[Cite as State v. Capps, 2026-Ohio-1185.]
IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS PERRY COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO Case No. 25-CA-00008
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion and Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Perry County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 25-CR-0008 DONALD CAPPS Judgment: Affirmed Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: March 31, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; William B. Hoffman; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: Terry J. Rugg, Perry County Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff- Appellee; April F. Campbell, Campbell Law, LLC, for Defendant-Appellant.
Hoffman, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Donald Capps appeals his convictions and sentence
entered by the Perry County Court of Common Pleas, on two counts of felonious assault
and two attendant firearm specifications, following a jury trial. Plaintiff-appellee is the
State of Ohio. We affirm the trial court. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
{¶2} On August 30, 2024, the Perry County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on
one count of felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a felony of the second
degree; and one count of felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of
the second degree. Each count carried an attendant firearm specification pursuant to R.C.
2941.145. Appellant appeared before the trial court for arraignment on September 12,
2024, and entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. On October 16, 2024, Appellant filed
a Notice of Self-Defense, advising he would be presenting evidence to establish at the time
of the offense he was acting in self-defense or defense of others.
{¶3} The matter proceeded to jury trial on May 29, 2025. The following evidence
was adduced at trial.
{¶4} At approximately 4:40 p.m. on July 13, 2024, Teresa Bly, Appellant’s wife,
called 9-1-1 and advised the operator Toni Capps, their daughter, was attempting to get
into the residence and had broken three windows in the process. Bly called 9-1-1 a second
time and told the operator Ms. Capps had broken another window. Bly also indicated Ms.
Capps was on the ground, bleeding. Because officers were delayed in responding, Perry
County Sheriff’s Office dispatcher Stacie Hinkle contacted Bly at 4:53 p.m. for an update
on the situation. At 4:57 p.m., Appellant called 9-1-1, stating he had shot his daughter
because she had broken a fifth window.
{¶5} Deputy Austin Wamack with the Perry County Sheriff’s Office was field
training with Sergeant Aaron Wolfe when they were dispatched to Appellant’s residence
at 7267 State Route 345, New Lexington. As the officers approached the residence, they
“heard a shotgun rack twice.” Trial Transcript, p. 155. The officers then observed Ms.
Capps lying on the ground and Appellant standing on a ladder, holding a shotgun. Deputy Wamack provided medical attention to Ms. Capps, who was unconscious, until EMS
arrived.
{¶6} New Lexington Police Officer Brianna Miller was also dispatched to
Appellant’s residence on July 13, 2024. Officer Miller was advised a female was breaking
windows at the house, the situation had escalated, and the female had been shot. Upon
arriving at the scene, Officer Miller saw Appellant had been detained and proceeded to
help administer first aid to the female.
{¶7} Sergeant Aaron Wolfe responded to Appellant’s residence with Deputy
Wamack. When the officers arrived at the scene, Sergeant Wolfe heard the unloading of
a pump action shotgun. Sergeant Wolfe and Deputy Wamack made their way around the
side of the house and immediately observed Toni Capps lying on the ground “with an
obvious birdshot wound to the left side of her body, the back.” Id. at p. 206. Sergeant
Wolfe asked Appellant what was going on. Initially, Appellant responded appropriately,
but quickly became agitated and had to be detained.
{¶8} Perry County Sheriff’s Office evidence technician Dana Wilson was called to
the scene. Wilson collected a 20-gauge shotgun, a spent shotgun shell, wadding from the
shell, two unused 20-gauge rounds, and a bottle of water. Wilson located blood in
different areas around the property, including beyond the tree line on the side yard, inside
the laundry room, and on the broken window leading into the laundry room. She also
located a 2 x 4 board under a broken window. Wilson photographed the scene and each
piece of evidence in its location at the scene.
{¶9} Callie Baker was asleep on the couch when her boyfriend woke her up after
hearing shots coming from across the street. Baker and her boyfriend watched from an
upstairs window as the events unfolded. Baker observed Appellant holding a gun and his daughter laying on the ground in the yard. Toni Capps was crawling around, asking for
help and water. Baker heard Appellant tell Ms. Capps he had called for help and to crawl
toward the water bottle he had thrown in the opposite direction. Ms. Capps crawled
toward the house. Appellant continued to hold the gun.
{¶10} Ezra Dupler was upstairs in the home he shared with Baker when he heard
what sounded like something breaking. Dupler proceeded downstairs. When he reached
the landing, he looked out the front window and saw a female on the ground and
Appellant, holding a shotgun, standing over her. The female was laying “right beside the
road, kind of in between the two trees that were in the yard.” Id. at p. 281. Dupler took a
photo of the female on the ground, which was time-stamped 4:42 p.m. Dupler continued
to watch and observed the female crawl toward the house, coming to rest by a large tree.
Dupler took another photo, which was time-stamped 4:57 p.m. Dupler heard the female
ask for help and water. Paramedics arrived soon thereafter.
{¶11} Toni Capps lived in a camper on the State Route 345 property owned by her
parents, Appellant and Bly. Ms. Capps was working at the Panther, a restaurant in New
Lexington, Ohio, on July 13, 2024. Ms. Capps had consumed three of four alcoholic
beverages, but did not feel impaired. She did, however, not feel well and had Appellant
and Bly pick her up early. An argument ensued between Ms. Capps and her parents
during the ride home. When they arrived at 7267 State Route 345, Ms. Capps intended to
get her daughter, who was in the house, and return to their camper to settle in for the
evening. Appellant and Bly would not allow Ms. Capps to see her daughter. The argument
escalated. Bly punched Ms. Capps in the face, forced her to the ground, and continued to
punch her in the face. Ms. Capps bit Bly in order to get Bly off of her. Bly retreated into
the house. {¶12} Ms. Capps “was still really upset and [she] wanted [her] daughter.” Trial
Transcript, Day 2, p. 11. She picked up a 2 x 4 board and started breaking out windows.
Ms. Capps broke the window on the back door and entered the house through the window.
However, an interior door was locked and she was not able to get further into the house.
Ms. Capps exited through the back door window and resumed breaking more windows.
After breaking a window on the west side of the house, Ms. Capps turned, threw the 2 x 4
board, and started to walk away. As she was walking away, Appellant shot her in the back.
Ms. Capps underwent surgery to remove the BBs from her kidneys, but because of the
number, doctors were unable to remove all of the BBs. She did not attack or threaten
Appellant while she was breaking the windows.
{¶13} Steven Howard, a shooting incident and reconstruction expert and
investigator, was retained by the State. As part of his investigation, Howard examined
Ms. Capps’s injuries and measured the size of the shotgun pellet pattern on her body. Ms.
Capps was struck on the left side, just below her shoulder blade, and down to her hip. The
pattern measured approximately 15 inches. According to Howard, a shot will spread out
one inch for every 3 feet it travels. As such, the 15-inch pattern indicates a starting point
of approximately 45 feet. Using the exact gun and ammunition, Howard opined Appellant
was 40 feet, plus or minus 6 inches, from Ms. Capps when he shot her.
{¶14} After hearing all the evidence and deliberating, the jury found Appellant
guilty of two counts of felonious assault and the attendant firearm specifications.
Appellant appeared before the trial court for sentencing on June 23, 2025. The State
elected to have Appellant sentenced on Count 1 of the Indictment. The trial court
sentenced Appellant to an aggregate minimum term of imprisonment of six years to a
maximum term of nine years. {¶15} It is from his convictions and sentence Appellant appeals, raising the
following assignments of error:
I. REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ONLY
GAVE CAPPS TWO PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN A FELONY CASE,
IN VIOLATION OF CRIM.R. 24 AND R.C. 2945.21.
II. CAPPS’ CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE HIS
COUNSEL WAS PREJUDICIALLY INEFFECTIVE.
III. IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT NOT
TO GIVE A DEFENSE OF RESIDENCE AND PROPERTY INSTRUCTION,
EVEN IF CAPPS’S ATTORNEY DID NOT INCLUDE IT IN HIS CRIM.R.
12.2 NOTICE OF SELF-DEFENSE.
IV. IT WAS REVERISBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
ALLOW THE STATE TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF CAPPS’ POST-
ARREST SILENCE.
V. THE EVIDENCE MANIFESTLY WEIGHED AGAINST CAPP’S
[SIC] CONVICTION.
VI. BECAUSE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR, CAPPS WAS DENIED
HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
I
{¶16} At oral argument, counsel for Appellant orally withdrew this assignment of
error; therefore, we shall not address it.
{¶17} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled. III
{¶18} For ease of discussion, we elect to address Appellant’s assignments of error
out of order. In his third assignment of error, Appellant maintains the trial court erred in
failing to instruct the jury on defense of residence and property despite defense counsel’s
failure to include such in his Crim.R. 12.2 Notice of Self-Defense.
{¶19} The trial court denied Appellant's request for the defense of
residence/property instruction as Appellant failed to provide notice 30 days before trial
in compliance with Crim.R. 12.2, which provides:
Whenever a defendant in a criminal case proposes to offer evidence
or argue self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person's
residence, the defendant shall, not less than thirty days before trial in a
felony case and fourteen days before trial in a misdemeanor case, give notice
in writing of such intent. The notice shall include specific information as to
any prior incidents or circumstances upon which defendant intends to offer
evidence related to conduct of the alleged victim, and the names and
addresses of any witnesses defendant may call at trial to offer testimony
related to the defense. If the defendant fails to file such written notice, the
court may exclude evidence offered by the defendant related to the defense,
unless the court determines that in the interest of justice such evidence
should be admitted.
{¶20} Although Appellant filed a Notice of Self-Defense on October 16, 2024, he
did not include notice of his intent to offer evidence or argue defense of residence/property. The notice simply read: “Defendant will offer testimony to establish
self-defense on his behalf and will prove that on or about the time of the alleged offense
he was acting in self-defense or in the defense of others.” October 16, 2024 Notice of Self-
Defense.
{¶21} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized “[t]he philosophy of the Criminal
Rules is to remove the element of gamesmanship from a trial.” State v. Howard, 56 Ohio
St.2d 328, 333 (1978). The discovery rules are intended to “prevent surprise and the
secreting of evidence favorable to one party . . . [and] to produce a fair trial.” City of
Lakewood v. Papadelis, 32 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 (1987). Those rules provide a range of
sanctions the trial court, in its discretion, may impose on a noncomplying party. Id. at 4.
{¶22} Because Crim.R. 12.2 uses the word “shall,” the notice is mandatory and
because Appellant failed to give the requisite notice, we find the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in enforcing Crim.R. 12.2.
{¶23} Appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled.
IV
{¶24} In his fourth assignment of error, Appellant asserts the trial court erred in
allowing the State to present evidence of his post-arrest silence. We agree, but find the
error does not rise to the level of plain error and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶25} During Sergeant Wolfe’s direct examination, the following exchange took
place between the officer and the prosecutor:
Q. [by the Prosecutor] When you first arrived on-scene, what was
your primary goal and focus? A. [by Sergeant Wolfe] Help her get the shooter detained?
Q. So you – would you say it’s to secure the crime scene?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. That way they could get the ambulance in?
A. Uh-huh, yes. Sorry.
Q. And after that interaction that you – that we saw on there [on the
video footage from the officer’s body camera] with [Appellant], did you
interview him any further after that?
A. No. We Mirandized him – and me and the chief deputy arrived on
the scene later on [sic] Mirandized him, but he wanted a lawyer.
Tr., Day 1, pp. 210-211.
{¶26} Defense counsel did not object.
{¶27} “Failure to raise specific constitutional errors at trial forfeits all such errors
on appeal except for plain error.” State v. Evans, 2023-Ohio-2373, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.), citing
State v. Zuern, 32 Ohio St.3d 56, 63 (1987); Crim.R. 52(B).
{¶28} Under Crim.R. 52(B), appellate courts have discretion to correct “[p]lain
errors or defects affecting substantial rights notwithstanding the accused's failure to meet
his obligation to bring those errors to the attention of the trial court.” State v. Rogers,
2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22. To prevail under a plain-error analysis, the appellant bears the
burden of demonstrating the trial court “deviated from a legal rule,” or there was “an
‘obvious’ defect in the proceedings” which resulted in prejudice, i.e., the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different. Id. at ¶¶ 17-22. Courts must notice plain error
“with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id. at ¶ 23. Courts must assess plain error from the whole of the
trial to ascertain if the outcome was affected. State v. Marcum, 2022-Ohio-3576, ¶ 38
(2nd Dist.), appeal not allowed, 2023-Ohio-1830.
{¶29} Appellant relies on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), in support of his position. In Doyle, the United States Supreme
Court held “the state, after giving a defendant Miranda warnings, cannot use the
defendant's post-arrest silence as a means to impeach the defendant if he or she later
decides to testify at trial.” State v. Eason, 2003-Ohio-6279, ¶ 23 (7th Dist.), citing Doyle
at 618. In the case at bar, Appellant did not testify; therefore, Doyle is inapplicable.
{¶30} Sergeant Wolfe was asked whether he or any other officer interviewed
Appellant after the initial interaction. Sergeant Wolfe replied, “No. We Mirandized him
* * * but he wanted a lawyer.” Tr., Day 1, p. 211. The State did not elicit further testimony
about Appellant’s post-arrest silence or his request for a lawyer during the remainder of
the trial.
{¶31} Assuming, arguendo, the prosecutor's questions or remarks were improper,
“reversal is not warranted unless the conduct complained of deprived the defendant of a
fair trial.” State v. Dorff, 2023-Ohio-3424, ¶ 27 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Fears, 86 Ohio
St.3d 329, 332 (1999). “Thus, upon reviewing the context of the entire trial, if it appears
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found the defendant guilty even
without the improper comments, then the comments were harmless.” Dorff at ¶ 27, citing
State v. LaMar, 2002-Ohio-2128, ¶ 121. “The touchstone of this analysis is the fairness of
the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” (Internal quotations and citations
omitted). Dorff at ¶ 27. {¶32} While we find Sergeant Wolfe’s response violated Appellant’s constitutional
right against self-incrimination, we conclude such error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
{¶33} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
II
{¶34} In his second assignment of error, Appellant contends he was denied his
right to the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree.
{¶35} A properly licensed attorney is presumed competent. State v. Hamblin, 37
Ohio St.3d 153 (1988). A defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
must establish: (1) the counsel's performance was deficient or unreasonable under the
circumstances; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. State v. Kole,
92 Ohio St.3d 303, 306 (2001), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). In order to show counsel's conduct was deficient or unreasonable, the defendant
must overcome the presumption counsel provided competent representation and must
show counsel's actions were not trial strategies prompted by reasonable professional
judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
{¶36} Trial counsel is entitled to a strong presumption all decisions fall within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 673, 675
(1998). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel's performance was
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the
alleged deficiencies.” State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 143 (1989), quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 697. Even debatable trial tactics and strategies do not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel. State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45 (1980). {¶37} “Prejudice results when ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”
State v. Liles, 2014-Ohio-259, (3d Dist.), ¶ 48, quoting Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 142,
citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. “’A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id., quoting Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 142, citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
{¶38} Appellant submits trial counsel was ineffective due to his consistent failure
to object. Specifically, trial counsel failed to object to 1) the introduction of two 9-1-1 calls
played during the testimony of the Perry County Sheriff’s Office dispatcher, who did not
take the calls; 2) testimony regarding his post-arrest silence; 3) the State’s introduction
of body camera footage of interviews with witnesses who did not testify at trial; and 4) the
trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on defense of residence/property.
{¶39} We first address Appellant’s contention trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the introduction of two 9-1-1 calls which were played during the direct
examination of Perry County Sheriff’s Office dispatcher Stacie Hinkle, who did not answer
the 9-1-1 calls. Assuming, arguendo, trial counsel’s failure to object was deficient or
unreasonable, we find Appellant has failed to establish there was a reasonable probability
the result of the proceeding would have been different had counsel objected. The 9-1-1
calls provided the time frame of the incident as it unfolded. The officers who responded
to the calls testified regarding their actions and what they observed at the scene.
{¶40} Appellant also argues trial counsel was ineffective failing to object to
testimony regarding his post-arrest silence. Having found in Appellant’s fourth
assignment of error, supra, Sergeant Wolfe’s statement regarding Appellant’s post-arrest
silence did violate his constitutional right against self-incrimination, we find it did not rise to the level of plain error and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly,
we find trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object. See State v. Elliott, 2024-
Ohio-3376, ¶ 148 (10th Dist.).
{¶41} As to Appellant’s assertion trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the State’s introduction of body camera footage of interviews with witnesses who did
not testify at trial, we find two of the witnesses, Callie Baker and Ezra Dupler, did, in fact,
testify and were subject to cross-examination. On cross-examination, Sergeant Wolfe was
asked about statements made by Teresa Bly. Sergeant Wolfe recalled Bly stated Ms. Capps
was being aggressive, had hit her in the head, and had threatened to kill her. Bly’s
statements support why Appellant took the action he did. Even if trial counsel was
deficient in failing to make such an objection, we find Appellant has failed to show how
he was prejudiced by the body camera footage of Sergeant Wolfe speaking with Bly.
{¶42} Appellant further contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on defense of residence/property. Assuming,
arguendo, counsel was deficient, we find the facts of this case did not warrant such an
instruction. The record establishes Ms. Capps had thrown the 2 x 4 into the yard and was
walking away from the house toward the camper when Appellant shot her. The evidence
revealed Ms. Capps was shot in the back and was approximately 40 feet away from the
house at the time. Even if the trial court instructed the jury on defense of
residence/property, we find there is not a reasonable probability the outcome would have
been different.
{¶43} Based upon the foregoing, we overrule Appellant’s second assignment of
error. V
{¶44} In his fifth assignment of error, Appellant challenges his conviction as
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶45} The term "manifest weight of the evidence" relates to persuasion. Eastley v.
Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. It concerns "the inclination of the greater amount of
credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other."
(Emphasis deleted.) State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), superseded by
constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d
89, 102 n.4 (1997); State v. Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 26.
{¶46} In determining whether a judgment is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, an appellate court reviews the entire record, "weighs the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in
resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered."
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st
Dist. 1983). Sitting as the "thirteenth juror," the court of appeals considers whether the
evidence should be believed and may overturn a verdict if it disagrees with the trier of
fact's conclusion. Id.
{¶47} When conducting a manifest weight review, the question is whether the jury
clearly lost its way in resolving conflicts, resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice,
even if the evidence is legally sufficient. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387; State v. Issa,
93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67 (2001). Appellate courts have traditionally presumed the jury's
assessment is correct, given its ability to observe witnesses' demeanor, gestures, and tone, all critical factors in evaluating credibility. Eastley, 2012-Ohio-2179, at ¶ 21; Seasons Coal
Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984).
{¶48} A manifest-weight claim succeeds only in "the exceptional case in which the
evidence weighs heavily against the conviction." (Internal quotations omitted.)
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. To reverse a conviction on manifest-weight grounds,
all three judges on the appellate panel must concur. Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 3(B)(3);
Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko, 2007-Ohio-4918, ¶¶ 2-4, citing Thompkins, syllabus ¶ 4.
{¶49} Appellant posits the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
Appellant did not act in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of residence.
Appellant continues the State failed to establish Appellant was at fault in creating the
situation which gave rise to the affray and failed to establish Appellant did not have
reasonable grounds to believe and an honest belief, even if mistaken, he or his residence
was in imminent or immediate danger of harm from Toni Capps.
{¶50} We find the evidence presented at trial belies Appellant’s position.
Appellant and Bly picked up Ms. Capps from her place of employment. On the drive
home, an argument ensued between Ms. Capps and her parents. When they arrived at
their residence, Ms. Capps intended to get her daughter, who was in the house, and return
to their camper. Appellant and Bly would not allow Ms. Capps to see her daughter. The
argument escalated. Bly punched Ms. Capps in the face, forced her to the ground, and
continued to punch her in the face. Ms. Capps bit Bly in order to get Bly off of her. Ms.
Capps was admittedly “still really upset and [she] wanted [her] daughter.” Tr., Day 2, p.
11. She picked up a 2 x 4 board and started breaking out windows. After breaking a
number of windows, Ms. Capps turned, threw the 2 x 4 board, and started to walk away. As she was walking away, Appellant shot her in the back. She had not attacked or
threatened Appellant or Bly while she was breaking the windows.
{¶51} Steven Howard, a shooting incident and reconstruction expert and
investigator, examined Ms. Capps’s injuries and measured the size of the shotgun pellet
pattern on her body. Ms. Capps was struck on the left side, just below her shoulder blade,
and down to her hip. The pattern measured approximately 15 inches. Using the exact
gun and ammunition, Howard recreated the shooting and opined Appellant was 40 feet,
plus or minus 6 inches, from Ms. Capps when he shot her.
{¶52} The jury was free to accept or reject any or all of the evidence offered by the
parties and assess the witnesses' credibility. Indeed, the jurors need not believe all of a
witness' testimony, but may accept only portions of it as true. State v. McGregor, 2016-
Ohio-3082, ¶ 10 (5th Dist.). "While the jury may take note of the inconsistencies and
resolve or discount them accordingly * * * such inconsistencies do not render defendant's
conviction against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence." (Citations omitted.)
Id. We find the jury did not lose its way in finding the State proved beyond a reasonable
doubt Appellant did not act in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of residence.
We further find the judgment of conviction was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
{¶53} Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
VI
{¶54} In his final assignment of error, Appellant submits he was denied his right
to a fair trial due to cumulative error.
{¶55} The cumulative-error doctrine provides “a trial court's judgment may be
reversed if the cumulative effect of multiple errors prevents a fair trial even though each of the individual errors, standing alone, would not constitute grounds for reversal.” Marrs
v. Mickel, 2023-Ohio-4528, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 64
(1995). That being said, “the cumulative-error doctrine does not apply in cases where
there are not multiple errors.” Id. at ¶ 24, citing State v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-2296, ¶
103 (8th Dist.); 180 Degree Solutions L.L.C. v. Metron Nutraceuticals, L.L.C., 2021-Ohio-
2769, ¶ 92 (8th Dist.). “The doctrine of cumulative error is inapplicable when the alleged
errors are found to be harmless or nonexistent.” Id., citing State v. Jackson, 2023-Ohio-
2381, ¶ 84 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Allen, 2016-Ohio-102, ¶ 53 (8th Dist.). Simply
stated, "[w]hen an appellate court determines no error has occurred, the doctrine cannot
apply." State v. Lyons, 2017-Ohio-4385, ¶ 46 (7th Dist.).
{¶56} The alleged cumulative errors are those raised in Appellant's second, third,
fourth, and fifth assignments of error. Having found Appellant's assignments of error to
be without merit in each addressed error, we similarly conclude there was no cumulative
effect, which resulted in Appellant being denied a fair trial.
{¶57} Appellant's sixth assignment of error is overruled. {¶58} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the
Perry County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
{¶59} Costs to Appellant.
By: Hoffman, J.
King, P.J. and
Gormley, J. concur.