
clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389
(1997). As such, we address each legal concept individually.
{¶8} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at
trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average
mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional
amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997). Accordingly,
“[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “In deciding if the
evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the
credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact.” State v.
Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120570 and C-120571, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33,
citing State v. Williams, 197 Ohio App.3d 505, 2011-Ohio-6267, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.).
See also State v. Berry, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-12-03, 2013-Ohio-2380, ¶ 19
(“Sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy rather than credibility or weight
of the evidence.”), citing Thompkins at 386.
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{¶9} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record,
“‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of
witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier
of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing
court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating
to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass,
10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard,
“[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the
conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v.
Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v.
Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
{¶10} R.C. 2907.05 sets forth the offense of gross sexual imposition and
provides, in relevant part:
(A) No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse
of the offender; cause another, not the spouse of the offender, to have
sexual contact with the offender; or cause two or more other persons
to have sexual contact when any of the following applies:
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***
(4) The other person, or one of the other persons, is less than thirteen
years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of that person.
R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). “In order to prove the offense of gross sexual imposition
[under R.C. 2907.05(A)(4)], ‘the State must prove that the defendant had sexual
contact with a person, not the defendant’s spouse, and that the contact was with a
person under the age of thirteen, whether the defendant knew the age of the person
or not.’” State v. Jones, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26289, 2015-Ohio-4116, ¶ 43,
quoting State v. Israel, 2d Dist. Miami No. 09-CA-47, 2010-Ohio-5044, ¶ 25. “The
term ‘sexual contact’ is defined as ‘any touching of an erogenous zone of another,
including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the
person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either
person.’” Id., quoting R.C. 2907.01(B). “‘“[T]here is no requirement that there be
direct testimony regarding sexual arousal or gratification.”’” Id., quoting State v.
Clark, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2013 CA 52, 2014-Ohio-855, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Gesell,
12th Dist. Butler No. CA2005-08-367, 2006-Ohio-3621, ¶ 25. “The trier of fact
may infer from the evidence presented at trial whether the purpose of the touching
was for the defendant’s sexual arousal or gratification.” Id., citing Clark at ¶ 12.
{¶11} At trial, S.E. testified that she was born in April of 2004 and that she
was 13 years old at the time of trial. (Sept. 26, 2017 Tr., Vol. I, at 43-44). She
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testified that she was 11 years old in 2015. (Id. at 44). S.E. testified that she was
“touched” by Coleman in her room “in the mornings when [she] went and got up
for school.” (Id. at 46-47). She testified that Coleman touched her while she was
in her bed. (Id. at 48). According to S.E., Coleman “walked in and got into [her]
bed.” (Id. at 48). She testified that no one else was in her room when Coleman
touched her. (Id. at 47). S.E. marked a diagram of a female child’s body to identify
the places that Coleman touched her. (Id. at 50). S.E. “marked something on the
front.” (Id.). (See State’s Ex. A). When asked if she knew the name for the part of
the body that she marked, she indicated that she did not know. (Sept. 26, 2017 Tr.,
Vol. I, at 50). However, she agreed that she has “heard some people call it breasts.”
(Id. at 51). When Coleman touched the “upper part” of her body, Coleman touched
her on top of her clothes. (Id.). Coleman touched the upper part of S.E.’s body
more than one time. (Id. at 52). According to S.E., Coleman told her “not to tell”
after he touched her. (Id. at 51).
{¶12} On cross-examination, S.E. testified that she shared a bedroom with
her sister and that her sister was in the room when Coleman touched her. (Id. at 59).
According to S.E., Coleman would wake S.E. first and that her sister was asleep
when Coleman touched her. (Id. at 59-60, 62). She testified that Coleman touched
her “[m]ore than once” but could not recall any details of the other times that
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Coleman touched her. (Id. at 62-63). She testified that she did not tell her mother
or scream because she was afraid of Coleman. (Id. at 60).
{¶13} On re-direct examination, S.E. testified that she was afraid of Coleman
because “[h]e used to beat [them].” (Id. at 63). She testified that “a few” times she
was “fast enough” to lock the bedroom door to prevent Coleman from entering in
the morning. (Id.).
{¶14} On re-cross examination, S.E. testified that she immediately told her
mother when Coleman beat her. (Id. at 64). Although she previously stated that
Coleman only touched her when they lived in an apartment, she testified that it
happened when they lived in the apartment and a house. (Id. at 65). She stated that
she would only try to lock the door when they lived in the house. (Id. at 64-65).
She testified that, although she could have, she did not lock the door when she went
to bed because she “was told to go to bed.” (Id. at 66).
{¶15} The State called Julie Kurtz (“Kurtz”) who testified that she is a school
counselor at Bellefontaine Middle School. (Id. at 26-27). Prior to working as a
school counselor, Kurtz worked for children’s services for 14 years where she
received training and experience investigating child-sexual-abuse allegations. (Id.
at 28).
{¶16} According to Kurtz, S.E., who was a seventh-grade student at the time,
was sent to her office on August 31, 2016 because she “was crying and was upset”
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during class. (Id. at 30). S.E. “told [Kurtz] that her mom’s ex-boyfriend had
touched her inappropriately.” (Id. at 31). When asked what she meant, S.E.
indicated that Coleman touched her breast area. (Id. at 31). Based on her training
and experience, Kurtz testified that S.E.’s behavior and statements were consistent
with that of a child who had been sexually abused. (Id. at 33). She further testified
that it is “not unusual” for a child to make a delayed disclosure of sexual abuse.
(Id.). As a result of S.E.’s assertion, Kurtz reported S.E.’s allegations to Logan
County Children’s Services. (Id. at 32).
{¶17} On cross-examination, Kurtz testified that she knew that S.E. was
diagnosed with bipolar disorder. (Id. at 35). She testified that S.E. had “crying
spree[s] in school,” which can be a symptom of bipolar disorder. (Id.). Further, “at
some point before she was in middle school [she was] put * * * on a * * * plan for
depression, and crying is also a symptom of depression.” (Id. at 35, 38). She
testified that “there is no cookie-cutter” description of a child that has been sexually
abused. (Id. at 37).
{¶18} On re-direct examination, she confirmed that she did not observe
“anything inconsistent” with that of a child who has been sexually abused. (Id. at
38).
{¶19} On re-cross examination, Kurtz testified that “chang[ing] her story” or
providing “different information here or there” are examples of inconsistent
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behavior. (Id. at 39). She testified that she talked with S.E. one time regarding the
sexual abuse. (Id.).
{¶20} Trista Harris (“Harris”), S.E.’s mother, testified that she was
romantically involved with Coleman and that Coleman moved in with her and her
children after they had been in a relationship for one year. (Id. at 67-69). She
testified that she ended her relationship with Coleman after “he became verbally and
physically abusive” in November of 2013 or 2014. (Id. at 71). After she and
Coleman ended their relationship, she moved with her children from the apartment
to the house. (Id.). A few months later, she and Coleman rekindled their
relationship. (Id. at 72). They finally ended their relationship in April 2015 when
Coleman “was physically abusive toward” Harris. (Id.).
{¶21} Harris, who worked third shift, left work early one night and
discovered Coleman sleeping in S.E.’s bed with S.E. (Id. at 74, 77). When Harris
confronted Coleman, Coleman, who “had been drinking,” told Harris “that he must
have went into the wrong room.” (Id. at 76). Harris asked S.E. about the incident
the next morning, and S.E. indicated that there was nothing that she needed to tell
her mother. (Id. at 77). A few days later, Harris contacted law enforcement after
“[a]n altercation occurred”; however, Harris did not tell law enforcement about
discovering Coleman sleeping in S.E.’s bed with S.E. (Id. at 77-78).
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{¶22} According to Harris, Coleman “smacked” S.E. “in the face once,” and
Harris informed Coleman “that he was not to touch [her] kids.” (Id. at 78). Harris
did not report the incident to law enforcement. (Id. at 79).
{¶23} On cross-examination, Harris testified that she did not report any of
the physical abuse to law enforcement because she was “scared” of Coleman. (Id.).
She testified that S.E. was first put on medication for her bipolar disorder when S.E.
“was in first grade” because “[s]he was having problems in school focusing on her
work, having emotional breakdowns.” (Id. at 81). S.E. continued to experience
those “problems” through the fifth grade. (Id.). Harris clarified that S.E.
experienced those problems prior to meeting Coleman. (Id.).
{¶24} Detective Blake Kenner (“Detective Kenner”) of the Bellefontaine
Police Department testified that he investigated S.E.’s allegations. (Id. at 99-100).
As part of his investigation, he interviewed Coleman. (Id. at 103-105). Regarding
Coleman’s interview, Detective Kenner testified
In my 25 years of law enforcement, I’ve spoken with people whom
were eventually found guilty of crimes and I’ve talked with people
who had not committed a crime. I laid some things out to [Coleman]
and made some comparisons for [Coleman], and I found it strange that
I didn’t get a real reaction from him, an emphatic reaction from him,
an emphatic denial from him when I was saying improper,
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inappropriate touching as opposed to rape. I expected an explosion.
I expected, [“]Are you kidding me?[”] I expected something. I * * *
didn’t get any of that. I got [a] very calm, * * * [“]right, right. I
appreciate that.[”] That, to me, I wouldn’t see that in someone who
did not commit the crime. That’s my opinion.
(Id. at 106). He also testified that Coleman denied S.E.’s allegations. (Id. at 107).
{¶25} S.E. was interviewed by a forensic interviewer. (Id. at 102). Detective
Kenner identified State’s Exhibit E as the video recording of S.E.’s interview, which
was later played for the jury. (Id. at 105, 118-119); (State’s Ex. E).
{¶26} Kerri Wilkinson (“Wilkinson”), a licensed social worker at
Nationwide Children’s Hospital in Columbus, Ohio, testified that she is a forensic
interviewer—“a trained professional * * * taught to recognize child development
[and] how to interview children when there’s allegations of physical abuse or sexual
abuse.” (Sept. 27, 2017 Tr., Vol. II, at 160-162). She testified that, based on her
training and experience, “[d]elayed disclosure” of sexual-abuse allegations is “a
common occurrence.” (Id. at 167).
{¶27} Wilkinson testified that she interviewed S.E. on September 6, 2016.
(Id. at 163-164). (See also State’s Ex. E). Wilkinson testified that, during the
interview, S.E. “was having some emotional responses to what had happened to her”
when S.E. described “the alleged abuse.” (Sept. 27, 2017 Tr., Vol. II, at 170). She
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further testified that S.E. “was consistent in her statements about being sexually
abused.” (Id. at 173).
{¶28} On cross-examination, Wilkinson testified that it is not her job to
“determine whether this child is telling [her] the truth or not.” (Id. at 174-175).
Prior to talking with Wilkinson, S.E. talked with Kurtz and children’s services;
however, Wilkinson did not know whether S.E.’s “story” was consistent. (Id. at
175).
{¶29} On re-cross examination, Wilkinson agreed that if S.E. was “asked
leading questions” during a previous interview, S.E.’s interview with Wilkinson
“could have been tainted.” (Id. at 178).
{¶30} The State presented the testimony of Elizabeth Ramsey (“Ramsey”), a
mental-health therapist at Consolidated Care in Bellefontaine, Ohio. (Sept. 26, 2017
Tr., Vol. I, at 109). Ramsey testified that she provided mental-health care for S.E.
and first encountered S.E. on October 25, 2016 “for an assessment following contact
through a crisis intervention, which occurred on October 19, 2016.” (Id. at 111).
On October 19, 2016, S.E. was taken to the emergency room “because she disclosed
that she had been self-harming in the form of cutting.” (Id.). According to Ramsey,
S.E. reported to Harris “that the reason for that behavior” was because Coleman
“had been sexually abusing her.” (Id. at 111-112). Ramsey testified that, based on
her training and experience, cutting is “consistent with a child sexual assault.” (Id.
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at 112). She testified that S.E. disclosed to her that Coleman “would come into her
room, lay down with her and begin touching her,” that “this happened regularly,”
that “this is how he would awaken her for school, and that he would touch her on
her breasts and touch her legs.” (Id. at 113).
{¶31} At the conclusion of the State’s evidence, the State moved to admit its
exhibits and rested. (Id. at 179-180). State’s Exhibits A, B, C, and E were admitted
without objection, and State’s Exhibit D was admitted over the defense’s objection.
(Id.). Next, Coleman made a Crim.R. 29(A) motion, which the trial court denied.
(Id. at 180-181).
{¶32} Coleman testified in his defense. (Id. at 183). He testified that he met
Harris in 2012 and that they became romantically involved a few months after they
met. (Id. at 184). He testified that he moved in with Harris and her children one
year after they began their relationship, or “right at the beginning of 2014.” (Id. at
184-185). He further testified that he and Harris ended their relationship “at the end
of 2014,” and Harris and her children moved out of the apartment to the house at
that time. (Id. at 185). Coleman testified that they later rekindled their relationship
and he “ended up moving” in the house with Harris and her children. (Id.).
{¶33} Coleman denied having any sexual contact with S.E. (Id. at 192). He
also denied that Harris caught him sleeping in S.E.’s bed in April 2015. (Id. at 188-
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189). He hypothesized that Harris “said that to add weight to her daughter’s story
about what has occurred.” (Id. at 188).
{¶34} According to Coleman, S.E. “did not have a great deal of emotional
control.” (Id. at 191). As such, Coleman stated that “the only reasonable
explanation that [he] can think of [regarding S.E.’s allegations] is that when [Harris]
and [Coleman] lived together, [S.E.] was having these emotional issues and [they]
were working on [coping with those issues]” and that S.E. “feels abandoned and
doesn’t have that environment that she had before” Coleman and Harris ended their
relationship. (Id. at 192). Coleman opined that “this is her way of trying to get back
at [him]” for moving out of the house. (Id.).
{¶35} Thereafter, the defense rested. (Id. at 195). The State did not present
any witnesses on rebuttal, and the matter was submitted to the jury, which found
Coleman guilty as to one count of gross sexual imposition. (Id. at 195, 225-227).
The jury could not reach a decision as to the other counts. (Id. at 227).
Subsequently, the trial court granted Coleman’s Crim.R. 29 motion as to those
counts. (Id. at 229).
{¶36} We first review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Coleman’s
gross-sexual-imposition conviction. State v. Velez, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-10,
2014-Ohio-1788, ¶ 68, citing State v. Wimmer, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-98-46, 1999
WL 355190, *1 (Mar. 26, 1999). Coleman challenges the sufficiency of the
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evidence supporting whether: (1) Coleman touched S.E.’s breast; (2) Coleman
touched S.E.’s breast for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either
person; and (3) S.E. was less than thirteen years of age at the time of the offense.1
{¶37} There is sufficient evidence that Coleman engaged in sexual contact
with S.E. S.E. testified that Coleman touched the “upper part” of her body over her
clothes. She marked an “X” on a diagram of a female child’s body to indicate where
Coleman touched her. (See State’s Ex. A). S.E. agreed that she has heard that part
of the human body referred to as “breasts.” (Sept. 26, 2017 Tr., Vol. I, at 50). That
act constitutes sexual contact under R.C. 2907.01(B). See State v. White, 3d Dist.
Seneca No. 13-16-21, 2017-Ohio-1488, ¶ 42, citing Jones, 2015-Ohio-4116, at ¶ 50.
Moreover, S.E. testified that Coleman admonished her not to tell anyone after he
sexually abused her. The evidence that Coleman touched S.E.’s breast coupled with
his admonishment not to tell anyone is sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact
to infer that the purpose of the touching was for Coleman’s sexual arousal or
gratification. Compare In re J.F., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96875, 2012-Ohio-2191,
¶ 29 (“We find that the evidence of J.F. touching A.G. while alone in a closet
coupled with his admonition not to tell anyone is sufficient for the trier of fact to
reasonably infer that the touching was for the purpose of sexual arousal or
gratification.”).
1 Coleman does not challenge the element that he is not married to the victim.
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{¶38} The State also presented sufficient evidence that the sexual contact
occurred while S.E. was less than thirteen years of age. See White at ¶ 38, 43.
Although S.E. did not provide a specific date when Coleman touched her, S.E.
testified that Coleman touched her when she lived in the apartment and the house—
a time period during which S.E. was less than thirteen years of age. See Jones at ¶
50 (“While K.D. did not provide specific dates when these acts occurred, K.D.’s
mother testified that Jones babysat K.D. at the S. Road address both before and after
his return to Dayton in September 2012, a period in which K.D. would have been
either nine or ten years old.”). Indeed, S.E. testified that she was born in 2004 and
that she was 11 years old in 2015. Coleman testified that he moved in with Harris
and her children in early 2014. Harris and her children moved from the apartment
to the house in late 2014 after Harris and Coleman ended their relationship. A few
months later, Harris and Coleman rekindled their relationship. The relationship
finally ended in April 2015.
{¶39} Thus, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found that Coleman engaged in sexual
contact with S.E., while S.E. was less than thirteen years of age. See White at ¶ 44,
citing Jones at ¶ 53.
{¶40} However, Coleman argues that his gross-sexual-imposition conviction
is based on insufficient evidence because the State failed to present evidence
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corroborating S.E.’s statements. He contends that because a sexual-imposition
conviction under R.C. 2907.06 requires corroboration, a gross-sexual-imposition
conviction should also require corroboration since sexual imposition is a lesser-
included offense of gross sexual imposition. Coleman’s argument is erroneous for
two reasons. First, Coleman’s argument “is irrelevant here because the question is
sufficiency, not weight,” and S.E.’s testimony, if believed, is sufficient to establish
all of the elements of gross sexual imposition. State v. J.M., 10th Dist. Franklin No.
14AP-621, 2015-Ohio-5574, ¶ 17, citing State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio St.3d 210,
2006-Ohio-6404, ¶ 53. Second, gross sexual imposition under R.C. 2907.05 does
not require corroborating evidence. State v. Coran, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2014-CA-
17, 2014-Ohio-4406, ¶ 11.
{¶41} Therefore, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence that Coleman
committed gross sexual imposition under R.C. 2907.05(A)(4).
{¶42} Having concluded that Coleman’s gross-sexual-imposition conviction
is based on sufficient evidence, we next address Coleman’s argument that his
conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Velez, 2014-Ohio-
1788, at ¶ 76. Coleman argues that his gross-sexual-imposition conviction is against
the manifest weight of the evidence because S.E.’s testimony was not credible. In
particular, he contends that the evidence that he did not touch S.E. is weightier than
the evidence that he touched S.E. because S.E.’s testimony was “vague and
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conflicting”; S.E. “indicated, in testimony, that she was not necessarily truthful
during her videotaped interview”; and S.E. suffers “from pre-existing emotional
issues.” (Appellant’s Brief at 16).
{¶43} Even if the evidence is not viewed in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, “through which we examine the sufficiency of the evidence, this is not
an exceptional case where the evidence weighs heavily against the convictions.”
State v. Suffel, 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-14-05, 2015-Ohio-222, ¶ 33. “As with
many sexual-abuse cases, this case presents the ‘classic “he-said/she-said”’
scenario, ‘with no physical evidence to corroborate the [victim’s] allegation[s].’”
White, 2017-Ohio-1488, at ¶ 50, quoting In re N.Z., 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2010-L-
023, 2010-L-035, and 2010-L-041, 2011-Ohio-6845, ¶ 79. “‘Thus, credibility of
the witnesses was the primary factor in determining guilt.’” Id., quoting In re N.Z.
at ¶ 79.
{¶44} As we noted above, “the weight to be given the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.” DeHass, 10 Ohio
St.2d 230 at paragraph one of the syllabus. “‘When examining witness credibility,
“the choice between credible witnesses and their conflicting testimony rests solely
with the finder of fact and an appellate court may not substitute its own judgment
for that of the finder of fact.”’” White at ¶ 50, quoting In re N.Z. at ¶ 79, quoting
State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 123 (1986). “‘A fact finder is free to believe all,
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some, or none of the testimony of each witness appearing before it.’” Id., quoting
In re N.Z. at ¶ 79, citing State v. Thomas, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2004-L-176, 2005-
Ohio- 6570, ¶ 29. See also State v. Missler, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-14-06, 2015-
Ohio-1076, ¶ 44, quoting State v. Daley, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-13-26, 2014-Ohio-
908, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St. 61, 67 (1964). “‘“A verdict is not
against the manifest weight of the evidence because the [jury] chose to believe the
State’s witnesses rather than the defendant’s version of the events.”’” Missler at ¶
44, quoting State v. Bean, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26852, 2014-Ohio-908, ¶ 15,
quoting State v. Martinez, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 12CA0054, 2013-Ohio-3189, ¶ 16.
{¶45} In this case, S.E. testified to her version of events surrounding the
sexual abuse that led to Coleman’s gross-sexual-imposition conviction, and the jury
found S.E. credible. See White at ¶ 51. Although S.E. was inconsistent in her
testimony describing Coleman’s sexual abuse, the jury also observed Coleman’s
testimony, “and we are mindful of the jury’s ‘superior first-hand perspective in
judging the demeanor and credibility of witnesses.’” Suffel at ¶ 33, quoting State v.
Phillips, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-79, 2014-Ohio-5162, ¶ 125, citing DeHass
at paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus, despite Coleman’s denial that he sexually
abused S.E., the jury heard the testimony of three witnesses with experience in
sexual-abuse cases involving children—Kurtz, Wilkinson, and Ramsey—in
addition to S.E.’s testimony. Kurtz and Wilkinson testified that S.E.’s behavior was
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consistent with that of a child who had been sexually abused. Similarly, Ramsey
testified that S.E. reported that she was cutting herself because Coleman sexually
abused her, and Ramsey testified that cutting behavior is consistent with child sexual
abuse. Further, despite the inconsistencies between S.E.’s testimony and the
statements she made during her interview with Wilkinson, the jury was able to
observe the entirety of the interview, including S.E.’s non-verbal, emotional
responses to Wilkinson’s questions regarding Coleman’s acts.
{¶46} For these reasons, Coleman’s argument is unpersuasive. Accordingly,
we cannot conclude that the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that Coleman’s conviction must be reversed and a
new trial ordered.
{¶47} Coleman’s assignments of error are overruled.
{¶48} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
ZIMMERMAN and SHAW, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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