State v. Cloud

Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JUSTIN WADE CLOUD, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0445

FILED 09-08-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR2024-153931-001

The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rueter, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix By Anne Carmack Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix By Lindsay Ficklin, Cynthia Dawn Beck Counsel for Appellant

Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Samuel A. Thumma1 joined.

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Justin Wade Cloud appeals his conviction and sentence for possession or use of a dangerous drug. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On November 14, 2024, Gilbert police officers executed a search warrant at a house in Gilbert. Officers ordered the occupants, including Cloud, to exit the house. Cloud walked from the backyard to the side of the house and jumped over the side wall to enter the front yard. Cloud then shoved his hands in his pockets, turned around and ran to the wall of a neighboring house. When Cloud jumped and tried to climb over the wall, Officers fired less-than-lethal rounds at him. He then stopped, pulled back his hands, and surrendered. An officer testified that “it looked like he threw something over” the wall. Officers searched the neighboring yard and found methamphetamine in a clear Ziploc bag.

¶3 The State charged Cloud with possession or use of a dangerous drug, a class 4 felony, and possession or use of drug paraphernalia, a class 6 felony. See A.R.S. §§ 13-3407(A)(7), -3415(A). The paraphernalia charge was dismissed before trial on the State’s motion.

¶4 Fifty-one potential jurors filled out a jury questionnaire to determine any bias and to confirm each juror’s ability to decide the case in a fair and impartial manner. The superior court and the parties reviewed these questionnaire responses before the venire panel was brought into the

1 Judge Samuel A. Thumma was on the panel assigned to this case until

retiring effective August 28, 2026. Arizona Supreme Court Chief Justice Ann A. Scott Timmer appointed Judge Thumma to continue to serve on the Court through December 31, 2026, to resolve those cases in which he previously participated like this case. See Arizona Supreme Court Administrative Order 2026-124.

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Decision of the Court

courtroom. Based on that review, by agreement of the parties, the court excused 18 potential jurors.

¶5 The parties could not agree on several other prospective jurors. Cloud voiced a preference to perform oral voir dire on the remaining prospective jurors to help resolve the disagreements. The superior court initially agreed with Cloud, but later identified several more prospective jurors it believed should be excused based on their questionnaire responses. The court then excused seven more jurors with the agreement of the parties.

¶6 On the State’s motion, but over Cloud’s objection, the court then excused several other potential jurors. Juror 11, one of the excused jurors, indicated it would be difficult for him to judge others. Cloud argued against striking Juror 11 because the juror did not say he would be unable to follow the law or the court’s instructions and did not say he was unable or unwilling to sit in judgment, only that it would be difficult. Cloud requested “the opportunity to ask him some questions and voir dire to ascertain [more information].” Over that objection, however, the court excused Juror 11.

¶7 The superior court then conducted oral voir dire in open court of the remaining prospective jurors. The court explained the voir dire process and asked several questions that required the jurors to raise their number if the question applied to them. The court asked the jurors if they were able to hear and understand everything; all raised their numbers. The court also asked if they knew anyone present in the courtroom, other jurors included. Juror 4 reported she knew Cloud from high school.

¶8 The court then turned questioning over to the parties. The State asked Juror 41 questions about his ability to come to court. Cloud further questioned Jurors 6, 14, 33, 41, 42, and 51. The court then asked if there was anything else the jurors thought it should know before the final jury selection. Jurors 13 and 41 provided further information. Based on the jurors’ answers in oral voir dire, the court and the parties agreed to excuse Jurors 4, 6, 13, 33, and 41.

¶9 The superior court selected the ten remaining jurors with the lowest numbers. It then asked the parties to “take a moment to digest” and ensure they had no further issues to discuss with the potential jurors. Neither party raised any objections. When asked if everything was “all good” with the jurors, Cloud’s counsel answered yes. The court then confirmed with both parties that they passed the panel for cause.

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Decision of the Court

¶10 After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Cloud as charged. Because the State proved Cloud had a prior non-historical felony, Cloud was sentenced as a category one repetitive offender. The superior court sentenced Cloud to a mitigated prison term of one year with 37 days of presentence incarceration credit. See A.R.S. § 13-703(H). Cloud timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. The Superior Court Conducted Oral Voir Dire.

¶11 Cloud first argues the superior court erred by failing to conduct oral voir dire, citing State v. Lucas, 260 Ariz. 567 (App. 2025). Cloud contends the court did exactly what Lucas disapproved by not properly adhering to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 18.5. We disagree.

¶12 We review de novo the application and interpretation of rules, Naranjo v. Sukenic, 254 Ariz. 467, 472, ¶ 17 (2023), but review a superior court’s control of voir dire for an abuse of discretion, see Lucas, 260 Ariz. at 573, ¶¶ 35–37. “[W]e will not disturb [a superior] court’s selection of the jury in the absence of a showing that a jury of fair and impartial jurors was not chosen.” Id. at 572, ¶ 32 (quoting State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 451, ¶ 93 (2004).

¶13 Contrary to Cloud’s assertion, this case is not like Lucas. In Lucas, we held the superior court erred when it relied exclusively on a written questionnaire in choosing the jury panel, without any oral voir dire. 260 Ariz. at 572, ¶¶ 27–28. The superior court in Lucas did not verbally question any of the prospective jurors and it denied counsel’s request to do so. Id. Here, prospective jurors were verbally questioned by the court and both parties. Cloud fails to show error.

II. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Striking Juror 11.

¶14 Cloud next argues the superior court erred in striking Juror 11 before oral voir dire when Cloud specifically requested to question Juror 11 further.

¶15 Lucas’s mandate that a court conduct oral voir dire does not require a court to orally ask questions of every prospective juror. In fact, Lucas explicitly states a court can use written questionnaires to “winnow out” prospective jurors. Id. ¶ 28. It only requires a court to conduct an oral voir dire and allow parties to question the prospective jurors during that

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Decision of the Court

time. Rule 18.5(d), (f). Cloud does not explain why Juror 11’s exclusion alone requires this court to vacate his conviction and remand for a new trial. Cloud is not entitled to a particular jury, only a fair and impartial one, and he fails to show that excluding Juror 11 from the pool did not secure such a panel. State v. Walden, 183 Ariz. 595, 609 (1995).

III. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Conducting Voir Dire.

¶16 Cloud argues the court’s oral voir dire was insufficient because it failed to ask about the jurors’ qualifications to serve and failed to follow up on problematic questionnaire responses. “To succeed on a claim that the court failed to adequately question the jury panel,” Cloud “must demonstrate not only that the voir dire examination was inadequate, but also that, as a result of the inadequate questioning, the jury selected was not fair, unbiased, and impartial.” Moody, 208 Ariz. at 451, ¶ 95. Cloud has not met this burden.

¶17 Rule 18.5 requires a court to conduct a “thorough oral examination of the prospective jurors and control the voir dire examination.” But the “scope and extent” of voir dire is left to the “sound discretion of the [superior] court.” Walden, 183 Ariz. at 607. Cloud does not suggest any questions that he now alleges should have been asked to learn more about the jurors’ qualifications. Nor does he show that failing to ask the jury panel more questions resulted in a biased jury or rendered his trial unfair.

¶18 As for failing to follow up on problematic questionnaire responses, Cloud only takes issue with one juror: Juror 12. In response to the question, “Is there anything about the nature of this case that might cause you to favor one side over the other?” Juror 12 said, “Yes.” Juror 12 explained he felt the court had a right to know he had a history of abusing controlled substances, but that he did not think it would affect his judgment or cause him to ignore facts presented at trial. Although the superior court did not direct any specific questions to Juror 12, Cloud also did not ask Juror 12 any questions during voir dire, nor did he object to Juror 12’s inclusion on the final jury panel.

¶19 The superior court gave Cloud ample opportunity to ask follow-up questions, so any argument that the court’s questioning was deficient is waived. See Moody, 208 Ariz. at 452, ¶ 98 (“It also follows that a defendant who believes a trial court’s voir dire to be deficient cannot sit on his rights and bypass the opportunity to cure the error by questioning jurors

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about those subjects that he feels were inadequately addressed when offered the opportunity to do so.”). Cloud fails to show the voir dire examination was inadequate.

IV. Cloud Fails to Show the Jury Was Not Fair and Impartial.

¶20 Cloud finally argues Juror 12’s “open acknowledgement of possible bias raises reasonable doubt that [he] was not impartial.” However, Cloud failed to object to Juror 12 or his inclusion on the jury panel. We review unobjected-to rulings concerning voir dire for fundamental error. State v. Thompson, 252 Ariz. 279, 293, ¶ 46 (2022). “An error is fundamental if (1) the error went to the foundation of the case, (2) the error took from the defendant a right essential to his defense, or (3) the error was so egregious that he could not possibly have received a fair trial.” Id. (citation modified) (quoting State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 142, ¶ 21 (2018)).

¶21 Although Juror 12 answered in the affirmative if anything might cause him to favor one side over the other, his explanation twice assured his history of drug abuse would not affect his judgment or impartiality. Cloud argues this was not enough since a juror’s own assurances are insufficient to ensure he will be fair, citing State v. Colorado, 256 Ariz. 97, 102, ¶ 22 (App. 2023). However, this misstates the law. Colorado reaffirmed that “a juror’s personal assurances of his or her impartiality are insufficient, standing alone, to reveal the juror’s biases or preconceived notions of a defendant’s guilt.” Id. Therefore, the superior court must “evaluate a juror’s assurances of impartiality in the context of the totality of factors under consideration by the [] court, including a juror’s demeanor and conduct.” Id. “If the juror’s demeanor, conduct, or other factors give the court a reason to disbelieve his or her personal assurances of serving fairly and impartially, the court should strike the juror for cause.” Id.

¶22 Here, the court conducted oral voir dire and asked questions of the jury panel, including Juror 12. After oral voir dire, the court excused an additional five prospective jurors for cause and stated it was based on the “in-person voir dire.” The court observed Juror 12’s demeanor and conduct, considered them together with the questionnaire responses, and chose to not excuse him for cause. And while the court did not explicitly state as such, the superior court is presumed to know and correctly apply the law when the record does not indicate to the contrary. State v. Ramirez, 178 Ariz. 116, 128 (1994). Other than this one answer in the questionnaire, Cloud does not indicate Juror 12 exhibited any other behavior during voir

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dire or during trial that would show he was biased. Cloud fails to show he did not have a fair and impartial jury.

¶23 Because the superior court did not err, we need not address Cloud’s arguments about structural error.

CONCLUSION

¶24 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR