[Cite as State v. Carrillo, 2023-Ohio-3264.]
COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: : : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. -vs- : : Case Nos. 22CAA090062 : 22CAA090063 EMANUEL CARRILLO : : : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Case Nos. 21CRI20723 and 22CRI010016
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: September 13, 2023
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
MELISSA A. SCHIFFEL WILLIAM T. CRAMER DELAWARE CO. PROSECUTOR 470 Olde Worthington Road, Ste. 200 KATHERYN L. MUNGER Westerville, OH 43082 145 North Union St., 3rd Floor Delaware, OH 43015 Delaware County, Case Nos. 22CAA090062 and 22CAA090063 2
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Appellant Emanuel Carrillo appeals from the August 10, 2023 Judgment
Entry of Prison Sentence of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is
the state of Ohio.
{¶2} The instant cases are consolidated [5th District Delaware Nos.
22CA090062 and 22CA090063] and arise from two cases in the Delaware County Court
of Common Pleas, case nos. 21CR-I-12-0723 and 22CR-I-01-0016.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶3} This case arose from a traffic stop of a truck with faulty license-plate
illumination. A K-9 sniff at the scene, and a subsequent search of hidden compartments
in the vehicle, yielded large amounts of methamphetamine, cocaine, fentanyl, and cash.
{¶4} The following facts are adduced from the record of the suppression hearing
and appellant’s change-of-plea and sentencing hearing.
Unilluminated license plate leads to traffic stop
{¶5} At the suppression hearing, the sole issue was the officer’s decision to make
the traffic stop.
{¶6} On December 16, 2021, around 3:11 a.m., Ptl. Weirich of the Delaware
Police Department was sitting stationary in a parking lot on U.S. 23, in uniform and a
marked vehicle. Weirich has 11 years’ experience as a patrol officer and his duties
include monitoring traffic. He noticed a black Chevy Silverado northbound on U.S. 23
with a dark-tinted passenger window. As the vehicle passed him, Weirich couldn’t read
the license plate and therefore could not determine whether the tint level was a violation. Delaware County, Case Nos. 22CAA090062 and 22CAA090063 3
{¶7} Weirich caught up to the vehicle to check the plate but was unable to read
letters and numbers because the plate was poorly illuminated. T. 11. As he followed the
vehicle, at first he was unable to discern whether any plate was present at all. T. 24.
Weirich followed the vehicle for a while in the adjacent lane, unable to read the markings
on the plate. In his experience, a plate must be legible from a distance of 50 feet of the
vehicle, and this plate was not legible.
{¶8} Weirich performed a traffic stop and was not able to read the plate until the
vehicle was stopped. His vehicle dash cam and body cam activated when he turned on
lights and sirens because he observed a slight lane violation as the truck went over the
right fog line.
{¶9} As Weirich approached the truck, his primary concern was officer safety,
but he noticed a New Mexico license plate was present and legible up-close; the left plate
light was illuminated, but the right license-plate light was out. Weirich audibly
commented, “It looks fine walking up on it.” T. 30. Weirich photographed the plate and
the photos were admitted at the suppression hearing as appellee’s exhibits 2 and 3.
Weirich cited appellant for no license-plate light.
{¶10} After the truck stopped, Weirich contacted appellant, the driver, who was
the sole occupant of the vehicle other than his dog. Weirich ran appellant’s license
information and learned his license was suspended. Also, the plate was registered to a
maroon pickup truck, but this vehicle was black. Appellant’s explanation of the purpose
of his trip from New Mexico to the Detroit suburbs also alerted Weirich’s inclination to
investigate further. Delaware County, Case Nos. 22CAA090062 and 22CAA090063 4
Sniff, searches, narcotics, and two indictments
{¶11} The following evidence is adduced from the record of the change-of-plea
and sentencing hearing, and was not at issue in the suppression hearing.
{¶12} A K-9 sniff alerted on the vehicle, leading to a probable-cause search
yielding a white rock-like substance in a clear plastic sandwich bag in the left AC dash
vent. The substance appeared to be crystal methamphetamine and weighed 78.6 grams.
A wad of folded U.S. currency was found in the right AC vent. Additional folded U.S.
currency was located in the center dash in “a natural void behind the center cubby area.”
Appellant claimed ownership of the cash behind the center dash area, but denied
knowledge of the narcotics and cash in the AC vents.
{¶13} Officers noticed what appeared to be tool marks on the interior of the
vehicle. A subsequent search yielded hidden compartments containing “bricks” of
cocaine and fentanyl, in addition to more currency.
{¶14} In case number 21CR-I-12-0723, appellant was charged by indictment with
one count of aggravated drug trafficking [methamphetamine] pursuant to R.C.
2925.03(A)(2) and one count of aggravated drug possession [methamphetamine]
pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(A), both felonies of the second degree.
{¶15} In case number 22CR-I-01-0016, appellant was charged by indictment with
one count of trafficking in cocaine pursuant to R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a felony of the first
degree [Count I]; one count of possession of cocaine pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(A), a
felony of the first degree [Count II]; one count of trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound
pursuant to R.C. 2925.02(A)(1), a felony of the first degree [Count III]; and one count of
possession of a fentanyl-related compound pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(A), a felony of the Delaware County, Case Nos. 22CAA090062 and 22CAA090063 5
first degree [Count IV]. Counts I through IV were accompanied by forfeiture and major-
drug-offender specifications.
{¶16} On January 14, 2022, appellee filed a motion to join the two cases because
they arose from the same course of conduct. On February 3, 2022, the trial court granted
the motion to join indictments.
{¶17} On February 28, 2022, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence
flowing from the traffic stop and arrest, and appellee responded with a memorandum in
opposition. The trial court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for April 18, 2022. After the
evidentiary hearing, appellee filed an additional supplemental response on April 22, 2022,
to which appellant responded on April 25, 2022.
{¶18} The trial court overruled appellant’s motion to suppress by judgment entry
dated June 10, 2022.
{¶19} On August 2, 2022, the parties entered a Crim.R. 11(F) plea agreement.
The terms of this agreement stated appellant would plead no contest to “a lesser included
offense of that set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, being Trafficking in between
50g-100g of a Fentanyl Related Compound, a felony of the first degree.” In return,
appellee would dismiss Counts I, II, IV, and the major-drug-offender specifications in case
numbers 22CR-I-01-0016 and 21CR-I-12-0723. Appellant agreed to forfeit a total of
$31,558 in currency, the parties waived a presentence investigation, and acknowledged
the trial court must impose a mandatory prison term of 11 to 16.5 years.
{¶20} Appellant thereupon withdrew his previously-entered pleas of not guilty and
entered a plea of no contest to Count III, “a lesser-included offense, trafficking in a Delaware County, Case Nos. 22CAA090062 and 22CAA090063 6
fentanyl-related compound” in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a felony of the first degree.
The trial court imposed a mandatory prison term of 11 to 16.5 years.
{¶21} Appellant now appeals from the trial court’s Judgment Entry of Prison
Sentence dated August 10, 2022.
{¶22} Appellant raises two assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶23} “I. APPELLANT’S RIGHTS TO BE FREE OF UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION [WERE] VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS SUBJECT TO A TRAFFIC STOP
THAT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY.”
{¶24} “II. INDEFINITE PRISON TERMS IMPOSED UNDER THE REAGAN
TOKES LAW VIOLATE THE JURY TRIAL GUARANTEE, THE DOCTRINE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS, AND DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES UNDER THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS.”
ANALYSIS
I.
{¶25} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court should have
granted his motion to suppress because his license plate was adequately illuminated and
Weirich could not lawfully extend the detention after he walked up to the vehicle and
determined it “looked ok.” We disagree.
{¶26} Appellate review of a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to suppress
involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332, 713 Delaware County, Case Nos. 22CAA090062 and 22CAA090063 7
N.E.2d 1 (4th Dist.1998). During a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role
of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to
evaluate witness credibility. State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 154, 661 N.E.2d 1030
(1996). A reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are
supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142, 145,
675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist.1996). Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must
independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court’s
conclusion, whether the trial court’s decision meets the applicable legal standard. State
v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 42, 619 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist.1993), overruled on other
grounds.
{¶27} There are three methods of challenging a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress on appeal. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court’s finding of fact. In
reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether the trial
court’s findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, State v.
Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486,
597 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist.1991). Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed
to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate
court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. See, Williams, supra.
Finally, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate or final
issues raised in a motion to suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an appellate
court must independently determine, without deference to the trial court’s conclusion,
whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in any given case. State v. Curry,
95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96,620 N.E.2d 906 (8th Dist.1994). Delaware County, Case Nos. 22CAA090062 and 22CAA090063 8
{¶28} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
warrantless searches and seizures, rendering them per se unreasonable unless an
exception applies. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d
576 (1967). An investigative stop, or Terry stop, is a common exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d
889 (1968). Because the “balance between the public interest and the individual's right to
personal security” tilts in favor of a standard less than probable cause in such cases, the
Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer's action is supported by reasonable suspicion
to believe that criminal activity “may be afoot.” United States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S.
873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,
7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). In Terry, the Supreme Court held that a police
officer may stop an individual if the officer has a reasonable suspicion based upon specific
and articulable facts that criminal behavior has occurred or is imminent. See, State v.
Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59, 61, 463 N.E.2d 1237 (1984).
{¶29} The propriety of an investigative stop must be viewed in light of the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the stop “as viewed through the eyes of the reasonable
and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.” State
v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87–88, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991); State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio
St.3d 177, 178, 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988). The Supreme Court of the United States has
reemphasized the importance of reviewing the totality of the circumstances in making a
reasonable-suspicion determination:
When discussing how reviewing courts should make
reasonable-suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that Delaware County, Case Nos. 22CAA090062 and 22CAA090063 9
they must look at the “totality of the circumstances” of each case to
see whether the detaining officer has a “particularized and objective
basis” for suspecting legal wrongdoing. This process allows officers
to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information
available to them that “might well elude an untrained person.”
Although an officer's reliance on a mere “hunch” is insufficient to
justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the
level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of
satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151
L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
417-418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).
{¶30} In the instant case, Weirich stopped appellant to investigate the illegible
license plate. Traffic stops based upon observation of a traffic violation are
constitutionally permissible. Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12, 1996-Ohio-431,
665 N.E.2d 1091. This Court has held that any traffic violation, even a de minimis
violation, may form a sufficient basis upon which to stop a vehicle. State v. Bangoura, 5th
Dist. No. 08 CA 95, 2009-Ohio-3339, 2009 WL 1916902, ¶ 14, citing State v. McCormick,
5th Dist. No.2000CA00204, 2001 WL 111891 (Feb. 2, 2001); State v. Woods, 5th Dist.
Licking No. 12-CA-19, 2013-Ohio-1136, 2013 WL 1209351, ¶ 60.
{¶31} In the instant case, the trial court found the traffic stop was justified by
Weirich’s suspicion of a license-plate violation per R.C. 4513.05(A), which requires the Delaware County, Case Nos. 22CAA090062 and 22CAA090063 10
following in pertinent part: “Either a tail light or a separate light shall be so constructed
and placed as to illuminate with a white light the rear registration plate, when such
registration plate is required, and render it legible from a distance of fifty feet to the rear.”
Appellant acknowledges our decision in State v. Ferrell, which is instructive here:
Appellant * * * maintains the trial court applied an erroneous
legal standard by effectively requiring an operator of a motor vehicle
to provide “full illumination” of the rear license plate. He urges that
the trial court misinterpreted our affirmance of the denial of a
suppression motion in State v. Helline, Ashland App. No.
01COA01424, 2001–Ohio–1899. The facts of Helline entail a dual-
light system on a rear plate where one bulb was completely out and
the other was heavily covered with dirt. See id. at 1. We note the
relevant traffic statute, R.C. 4513.05, provides in pertinent part: “ * *
* Either a tail light or a separate light shall be so constructed and
placed as to illuminate with a white light the rear registration plate, *
* * and render it legible from a distance of fifty feet to the rear. * * * ”
As noted in our recitation of the facts of the present case, the trial
court was supplied with several photographs of the rear license plate
area of appellant's Saab, taken some time after the stop in question.
The trial court judge subsequently stated that he was “willing to
accept the photos as a true representation of the appearance of the
Saab's license plate at the time of the stop.” Judgment Entry Denying
Motion to Suppress, November 15, 2012, at 10. As appellant Delaware County, Case Nos. 22CAA090062 and 22CAA090063 11
correctly notes, the trial court, although ultimately determining that
the stop was valid, concluded that based on the photographs, the
rear license plate may have been at least partially illuminated,
although more than half of the letters/number on the plate appeared
to be unlit. See id. at 10. The trial court judge, nonetheless, did “give
credence to Officer Leighty's testimony, which convinces me that the
plate did not appear to be properly illuminated at the time of the traffic
stop.” Id. at 10.
State v. Ferrell, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 13 CAC 01 0001,
2013-Ohio-4651, ¶ 13.
{¶32} Similar to the trial court in Ferrell, the trial court in the instant case
determined from Weirich’s testimony and appellee’s exhibits that the license plate was
not properly illuminated. Appellant argues the trial court’s finding is not supported by
competent, credible evidence because the plate was at least partially illuminated.
{¶33} When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier
of fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate the credibility
of witnesses. State v. Kay, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2022 CA 00020, 2022-Ohio-3538, ¶ 13,
citing State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314, 1995-Ohio-243, 652 N.E.2d 988; State v.
Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Appellant argues appellee’s
exhibits demonstrate the plate was visible, but Weirich testified he was unable to read the
plate as he followed the vehicle on the roadway. The bodycam video and photographs
show the appearance of the plate after the stop was effectuated. Delaware County, Case Nos. 22CAA090062 and 22CAA090063 12
{¶34} The trial court’s findings that at first, Weirich could not tell whether the truck
had a license plate at all, and subsequently determined the plate was not visible within
50 feet, are supported by the officer’s testimony. As the trier of fact, the trial court was
free to accept or reject any or all of the testimony presented at the suppression hearing.
State v. Frye, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2006CA00363, 2007-Ohio-7111, ¶ 48. An appellate
court “cannot, and will not, ‘second-guess a trial court's decision to believe the testimony
in the record,’” especially when the trial court had the benefit of comparing the testimony
with the exhibits. State v. Leder, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2018-10-072, 2019-Ohio-
2866, ¶ 20, internal citation omitted.
{¶35} The trial court did not err in finding Weirich had a sufficient basis upon which
to stop appellant’s vehicle.
{¶36} Appellant further argues Weirich had no authority to extend the traffic stop
for further investigation after he stated “looks fine walking up on it.”
{¶37} Weirich was within constitutional authority to make contact with appellant
and investigate further. “When detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may
delay a motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or warning.” State v. Batchili,
113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282. This “includes the period of time
sufficient to run a computer check on the driver's license, registration, and vehicle plates.”
Id. Further, “in determining if an officer completed these tasks within a reasonable length
of time, the court must evaluate the duration of the stop in light of the totality of the
circumstances and consider whether the officer diligently conducted the investigation.” Id.
An officer “may not expand the investigative scope of the detention beyond that which is
reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of the initial stop unless any new or Delaware County, Case Nos. 22CAA090062 and 22CAA090063 13
expanded investigation is supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that some
further criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Woodson, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2007-CA-00151,
2008-Ohio-670, 2008 WL 442569, ¶ 12 ,quoting Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-
2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282 at ¶ 34.
{¶38} “Reasonable suspicion is “* * * something more than an inchoate or
unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but less than the level of suspicion required for
probable cause.” State v. Shepherd, 122 Ohio App.3d 358, 364, 701 N.E.2d 778 (2nd
Dist. 1997). “A court will analyze the reasonableness of the request based on the totality
of the circumstances, viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and prudent police officer
on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.” State v. Farey, 5th Dist. Stark,
2018-Ohio-1466, 110 N.E.3d 960, ¶ 23, citing Village of Kirtland Hills v. Strogin, 6th Dist.
Lake App. No. 2005-L-073, 2006-Ohio-1450, 2006 WL 766541, ¶ 13 (internal citation
omitted).
{¶39} The Ohio Supreme Court has identified certain specific and articulable facts
that would justify an investigatory stop by way of reasonable suspicion, factors that fall
into four general categories: (1) location; (2) the officer's experience, training, or
knowledge; (3) the suspect's conduct or appearance; and (4) the surrounding
circumstances. State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178-79, 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988); State
v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991). No single factor is
dispositive; the decision must be viewed based on the totality of the circumstances. Bobo,
37 Ohio St.3d 177, 524 N.E.2d 489 at paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. White, 9th
Dist. No. 05CA0060, 2006-Ohio-2966, 2006 WL 1627392, ¶ 16. We believe that these Delaware County, Case Nos. 22CAA090062 and 22CAA090063 14
factors would be helpful when analyzing whether a stop was unconstitutionally prolonged.
State v. Roberts, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2023-CA-00011, 2023-Ohio-2763, ¶ 18.
{¶40} In the instant case, Weirich testified he noticed the plate “looked ok” as he
walked up to the driver, but the plate was secondary to his concern for officer safety in
that moment. Upon speaking to appellant, he learned appellant was driving from New
Mexico to the Detroit suburbs with no visible baggage; appellant’s driver’s license was
suspended; and upon running the plate, the registration came back to a different vehicle.
{¶41} Additional information raised Weirich’s suspicions as his encounter with
appellant continued, but evidence at the suppression hearing was limited to the stop itself
and Weirich’s initial contact with appellant. Defense trial court told the trial court at the
opening of the hearing that the suppression motion was strictly limited to the stop, “not
the K-9 and not [appellant’s] statements.” T. 4-5. The scope of the suppression hearing
therefore did not include the officer’s development of reasonable suspicion to continue to
detain appellant.
{¶42} Appellant implies Weirich’s ability to investigate ended with his comment
that the plate “looked ok” when he viewed it close-up, but we disagree; Weirich was
authorized to make contact with appellant and investigate further, and additional
reasonable suspicion arose at that point. See Batchili, supra, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-
Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282.
{¶43} The trial court's decision overruling appellant’s motion to suppress evidence
is based upon competent, credible, evidence. We further find that, because Weirich had
a reasonable and articulable suspicion to continue appellant’s detention, no violation of Delaware County, Case Nos. 22CAA090062 and 22CAA090063 15
appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights has been demonstrated. Roberts, supra, 5th Dist.
Licking No. 2023-CA-00011, 2023-Ohio-2763, ¶ 25.
{¶44} The first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶45} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues his mandatory indefinite
prison term violates the jury trial guarantee, the doctrine of separation of powers, and due
process principles under the federal and state constitutions. Because the Ohio Supreme
Court recently overruled these arguments in State v. Hacker, 2023-Ohio-2535, –––
N.E.3d ––––, and we have previously overruled these arguments, we disagree.
{¶46} Pursuant to State v. Maddox, 168 Ohio St.3d 292, 2022-Ohio-764, 198
N.E.3d 797, the Ohio Supreme Court held that constitutional challenges to the Reagan
Tokes Act are ripe for review on direct appeal. State v. Turner, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2022
CA 00040, 2023-Ohio-441, 2023 WL 2017516, ¶ 40.
{¶47} In State v. Householder, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2021-0026, 2022-
Ohio-1542, at ¶ 6, this Court set forth its position on the arguments raised in appellant's
second assignment of error:
For the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of The
Honorable W. Scott Gwin in State v. Wolfe, 5th Dist. Licking No.
2020CA00021, 2020-Ohio-5501 [2020 WL 7054428], we find the
Reagan Tokes Law does not violate Appellant's constitutional rights
to trial by jury and due process of law, and does not violate the
constitutional requirement of separation of powers. We hereby adopt
the dissenting opinion in Wolfe as the opinion of this Court. In so Delaware County, Case Nos. 22CAA090062 and 22CAA090063 16
holding, we also note the sentencing law has been found
constitutional by the Second, Third, Sixth, and Twelfth Districts, and
also by the Eighth District sitting en banc. See, e.g., State v.
Ferguson, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 28644, 2020-Ohio-4153 [2020
WL 4919694]; State v. Hacker, 3rd Dist. Logan, 2020-Ohio-5048
[161 N.E.3d 112]; State v. Maddox, 6th Dist. Lucas, 2022-Ohio-1350
[188 N.E.3d 682]; State v. Guyton, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-12-
203, 2020-Ohio-3837 [2020 WL 4279793]; State v. Delvallie, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga, 2022-Ohio-470 [185 N.E.3d 536]. Further, we reject
Appellant's claim the Reagan Tokes Act violates equal protection for
the reasons stated in State v. Hodgkin, 12th Dist. Warren No.
CA2020-08-048, 2021-Ohio-1353 [2021 WL 1530036].
{¶48} Based on the forgoing authority, the trial court did not err in sentencing
appellant to an indefinite term. Turner, supra, 2023-Ohio-441, ¶ 42; State v. Corbett, 5th
Dist. No. 22CA0013, 2023-Ohio-556, 209 N.E.3d 280, ¶ 46; Hacker, supra; State v.
Cooper, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2022CA00091, 2023-Ohio-2897, ¶ 61.
{¶49} Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. Delaware County, Case Nos. 22CAA090062 and 22CAA090063 17
CONCLUSION
{¶50} Appellant’s two assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the
Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Delaney, J.,
Hoffman, P.J. and
Baldwin, J., concur.