State v. Clark

460 A.2d 449, 143 Vt. 11, 1983 Vt. LEXIS 455

• Court: Supreme Court of Vermont
• Decided: April 5, 1983
• Docket: 82-214
• Status: Published

Opinions

Billings, C.J.

Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a) (2). Prior to the hearing on the merits, defendant filed a motion to suppress certain incriminating statements he had made to the police while being processed for the offense charged. Defendant claims that at the time he made the statements he was incapable of knowingly and intelligently waiving his constitutional rights. Of primary concern to the defendant was his admission as to the operation of the vehicle, without which the State would have been unable to prove this element of the offense.

The suppression motion was heard by a second judge, prior to trial. In denying the suppression motion, the court found that at the time defendant waived his rights, his mental capacity “was not so overborne by his alcoholic condition that he could not have been conceived to be able to comprehend such rights and make a knowing waiver thereof.” The court then cited State v. Pease, 129 Vt. 70, 74-75, 271 A.2d 835, 838 (1970), as authority for this standard. Defendant contends, however, and the State agrees, that Pease recites an appellate review standard, applicable where the issue of competent waiver was not raised below. In contrast, at the trial level it is the State’s burden to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth. Amendment rights. State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 439, 450 A.2d 336, 341 (1982); State v. Breznick, 134 Vt. 261, 265, 356 A.2d 540, 542 (1976).

We agree with the parties that the standard used impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to defendant, and as such constituted reversible error. The State would argue against reversal, contending that the trial court’s findings provide a sufficient basis for the conclusion that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. However, with regard to the crucial issue of defendant’s mental capacity at the time of the supposed waiver, the two relevant findings merely recite the witnesses’ testimony, and as such are improper and provide no support for a judgment. Valsangiacomo v. Paige & Campbell, Inc., 136 Vt. 278, 279-80, 388 A.2d 389, 390-91 (1978); Krupp v. Krupp, 126 Vt. 511, 514-15, 236 A.2d 653, 655-56 (1967). While the remainder of the findings are not improper, neither are they sufficient to establish defendant’s mental competence to the degree required by law.

For these reasons the trial court’s suppression order is reversed, and defendant is entitled to a new trial on the merits.

Reversed and remanded.