[269]*269BUTTLER, J.
Defendants were charged with criminal trespass in the second degree, ORS 164.245, for blocking the doors of the Lovejoy Surgicenter with the objective of preventing women from entering for the purpose of obtaining abortions. At their trials, defendants sought to assert the choice of evils defense, ORS 161.200, arguing that the trespass was an emergency measure that was necessary to avoid the imminent deaths of unborn children.1 The trial court granted the state’s pretrial motion to exclude evidence of the defense on the ground that to allow its assertion would be inconsistent with federal law, specifically Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113, 93 S Ct 705, 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1973). Defendants appeal after their convictions, assigning error to the court’s granting of the state’s motion.
Defendants’ first two arguments relate to the propriety of a pretrial exclusionary ruling in these circumstances. Defendants’ arguments were rejected in State v. Whisman, 33 Or App 147, 151, 575 P2d 1005 (1978), in which we concluded:
“The intent of the legislature in enacting ORS 161.200 was to ‘leave it to the trial judge to deal with the matter as he would any other offered evidence.’ See Commentary, Proposed Oregon Criminal Code 20, § 20 (1970). See also, Minutes, Criminal Law Revision Commission, November 7, 1969, pp 25-30.”
We went on to say that “the trial judge must determine in the first instance whether defendant’s evidence relating to the defense of justification is relevant, material, competent and admissible.” 33 Or App at 151. That is what the trial court did here and, in doing so, it acted within the range of its discretion.
In their remaining assignments, defendants argue that the court erred as a matter of law in excluding evidence in support of their choice of evils defense, ORS 161.200, thereby precluding their arguing their only defense to the jury. The trial court found that defendants had tendered sufficient evidence on all of the elements of the defense, generally, to submit it to the jury but concluded that to submit it would be [270]*270inconsistent with Roe v. Wade, supra. Although it is not entirely clear, it appears that the court concluded that allowing defendants to present the defense would constitute state action, see, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 264, 84 S Ct 710, 11 L Ed 2d 686 (1964); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US 1, 68 S Ct 836, 92 L Ed 1161 (1948), by which the state would be sanctioning defendants’ interference with the women’s federal constitutional rights.
The trial court, on this record, was correct in holding that the women with whom defendants interfered had a federal constitutional right to be free of interference from the state in seeking an abortion.2 In Roe v. Wade, supra, the Court held that, through the first trimester of pregnancy, the right to an abortion is absolute. In the second trimester, a state may choose to regulate abortion procedures in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. In the final trimester, the state may regulate abortion for the preservation of the life of the fetus. Defendants offered no evidence at the pretrial hearing that any of the women that they prevented from entering the clinic did not fall within the protection of Roe v. Wade, supra, or that they made any attempt to distinguish among them. Rather, their evidence was that life begins at the time of conception and that, therefore, none of the women had a right to abort their fetuses.
Because we conclude that there are independent state grounds on which to base our decision, we need not decide whether allowing the choice of evils defenses here would constitute state action, thereby running afoul of Roe v. Wade, supra.
ORS 161.200 provides:
“(1) Unless inconsistent with other provisions of chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, defining justifiable use of physical force, or with some other, provision of law, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when:
“(a) That conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury; and
[271]*271“(b) The threatened injury is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue.
“(2) The necessity and justifiability of conduct under subsection (1) of this section shall not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class arising thereunder.”
Before considering subsections (a) and (b) of section (1), which set forth the elements of the defense, it is necessary to determine whether, in this case, defendants get past the threshold barrier that the defense is not available if its application would be “inconsistent * * * with some other provision of law.” Although there is little in the legislative history of the statute that helps us to discern what the legislature intended by that language, its conscious choice of very broad language indicates that, if allowing the defense would be inconsistent with any other discernable legislative or other governmental decision, it may not be asserted.
ORS 161.200 was enacted as part of the 1971 revision of the criminal code. Although the Commentary to the Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, § 20, states that it was derived from Model Penal Code § 3.02, New York Revised Penal Law § 35.05(2) and Michigan Revised Criminal Code § 605,3 the language of section (1) is identical to that of the Michigan statute, with some phrases deleted.4 The language with which [272]*272we are concerned, specifying an exception to the availability of the defense, is the broadest of the three sources to which the drafters referred. The New York counterpart provides the least restrictive exception: The defense is available “[ujnless otherwise limited by the ensuing provisions of this article defining justifiable use of physical force[.]” New York Penal Law § 35.05. The exceptions in Model Penal Code § 3.02(1) lie somewhere between the other two. It permits the defense if
“(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
“(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.”
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[269]*269BUTTLER, J.
Defendants were charged with criminal trespass in the second degree, ORS 164.245, for blocking the doors of the Lovejoy Surgicenter with the objective of preventing women from entering for the purpose of obtaining abortions. At their trials, defendants sought to assert the choice of evils defense, ORS 161.200, arguing that the trespass was an emergency measure that was necessary to avoid the imminent deaths of unborn children.1 The trial court granted the state’s pretrial motion to exclude evidence of the defense on the ground that to allow its assertion would be inconsistent with federal law, specifically Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113, 93 S Ct 705, 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1973). Defendants appeal after their convictions, assigning error to the court’s granting of the state’s motion.
Defendants’ first two arguments relate to the propriety of a pretrial exclusionary ruling in these circumstances. Defendants’ arguments were rejected in State v. Whisman, 33 Or App 147, 151, 575 P2d 1005 (1978), in which we concluded:
“The intent of the legislature in enacting ORS 161.200 was to ‘leave it to the trial judge to deal with the matter as he would any other offered evidence.’ See Commentary, Proposed Oregon Criminal Code 20, § 20 (1970). See also, Minutes, Criminal Law Revision Commission, November 7, 1969, pp 25-30.”
We went on to say that “the trial judge must determine in the first instance whether defendant’s evidence relating to the defense of justification is relevant, material, competent and admissible.” 33 Or App at 151. That is what the trial court did here and, in doing so, it acted within the range of its discretion.
In their remaining assignments, defendants argue that the court erred as a matter of law in excluding evidence in support of their choice of evils defense, ORS 161.200, thereby precluding their arguing their only defense to the jury. The trial court found that defendants had tendered sufficient evidence on all of the elements of the defense, generally, to submit it to the jury but concluded that to submit it would be [270]*270inconsistent with Roe v. Wade, supra. Although it is not entirely clear, it appears that the court concluded that allowing defendants to present the defense would constitute state action, see, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 264, 84 S Ct 710, 11 L Ed 2d 686 (1964); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US 1, 68 S Ct 836, 92 L Ed 1161 (1948), by which the state would be sanctioning defendants’ interference with the women’s federal constitutional rights.
The trial court, on this record, was correct in holding that the women with whom defendants interfered had a federal constitutional right to be free of interference from the state in seeking an abortion.2 In Roe v. Wade, supra, the Court held that, through the first trimester of pregnancy, the right to an abortion is absolute. In the second trimester, a state may choose to regulate abortion procedures in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. In the final trimester, the state may regulate abortion for the preservation of the life of the fetus. Defendants offered no evidence at the pretrial hearing that any of the women that they prevented from entering the clinic did not fall within the protection of Roe v. Wade, supra, or that they made any attempt to distinguish among them. Rather, their evidence was that life begins at the time of conception and that, therefore, none of the women had a right to abort their fetuses.
Because we conclude that there are independent state grounds on which to base our decision, we need not decide whether allowing the choice of evils defenses here would constitute state action, thereby running afoul of Roe v. Wade, supra.
ORS 161.200 provides:
“(1) Unless inconsistent with other provisions of chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, defining justifiable use of physical force, or with some other, provision of law, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when:
“(a) That conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury; and
[271]*271“(b) The threatened injury is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue.
“(2) The necessity and justifiability of conduct under subsection (1) of this section shall not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class arising thereunder.”
Before considering subsections (a) and (b) of section (1), which set forth the elements of the defense, it is necessary to determine whether, in this case, defendants get past the threshold barrier that the defense is not available if its application would be “inconsistent * * * with some other provision of law.” Although there is little in the legislative history of the statute that helps us to discern what the legislature intended by that language, its conscious choice of very broad language indicates that, if allowing the defense would be inconsistent with any other discernable legislative or other governmental decision, it may not be asserted.
ORS 161.200 was enacted as part of the 1971 revision of the criminal code. Although the Commentary to the Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, § 20, states that it was derived from Model Penal Code § 3.02, New York Revised Penal Law § 35.05(2) and Michigan Revised Criminal Code § 605,3 the language of section (1) is identical to that of the Michigan statute, with some phrases deleted.4 The language with which [272]*272we are concerned, specifying an exception to the availability of the defense, is the broadest of the three sources to which the drafters referred. The New York counterpart provides the least restrictive exception: The defense is available “[ujnless otherwise limited by the ensuing provisions of this article defining justifiable use of physical force[.]” New York Penal Law § 35.05. The exceptions in Model Penal Code § 3.02(1) lie somewhere between the other two. It permits the defense if
“(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
“(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.”
Although we agree with Judge Graber’s concurring opinion that the exceptions in the Oregon statute are closer to those in the Model Penal Code § 3.02(1) than they are to the New York Penal Law § 35.05(2), the Oregon language, taken from the proposed Michigan statute, is broader than that in either the other two. It is doubtful that the phrase of the Oregon statute, precluding the defense if it would be “inconsistent * * * with some other provision of law,” means the same thing as § 3.02(1)(c) of the Model Penal Code. ORS 161.200(1) does not require, as does the Model Penal Code, an express legislative foreclosure of the defense; it requires only that the defense be inconsistent with some other provision of law.
Here, it would be inconsistent with Oregon Laws 1983, chapter 470, section 1, which, after Roe v. Wade, supra, was decided, repealed all of the laws that might inhibit or restrict a woman in obtaining an abortion, former ORS 435.415;5 former ORS 435.425,6 former ORS 435.445,7 or mak [273]*273ing it a crime to perform or aid in an abortion, former ORS 435.455,8 or permitting suspension or revocation of a doctor’s license for performing an abortion. Former ORS 677.190. It would also be inconsistent with ORS 435.475(3), which prohibits any hospital operated by the state or by a political subdivision in the state from denying admission to a woman seeking an abortion. All of those legislative actions make it clear that the Oregon legislature has chosen, not only not to [274]*274regulate abortions in any respect,9 but also not to interfere with a woman’s right to seek and obtain an abortion. The present state of Oregon law is that a woman’s decision to have an abortion is left to her and her physician. See ORS 435.435 et seq. To permit defendants to prevent or interfere with that freedom of choice would be inconsistent with the “other provisions of law.” It is clear from the legislative action that no interference with a woman’s choice to have an abortion is to be tolerated, and, therefore, the defense is unavailable. ORS 161.200(1).
Affirmed.