State v. Charles Reed
This text of State v. Charles Reed (State v. Charles Reed) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED JUNE 1999 SESSION September 20, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) ) C.C.A. No. 01C01-9801-CC-00012 Appellee, ) ) Bedford County v. ) ) Honorable W illiam Charles Lee, Judge CHARLES MICHAEL REED, ) ) (Sentencing) Appellant. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
DONNA L. HARGROVE PAUL G. SUMMERS District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
ANDREW JACKSON DEARING, III CLINTON J. MORGAN Assistant Public Defender Assistant Attorney General 105 South Main Street 425 Fifth Avenue North P. O. Box 1119 Nashville, TN 37243-0493 Fayetteville, TN 37334-1119 WILLIAM MICHAEL McCOWN District Attorney General
ROBERT G. CRIGLER Assistant District Attorney General One Public Square, Suite 100 Shelbyville, TN 37160-3953
OPINION FILED: _______________________________
AFFIRMED
ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE OPINION
The defendant, Charles Michael Reed, was indicted for burglary and felony theft.
A Bedford County jury found him guilty of the lesser included offenses of criminal trespass
and theft of property under $500. The trial court sentenced him to ten months and sixteen
days for theft of property and to eighteen days for criminal trespass. The two sentences
were to run concurrently. The defendant now appeals the imposition of his sentence,
arguing he should have received alternative sentencing. Based on our review of this
matter, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
When an accused challenges the length, range, or manner of service of a
sentence, this court has a duty to conduct a de novo review of the sentence with the
presumption that the determinations made by the trial court are correct. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-35-401(d). In conducting a de novo review of a sentence, the court must consider:
(a) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (b) the
presentence report; (c) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing
alternatives; (d) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (e) any
statutory mitigating or enhancement factors; (f) any statement that the defendant made on
his own behalf; and (g) the potential or lack of potential for rehabilitation or treatment.
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, & -210. See State v. Smith, 735 S.W.2d 859, 863
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). In felony cases, the presumption of correctness is "conditioned
upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial court considered the sentencing
principles and all relevant facts and circumstances.” State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169
(Tenn. 1991). However, our supreme court has held that trial judges in misdemeanor
cases are not required to make specific findings of fact on the record regarding sentencing
decisions. State v. Troutman, 979 S.W.2d 271, 273-74 (Tenn. 1998).
The defendant does not challenge the length of his sentence, rather only the
manner in which it is to be served. He introduced testimony describing the hardships his
wife and two young children would face were he to lose his job because of a lengthy jail
2 sentence. For this reason, he argued he should receive some form of probation or work
release to allow him to keep his job. A review of the record reveals the trial court
considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances before
sentencing the defendant. The trial court found that there were no mitigating factors but
that two enhancing factors existed, the defendant had a history of criminal convictions and
he had “recently and frequently” been unsuccessful in an alternative sentence imposed
upon him. We agree with the trial court in this regard.
The defendant was convicted of burglary third degree on March 9, 1989, in the
Bedford County Circuit Court, Case No. 11669, and sentenced to three years
imprisonment. In exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea in that case, it was agreed that
he would not be prosecuted for the additional offense of burglary of a truck. He was found
guilty of burglary in Case No. 12435 in the Bedford County Circuit Court on October 29,
1990, and sentenced to two years imprisonment. He was found guilty on May 9, 1995, in
the Bedford County General Sessions Court, Case No. 80786-109-258, of DUI, first
offense, sentenced to confinement for eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all but
forty-eight hours suspended, fined $350, and ordered to pay court costs and to attend DUI
school.
On May 26, 1995, a probation revocation warrant was served on the defendant as
to the DUI conviction, alleging that he had violated the terms of probation by being
arrested, while on probation, and charged with public intoxication. On May 31, 1995, the
Bedford County General Sessions Court ordered that he serve ten days on the DUI
conviction, this sentence to be consecutive to that which he had received for public
intoxication. Additionally, a second probation revocation warrant was issued on December
5, 1995, seeking revocation of the DUI suspended sentence because the defendant had
subsequently been arrested for vandalism, aggravated criminal trespass, and public
intoxication, according to the warrant. On January 16, 1996, the trial court ordered that the
defendant serve sixty days of the DUI sentence.
3 Finally, on June 25, 1997, the defendant was charged with domestic abuse. He
entered a guilty plea to this offense on July 29, 1997, and received a sentence of eleven
months and twenty-nine days, all of which was suspended. The defendant was ordered
to pay court costs and to attend a domestic violence class. Thus, based on the
defendant’s extensive criminal history and his inability to comply with the terms and
conditions of a previous order of probation, we cannot say the trial court abused its
discretion in choosing the manner of sentence in this case.
For these reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
________________________________________ ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE
CONCUR:
____________________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE
____________________________________ JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
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