Per Curiam.
Defendant-appellant, Isaac Corney Bush (hereinafter appellant), was found guilty by a jury of the offense of burglary in the first degree in violation of Section 810(l)(e) of the Hawaii Penal Code, as enacted by Act 9, Session Laws of Hawaii 1972.
He was sentenced to serve a term of 10 years in the Hawaii State Prison. He has appealed from that judgment and sentence. We affirm both the judgment and sentence.
In his opening brief, the appellant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution to warrant a conviction. The appellant’s sole argument is that the trial court erred when it refused to give over appellant’s
objection Hawaii Standard Jury Instruction Criminal (hereinafter HAWJIC) No. 3.9,
which would have told the jury about the interpretation and application of evidence susceptible to two reasonable interpretations. We have carefully reviewed the record in the instant case, and we reject the appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in refusing to give HAWJIC No. 3.9.
The appellant argues that because the conviction was based solely on circumstantial evidence, as a matter of law, he was entitled to instructions on the degree and quality of proof necessary to convict.
People v. Vasquez,
47 A.D.2d 934, 367 N.Y.S.2d 78
(1975); Peoplev. Garcia,
169 Cal. App. 2nd 368, 337 P.2d 100 (1959). We agree with the appellant to the extent that because the evidence in the instant case was circumstantial, instructions on circumstantial evidence were necessary. A review of the trial record reveals that the lower court gave adequate instructions distinguishing and expounding the uses of circumstantial and direct evidence to the jury.
However, we find no error in the trial court’s refusal to give the specific instruction the appellant requested. “This court has uniformly held that where a proposition of law is requested to be given in an instruction, the instruction may properly be refused where the same proposition is adequately covered in another instruction that is given. ”
State v. Stuart,
51 Haw. 656, 660-61, 466 P.2d 444, 447 (1970).
In the instant case, the trial court gave the jury instx actions on the state’s burden to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The part thereof relevant to the instant case reads, “. . . it places upon the prosecution the burden of proving a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
every material element
of the crime charged.” (Emphasis added.) This passage includes within its ambit the tenor of HAWJIC No. 3.9. If the jurors were to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to every material element, of necessity they would have had to resolve
evidence susceptible to two constructions unfavorable to defendant. There is before us neither evidence nor a contention that the jury did otherwise than as instructed. We conclude that the instruction requested by the appellant which was refused stated the same proposition of law as that contained in the trial court’s instructions.
Appellant infers that the instructions given by the trial court left the jury in confusion as to the proper application of abstract principles such as “circumstantial evidence” and “reasonable doubt,” which constituted reversible error. This is especially so because the doctrine of reasonable doubt is much broader to the legally trained mind than would be easily understood by the inexperienced juror.
State v. Davis,
69 Ida. 270. 206 P.2d 271 (1949);
People v. Hatchett,
63 Cal. App. 2d 144, 146 P.2d 469 (1944). We hold that the prevailing theory in Hawaii was announced in
State v. Stuart, supra,
wherein we concluded as controlling
Territory v. Honda,
31 Haw. 913 (1931). In both these cases we approved the trial courts’ instructions to the jury on the standards of reasonable doubt. In both cases we approved the trial courts’ refusals to give additional instructions because the principles expressed therein were contained in those used by these courts. In
Stuart,
the refused instruction was the same verbatim as the refused instruction in the instant case. We hold that the correct statement of law regarding circumstantial evidence is contained in
Holland v. United States,
348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954):
Admittedly, circumstantial evidence may in some cases point to a wholly incorrect result. Yet this is equally true of testimonial evidence. In both instances, a jury is asked to weigh the chances that the evidence correctly points to guilt against the possibility of inaccuracy or ambiguous inference. In both, the jury must use its experience with people and events in weighing the probabilities. If the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require no more.
The Supreme Court of Arizona in
State v. Harvill,
106 Ariz. 386, 476 P.2d 841 (1970), overruled its previous cases
which required the giving of instructions on reasonable hypotheses from circumstantial evidence. Prior to
Harvill,
the Arizona court stated:
The jury was instructed that the law makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence as to the degree of proof required for a conviction. The instruction is contrary to the law of this state. We are committed to the Rule that to warrant a conviction it is necessary that the circumstantial evidence offered should not only be consistent with guilt but inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v.
Reynolds,
104 Ariz. 149, 150, 449 P.2d 614, 615 (1969).
In overruling
Reynolds
and all cases stating the previous rule on circumstantial evidence, the Court in
Harvill
held that instructions to the jury on the “reasonable hypothesis” theory of circumstantial evidence would be unnecessary where the jury is properly instructed as to reasonable doubt.
The Harvill
Court concluded that “[a] proper instruction on ‘reasonable doubt’ as applied to all kinds of evidence gives the jury an appropriate standard upon which to make a determination of guilt or innocence; to instruct further is to invite the confusion of semantics.” 106 Ariz. at 391, 476 P.2d at 846.
In
United States v. Becker,
62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Per Curiam.
Defendant-appellant, Isaac Corney Bush (hereinafter appellant), was found guilty by a jury of the offense of burglary in the first degree in violation of Section 810(l)(e) of the Hawaii Penal Code, as enacted by Act 9, Session Laws of Hawaii 1972.
He was sentenced to serve a term of 10 years in the Hawaii State Prison. He has appealed from that judgment and sentence. We affirm both the judgment and sentence.
In his opening brief, the appellant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution to warrant a conviction. The appellant’s sole argument is that the trial court erred when it refused to give over appellant’s
objection Hawaii Standard Jury Instruction Criminal (hereinafter HAWJIC) No. 3.9,
which would have told the jury about the interpretation and application of evidence susceptible to two reasonable interpretations. We have carefully reviewed the record in the instant case, and we reject the appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in refusing to give HAWJIC No. 3.9.
The appellant argues that because the conviction was based solely on circumstantial evidence, as a matter of law, he was entitled to instructions on the degree and quality of proof necessary to convict.
People v. Vasquez,
47 A.D.2d 934, 367 N.Y.S.2d 78
(1975); Peoplev. Garcia,
169 Cal. App. 2nd 368, 337 P.2d 100 (1959). We agree with the appellant to the extent that because the evidence in the instant case was circumstantial, instructions on circumstantial evidence were necessary. A review of the trial record reveals that the lower court gave adequate instructions distinguishing and expounding the uses of circumstantial and direct evidence to the jury.
However, we find no error in the trial court’s refusal to give the specific instruction the appellant requested. “This court has uniformly held that where a proposition of law is requested to be given in an instruction, the instruction may properly be refused where the same proposition is adequately covered in another instruction that is given. ”
State v. Stuart,
51 Haw. 656, 660-61, 466 P.2d 444, 447 (1970).
In the instant case, the trial court gave the jury instx actions on the state’s burden to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The part thereof relevant to the instant case reads, “. . . it places upon the prosecution the burden of proving a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
every material element
of the crime charged.” (Emphasis added.) This passage includes within its ambit the tenor of HAWJIC No. 3.9. If the jurors were to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to every material element, of necessity they would have had to resolve
evidence susceptible to two constructions unfavorable to defendant. There is before us neither evidence nor a contention that the jury did otherwise than as instructed. We conclude that the instruction requested by the appellant which was refused stated the same proposition of law as that contained in the trial court’s instructions.
Appellant infers that the instructions given by the trial court left the jury in confusion as to the proper application of abstract principles such as “circumstantial evidence” and “reasonable doubt,” which constituted reversible error. This is especially so because the doctrine of reasonable doubt is much broader to the legally trained mind than would be easily understood by the inexperienced juror.
State v. Davis,
69 Ida. 270. 206 P.2d 271 (1949);
People v. Hatchett,
63 Cal. App. 2d 144, 146 P.2d 469 (1944). We hold that the prevailing theory in Hawaii was announced in
State v. Stuart, supra,
wherein we concluded as controlling
Territory v. Honda,
31 Haw. 913 (1931). In both these cases we approved the trial courts’ instructions to the jury on the standards of reasonable doubt. In both cases we approved the trial courts’ refusals to give additional instructions because the principles expressed therein were contained in those used by these courts. In
Stuart,
the refused instruction was the same verbatim as the refused instruction in the instant case. We hold that the correct statement of law regarding circumstantial evidence is contained in
Holland v. United States,
348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954):
Admittedly, circumstantial evidence may in some cases point to a wholly incorrect result. Yet this is equally true of testimonial evidence. In both instances, a jury is asked to weigh the chances that the evidence correctly points to guilt against the possibility of inaccuracy or ambiguous inference. In both, the jury must use its experience with people and events in weighing the probabilities. If the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can require no more.
The Supreme Court of Arizona in
State v. Harvill,
106 Ariz. 386, 476 P.2d 841 (1970), overruled its previous cases
which required the giving of instructions on reasonable hypotheses from circumstantial evidence. Prior to
Harvill,
the Arizona court stated:
The jury was instructed that the law makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence as to the degree of proof required for a conviction. The instruction is contrary to the law of this state. We are committed to the Rule that to warrant a conviction it is necessary that the circumstantial evidence offered should not only be consistent with guilt but inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v.
Reynolds,
104 Ariz. 149, 150, 449 P.2d 614, 615 (1969).
In overruling
Reynolds
and all cases stating the previous rule on circumstantial evidence, the Court in
Harvill
held that instructions to the jury on the “reasonable hypothesis” theory of circumstantial evidence would be unnecessary where the jury is properly instructed as to reasonable doubt.
The Harvill
Court concluded that “[a] proper instruction on ‘reasonable doubt’ as applied to all kinds of evidence gives the jury an appropriate standard upon which to make a determination of guilt or innocence; to instruct further is to invite the confusion of semantics.” 106 Ariz. at 391, 476 P.2d at 846.
In
United States v. Becker,
62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933), the appellant therein assigned error to the trial court’s refusal of an instruction stating that evidence was sufficient only if it foreclosed the hypothesis of innocence. The trial court therein gave instructions requiring a conviction only upon a finding of guilt “beyond fair doubt.” 62 F.2d at 1010. Speaking for the Court, Justice Learned Hand therein stated:
The requirement seems to us a refinement which only serves to confuse laymen into supposing that they should use circumstantial evidence otherwise than testimonial. All conclusions have implicit major premises drawn from common knowledge; the truth of testimony depends as much upon these, as do inferences from events. A jury tests a witness’s credibility by using their experience in the past as to similar utterances of persons in a like position. That is precisely the same mental process as
when they infer from an object what has been its past history, or from an event what must have preceded it. All that can be asked is that the importance of the result to the accused shall demand a corresponding certainty of his guilt; and this is commonly and adequately covered by telling them that the conclusion shall be free from fair doubt. To elaborate this into an inexorable ritual, or to articulate it from different situations, is more likely to impede, than to promote, their inquiry.
Clayton C. Ikei
for defendant-appellant.
James Takayesu,
deputy prosecuting attorney
(Earle A. Partington,
deputy prosecuting attorney, on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
The instruction requested by the appellant merely restated in different terms the proposition of law upon which the jury was fully and adequately instructed. The trial court, therefore, properly refused to give the appellant’s instruction on evidence susceptible of different constructions. Affirmed.