IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA23-606
Filed 7 May 2024
New Hanover, Nos. 21 CRS 50349, 50523
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
WILLIAM LOGAN BUCK, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 24 January 2023 by Judge G.
Frank Jones in New Hanover County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
24 January 2024.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Alexander Hiram Ward, for the State.
Carolina Appeal, by Andrew Nelson, for Defendant-Appellant.
CARPENTER, Judge.
William Logan Buck (“Defendant”) appeals from judgment after a jury
convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious
injury (“AWDWIKISI”), felony hit and run with serious injury, and robbery with a
dangerous weapon. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred by: (1) denying
his motion to arrest judgment concerning his felony hit-and-run verdict; (2) failing to
arrest judgment concerning his AWDWIKISI verdict; (3) denying his motion to
dismiss his felony hit-and-run charge; (4) denying his motion to dismiss his
AWDWIKISI charge; (5) instructing the jury that it could convict him for STATE V. BUCK
Opinion of the Court
AWDWIKISI and felony hit and run; and (6) making a clerical error in his felony hit-
and-run judgment. After careful review, we disagree with Defendant concerning his
first five arguments, but we agree with Defendant concerning his final argument.
Accordingly, we remand this case for the trial court to correct a clerical error.
Otherwise, we discern no error.
I. Factual & Procedural Background
On 19 April 2021, a New Hanover County grand jury indicted Defendant with
one count of each of the following: AWDWIKISI, felony hit and run with serious
injury, and robbery with a dangerous weapon. The State began trying Defendant on
17 January 2023 in New Hanover County Superior Court.
Trial evidence tended to show the following. On 11 January 2021, Demetrius
Moss (“Victim”) met Defendant in the Martin Luther King Center parking lot in
Wilmington, North Carolina. Defendant intended to sell marijuana to Victim.
Defendant was seated in his car when Victim approached. Instead of purchasing
marijuana from Defendant, Victim grabbed Defendant’s marijuana and ran.
Defendant then accelerated his car, pursued Victim, and hit Victim with his
car. The crash-data recorder from Defendant’s car showed that directly before the
collision with Victim, Defendant’s “accelerator percentage” was 99%, which
investigating officer Eric Lippert described as “pedal to the medal” and “probably as
high as it goes.”
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After Defendant struck Victim with his car, Defendant exited his car, went
through Victim’s pockets, removed the marijuana and Victim’s phone, and drove
away. After twelve surgeries, Victim spent over two months in the hospital
recovering from a broken tibia, fibula, and pelvis.
At the close of the State’s evidence and again at the close of all evidence,
Defendant moved to dismiss all charges. The trial court denied both motions. The
trial court instructed the jury on all charges; Defendant did not object to the
instructions.
The jury convicted Defendant of each charge. Following the jury’s guilty
verdicts, Defendant moved to arrest judgment concerning only the felony hit-and-run
verdict. The trial court denied the motion.
The trial court then entered three judgments. In the first judgment, the trial
court sentenced Defendant to a term of between seventy-three and one hundred
months of imprisonment for AWDWIKISI. In the second judgment, the trial court
sentenced Defendant to a term of between thirteen and twenty-five months of
imprisonment for felony hit and run with serious injury. The second judgment,
however, noted that the jury found Defendant guilty of subsection “20-166(E).” In the
third judgment, the trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of between sixty-four
and eighty-nine months of imprisonment for robbery with a dangerous weapon. The
trial court set the second and third judgments to run concurrently with the first. On
3 February 2023, Defendant filed written notice of appeal.
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II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2023)
III. Issues
The issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred by: (1) denying
Defendant’s motion to arrest judgment concerning his felony hit-and-run verdict; (2)
failing to arrest judgment concerning his AWDWIKISI verdict; (3) denying
Defendant’s motion to dismiss his felony hit-and-run charge; (4) denying Defendant’s
motion to dismiss his AWDWIKISI charge; (5) instructing the jury that it could
convict Defendant for AWDWIKISI and felony hit and run with serious injury; and
(6) making a clerical error in Defendant’s felony hit-and-run judgment.
IV. Analysis
A. Arrest of Judgment
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to arrest judgment
concerning his convictions for felony hit and run with serious injury and
AWDWIKISI. After careful review, we disagree.
“Whether to arrest judgment is a question of law, and ‘[q]uestions of law are
reviewed de novo on appeal.’” State v. Curry, 203 N.C. App. 375, 378, 692 S.E.2d 129,
134 (2010) (quoting Metcalf v. Black Dog Realty, LLC, 200 N.C. App. 619, 635, 684
S.E.2d 709, 720 (2009)) (alteration in original). Under a de novo review, this Court
“‘considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment’ for that of the
lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008)
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(quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen, Ltd. P’ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316,
319 (2003)).
A trial court must arrest a judgment when:
it is apparent that no judgment against the defendant could be lawfully entered because of some fatal error appearing in (1) the organization of the court, (2) the charge made against the defendant (the information, warrant or indictment), (3) the arraignment and plea, (4) the verdict, [or] (5) the judgment.
State v. Perry, 291 N.C. 586, 589, 231 S.E.2d 262, 265 (1977).
1. Felony Hit and Run with Serious Injury
Concerning his motion to arrest judgment for his felony hit-and-run conviction,
Defendant argues that, under subsection 20-166(a), a “crash” cannot be intentional.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166(a) (2021). Therefore, according to Defendant, it was
erroneous for the jury to convict him of AWDWIKISI, an intentional crime, and to
also find that he crashed into Victim, because a “crash” is unintentional. We disagree
with Defendant.
The meaning of “crash” requires us to interpret section 20-166. See id. In
statutory interpretation, “[w]e take the statute as we find it.” Anderson v. Wilson,
289 U.S. 20, 27, 53 S. Ct. 417, 420, 77 L. Ed. 1004, 1010 (1933). This is because “a
law is the best expositor of itself.” Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33, 52, 2 L.
Ed. 199, 205 (1804). And when a statute “contains a definition of a word used therein,
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that definition controls, however contrary to the ordinary meaning of the word it may
be.” In re Clayton-Marcus Co., 286 N.C. 215, 219, 210 S.E.2d 199, 203 (1974).
Under subsection 20-166(a), it is a felony for a driver of a vehicle “involved in
a crash” that causes serious bodily injury to leave the scene of the crash. See N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 20-166(a). A “crash” is “[a]ny event that results in injury or property
damage attributable directly to the motion of a motor vehicle or its load. The terms
collision, accident, and crash and their cognates are synonymous.” Id. § 20-4.01(4c).
The General Assembly has not defined “any,” so it keeps its ordinary meaning:
comprehensive. See id.; Reg’l Acceptance Corp. v. Powers, 327 N.C. 274, 278, 394
S.E.2d 147, 149 (1990) (“Where words of a statute are not defined, the courts presume
that the legislature intended to give them their ordinary meaning determined
according to the context in which those words are ordinarily used.”); Midrex Techs.,
Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 369 N.C. 250, 258, 794 S.E.2d 785, 792 (2016) (stating
that we look to dictionaries to discern a word’s common meaning); Any, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (defining “any” as “one or some
indiscriminately of whatever kind”).
Here, Defendant’s car caused Victim’s injuries. The only dispute is about the
relevance of Defendant’s intent while driving his car. The statutory definition is
clear: A crash is “[a]ny event that results in injury or property damage attributable
directly to the motion of a motor vehicle or its load.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-4.01(4c).
The General Assembly chose not to discriminate between intended events and
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unintended events; therefore, so long as there is injury caused by a motor vehicle—
intent is irrelevant. See id; MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra.
Defendant argues to the contrary. He asserts that because the General
Assembly equates crashes to accidents, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-4.01(4c), crashes must
be unintentional. In other words, Defendant argues that because accidents are
unintentional, crashes must be unintentional, too.
The General Assembly, however, defined crash—then equated accident to
crash. See id. Whether the equation complies with the common understanding of
accident is irrelevant because when a statute “contains a definition of a word used
therein, that definition controls, however contrary to the ordinary meaning of the
word it may be.” See In re Clayton-Marcus Co., 286 N.C. at 219, 210 S.E.2d at 203
(emphasis added). So when the General Assembly equated accident to crash, it gave
accident the same legislative definition as crash, despite the commonly understood
meaning of accident. See id. at 219, 210 S.E.2d at 203.
Accordingly, crash means “[a]ny event that results in injury or property
damage attributable directly to the motion of a motor vehicle or its load”—regardless
of intent. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-4.01(4c).
Defendant also asserts that the rule of lenity requires us to read crash more
narrowly. Again, we disagree.
The rule of lenity “forbids a court to interpret a statute so as to increase the
penalty that it places on an individual when the Legislature has not clearly stated
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such an intention.” State v. Boykin, 78 N.C. App. 572, 577, 337 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1985).
But “[t]he rule of lenity only applies when the applicable criminal statute is
ambiguous.” State v. Cates, 154 N.C. App. 737, 740, 573 S.E.2d 208, 2010 (2002).
Indeed, the “rule comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what
[the legislature] has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration
of being lenient to wrongdoers.” Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596, 81 S.
Ct. 321, 326, 5 L. Ed. 2d 312, 319 (1961).
As detailed above, section 20-166 is clear; therefore, the rule of lenity does not
apply. See Cates, 154 N.C. App. at 740, 573 S.E.2d at 210; Callanan, 364 U.S. at 596,
81 S. Ct. at 326, 5 L. Ed. 2d at 319. The trial court did not err by declining to arrest
Defendant’s felony hit-and-run judgment because a driver’s intent is irrelevant
concerning “crash.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166(a). Accordingly, there was no fatal
error requiring the trial court to arrest Defendant’s judgment. See Perry, 291 N.C. at
589, 231 S.E.2d at 265.
2. AWDWIKISI
Standing on his misconception of “crash,” Defendant asserts that if the trial
court did not err by declining to arrest his felony hit-and-run judgment, the trial court
must have erred in failing to arrest his AWDWIKISI judgment. We disagree.
“Any person who assaults another person with a deadly weapon with intent to
kill and inflicts serious injury” is guilty of AWDWIKISI. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32(a)
(2021).
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Unlike his felony hit-and-run judgment, Defendant failed to move the trial
court to arrest his AWDWIKISI judgment. And generally,“[i]n order to preserve an
issue for appellate review, the appellant must have raised that specific issue before
the trial court to allow it to make a ruling on that issue.” Regions Bank v. Baxley
Com. Props., LLC, 206 N.C. App. 293, 298–99, 697 S.E.2d 417, 421 (2010) (citing N.C.
R. App. P. 10(b)(1)).
In criminal cases, certain unpreserved issues qualify for “plain error” review,
but issues regarding arresting judgments do not. See State v. Gregory, 342 N.C. 580,
584, 467 S.E.2d 28, 31 (1996) (citing State v. Sierra, 335 N.C. 753, 761, 440 S.E.2d
791, 796 (1994)) (noting that we “review unpreserved issues for plain error when they
involve either (1) errors in the judge’s instructions to the jury, or (2) rulings on the
admissibility of evidence”). Accordingly, we need not review Defendant’s motion-to-
arrest argument concerning his AWDWIKISI judgment because his argument is
unpreserved and does not involve jury instructions or admissibility of evidence. See
id.
Defendant, however, asks us to use Rule 2 to address his AWDWIKISI
argument. See N.C. R. App. P. 2. Under Rule 2, we may “suspend or vary the
requirements or provisions of” our Rules of Appellate Procedure. See id. But we only
invoke Rule 2 “to consider, in exceptional circumstances, significant issues of
importance in the public interest or to prevent injustice which appears manifest to
the Court and only in such instances.” Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 66, 511
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S.E.2d 298, 299–300 (1999) (citing Blumenthal v. Lynch, 315 N.C. 571, 578, 340
S.E.2d 358, 362 (1986)).
Here, as detailed above, Defendant’s intent argument fails: Convictions of
AWDWIKISI and felony hit and run with serious injury are not mutually exclusive
because assault is intentional, and a “crash” can also be intentional. See N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 14-32(a), 20-4.01(4c), 20-166(a). This case is not the “exceptional
circumstance” required to invoke Rule 2. See Steingress, 350 N.C. at 66, 511 S.E.2d
at 299–300. Therefore, we dismiss Defendant’s motion-to-arrest argument
concerning his AWDWIKISI conviction.
B. Motions to Dismiss Charges
Next, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motions to
dismiss. We review a denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. State v. Smith, 186 N.C.
App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). And under a de novo review, this Court
“‘considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment’ for that of the
lower tribunal.” Williams, 362 N.C. at 632–33, 669 S.E.2d at 294 (quoting In re
Greens of Pine Glen, Ltd. P’ship, 356 N.C. at 647, 576 S.E.2d at 319).
“Upon defendant’s motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether
there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or
of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of
such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373,
378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000) (quoting State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d
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914, 918 (1993)). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71,
78, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980).
In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence concerning a motion to dismiss,
the evidence must be considered “in the light most favorable to the State; the State
is entitled to every reasonable intendment and every reasonable inference to be
drawn therefrom . . . .” State v. Winkler, 368 N.C. 572, 574–75, 780 S.E.2d 824, 826
(2015) (quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)). In other
words, if the record developed at trial contains “substantial evidence, whether direct
or circumstantial, or a combination, ‘to support a finding that the offense charged has
been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the
motion to dismiss should be denied.’” Id. at 575, 780 S.E.2d at 826 (quoting State v.
Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 383 (1988)).
Defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence concerning every
element of felony hit and run with serious injury. Rather, Defendant echoes his
motion-to-arrest argument: That the second element of felony hit and run with
serious injury is not satisfied because “the event would not qualify as a ‘crash’ under
section 20-166.”
Felony hit and run with serious injury requires the State to prove that:
(1) Defendant was driving a vehicle; (2) Defendant knew or
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reasonably should have known that the vehicle was involved in a crash; (3) Defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the crash resulted in serious bodily injury to or the death of another; (4) Defendant did not immediately stop his vehicle at the scene of the crash; and (5) Defendant’s failure to stop was willful.
State v. Gibson, 276 N.C. App. 230, 240, 855 S.E.2d 533, 540 (2021) (citing N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 20-166(a)).
As detailed above, Defendant’s act qualifies as a crash. Further, the State
satisfied the second element of felony hit-and-run by offering testimony that
Defendant intentionally pursued and struck Victim with his car. See id. at 240, 855
S.E.2d at 540. Trial testimony about this event is substantial evidence because it is
such “relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion” that Defendant intentionally hit Victim with his car. See Smith, 300 N.C.
at 78, 265 S.E.2d at 169.
Concerning the remaining felony hit-and-run elements, “[i]t is well-settled that
arguments not presented in an appellant’s brief are deemed abandoned on appeal.”
Davignon v. Davignon, 245 N.C. App. 358, 361, 782 S.E.2d 391, 394 (2016) (citing
N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6)); State v. Evans, 251 N.C. App. 610, 625, 795 S.E.2d 444, 455
(2017) (deeming an argument abandoned because the appellant did “not set forth any
legal argument or citation to authority”). Because Defendant makes no argument
concerning the sufficiency of evidence supporting the other elements of felony hit and
run, all such arguments are abandoned. See Davignon, 245 N.C. App. at 361, 782
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S.E.2d at 394. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to
dismiss his felony hit-and-run charge. See Fritsch, 351 N.C. at 378, 526 S.E.2d at
455.
Again, Defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence concerning
every element of AWDWIKISI. Defendant merely stands on his same motion-to-
arrest argument. He argues that if he committed felony hit and run with serious
injury, he could not have committed AWDWIKISI. We disagree.
AWDWIKISI requires: “(1) [a]n assault, (2) with a deadly weapon, (3) with
intent to kill, (4) inflicting serious injury, (5) not resulting in death.” State v.
Meadows, 272 N.C. 327, 331, 158 S.E.2d 638, 640 (1968) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
32).
As explained above, AWDWIKISI and felony hit and run with serious injury
are not mutually exclusive. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-32(a), 20-4.01(4c), 20-166(a).
The State satisfied the assault prong of AWDWIKISI by offering testimony that
Defendant purposefully pursued Victim and hit him with his car. See Meadows, 272
N.C. at 331, 158 S.E.2d at 640. Trial testimony about this event is substantial
evidence because it is such “relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion” that Defendant intentionally hit Victim with his
car. See Smith, 300 N.C. at 78, 265 S.E.2d at 169.
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Because this is the only argument offered by Defendant, we will not address
the remaining elements of AWDWIKISI. See Davignon, 245 N.C. App. at 361, 782
S.E.2d at 394. Thus, we discern no error concerning the trial court’s denial to dismiss
Defendant’s AWDWIKISI charge. See Fritsch, 351 N.C. at 378, 526 S.E.2d at 455.
C. Jury Instructions
Next, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by giving jury instructions
on felony hit and run and AWDWIKISI because it is impossible to be convicted of both
crimes. We disagree.
Defendant did not object to the trial court’s jury instructions, so he failed to
preserve his jury-instruction argument for appeal. See Regions Bank, 206 N.C. App.
at 298–99, 697 S.E.2d at 421. But because this issue involves jury instructions in a
criminal case, we will review for plain error. See Gregory, 342 N.C. at 584, 467 S.E.2d
at 31.
To find plain error, this Court must first determine that an error occurred at
trial. See State v. Towe, 366 N.C. 56, 62, 732 S.E.2d 564, 568 (2012). Second,
Defendant must demonstrate the error was “fundamental,” which means the error
probably caused a guilty verdict and “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 764, 767
S.E.2d 312, 320–21 (2015) (quoting State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518–19, 723
S.E.2d 326, 334–35 (2012)). Notably, the “plain error rule . . . is always to be applied
cautiously and only in the exceptional case . . . .” State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660,
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300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002
(4th Cir. 1982)).
Concerning jury instructions, the trial court must accurately “instruct the jury
on the law applicable to the substantive features of the case arising on the evidence.”
State v. Robbins, 309 N.C. 771, 776, 309 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1983).
Once again, AWDWIKISI and felony hit and run with serious injury are not
mutually exclusive. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-32(a), 20-4.01(4c), 20-166(a).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in giving jury instructions on both and allowing
the jury to convict Defendant of both. See Robbins, 309 N.C. at 776, 309 S.E.2d at
191. Because the trial court did not err, it certainly did not plainly err. See Towe,
366 N.C. at 62, 732 S.E.2d at 568.
D. Clerical Error
Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court erred because the second
judgment contains a clerical error. We agree.
When we discern a clerical error in a judgment, we remand so the trial court
can comply with its “duty to make its records speak the truth.” State v. Linemann,
135 N.C. App. 734, 738, 522 S.E.2d 781, 784 (1999) (quoting State v. Cannon, 244
N.C. 399, 403, 94 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1956)). A clerical correction on remand “does not
constitute a new conviction or judgment.” Id. at 738, 522 S.E.2d at 784.
Here, the second judgment noted that the jury found Defendant guilty of
subsection “20-166(E),” rather than the appropriate subsection, (a). See N.C. Gen.
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Stat. § 20-166(a). Therefore, we remand for the trial court to correct the judgment to
show a conviction under subsection 20-166(a). See id.; Linemann, 135 N.C. App. at
738, 522 S.E.2d at 784.
V. Conclusion
We conclude that the trial court did not err by declining to arrest Defendant’s
judgments, declining to grant his motions to dismiss, or by instructing the jury on
both felony hit and run with serious injury and AWDWIKISI. But the trial court did
commit a clerical error in its felony hit-and-run judgment. Accordingly, we remand
only for the trial court to correct the clerical error.
REMANDED.
Judges HAMPSON and GORE concur.
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