State v. Byers

2003 MT 83, 67 P.3d 880, 315 Mont. 89, 2003 Mont. LEXIS 159
CourtMontana Supreme Court
DecidedApril 17, 2003
Docket02-132
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 2003 MT 83 (State v. Byers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Byers, 2003 MT 83, 67 P.3d 880, 315 Mont. 89, 2003 Mont. LEXIS 159 (Mo. 2003).

Opinion

JUSTICE REGNIER

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 The Appellant, Tony R. Byers (“Byers”), was charged with conspiracy to commit criminal production or manufacture of dangerous drugs, a felony, in violation of §§ 45-4-102 and 45-9-110, MCA; criminal production or manufacture of dangerous drugs, a felony, in violation of §§ 45-4-102 and 45-9-110, MCA; criminal possession of dangerous drugs, a felony, in violation of §§ 45-4-102 and 45-9-130, MCA; and criminal possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor, in violation of § 45-10-103, MCA. After the State presented its case at trial, Byers moved for a directed verdict on the basis that there was insufficient corroborative evidence to support the accomplice testimony, as required by § 46-16-213, MCA. The District Court denied the motion and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. Byers appeals from the District Court’s denial of his motion for a directed verdict. We affirm.

¶2 We address the following issues on appeal:

¶3 1. Did the District Court err when it found that there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the accomplice evidence as to Count I?

¶4 2. Did the District Court err when it found that there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the accomplice evidence as to Count II?

*91 BACKGROUND

¶5 Byers was charged by Information with several counts related to the possession and manufacture of methamphetamine. He appeals his conviction as to Counts I and II. Because Counts I and II are based on facts almost entirely separate from one another, we describe the facts in detail below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6 We review the denial of a motion for directed verdict in the same manner that we review the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction. See State v. Bower (1992), 254 Mont. 1, 6, 833 P.2d 1106, 1109. We examine “whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Mergenthaler (1994), 263 Mont. 198, 203, 868 P.2d 560, 562. The decision to direct a verdict at the close of the State's case lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. See State v. Moore (1994), 268 Mont. 20, 64, 885 P.2d 457, 484, overruled on other grounds by State v. Gollehon (1995), 274 Mont. 116, 121, 906 P.2d 697, 701.

DISCUSSION ISSUE ONE

¶7 Did the District Court err when it found that there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the accomplice evidence as to Count I?

¶8 Narcotics detective Sandra Ann Bjorklund ("Officer Bjorklund") discovered a portable methamphetamine lab while searching an apartment occupied by Jonathon Toth (“Toth”) and Mary Hein (“Hein”). Items seized during the search include a black duffel bag containing the portable methamphetamine lab, a marijuana pipe, a crack pipe, which can be used to smoke methamphetamine, a Chap Stick container which had been hollowed out and contained methamphetamine residue, a snort tube, and two recipes for manufacturing methamphetamine using ephedrine.

¶9 Toth told Officer Bjorklund that a man named Tony helped him manufacture the methamphetamine, and gave her a description of Tony and Tony’s car. Tony is the defendant, Tony Byers. Hein testified at trial that Byers showed Toth and Hein how to manufacture the methamphetamine and Toth wrote down the recipe. Hein also testified that Byers sometimes stayed at her apartment, that some of the equipment in the apartment was Byers’, that Byers would take some *92 of the methamphetamine that was made in the apartment, and that the methamphetamine lab belonged to Toth and Byers.

¶10 Toth and Hein were both charged as a result of the methamphetamine lab found in their apartment. Toth accepted a plea agreement in which he was sentenced for accountability for criminal production or manufacture of dangerous drugs and criminal possession of dangerous drugs. Hein’s case was still pending at the time of Byers’ trial, however she admitted she was involved in the manufacture of methamphetamine and she was given use immunity for her testimony in Byers’ trial. Toth did not testify at Byers’ trial.

¶11 Count I of the Information charged Byers with conspiracy to commit criminal production or manufacture of dangerous drugs, a felony, in violation of §§ 45-4-102 and 45-9-110, MCA. It was alleged that on or about October 1 through 22, 2000, Byers, with the purpose that the offense of criminal production or manufacture of dangerous drugs be committed, agreed with Toth and/or Hein to commit that offense and performed an act in furtherance of that agreement by providing the recipe and some of the materials for producing methamphetamine at their apartment, and also cooked the methamphetamine.

¶12 In a criminal proceeding, testimony of a person who is legally accountable is governed by § 46-16-213, MCA, which states:

A person may not be found guilty of an offense on the testimony of one responsible or legally accountable for the same offense ... unless the testimony is corroborated by other evidence that in itself and without the aid of the testimony of the one responsible or legally accountable for the same offense tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.

¶13 We have previously addressed the guidelines for testing the sufficiency of corroborating evidence. In State v. Kemp (1979), 182 Mont. 383, 597 P.2d 96, we concluded:

To be sufficient, corroborating evidence must show more than that a crime was in fact committed or the circumstances of its commission. It must raise more than a suspicion of the defendant's involvement in, or opportunity to commit, the crime charged. But corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, by itself, to support a defendant's conviction or even to make out a prima facie case against him. Corroborating evidence may be circumstantial and can come from the defendant or his witnesses.

Kemp, 182 Mont. at 387, 597 P.2d at 99 (citations omitted). In State v. Kaczmarek (1990), 243 Mont. 456, 460, 795 P.2d 439, 442, we further *93 determined that “corroborating evidence is not insufficient merely because it is circumstantial, disputed, or possibly consistent with innocent conduct; it is the jury's duty to resolve such factual questions.”

¶14 Since Toth and Hein were accomplices in the crimes with which Byers was charged in Count I, corroborating evidence must be held to the standards in § 46-16-213, MCA.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2003 MT 83, 67 P.3d 880, 315 Mont. 89, 2003 Mont. LEXIS 159, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-byers-mont-2003.