DUNN, Justice.
Defendants Richard Clark and Michael Hastings appeal from their convictions in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of maintaining a dwelling house where controlled drugs were used or stored and of possession of marijuana in violation of the Drugs and Substances Control Act embodied in SDCL 39-17.1 We affirm.
The basic facts involved in this case were stipulated to by the parties, and there is no transcript of testimony before the trial court. It appears that both defendants resided in and paid the rent on a house located at 3726 North Seventh Avenue in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, for several months pri- or to the search of the house and their arrest as described below. On July 20, 1977, Willie Isonhood, Jr., was arrested by the Sioux Falls police on a felony drug charge unrelated to the present case. He informed officers that there was a place in northern Sioux Falls with the same address as the house the defendants rented where drugs were being stored and used. He also stated that he personally observed cocaine, marijuana, and amphetamines being used in the presence of one or both of the defendants at various times at that address during a period of four months. Isonhood purchased several grams of cocaine at the defendants’ address on July 19, 1977, in the presence of the defendants. He noticed additional cocaine in the defendants’ refrigerator and at least a pound of marijuana in the desk drawer. Isonhood was also present at the defendants’ residence on a Tuesday evening when a telephone call was made to an individual in Des Moines, Iowa, in the presence of both defendants. The content of the telephone conversation was that various drugs were being ordered from an unknown individual in Des Moines who was in the trucking business or was a truck driver and who was bringing the drugs to Sioux Falls the next afternoon or evening.
On the same date as Isonhood’s arrest, July 20, 1977, a search warrant was issued upon a finding of probable cause by a magistrate. The defendants’ rented house at 3726 North Seventh Avenue was subsequently searched by several officers. The search resulted in the seizure of suspected controlled substances from throughout the house. The seized items were sent to the State Chemistry Laboratory in Vermillion, South Dakota, for scientific testing purposes. Testing resulted in identification of 42.39 ounces of marijuana (genus cannabis), as well as cannabis residue, prepared cannabis oil (hash oil), and cocaine.
On July 27, 1977, a Minnehaha County grand jury handed down indictments for each of the defendants on five criminal counts. The trial court denied the defendants’ motions to quash the indictments, to suppress the evidence seized, and to quash the search warrant. On January 26, 1978, the trial court consolidated the charges against each of the defendants so that they could be tried at the same time. The defendants each entered oral pleas of not guilty to the charges set forth in the indictments, and the case was submitted to the trial court on the stipulated facts as to the charges of possession of marijuana — more than one ounce — and maintaining a dwelling where controlled drugs were used or stored.2 On February 10, 1978, the trial [414]*414court found each of the defendants guilty of both criminal charges and ordered a pre-sentence investigation as to each defendant. On April 14, 1978, the trial court sentenced each defendant to a total of two and one-half years in the state penitentiary.
On appeal, the defendants first contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress and in admitting the fruits of the search into evidence for the reason that the affidavit in support of the search warrant was insufficient to meet the requirements for a showing of probable cause.3 In reviewing the affidavits, we must remember that the search warrant should not be invalidated by interpreting the affidavits in a hypertechnical manner; rather, the affidavit should be read as a whole and interpreted in a common-sense and realistic manner. State v. Kaseman, 1978, S.D., 273 N.W.2d 716; State v. Gerber, 1976, S.D., 241 N.W.2d 720; State v. Haron, 1974, 88 S.D. 397, 220 N.W.2d 829; United States v. Ventresca, 1965, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684. The resolution of a marginal showing of probable cause on an affidavit should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants. State v. Kaseman, supra; State v. Kietzke, 1971, 85 S.D. 502, 186 N.W.2d 551. Accordingly, every reasonable inference possible should be drawn in order to support the determination of probable cause by the magistrate. State v. Kaseman, supra; State v. Glidden, 1976, S.D., 246 N.W.2d 779. See also, Spinelli v. United States, 1969, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. There need not be a prima facie showing of legal evidence of a suspected act. The standard of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is a showing of probability of criminal activity. State v. Kaseman, supra.
The affidavit upon which the magistrate issued the search warrant was the sworn statement of a Sioux Falls detective. The affidavit contained the following information: that the Sioux Falls Police Department Narcotics Division had the defendants under periodic surveillance for drug trafficking since at least January of 1977; that both defendants were identified as being the occupants of the rented house at 3726 North Seventh Avenue in Sioux Falls; that defendant Hastings had been' on juvenile probation for drug using and dealing; that the defendants’ neighbors had complained about the large number of individuals coming and going at the residence; that Ison-hood had been arrested on July 20, 1977, on a felony drug charge; that Isonhood had been distributing drugs, including cocaine, marijuana and speed, in the Sioux Falls area for about six months; that Isonhood purchased a “wide variety of drugs on numerous occasions in excess of twenty” from the defendants at their residence; that Isonhood purchased several grams of cocaine the evening before his arrest from defendant Hastings and there was more cocaine in the refrigerator and a pound of marijuana in a desk drawer; that Isonhood had been involved in setting up a contact for the defendants with a trucker bringing in drugs by truck and utilizing a rented car in Sioux Falls; that the affiant observed this operation in action and arrested the trucker allegedly supplying drugs to the defendants at their residence address.
The defendants would have us read the affidavit in a critical, hypertechnical manner to arrive at the conclusion that there is no showing of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. This we will not do. The affidavit places the defendants [415]*415in the residence to be searched, the residence had been under surveillance for months for suspected drug activity, an individual personally observed drugs in the house and purchased such drugs, and the individual further provided information on the drug-running operation to the defendants’ residence which resulted in an arrest.
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DUNN, Justice.
Defendants Richard Clark and Michael Hastings appeal from their convictions in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of maintaining a dwelling house where controlled drugs were used or stored and of possession of marijuana in violation of the Drugs and Substances Control Act embodied in SDCL 39-17.1 We affirm.
The basic facts involved in this case were stipulated to by the parties, and there is no transcript of testimony before the trial court. It appears that both defendants resided in and paid the rent on a house located at 3726 North Seventh Avenue in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, for several months pri- or to the search of the house and their arrest as described below. On July 20, 1977, Willie Isonhood, Jr., was arrested by the Sioux Falls police on a felony drug charge unrelated to the present case. He informed officers that there was a place in northern Sioux Falls with the same address as the house the defendants rented where drugs were being stored and used. He also stated that he personally observed cocaine, marijuana, and amphetamines being used in the presence of one or both of the defendants at various times at that address during a period of four months. Isonhood purchased several grams of cocaine at the defendants’ address on July 19, 1977, in the presence of the defendants. He noticed additional cocaine in the defendants’ refrigerator and at least a pound of marijuana in the desk drawer. Isonhood was also present at the defendants’ residence on a Tuesday evening when a telephone call was made to an individual in Des Moines, Iowa, in the presence of both defendants. The content of the telephone conversation was that various drugs were being ordered from an unknown individual in Des Moines who was in the trucking business or was a truck driver and who was bringing the drugs to Sioux Falls the next afternoon or evening.
On the same date as Isonhood’s arrest, July 20, 1977, a search warrant was issued upon a finding of probable cause by a magistrate. The defendants’ rented house at 3726 North Seventh Avenue was subsequently searched by several officers. The search resulted in the seizure of suspected controlled substances from throughout the house. The seized items were sent to the State Chemistry Laboratory in Vermillion, South Dakota, for scientific testing purposes. Testing resulted in identification of 42.39 ounces of marijuana (genus cannabis), as well as cannabis residue, prepared cannabis oil (hash oil), and cocaine.
On July 27, 1977, a Minnehaha County grand jury handed down indictments for each of the defendants on five criminal counts. The trial court denied the defendants’ motions to quash the indictments, to suppress the evidence seized, and to quash the search warrant. On January 26, 1978, the trial court consolidated the charges against each of the defendants so that they could be tried at the same time. The defendants each entered oral pleas of not guilty to the charges set forth in the indictments, and the case was submitted to the trial court on the stipulated facts as to the charges of possession of marijuana — more than one ounce — and maintaining a dwelling where controlled drugs were used or stored.2 On February 10, 1978, the trial [414]*414court found each of the defendants guilty of both criminal charges and ordered a pre-sentence investigation as to each defendant. On April 14, 1978, the trial court sentenced each defendant to a total of two and one-half years in the state penitentiary.
On appeal, the defendants first contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress and in admitting the fruits of the search into evidence for the reason that the affidavit in support of the search warrant was insufficient to meet the requirements for a showing of probable cause.3 In reviewing the affidavits, we must remember that the search warrant should not be invalidated by interpreting the affidavits in a hypertechnical manner; rather, the affidavit should be read as a whole and interpreted in a common-sense and realistic manner. State v. Kaseman, 1978, S.D., 273 N.W.2d 716; State v. Gerber, 1976, S.D., 241 N.W.2d 720; State v. Haron, 1974, 88 S.D. 397, 220 N.W.2d 829; United States v. Ventresca, 1965, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684. The resolution of a marginal showing of probable cause on an affidavit should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants. State v. Kaseman, supra; State v. Kietzke, 1971, 85 S.D. 502, 186 N.W.2d 551. Accordingly, every reasonable inference possible should be drawn in order to support the determination of probable cause by the magistrate. State v. Kaseman, supra; State v. Glidden, 1976, S.D., 246 N.W.2d 779. See also, Spinelli v. United States, 1969, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. There need not be a prima facie showing of legal evidence of a suspected act. The standard of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is a showing of probability of criminal activity. State v. Kaseman, supra.
The affidavit upon which the magistrate issued the search warrant was the sworn statement of a Sioux Falls detective. The affidavit contained the following information: that the Sioux Falls Police Department Narcotics Division had the defendants under periodic surveillance for drug trafficking since at least January of 1977; that both defendants were identified as being the occupants of the rented house at 3726 North Seventh Avenue in Sioux Falls; that defendant Hastings had been' on juvenile probation for drug using and dealing; that the defendants’ neighbors had complained about the large number of individuals coming and going at the residence; that Ison-hood had been arrested on July 20, 1977, on a felony drug charge; that Isonhood had been distributing drugs, including cocaine, marijuana and speed, in the Sioux Falls area for about six months; that Isonhood purchased a “wide variety of drugs on numerous occasions in excess of twenty” from the defendants at their residence; that Isonhood purchased several grams of cocaine the evening before his arrest from defendant Hastings and there was more cocaine in the refrigerator and a pound of marijuana in a desk drawer; that Isonhood had been involved in setting up a contact for the defendants with a trucker bringing in drugs by truck and utilizing a rented car in Sioux Falls; that the affiant observed this operation in action and arrested the trucker allegedly supplying drugs to the defendants at their residence address.
The defendants would have us read the affidavit in a critical, hypertechnical manner to arrive at the conclusion that there is no showing of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. This we will not do. The affidavit places the defendants [415]*415in the residence to be searched, the residence had been under surveillance for months for suspected drug activity, an individual personally observed drugs in the house and purchased such drugs, and the individual further provided information on the drug-running operation to the defendants’ residence which resulted in an arrest. We are convinced that the magistrate was informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the affiant and informant concluded that there were controlled substances at the defendants’ residence and from which the affiant concluded that the informant’s information was reliable. United States v. Harris, 1971, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723; Spinelli v. United States, supra; Aguilar v. Texas, 1964, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723. See, People v. Bolender, 1974, 24 Ill. App.3d 804, 322 N.E.2d 624. With this information, the magistrate properly concluded that there was a showing of probability of criminal activity sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant for the defendants’ residence. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the motions to suppress and in admitting the fruits of the search into evidence on the basis of lack of probable cause.
The defendants next contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress and in admitting the fruits of the search into evidence for the reason that the search warrant did not particularly describe what was to be seized.4 The body of the search warrant reads as follows:
“Proof by Affidavit, having been this day made before me by Eugene Corbett, that there is probable cause for believing that the said MIKE HASTINGS and DICK CLARK, defendants above named, committed felonies, to-wit: Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute.
“YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED, at any time of the day or night, to make immediate search of a residence at 3726 North Seventh Avenue, Sioux Falls, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, and seize any and all substances controlled by SDCL 39-17, and if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me in the Courtroom, City Hall, Sioux Falls, Min-nehaha County, South Dakota.”
The defendants point to the language “any and all substances controlled by SDCL 39-17” as not particularly describing the thing to be searched and seized. The defendants contend that this constitutes an impermissi-bly general warrant.
The long history of the use of general warrants is largely a history of conflict between the British Crown and the press. During the time of enforcement of laws licensing the publication of literature and of prosecutions for seditious libel, general warrants were systematically issued giving officers of the Crown roving commissions to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent and the publication of libel, Stanford v. Texas, 1965, 379 U.S. 476, 85 S.Ct. 506,13 L.Ed.2d 431. The basic problem regarding general warrants was not the intrusion per se, but the general, exploratory rummaging through one’s personal belongings. Andresen v. Maryland, 1976, 427 U.S. 463, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 1971, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564. It is out of this historical context that the Bill of Rights5 restrictions on the power of search and seizure were fashioned.
Regarding the restriction of particularity in the search warrant, such restriction should be given a reasonable interpretation commensurate with the type of property sought to be seized. Descriptions may vary depending on the nature of the thing to be seized and must be specific to the extent that the circumstances will allow. 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 81, p. 895; 68 Am.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, § 81, p. 736.
“If the purpose of the search is to find a specific item of property, it should be so [416]*416particularly described in the warrant as to preclude the possibility of the officer seizing the wrong property; whereas, on the other hand, if the purpose is to seize not a specific property, but any property of a specified character, which by reason of its character is illicit or contraband, a specific particular description of the property is unnecessary and it may be described generally as to its nature or character.” People v. Schmidt, 1970, 172 Colo. 285, 473 2d 698, 700.
We can therefore conclude that a lesser standard of particularity of description is required in search warrants involving contraband or inherently illicit property.6 A suggested test of the existence of the requisite particularity is whether the warrant places a meaningful restriction on the objects to be seized. People v. McEwen, 1966, 244 Cal.App.2d 534, 53 Cal.Rptr. 362. In any analysis, the standard of particularity requires that the officer executing the warrant does not have any discretion with regard to what is to be seized. Andresen v. Maryland, supra; Stanford v. Texas, supra; Marron v. United States, 1927, 275 U.S. 192, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231.
The defendants rely on State v. Nelson, 1969, 84 S.D. 218, 169 N.W.2d 533, and suggest that it controls the present case. In Nelson, the court held that a search warrant authorizing officers to seize “ ‘any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13.3703 [the third-degree burglary statute], or otherwise’ ” did not describe anything with reasonable particularity thereby rendering the warrant void and the resulting search and seizure unreasonable. The Nelson warrant left what was to be seized to the sole discretion of the officer executing the warrant. This is certainly distinguishable from the present case. The warrant informed the executing officers that the magistrate found probable cause for believing that the defendants committed felonies of possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute and ordered the officers to immediately search the defendants’ residence and seize “any and all substances controlled by SDCL 39-17.” By definition at SD.CL 39-17-46, the term “controlled substances” is confined to four schedules that expressly list chemical substances. Officers executing the warrant were not left to exercise discretion with regard to what was to be seized; they were to seize any substance which is expressly listed on the four schedules in SDCL 39-17. This distinguishes the present case from the Nelson case, and therefore Nelson is not controlling here.
The defendants argue that in evaluating the search warrant’s particularity, the warrant description be read in conjunction with the information available from the supporting affidavit. The defendants suggest that the test should be that the warrant reasonably conform, in degree of specificity, with the supporting affidavit. We stated in Kaseman, supra, that the implication arises from a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
“that there is a violation in respect to some property located on some premises, or on some person, «which can be identified expressly or by reasonable inference from the information given in the affidavit so as to be capable of being particularly described in the warrant.” 273 N.W.2d 716.
In this regard, the affidavit contained information that drug trafficking was involved, that there had been an arrest on a felony drug charge, that the informant distributed drugs, including cocaine, marijuana, and speed, that the informant purchased “a wide variety of drugs” on many occasions, that the informant purchased cocaine and saw marijuana the evening before his arrest, and that a trucker was supplying drugs to the defendants. Although specific controlled substances were referred to by [417]*417name, the terms “drugs” and “wide variety of drugs” were also used. We conclude that under the circumstances presented in this affidavit, the use of the language “any and all substances controlled by SDCL 39-17” in the search warrant reasonably conforms to the information in the supporting affidavit.7
Taking into consideration the inherent nature and character of the property involved, we hold "that the search warrant described with reasonable particularity what was to be seized. There was no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the officers executing the warrant, and therefore the warrant was within the constitutionally mandated particularity requirement.8 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the defendants’ motions to suppress and in admitting the fruits of the search into evidence on the basis of lack of particularity in description.
We have considered the defendants’ remaining contentions based upon their assignments of error and find them to be without merit.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
WOLLMAN, C. J., and MORGAN and FOSHEIM, JJ., concur.
HENDERSON, J., concurs specially.