State v. Cherry

2024 Ohio 5344

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 8, 2024
• Docket: 2024-CA-2
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Cherry, 2024-Ohio-5344.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 2024-CA-2 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 23-CR-677 : ASHANTI AKINTUNDE CHERRY : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :

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OPINION

Rendered on November 8, 2024

ALANA VAN GUNDY, Attorney for Appellant

ROBERT C. LOGSDON, Attorney for Appellee

.............

HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Ashanti Akintunde Cherry appeals his convictions of kidnapping, felonious

assault, and having weapons while under disability, along with firearm specifications

associated with the kidnapping and felonious assault offenses. contained firearm -2-

specifications. Cherry was found not guilty of strangulation and tampering with evidence.

{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Procedural History

{¶ 3} According to the State, in September 2023, J.S. was badly beaten by Cherry

because he believed she had cooperated with law enforcement officers by wearing a

“wire” during some of their conversations; the offenses occurred in a trailer where Cherry

resided in Springfield. In October 2023, Cherry was indicted for kidnapping, felonious

assault, abduction, strangulation, having weapons under disability, and tampering with

evidence; the counts of kidnapping and felonious assault included firearm specifications.

{¶ 4} Cherry was tried by a jury in November 2023. He was found guilty of

kidnapping, felonious assault, abduction, having weapons under disability, and the

firearm specifications; he was found not guilty of strangulation and tampering with

evidence. The trial court merged the kidnapping and abduction counts, and the State

elected to proceed to sentencing on the kidnapping. The court sentenced Cherry to an

indefinite prison term of 10 to 15 years for kidnapping, an indefinite term of six to nine

years for felonious assault, and 30 months for having weapons while under disability, all

to be served consecutively. The court ordered mandatory terms of three years each on

the two firearm specifications, to be served prior to and consecutively to the other

sentences. The aggregate sentence was 24.5 to 29.5 years. The court also designated

Cherry as a violent offender under R.C. 2903.41.

{¶ 5} Cherry raises four assignments of error on appeal. Before addressing them,

we will review the testimony of the witnesses at trial. We will refer to some of the -3-

witnesses by their first names only or by initials to shield their identities.

Christy S.

{¶ 6} Christy S. testified that she had known Cherry her entire life. She was with

him on September 29-30, 2023, at the trailer where he lived, which was parked behind a

house on Clifton Avenue in Springfield. On September 29, 2023, she drove Tyson W.

and his girlfriend to the trailer to buy drugs from Cherry. Tyson went inside the trailer

while Christy and Tyson’s girlfriend waited in the car. Christy then went inside to ask

Cherry if he wanted to trade a navigation system she had for some drugs and money; he

agreed to “take a look at it” after she took Tyson home. Christy then drove Tyson and

his girlfriend to Race Street, dropped them off, and returned to Cherry’s trailer with her

boyfriend, Mike, to discuss the potential swap of the navigation system with Cherry.

{¶ 7} Cherry was watching videos when Christy returned; she lay down beside him,

“cuddled,” and watched videos with him while Mike waited in the car. Mike began texting

Christy. Cherry “didn’t feel comfortable” with Mike’s being right outside Cherry’s house,

and Cherry did not like Mike, so Christy told Cherry she was going to drive Mike

somewhere else.

{¶ 8} Christy intended to return to the trailer immediately, but she and Mike argued

and he “put his hands on” her at a Quality Inn where she had taken him, grabbed her by

her hair, and tried to take her keys. Christy ran to the hotel lobby and called the police.

When she returned to her car, Mike and his belongings were gone, and her car would not

start because Mike had unhooked the battery. Christy was able get her car started as -4-

the police arrived, and she left without speaking to them to return to Cherry’s trailer.

Christy testified that she was addicted to fentanyl and had used some earlier in the day.

{¶ 9} When Christy arrived at the trailer for the third time, J.S. was there.

According to Christy, J.S. “had blood on her,” and Cherry told J.S. not to look at Christy

because “she ain’t gonna . . . save you.” Christy then told J.S., “Yeah, I ain’t gonna . . .

save you.” Christy said this because Cherry had a gun in his hand, and he was yelling

at J.S. and hitting her; J.S. had “blood coming down” from being previously hit by Cherry.

Christy saw Cherry hit J.S. multiple times. Christy could not identify the gun specifically,

but she testified that it was black and was not a revolver.

{¶ 10} Cherry told Christy that J.S. had “wore a wire” on him, although J.S.

repeatedly denied doing so while Cherry continued to hit her with the gun. J.S. finally

said, “Okay, I did it,” and Cherry said, “See, I told you.” Cherry continued to question

J.S., who was “stunned” and “didn’t even know nothing about no controlled buys, no wire,

no nothing.” Cherry made J.S. get onto the floor, and he ordered Christy to get a “plastic

wrap” that was under his bed. Cherry said that he “didn’t want the blood to splatter

everywhere” because he said he “was gonna kill” J.S. Christy retrieved the plastic wrap

because she wanted to “stay out the way, stay out the business.”

{¶ 11} Cherry then began hitting J.S. with an “1800 bottle” of tequila. He “just kept

telling her, like, that she was gonna die and he was gonna kill her.” Cherry also

threatened to kill J.S.’s , daughter, mother, and the people closest to her, while J.S.

repeatedly denied that she had informed on Cherry. According to Christy, “the more that

she talked, the more that he hit her with it and it was quite often because she just kept -5-

pleading to him that she did not do it and he repeatedly kept hitting her.” Cherry beat

J.S. “for like 12 hours,” and J.S. “was about gone. She came there full of life and she

was leaving with none.” Christy did not believe J.S. would survive.

{¶ 12} Christy testified that earlier, while she was at the trailer before J.S. arrived,

Cherry had been drinking alcohol with a couple of his friends, and there were “other drugs

involved. He had a plate with drugs on it” as well as a “xanny bar.” Christy stated that

Cherry was under the influence.

{¶ 13} According to Christy, Cherry tied a cord around J.S.’s hands “and around

her neck and around his hand and while he was like sleeping.” Wherever Cherry went,

“he had her with him.” If J.S. moved, Cherry struck her. Christy noticed that J.S. was

drifting in and out of consciousness.

{¶ 14} At some point during the night, Christy left the trailer to seek help from her

boyfriend Mike. She told Mike what had happened to J.S., and that she had “left to go

get food” and didn’t have much time because J.S. “might already be dead.” Mike told

Christy to call 911, and she did so. Christy picked up Jaeda K., Cherry’s girlfriend, and

brought her to the camper because Cherry “wanted his baby, he needed his wife,”

because he was “real upset.” When Christy returned, J.S. was “laying on the ground in

a pile of blood.” J.S. told Jaeda that she had not done anything wrong. Cherry hit J.S.

and told her to shut up. Jaeda said to Cherry, “Baby, you know you can’t let her go, you

know you got to kill her,” and Cherry responded, “I know.”

{¶ 15} Christy testified that she “wasn’t directed to clean anything up” in the trailer,

but she did so anyway because blood was “getting everywhere” and she “was there -6-

making money. The blood was in [her] way.” Christy cleaned up the blood with “dirty

towels that [Cherry] had around and some spray.” According to Christy, J.S.’s blood was

“clumpy,” and Cherry looked at J.S., “started laughing like an evil laugh,” and said, “this

is my favorite part. It’s clumpy. That means you’re almost dead.”

{¶ 16} Christy, Jaeda, and Cherry went into the bedroom of the camper while J.S.

remained on the floor. When asked if she did anything to help J.S., Christy stated that

she “took part of my meal and I fed it” to J.S. while Cherry was “going in and out of sleep.”

According to Christy, J.S. was “dope sick” or feeling very ill; Christy was smoking fentanyl,

which she described as “kind of a medicine,” and she pretended to be “nodding out” while

really she was bending over to let J.S. have hits of “the stuff to make her feel better

because she was done for, like she was in a lot of pain,” and “all her head being split open

and everything.”

{¶ 17} Christy heard footsteps outside the trailer and knew that the police had

arrived. Officers knocked very loudly three times, and Cherry tried to push J.S. into the

bathroom, while Christy told J.S. to “holler [for] help.” Realizing that they were in trouble

and not wanting Cherry to go to jail, Jaeda grabbed a knife and tried to cut the cords off

of J.S. “to make it look like she wasn’t just held hostage.” Christy “grabbed [J.S.] up and

. . . grabbed [Jaeda] by the back of her hair and I ran out the door with them,” pushing

Cherry out of the way.

{¶ 18} Christy visited Cherry in jail, and he asked her to recant her statement to

the police and say that “the detectives schooled me on what to say.” Christy testified

that she told the detectives the truth about everything that had happened. Christy -7-

wanted to be honest at trial “in front of [Cherry],” because he was important to me, but

she also didn’t want J.S.’s daughter to grow up without J.S. When asked if she did

anything to let J.S. know that law enforcement had been contacted while waiting for the

police to arrive, Christy stated that she wrote a note back on a notebook “Calm down, just

chill, I called the police, they’re on their way.”

J.S.

{¶ 19} J.S. was 33 at the time of trial. She testified that she had two children. She

had known Cherry for two years, having met him through her husband. J.S. stated that

she was addicted to fentanyl and bought her drugs from Cherry. On the date of the

incident, J.S. went to Cherry’s trailer with two other people, Jarrett and Cheyenne. J.S.

remained outside while Jarrett and Cheyenne went in to speak to Cherry. After 30

minutes or so, Jarrett told J.S., who was ready to leave, to come inside. Cherry accused

J.S. of having worn “a wire” on him, but she denied having done so. Cherry kept asking

her, “what did they tell you about me,” but she didn’t understand what he was saying

because she stayed at home with her daughter all the time. Cherry hit J.S. “in the head

a couple times with a pistol,” and he told J.S. that he would “make sure [she] wasn’t going

home to [her] daughter that night” and that he was going to kill her. J.S. tried to leave,

but Cherry pulled her back. He also hit her in the head with the tequila bottle, which

caused her to get five staples in her head.

{¶ 20} J.S. estimated that she was in the trailer for nine hours. She finally told

Cherry that she had worn a wire after he repeatedly questioned her, although she had not -8-

done so, because she wanted him to leave her alone. Cherry told Cheyenne to “get

plastic” and had J.S. put it behind her, so when he shot her, “the blood wouldn’t splatter

all over the place.” Cherry tied J.S. up with cords, with one around her neck and the

other around her hands behind her back. J.S. “started to feel funny” because of blood

loss from her head, and Christy began to clean up the blood. Christy also gave J.S.

some food and fentanyl, and she wrote a note to J.S. that police had been notified.

{¶ 21} When Cherry’s girlfriend, Jaeda, arrived, J.S. “tried to tell her that it wasn’t

me that snitched on him, and she kicked me in the face.” When the police arrived, Cherry

made J.S., Christy, and Jaeda go into the bathroom. When officers knocked on the door,

Christy opened it, they went outside, and J.S. got into an ambulance and was transported

to the hospital. She testified that she did not think she was going to survive or see her

daughter again. J.S. identified multiple photos of the injuries caused by Cherry, and she

testified that the injuries were not present when she had arrived at his trailer.

{¶ 22} J.S. testified that Phillip, a former boyfriend of hers, gave her a letter he had

written for J.S. to copy in her own handwriting before trial. She identified a portion of the

letter that she did copy, and she acknowledged that it stated that Cherry had been

wrongfully incarcerated. Phillip also arranged for J.S. to speak to Cherry on the phone,

and Cherry made promises to her in exchange for her copying the letter. She began to

copy the letter because she believed doing so “would save me some harm,” and she

wanted her daughter to be safe. J.S. also identified a message Jaeda posted on

Facebook Messenger asking J.S. to get in touch with her.

Sergeant Wildeman -9-

{¶ 23} Sergeant Anna Wildeman of the Springfield Police Department was

dispatched to Cherry’s trailer on an anonymous 911 call regarding a victim being held

hostage who had been badly beaten. The caller requested that the report not be

broadcast over the police radio because it could be “tracked.” Dispatch also reported

another anonymous call from a person claiming to be the first caller’s boyfriend, which

confirmed the initial report.

{¶ 24} Wildeman responded with multiple officers to the trailer. When they

arrived, the door was ajar; the officers ordered the occupants outside but got no response.

When the officers approached the door, it was slammed shut and locked, and then it

“popped” back open. Christy, J.S., and Jaeda came out of the trailer. J.S. had been

beaten “really, really badly”; she had “a big gash” on her head and her hair was “matted

with blood.” J.S. told Officer Wildeman that she was queasy and dizzy. Officer Devore

placed J.S. in a cruiser and called an ambulance. Wildeman subsequently entered the

trailer with other officers and took Cherry into custody without incident. Wildeman stated

that, when the officers first arrived at the trailer, Cherry had said to them: “I want to go

back to sleep, there’s nobody in here.”

Officer Holbrook

{¶ 25} Officer Trenton Holbrook of the Springfield Police Department responded to

the trailer, noticed the door was ajar, and notified Wildeman, who was his supervisor. He

and Officer Devore announced their presence, and Cherry opened the door and began

speaking to the officers. The officers ordered him to come out, and Cherry slammed the

door shut. Cherry stated that no one was there, said he was going back to sleep, and -10-

asked the officers to leave. Then three three women exited the trailer. Thereafter,

Wildeman entered the camper with a shield, with Holbrook behind her. Holbrook took

Cherry into custody. Cherry stated that no one had been held in the trailer and the

women had been free to leave.

Officer Warnock

{¶ 26} Officer Brad Warnock of the Springfield Police Department testified that he

had responded with approximately eight officers to Cherry’s trailer on September 30,

2023, on the report of a hostage there who was seriously injured. When the women

exited the trailer, Warnock observed that J.S. had “severe facial bruises” and that

Christy’s demeanor was frantic; Christy was “very upset” while describing to Officer

Barger what had occurred in the trailer overnight. Officer Devore removed J.S. from the

scene.

{¶ 27} Warnock recorded Christy’s conversation with Officer Barger. The video of

the interview showed Christy outside on a sidewalk, visibly upset, placing her head in her

hands, spinning around in circles, and repeatedly wiping her eyes. There was initially no

audio, but then Christy could be heard responding to Officer Barger’s questions in a

distraught manner while crying. She stated that she had obtained a plastic sheet for

Cherry and that Cherry had had zip ties. Christy stated that Cherry had dragged J.S. to

the hallway and repeatedly beat her and told her he was going to kill her. According to

Christy, Cherry had been drinking and had “popped a Xanax.” She stated that the bottle

of Tequila and the gun with which Cherry had hit J.S. were in the trailer, and she offered

to show officers their location. Jaeda’s voice could be heard in the background and was -11-

identified by Warnock; Jaeda was saying that J.S. had told them that she had been

“jumped” and that J.S. had already been injured when she arrived at the trailer. Warnock

testified that Jaeda’s statement that J.S. had been been jumped was “[n]ot particularly”

consistent with statements she made during a later interview with law enforcement

officers. Warnock testified that Christy’s statements were consistent with what he

observed at the scene.

Detective Fent

{¶ 28} Detective Sandy Fent of the Springfield Police Department testified that she

had been the lead investigator on Cherry’s case and had helped obtain a search warrant

for Cherry’s trailer on September 30, 2023. She initially went to the trailer to view the

scene and then proceeded to the hospital to see J.S. At that time, J.S. was “in and out

of sleeping and consciousness.” During their brief conversation, which Fent recorded,

Fent acknowledged J.S.’s visible injuries, and J.S. identified Cherry as her attacker.

Officer Devore

{¶ 29} Officer Douglas Devore was on routine patrol when he was dispatched to

Cherry’s trailer on the report of woman who was being held captive and who had been

beaten and “was possibly near death.” He testified that he, Holbrook, and Wildeman

used an alley to gain access to the trailer, and they and other responding officers

approached the trailer from “different angles.” When officers initially asked Cherry to

come out and speak to them, identifying themselves as Springfield Police, he responded,

“Hell no” and slammed the door shut. Three women then emerged; Devore stated that

“they came out as a group, huddled down, hunched down, and moved in a scurrying -12-

fashion.” Devore noticed J.S.’s condition and approached her. She was not “actively

bleeding,” and the blood had coagulated. She stated, “Thank God, thank God; I didn’t

think I was gonna get out of there.” Devore put her in the back of his cruiser and backed

down the alley onto Limestone Street.

{¶ 30} Devore described J.S. as having had “matted, dried, and congealed blood

in her hair,” and he assumed she had some type of head injury. He requested an

ambulance to meet him on Limestone Street and followed it to the hospital. Devore

spoke to J.S. in the cruiser before the ambulance arrived, and she provided her mother’s

phone number for him to call. At the hospital, he worked with hospital staff to gather

J.S.’s clothing, noting that J.S. “was in no condition to walk, let alone take clothes on and

off.” Devore stated that J.S. was very small in stature and weighed approximately 90

pounds. After hospital staff assessed her injuries and put her in a gown, Devore took

photos of J.S.’s injuries, her a blood-soaked sweatshirt, and her blood-soaked black shirt.

He also spoke to her at the hospital.

{¶ 31} On cross-examination, Devore acknowledged that he did not know when or

where J.S. had received her injuries, but he reiterated that J.S. had said in the cruiser

that Cherry “beat her” and held her “captive”; she did not describe what had happened

specifically. Devore testified that their conversation had occurred about 15 minutes after

J.S. exited the trailer.

Sergeant Pergram

{¶ 32} Sergeant Doug Pergram, a crime scene investigator with the Springfield

Police Department, testified that Cherry’s trailer had been secured while officers worked -13-

to obtain a warrant to search the trailer. The warrant was issued after about two and a

half hours. Then, Pergram took exterior and interior photos of the trailer, which he

identified at trial. He testified that the trailer had been “extremely dirty and unkempt.”

He identified photos of a zip tie on a table, a large bottle of tequila, an ammunition box,

and a rifle with a magazine and bullet behind a plastic set of drawers. Pergram stated

that he had tested the rifle and found it to be operable.

{¶ 33} Pergram had also photographed black phone cords that were tied together

in the mid-section of the trailer and suspected blood on the hallway floor near the

bathroom, and he identified these photos at trial. He testified that blood samples had been

collected. Pergram also identified photos of a black pistol retrieved from Cherry’s bed,

including a photo that showed the gun had a loaded magazine; an additional magazine

was also found in the trailer. Pergram learned where the gun would be found from

detectives who had spoken with J.S. Pergram testified that testing established that the

gun was operable.

{¶ 34} Pergram also identified a photo of a pile of trash outside the trailer because

he had learned that a bottle used in the incident would be located there. The photo

depicted bloody rags. Pergram also identified a photo of a bottle of vodka with suspected

blood visible on the label, a sheer plastic drop cloth that had been removed from the

trailer, a package of black zip ties, and a receipt from McDonald’s dated September 30,

2023.

Logan Schepeler

{¶ 35} Logan Schepeler, a forensic scientist in the DNA section of the Ohio Bureau -14-

of Criminal Investigation, was qualified as an expert in DNA, having examined thousands

of pieces of evidence for DNA. He had examined and prepared a report about a DNA

standard from J.S., four swabs from blood stains and cords that were bound together in

Cherry’s trailer, and a DNA standard from Cherry. J.S.’s blood was found on a swab

taken from the trailer and on the cords, and Cherry was the major contributor to a mixed

sample found on a bottle of tequila.

Officer Massie

{¶ 36} Justin Massie of the Springfield Police Department was an investigator in

the crimes against persons unit. He testified that he had interviewed Cherry on

September 30, 2023, after speaking with Christy and Jaeda; the interview was recorded.

In the portion of the video played for the jury, Cherry stated that he and others had been

sleeping in the trailer when J.S. arrived with her injuries; he did not know what time she

had arrived or how she had been injured. Massie testified that there had not been any

calls from the trailer that night for medical assistance prior to Christy’s call. Cherry was

read his rights and acknowledged his understanding of those rights.

Detective Melchi

{¶ 37} Detective Brian Melchi of the Clark County Sheriff’s Office testified that his

responsibilities included retrieving and providing recorded jail calls and video visits when

requested by the courts, attorneys, or the public. He had complied such materials for

Cherry’s phone calls and video visits at Det. Fent’s request.

{¶ 38} Fent testified a second time at the end of trial, focusing on her investigation -15-

of Cherry’s jail calls, messages, and recorded jail visits subsequent to his arrest. Prior

to playing the numerous recorded calls for the jury, the court cautioned the jury that the

recordings contain other voices in addition to Cherry’s; jurors were instructed to disregard

what any other individual said and “only use that for the context” of what Cherry “may or

may not be saying.”

{¶ 39} The jury heard a portion of a call from October 5, 2023, between Cherry and

Jaeda, in which Jaeda told Cherry that J.S. was “out.” Cherry stated that someone

needed to speak to J.S. “about telling the truth” and that “some good things [would]

happen” for J.S. if she recanted her story. Jaeda responded, “I got you.”

{¶ 40} In several phone calls between Cherry and Jaeda, the name “Anthony” was

mentioned. For example, Cherry stated in one of the calls that he owned his own tree

business and that “Anthony” would be “okay” because he could help Cherry run the

business and “have a job.” Detective Fent explained that “Anthony” was the name of

J.S.’s husband, who was in jail at the time of the calls; based on the facts that Anthony

was in jail (and therefore could not work for a tree service company) and that Cherry and

Jaeda used the pronoun “she” and other female references in several calls, investigators

surmised that Cherry and Jaeda were really referring to J.S. when they discussed

“Anthony” on the calls.

{¶ 41} In an October 6, 2023 call, Cherry and Jaeda discussed a “note,” and

Cherry told Jaeda to “get it notarized.” On the same day, a text message was sent from

Cherry’s account at the jail; according to Fent, the message was sent form Cherry to a

woman known as “Noodles,” who was the mother of some of Cherry’s children. The -16-

message stated in part, “So please listen. This is very important. My tree business, I

been needing a bomb ass climber. Well, my dude, and he climbs and he’s a beast, so

I’m trying to lock him in to only work for me. He be working for Haley’s, but they was

doing him dirty and hardly letting him climb. Well, he’d be my sole climber, and I’m willing

to give him an advance to be committed only to Cherry Picker’s Tree Care.” The

message further stated, “please help Jaeda handle this. Very important on getting my

business back up and running,” and “If I can get dude to be working . . . and be loyal to

Cherry Pickers Tree Care, I see a real nice future knowledge. From the God.” Fent

testified that “the God” was one of Cherry’s nicknames.

{¶ 42} In another October 6, 2023, call between Cherry and Jaeda that was played

for the jury, Jaeda stated that “somebody said” three sheriffs had been seen sitting outside

Cherry’s trailer. Cherry told Jaeda to avoid the trailer or “move discretely” if she did go

there, because law enforcement may “be trying to get [her] subpoenaed to come to court.”

{¶ 43} In October 8, 2023 call between Cherry and his brother, Cherry used the

phrase, “no face, no case,” and he stated that he “didn’t do shit.”

{¶ 44} In an October 10, 2023 call between Cherry and “Noodles,” Cherry asked if

“anybody got a hold of Anthony” and further stated that “ain’t nobody doin’ nothing.”

Noodles stated that Cherry’s brother “is supposed to holler at him,” and that she was

“putting [Cherry’s] brother on it.” Cherry stated that “shit should be taken care of” and

that he had “set everything out as smooth as can be.” In another call on the same day

between Cherry and Jaeda, Jaeda told Cherry that she could not “find her on Facebook,”

and Cherry immediately corrected her, stating “him.” Cherry then stated that his -17-

preliminary hearing had been moved to the following day, and he advised Jaeda to “stay

away” from the trailer.

{¶ 45} Cherry and Jaeda again talked by phone on October 11, 2023, and a

recording of that call was also played for the jury. Jaeda told Cherry that Christy had

“flipped” on him and was the one who had called the police the night of the incident.

Cherry told Jaeda to put the “truth” in “the paper,” to “write it out, find her and get it

notarized.” He stated, “none of that bull shit has happened.” In another call the same

day, Cherry told Jaeda that he had been indicted and that he was not coming home

“without that paperwork” from J.S.

{¶ 46} In an October 22, 2023 call between Cherry and someone Fent identified

as Phillip, Phillip advised Cherry that he had found “the paper” Cherry was looking for,

and he asked Cherry what he should do with it. Cherry stated that it had “to be

notarized,” and “those accusations are false.” Phillip responded that he would “most

definitely take care” of it. Cherry stressed that “it’s crunch time” and stated, “that’s good

news to the god [Cherry’s nickname].” According to Cherry, notarizing “the paper” would

make it “legal tender.” In another call on the same day, Phillip stated that “everything is

still in motion.” Cherry advised Phillip to tell Cherry’s daughter to help Phillip with his

“transportation issues.” Cherry stated that he was “facing 88” and that “the truth will

come out when she signs that paper.”

{¶ 47} In a call on October 23 between Cherry and Phillip, Cherry stated that if “this

shit ain’t happened it ain’t going to happen.” Cherry stated that he would “be a good

crutch to lean on” for “them,” that “the world [was] theirs,” and that “they” would “never -18-

have a worry in the world.” According to Cherry, his word was “as good as gold.” Later

in the call, Phillip passed the phone to a “friend,” and a female voice that Fent identified

as J.S. stated, “Look, I don’t hate you.”

{¶ 48} Fent testified that, after she was made aware that Phillip had put J.S. on the

phone with Cherry, she heard another call in which Cherry dictated a letter to Phillip that

sought to exonerate Cherry by stating that he had been wrongfully accused. Fent

immediately proceeded to the home of J.S.’s mother out of concern for J.S.’s safety.

When she arrived, Phillip answered the door. Fent asked if J.S. was present, and J.S.

came to the door. After speaking with J.S., Fent obtained a handwritten letter purporting

to exonerate Cherry, along with a portion of that same letter that J.S. had begun to copy

in her own handwriting. J.S. had written: “To whom it may concern, I, [J.S.] would like to

set the record straight. On or around about September 30th, 2023 Ashanti Cherry was

wrongfully charged and incarcerated.” Fent testified that the statement written by J.S.

had been copied, nearly verbatim, from the full written statement (State’s Exhibit 51) as

dictated by Cherry to Phillip in the October 23, 2023 recorded phone call.

{¶ 49} Fent also identified a March 7, 2023 certified indictment charging Cherry

with aggravated possession of drugs, which was the basis of the charge for having

weapons while under disability.

{¶ 50} As discussed above, based on this evidence, Cherry was convicted of

kidnapping, felonious assault, having weapons under disability, and the firearm

specifications. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 24.5 to 29.5 years in prison,

including two, three-year consecutive sentences on firearm specifications. -19-

{¶ 51} Cherry asserts four assignments of error on appeal. His first assignment

of error states:

COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO FILE A MOTION

TO SUPPRESS THE LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERVIEW AND

INTERROGATION AS WELL AS WELL AS NOT OBJECTING TO THE

PROSECUTOR INTRODUCING NEW EVIDENCE DURING THE

DISPOSITION.

Failure to File Motion to Suppress

{¶ 52} Cherry asserts that playing a video of his interview with law enforcement

officers at trial was prejudicial to him because he had been interviewed without counsel

present, he made “no admissions” during the interview, and he invoked his Fifth

Amendment rights. As such, he argues that his attorney should have sought to suppress

the video of the interview. According to Cherry, it is “highly possible” that a motion to

suppress would have been successful if one had been filed, because the video could

have “easily prejudice[d] the jury into believing that he was guilty.” The State responds

that such a motion would have failed and that, even if it had been granted, the outcome

of the trial would not have been different given the overwhelming evidence of Cherry’s

guilt.

{¶ 53} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must

satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In

other words, Cherry must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that he was

prejudiced by the deficient performance. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. “In -20-

reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, ‘[t]rial counsel is entitled to a strong

presumption that his or her conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance.’ ”

State v. Coben, 2002-Ohio-914, *2 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516,

524 (1992), citing Strickland at 687-89. “In addition, the error must be so egregious that

counsel ‘was not functioning as the “counsel” that the Sixth Amendment guarantees.’ ”

Id., citing Cook.

{¶ 54} “ ‘Failure to file a suppression motion does not constitute per se ineffective

assistance of counsel.’ ” State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389 (2000), quoting

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986). An appellant “must point to evidence

in the record showing there was a reasonable probability the result of [the proceeding]

would have differed if the motion had been filed or pursued.” State v. Weimer, 2013-

Ohio-5651, ¶ 38 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Walker, 2010-Ohio-4695, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.).

{¶ 55} We agree with the State that, given the overwhelming evidence of Cherry’s

guilt, as discussed in detail under his third assignment of error, ineffective assistance of

counsel is not demonstrated in defense counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress.

Failure to Object at Sentencing

{¶ 56} In his next argument for ineffective assistance, Cherry asserts that, although

the State did not produce any evidence that he was a drug dealer or trafficker, the

prosecutor stated at sentencing that Cherry had been involved in dealing narcotics and

that a significant amount had been found in his trailer. Specifically, the prosecutor said:

“This was a particularly violent series of events all surrounding Mr. Cherry’s belief that the

victim had worn a wire on him. He is involved in dealing narcotics and there was a -21-

significant amount found in the [trailer] for which he is also now facing charges . . .”

According to Cherry, defense counsel should have objected, and it “would be difficult to

argue” that this did not prejudice the court against him. Cherry acknowledges that

defense counsel did “rebut” the prosecutor’s assertion, but he asserts that in failing to

object, counsel did not preserve the argument for appeal, and thus Cherry would be

required to show plain error. The State responds that the prosecutor’s reference to

Cherry’s involvement in narcotics was “within the permissible scope of information the

court could consider during sentencing,” and therefore defense counsel’s failure to object

did not constitute ineffective assistance.

{¶ 57} It is well established in Ohio law that, at sentencing, the trial court may

consider information beyond that strictly related to the conviction offense. State v.

Bowser, 2010-Ohio-951, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.). Here, the evidence at trial established that

Christy had initially gone to Cherry’s trailer so Tyson could purchase drugs from Cherry.

Christy also offered to swap her navigation system with Cherry for drugs and/or money.

She testified that Cherry had a “plate of drugs” and a “Xanny bar” in the trailer. J.S.

testified she bought drugs from Cherry. Most significantly, Cherry believed that J.S. had

“wore a wire” to record him engaged in illegal activity, which resulted in his attacking her.

Evidence of Cherry’s involvement with drugs was relevant to J.S.’s credibility. Fent

offered evidence that Cherry had been indicted for aggravated possession drugs on

March 7, 2023, as the basis for the weapons under disability charge.

{¶ 58} We conclude that ineffective assistance of counsel is not demonstrated in

this instance. The prosecutor’s comments at sentencing were consistent with the -22-

evidence presented, and we cannot conclude that the outcome of the trial would have

been different if defense counsel had specifically objected to them.

{¶ 59} Cherry’s first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 60} Cherry’s second assignment of error is as follows:

THE COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING INAPPROPRIATE

HEARSAY EVIDENCE. IN TOTALITY, OVER EIGHT INCIDENTS OF

HEARSAY [WERE] OBJECTED TO, OVERRULED, AND WERE

PRESENTED TO THE JURY AND THUS, THIS CONSTITUTES AN

ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION.

{¶ 61} Cherry argues that, during trial, defense counsel objected to eight instances

of hearsay that were allowed into evidence, which preserved those issues for appeal.

The State responds that the evidence contested by Cherry was properly admitted.

{¶ 62} The general principle that guides admission of evidence is that all relevant

evidence is admissible. State v. Morris, 2012-Ohio-2407, ¶ 11, citing Evid.R. 402. To

be relevant, evidence must have “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is

of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it

would be without the evidence.” Evid.R. 401. However, “[a]lthough relevant, evidence

is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.” Evid.R. 403(A).

{¶ 63} Evid.R. 801(C) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by

the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth

of the matter asserted in the statement.” “A ‘statement’ is (1) an oral or written assertion -23-

or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.”

Evid.R. 801(A). Pursuant to Evid.R. 802, hearsay is generally inadmissible, but there

are numerous exceptions set forth in Evid.R. 803 and 804. Moreover, certain types of

statements are not hearsay pursuant to Evid.R. 801(D).

{¶ 64} Evid.R. 803(1) allows the admission of “present sense impressions” as an

exception to the hearsay rule. Present sense impressions are statements “describing or

explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or

condition, or immediately thereafter unless circumstances indicate lack of

trustworthiness. . . .” Evid.R. 803(1). “To qualify as a present sense impression, the

statement must be made in close temporal proximity to the event described.” State v.

Jackson, 2002-Ohio-1202, *4 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 65} “ ‘There is an assumption that statements or perceptions that describe

events uttered during or within a short time from the occurrence of the event are more

trustworthy than statements not uttered at or near the time of the event.’ ” State v. Travis,

2006-Ohio-787, ¶ 35 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Ellington, 2004-Ohio-5036, ¶ 10 (8th

Dist.). The basis for trustworthiness is “ ‘the spontaneity of the statement, either

contemporaneous with the event or immediately thereafter,’ ” such that “ ‘the minimal

lapse of time between the event and statement reflects an insufficient period to reflect on

the event perceived – a fact which obviously detracts from the statement’s

trustworthiness.’ ” Id.

{¶ 66} An “excited utterance” is another exception to the hearsay rule and is “[a]

statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under -24-

the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” Evid.R. 803(2). “For a

statement to be admissible as an excited utterance, four prerequisites must be satisfied:

(1) the occurrence of an event startling enough to produce a nervous excitement in the

declarant; (2) a statement made while still under the stress of excitement caused by the

event; (3) a statement related to the startling event; and (4) the declarant's personal

observation of the startling event.” State v. Abner, 2006-Ohio-4510, ¶ 69 (2d Dist.), citing

State v. Taylor, 66 Ohio St.3d 295, 300-301 (1993). “ ‘The controlling factor is whether

the declaration was made under such circumstances as would reasonably show that it

resulted from impulse rather than reason and reflection.’ ” State v. Crowley, 2009-Ohio-

6689, *5 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Humphries, 79 Ohio App.3d 589, 598 (12th Dist.).

In short, an excited utterance is a spontaneous exclamation made

under the stress of a startling event. In contrast, a present sense

impression is a statement describing or explaining an event while or

immediately after the event is perceived. With present sense impressions,

the declarant need not be under “stress of excitement caused by the event

or condition,” as required for an excited utterance; rather, the primary focus

is whether the statement was contemporaneous with the perceived event

or condition. With both exceptions, the declarations are admissible unless

there is an indication that the statements are not trustworthy.

Id.

{¶ 67} Finally, Evid.R. 801(D) governs prior consistent statements and admissions

by a party-opponent. Pursuant to Evid.R 801(D)(1)(b), if the declarant testifies at trial -25-

and is subject to examination concerning the statement, and the statement is “consistent

with declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against

declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive,” the statement is not

hearsay. Pursuant to Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(a), a statement by a party-opponent offered

against the party is not hearsay.

{¶ 68} “The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound

discretion of the trial court.” State v. Helke, 2015-Ohio-4402, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.), quoting

State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 180 (1987). Thus, we review the trial court's

evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 14. To constitute an abuse of

discretion, a trial court's action must be arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable.

Ojalvo v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 12 Ohio St.3d 230, 232 (1984).

{¶ 69} With these standards in mind, we turn to the statements that Cherry asserts

should have been excluded as hearsay.

911 call by Christy

{¶ 70} The recording of Christy’s 911 call was presented at trial, and it is clear from

the recording that the call was placed while J.S. remained injured in the trailer and Christy

was experiencing stress, believing that J.S. was near death. The call was less than three

minutes in length. In it, Christy described a “life and death situation” and stated that J.S.

was “half dead” and had been beaten and held captive in the trailer by an “armed and

dangerous” Cherry. Christy also advised the dispatcher that Cherry used a police

scanner to monitor police radio traffic, and if Cherry were to hear mention of her 911 call

over his scanner, he would kill J.S. Christy repeatedly urged the dispatcher to send help -26-

to the trailer. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 911 call, because

Christy’s statements in the call were made under the stress of a startling event, namely

Cherry’s repeatedly beating J.S., which Christy had witnessed, and Christy’s belief that

J.S. was near death. These statements were properly admitted pursuant to Evid.R.

802(1) and (2).

Recorded Statement of Christy

{¶ 71} Cherry also objected on hearsay grounds to the admission of a video

recording made by Officer Warnock of Christy’s conversation with Officer Barger. The

State argued that Christy’s statements were excited utterances, present sense

impressions, and prior consistent statements, and therefore were admissible. After

listening to the recording outside of the presence of the jury, the court concluded that the

confrontation clause was not at issue, because Christy had been subject to cross-

examination and her statement was “offered to rebut an express or implied charge against

[her] of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.” Defense counsel responded

that there were “some inconsistencies” between what Christy had said in the recording

and what she testified to at trial, and that there were “some additional voices” in the

recording which suggested that J.S. had already been beat up when Christy arrived at

the trailer. The court admitted the recording pursuant to Evid.R. 801(D)(1)(b) as a prior

consistent statement, and it was played for the jury.

{¶ 72} Cherry asserts that Christy’s statement was made to Barger “after the police

came and the situation was resolved.” He argues that Christy had already testified

before the video was offered into evidence, and therefore it wasn’t possible for the -27-

defense “to cross-examine her again.” According to Cherry, there were “also additional

voices and inconsistent statements on the recording.” The State responds that the

interview qualified as an exception to the hearsay rule as both a present-sense

impression and an excited utterance.

{¶ 73} At the beginning of the video played at trial, Christy was outside the trailer

on a sidewalk. Although there initially was no audio, Christy was visibly upset. When

Christy could be heard, she was distraught and crying as she told Barger about the

incident and implicated Cherry. The trial court reasonably concluded that, like Christy’s

statements in the 911 call, these statements fell within the present sense impression and

excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule.

Det. Fent’s interview of J.S. at the hospital

{¶ 74} Defense counsel objected to the playing of the three-minute recording of

Det. Fent’s interview with J.S. at the hospital on the basis of hearsay; in the interview,

J.S. identified Cherry as her attacker. In response, the State argued that the recording

was a prior consistent statement as to who had caused the injuries, a present sense

impression made immediately after J.S. was injured, and that it “[went] to the physical

state of the victim” and to the State’s version of what had occurred. Defense counsel

contended that the prejudicial value of the recording outweighed its probative value. After

listening to the recording outside of the presence of the jury, the court allowed it to be

admitted “for that very narrow purpose of being a prior consistent statement.”

{¶ 75} Cherry asserts on appeal that J.S. had already testified by the time the State

sought to admit the video, and he points out that “the situation had been resolved” by the -28-

time J.S. was interviewed. Cherry further notes that J.S. was “groggy” at the time of the

video. The State argues that the interview was a prior consistent statement which

demonstrated that J.S.’s trial testimony aligned with statements she made immediately

after the “horrific acts” committed against her and showed the physical condition inflicted

by Cherry. The State further asserts that J.S.’s statements qualified as present sense

impressions, as they were “made immediately following the stress-inducing event, with

no indication of a lack of trustworthiness,” and the statements qualified as excited

utterances.

{¶ 76} We agree that J.S.’s statements in the interview were prior consistent

statements. J.S. testified at trial that Cherry had beat her repeatedly, and in the video of

her statements to Fent, J.S. identified Cherry as her attacker. The trial court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting this video.

Devore’s testimony

{¶ 77} Cherry asserts that Devore’s testimony regarding J.S.’s statements to him,

which he relayed to Fent, constituted “two layers of hearsay,” one to Devore and one to

Fent. According to Cherry, if the statements did not fall within a hearsay exception, they

should not have been heard at all by the jury, and “what has been heard cannot be

unheard.” The State responds that J.S.’s statements in the immediate aftermath of the

incident were present sense impressions, “as the ordeal that [J.S.] had endured for many

hours had just concluded a mere fifteen minutes prior”; it also argues that the statements

qualified as excited utterances.

{¶ 78} Devore spoke to J.S. in the car before the ambulance arrived, and she -29-

provided her mother’s phone number to him. He spoke with her again at the hospital.

When Devore was asked about the information provided by J.S., defense counsel

objected on the basis of hearsay. The court allowed the State to lay a foundation, and

Devore stated that J.S. had made the statements at the hospital within approximately 30-

45 minutes of leaving the trailer and that she was “just an emotional wreck” at the time.

According to Devore, J.S. still appeared to be under the stress of the situation in the

trailer. He asked her what happened, and she told him.

{¶ 79} When the State asked what information J.S. had relayed to Devore, defense

counsel again objected. The court indicated that it had “not heard any grounds at this

point that would support an excited utterance other than that she was still under it.” The

State asked if Devore had recorded the conversation, and he responded that he had been

unable to do so. In response to defense counsel’s objection, and the court determined

that J.S.’s statement qualified as a present sense impression.

{¶ 80} The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Devore testified that J.S. had

implicated Cherry in his cruiser before she was taken to the hospital, within 15 minutes of

exiting Cherry’s trailer, while she was “[a]bsolutely” under the stress of the hours-long

event. At the hospital shortly thereafter, J.S. explained that her visible injuries had been

caused by Cherry, and there was no indication that her statements were not trustworthy.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the statements made to

Devore were present sense impressions.

Cherry’s recorded interview

{¶ 81} Defense counsel objected to the State’s admission of Cherry’s recorded -30-

interview with Det. Massie from September 30, 2023. The trial court allowed the

interview to be played pursuant to Evid.R. 801(D)(2) as an admission by a party-

opponent.

{¶ 82} Cherry argues that he was without counsel at the time of the statement,

made no admissions, and invoked his Fifth Amendment rights. As such, he asserts that

the interview had no probative value. In response, the State points out that Cherry had

indicated that J.S. arrived at his trailer already beaten and that the interview therefore had

“significant probative value, as [Cherry] made unsubstantiated claims of not being

responsible for the beating while offering no details or further information.” We conclude

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Cherry’s statements in the

interview, pursuant to Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(a).

Recorded jail calls

{¶ 83} While the jury was not present, the State informed the court that it intended

to play 14 recorded jail calls that “represent[ed] [Cherry’s] attempts to interfere with

witnesses by getting them to sign affidavits, sending people to find them, . . . promising

them things.” Three of the calls pertained to the statement that Cherry dictated to Phillip

over the phone; Phillip then tried to get J.S. to copy and sign the statement. Defense

counsel objected to the evidence about the calls, arguing that their prejudicial effect

outweighed their probative value and that Cherry made no admissions in the calls.

Defense counsel asserted that asking someone to prepare a statement doesn’t prove

whether the statement is true or false and that the State was using the tapes to make

Cherry “look bad” in his relationships with Christy and Jaeda. The State responded that -31-

the recordings contained tacit, probative admissions.

{¶ 84} Cherry argues that he objected to the playing of the jail phone calls in which

no admissions were made. According to the State, “dictating an affidavit for someone

else to sign, responding with silence to accusations of his crimes, and attempting to

influence witnesses not to appear,” as demonstrated in the calls, were tacit admissions

of Cherry’s criminal activity.

{¶ 85} The evidence established that, at the start of each jail phone call, a recorded

message advised Cherry that the jail calls were being recorded. Nonetheless, on these

calls, as discussed above, Cherry sought the assistance of Jaeda, “Noodles,” and his

brother in locating J.S. and obtaining a statement from her exonerating him. He also

advised Jaeda to avoid the trailer to prevent her being subpoenaed. He communicated

surreptitiously, identifying J.S. as “Anthony,” whose loyalty he sought. He dictated a

letter to Phillip for J.S. to copy in her own handwriting, which exonerated Cherry. Cherry

suggested that good things would happen for J.S. if she made the exculpatory statement,

and he stressed that the statement should be notarized. Cherry stated that he would not

be coming home “without that paperwork” from J.S. The trial court did not abuse its

discretion in concluding that the statements on the phone calls were admissions by a

party-opponent and therefore admissible under Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(a) as substantive

evidence of Cherry’s guilt.

Video of Jail Visit

{¶ 86} The basis for Cherry’s argument regarding a recording of a jail visit with

Jaeda is not clear, and Cherry did not object to the playing of this recording at trial. The -32-

portion played for the jury depicted a conversation between Cherry and Jaeda in which

Cherry threatened to punch her in the face if she were late again, and she responded,

“Yes Daddy.” Plain error is not demonstrated in the admission of the video.

Drug related evidence

{¶ 87} Defense counsel objected to the admission of drug test results after such

tests were performed on Cherry. In response, the State argued that the case revolved

around Cherry’s belief that J.S. had worn a wire on him, and although this belief had been

inaccurate, drug paraphernalia and substantial amounts of drugs had been found in

Cherry’s trailer. The court excluded the drug test results as irrelevant and instructed the

jury to disregard the prosecutor’s remarks about the exhibits that were being excluded.

{¶ 88} Cherry asserts that, although the court properly excluded evidence of the

drug test results, the State nonetheless managed to mention evidence “that was not

related to [the] charges and was completely irrelevant.” The State notes that the court

sustained Cherry’s objection and “explicitly instructed the jury not to consider the drug

results,” which was “the most favorable outcome the defense could hope for.” We

“generally presume that a jury will follow the trial court’s limiting instructions concerning

the evidence that may be considered and for what purpose, as well as curative

instructions to disregard testimony.” State v. Green, 2020-Ohio-5206, ¶ 87 (2d Dist.)

As such, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in handling this

matter as it did.

{¶ 89} Having reviewed each aspect of Cherry’s second assignment of error, we

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in these rulings. Cherry’s second -33-

assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 90} Cherry’s third assignment of error is as follows:

APPELLANT’S CONVICTION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

{¶ 91} Cherry asserts that the State did not meet its burden to prove that J.S. did

not come to Cherry’s home already injured. Cherry argues that evidence around the

circumstances of the beating was lacking and that, if J.S. were badly beaten in the trailer,

“where was the blood splatter?” He argues that there was little evidence, other than

hearsay, that Cherry was the one who harmed the victim. “No evidence was presented

that she did not come to his home already in that state, other than the statements from

two witnesses that bring their own histories with the justice system to court.”

{¶ 92} “ ‘A sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument challenges whether the state

has presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go

to the jury or to sustain the verdict as a matter of law.’ ” (Citations omitted.) State v.

Williams, 2022-Ohio-2517, ¶ 44 (2d Dist.)

“An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence

admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would

convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” -34-

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two

of the syllabus.

State v. Stutz, 2020-Ohio-6959, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 93} R.C. 2905.01(A)(3) proscribes kidnapping and states: “No person, by force,

threat, or deception, . . . shall remove another from the place where the other person is

found or restrain the liberty of the other person, for any of the following purposes: . . . (3)

To terrorize, or to inflict serious physical harm on the victim or another.” R.C.

2903.11(A)(2) proscribes felonious assault: “(A) No person shall knowingly do either of

the following: . . . (2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another . . . by means

of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.” R.C. 2909.05(A)(2) governs abduction:

“(A) No person, without privilege to do so, shall knowingly do any of the following: . . . (2)

By force or threat, restrain the liberty of another person under circumstances that create

a risk of physical harm to the victim or place the other person in fear.” Finally, R.C.

2923.13 defines having a weapon while under disability: “(A) Unless relieved from

disability under operation of law or legal process, no person shall knowingly acquire,

have, carry, or use any firearm or dangerous ordnance, if any of the following apply: (1)

The person is a fugitive from justice.”

{¶ 94} As discussed above, Christy and J.S. testified consistently that, from

September 29-30, 2023, Cherry had held J.S. captive and beat her repeatedly with a

tequila bottle and a pistol because he believed she had worn a wire to record him. J.S.’s

injuries were consistent with the version of events told by Christy and J.S., and specific

items described by J.S. were found in Cherry’s trailer. J.S.’s blood was also found there. -35-

J.S. told Officer Devore and Detective Fent that Cherry had caused her injuries.

Moreover, in his recorded jail calls, Cherry schemed to avoid being held accountable, and

evidence of a prior conviction that precluded Cherry from possessing a gun was

presented. Having reviewed the entire record in a light most favorable to the State, we

conclude that Cherry’s convictions for kidnapping, felonious assault, and having weapons

while under disability were supported by sufficient evidence. The State was not required

to affirmatively disprove Cherry’s version of the events. Cherry’s third assignment of

error is overruled.

{¶ 95} Cherry’s fourth assignment of error is as follows:

APPELLANT’S PRISON SENTENCE IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

{¶ 96} According to Cherry, the court had the discretion to impose prison time for

each firearm specification, but it was not required to do so. The State argues that

Cherry’s sentence is not contrary to law.

{¶ 97} “When reviewing felony sentences, a court of appeals must apply the

standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G).” State v. Williams, 2022-Ohio-2897,

¶ 18 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Farra, 2022-Ohio-1421, ¶ 73 (2d Dist.). Under that

statute, an appellate court may increase, reduce, or modify a sentence, or vacate it

altogether and remand for resentencing, “only if it clearly and convincingly finds either (1)

that the record does not support certain specified findings or (2) that the sentence

imposed is contrary to law.” State v. Worthen, 2021-Ohio-2788, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 98} “Nothing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently

weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court -36-

concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.”

State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 42. “The inquiry is simply whether the sentence is

contrary to law.” State v. Bartley, 2023-Ohio-2325 ¶ 9 (2d Dist.). “A sentence is

contrary to law when it falls outside the statutory range for the offense or if the sentencing

court does not consider R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id., citing State v. Dorsey, 2021-

Ohio-76, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 99} In State v. Bollar, 2022-Ohio-4370, the trial court had merged involuntary-

manslaughter and felonious-assault counts and imposed three-year prison terms for each

of the firearm specifications attached to those counts. In Bollar, the Ohio Supreme Court

held that the trial court was required to impose separate prison terms for multiple firearm

specifications, even if the underlying involuntary manslaughter and felonious assault

convictions to which the firearm specifications related had been merged at sentencing as

allied offenses. Id. at ¶ 19, abrogating State v. Roper, 2013-Ohio-2176 (9th Dist.); State

v. Doyle, 2019-Ohio-979 (8th Dist.).

{¶ 100} R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b) provides that “[e]xcept as provided in division

(B)(1)(g) of this section, a court shall not impose more than one prison term on an offender

under division (B)(1)(a) of this section for felonies committed as part of the same act or

transaction.” The general rule in R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b) is subject to the exception set

forth in R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), which provides:

If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to two or more felonies, if one

or more of those felonies [is] . . . felonious assault, . . . and if the offender is

convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described under -37-

division (B)(1)(a) of this section in connection with two or more of the

felonies, the sentencing court shall impose on the offender the prison term

specified under division (B)(1)(a) of this section for each of the two most

serious specifications of which the offender is convicted or to which the

offender pleads guilty and, in its discretion, also may impose on the offender

the prison term specified under that division for any or all of the remaining

specifications.

{¶ 101} In State v. Mingo, 2024-Ohio-543, ¶ 52 (9th Dist.), the Ninth District, citing

Bollar, noted that “convicted,” as used in R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), means “ ‘found guilty,’ ”

and that “Bollar does not only apply in cases where the defendant pleaded guilty.” It

quoted Bollar, as follows:

[R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g)] requires that the offender receive prison terms for

each of the two most serious firearm specifications when the offender

pleads guilty to multiple felony offenses (and at least one of those is a felony

listed in the statute) and also pleads guilty to multiple accompanying

specifications. [R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g)] makes no exception to the

application of its provisions when one of the underlying felony offenses has

been merged. Instead, it simply applies whenever the offender has pleaded

guilty to (or been found guilty of) multiple felony offenses and multiple

specifications. Here, Bollar pleaded guilty to multiple felonies and multiple

specifications. Thus, according to the plain language of the statute, he

must receive prison terms for the two most serious specifications to which -38-

he pleaded guilty.

Mingo at ¶ 52, quoting Bollar at ¶ 19.

{¶ 102} Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that Cherry’s sentence is not

contrary to law. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), the trial court properly imposed

prison terms for the two firearm specifications. Cherry’s fourth assignment of error is

overruled.

Conclusion

{¶ 103} Ineffective assistance of counsel is not demonstrated in counsel’s failure

to file a motion to suppress Cherry’s interview with law enforcement or in failing to object

during closing argument to the State’s suggestion that Cherry was involved in dealing

narcotics. An abuse of discretion is not demonstrated in the trial court’s admission of

recorded communications from the jail or other statements that fell within exceptions to

the hearsay rule. Sufficient evidence supported Cherry’s convictions, and his sentence

is not contrary to law. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

EPLEY, P.J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.