[206]*206GRABER, J.
Defendant appeals his conviction for manufacturing a controlled substance, ORS 475.992(1), and challenges the denial of a motion to suppress his statements and evidence seized from his vehicle. He argues that the statements and evidence resulted from an unlawful stop and that he did not receive necessary Miranda warnings. We affirm.
Lane County Sheriffs officers began surveillance of a heavily wooded section of BLM property after noticing several plots of marijuana plants during an aerial observation. No one came into the area during the first day and a half of surveillance. On the second day, defendant’s truck came up the dead end gravel road and stopped. An officer hiding nearby saw defendant get out of the truck and enter the woods in the direction of the marijuana plants.1
Defendant emerged from the woods about an hour and 15 minutes later, went to his pickup, and then reentered the woods. The officer could see an implement hanging from defendant’s belt that he described as “a pair of clippers or some other tool.” Defendant returned to his truck approximately 45 minutes later and drove toward the highway. Officer Purdue, who was in a car with another officer and who had received radio reports from the hidden officer, stopped defendant’s truck when it reentered the highway. Purdue told defendant that he wanted to discuss his activities in the area and to show him that a trailer hitch was partially blocking his truck’s license plate. Both men walked to the rear of the truck to look at the hitch and the license plate.
Defendant handed his driver’s license to Purdue on request. At about that time, Officer Jenkins arrived; he took defendant’s license and ran a record check by radio. Purdue and the other officer left shortly after completing the record check, after which Jenkins was the only officer present. Jenkins told defendant about the surveillance of the marijuana plants and asked him if he would mind talking to him. Defendant said no, that he had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong.
[207]*207At first, defendant responded that he was in the woods looking for animal tracks and had no knowledge of any marijuana plants. After further discussion, he told Jenkins that he had found the marijuana and had contemplated stealing it, but decided not to. Defendant ultimately admitted that the marijuana plants were his. Jenkins searched defendant’s truck, with defendant’s consent, and seized two machetes. Defendant was not arrested or given a citation but was allowed to leave.
The entire encounter lasted approximately 30 minutes. Defendant testified that he repeatedly asked Jenkins whether he was under arrest and that Jenkins told him that he was not. Part of the conversation took place at the rear of defendant’s pickup, where he and the officer had gone to inspect the license plate. At some point, Jenkins asked defendant if they could continue the discussion in his vehicle, because he could not hear defendant over the road noise. Defendant agreed. Jenkins told him that “[b]ecause you are in my truck doesn’t mean you’re arrested.” Jenkins testified that he returned defendant’s driver’s license some time during the conversation, but defendant testified that it was not returned until he was expressly allowed to leave.
Defendant was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance. He moved to suppress all the evidence and argued that the initial stop was unlawful, that the inquiry after the stop was unreasonable, and that his consent to search was not voluntary. The court denied the motion. Defendant was convicted by a jury.
On appeal, defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. He first renews his challenge to the initial stop. ORS 131.615.2 He argues that the officers lacked a [208]*208“reasonable suspicion”3 that he had committed a crime. In determining whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion, we use an “objective test of observable facts.” State v. Valdez, 277 Or 621, 629, 561 P2d 1006 (1977). Defendant was the only person seen during the two-day surveillance. He was in the vicinity of the plants for approximately t\yo hours and carried a tool that looked like clippers. Those facts were sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that he was cultivating the marijuana.
Defendant next contends that neither officer gave him Miranda warnings; therefore, the incriminating statements should be suppressed.4 The state does not dispute the absence of Miranda warnings but contends that they were not required.
Defendant argues that Miranda warnings are required under Article I, section 12,5 and that the Oregon Constitution provides him more protection than the federal constitution in this case. The Supreme Court has told us, although somewhat cryptically, that Article I, section 12, requires Miranda warnings; however, that provision did not require warnings here.
In State v. Smith, 301 Or 681, 725 P2d 894 (1986), the plurality opinion of the Supreme Court concluded that Miranda warnings are not necessary under the state constitution. A fourth judge concurred in the result, but concluded that warnings are warranted under Article I, section 12, when a defendant is in “full custody.” 301 Or at 701-02 (Jones, J., concurring).
In State v. Magee, 304 Or 261, 744 P2d 250 (1987), the [209]*209Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction, because he had not received Miranda warnings. After discussing some of the federal cases on the subject, the court said:
“We need not decide the multifarious cases that arise in the state courts by matching their facts with those in the few cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. This is a needlessly speculative and ultimately wasteful exercise at least when Oregon law furnishes an independent basis of decision. * * * It does so in this case.” 304 Or at 266. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
The “independent basis of decision,” in context, is Article I, section 12. Four judges joined the majority. Three concurring judges would have held that Article I, section 12, does not require warnings. 304 Or at 266-67 (Carson, J., concurring). The result in Magee makes no sense except as a rejection of the views of the plurality in Smith. .
State v. Vu, 307 Or 419, 425, 770 P2d 577 (1989), cites State v. Magee, supra, as the only pertinent case under the heading: “Failure to Give Miranda Warnings * * * Under the Oregon Constitution.” The court’s brief discussion assumes that the Oregon Constitution requires warnings:
“We allowed review in this case primarily to determine, under the Oregon Constitution, the admissibility for impeachment purposes of a defendant’s statement once the statement had been suppressed because of a failure to give Miranda warnings. We do not reach that issue.” 307 Or at 425. (Emphasis supplied.)
That passage confirms that Article I, section 12, requires warnings — under some circumstances.
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[206]*206GRABER, J.
Defendant appeals his conviction for manufacturing a controlled substance, ORS 475.992(1), and challenges the denial of a motion to suppress his statements and evidence seized from his vehicle. He argues that the statements and evidence resulted from an unlawful stop and that he did not receive necessary Miranda warnings. We affirm.
Lane County Sheriffs officers began surveillance of a heavily wooded section of BLM property after noticing several plots of marijuana plants during an aerial observation. No one came into the area during the first day and a half of surveillance. On the second day, defendant’s truck came up the dead end gravel road and stopped. An officer hiding nearby saw defendant get out of the truck and enter the woods in the direction of the marijuana plants.1
Defendant emerged from the woods about an hour and 15 minutes later, went to his pickup, and then reentered the woods. The officer could see an implement hanging from defendant’s belt that he described as “a pair of clippers or some other tool.” Defendant returned to his truck approximately 45 minutes later and drove toward the highway. Officer Purdue, who was in a car with another officer and who had received radio reports from the hidden officer, stopped defendant’s truck when it reentered the highway. Purdue told defendant that he wanted to discuss his activities in the area and to show him that a trailer hitch was partially blocking his truck’s license plate. Both men walked to the rear of the truck to look at the hitch and the license plate.
Defendant handed his driver’s license to Purdue on request. At about that time, Officer Jenkins arrived; he took defendant’s license and ran a record check by radio. Purdue and the other officer left shortly after completing the record check, after which Jenkins was the only officer present. Jenkins told defendant about the surveillance of the marijuana plants and asked him if he would mind talking to him. Defendant said no, that he had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong.
[207]*207At first, defendant responded that he was in the woods looking for animal tracks and had no knowledge of any marijuana plants. After further discussion, he told Jenkins that he had found the marijuana and had contemplated stealing it, but decided not to. Defendant ultimately admitted that the marijuana plants were his. Jenkins searched defendant’s truck, with defendant’s consent, and seized two machetes. Defendant was not arrested or given a citation but was allowed to leave.
The entire encounter lasted approximately 30 minutes. Defendant testified that he repeatedly asked Jenkins whether he was under arrest and that Jenkins told him that he was not. Part of the conversation took place at the rear of defendant’s pickup, where he and the officer had gone to inspect the license plate. At some point, Jenkins asked defendant if they could continue the discussion in his vehicle, because he could not hear defendant over the road noise. Defendant agreed. Jenkins told him that “[b]ecause you are in my truck doesn’t mean you’re arrested.” Jenkins testified that he returned defendant’s driver’s license some time during the conversation, but defendant testified that it was not returned until he was expressly allowed to leave.
Defendant was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance. He moved to suppress all the evidence and argued that the initial stop was unlawful, that the inquiry after the stop was unreasonable, and that his consent to search was not voluntary. The court denied the motion. Defendant was convicted by a jury.
On appeal, defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. He first renews his challenge to the initial stop. ORS 131.615.2 He argues that the officers lacked a [208]*208“reasonable suspicion”3 that he had committed a crime. In determining whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion, we use an “objective test of observable facts.” State v. Valdez, 277 Or 621, 629, 561 P2d 1006 (1977). Defendant was the only person seen during the two-day surveillance. He was in the vicinity of the plants for approximately t\yo hours and carried a tool that looked like clippers. Those facts were sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that he was cultivating the marijuana.
Defendant next contends that neither officer gave him Miranda warnings; therefore, the incriminating statements should be suppressed.4 The state does not dispute the absence of Miranda warnings but contends that they were not required.
Defendant argues that Miranda warnings are required under Article I, section 12,5 and that the Oregon Constitution provides him more protection than the federal constitution in this case. The Supreme Court has told us, although somewhat cryptically, that Article I, section 12, requires Miranda warnings; however, that provision did not require warnings here.
In State v. Smith, 301 Or 681, 725 P2d 894 (1986), the plurality opinion of the Supreme Court concluded that Miranda warnings are not necessary under the state constitution. A fourth judge concurred in the result, but concluded that warnings are warranted under Article I, section 12, when a defendant is in “full custody.” 301 Or at 701-02 (Jones, J., concurring).
In State v. Magee, 304 Or 261, 744 P2d 250 (1987), the [209]*209Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction, because he had not received Miranda warnings. After discussing some of the federal cases on the subject, the court said:
“We need not decide the multifarious cases that arise in the state courts by matching their facts with those in the few cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. This is a needlessly speculative and ultimately wasteful exercise at least when Oregon law furnishes an independent basis of decision. * * * It does so in this case.” 304 Or at 266. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
The “independent basis of decision,” in context, is Article I, section 12. Four judges joined the majority. Three concurring judges would have held that Article I, section 12, does not require warnings. 304 Or at 266-67 (Carson, J., concurring). The result in Magee makes no sense except as a rejection of the views of the plurality in Smith. .
State v. Vu, 307 Or 419, 425, 770 P2d 577 (1989), cites State v. Magee, supra, as the only pertinent case under the heading: “Failure to Give Miranda Warnings * * * Under the Oregon Constitution.” The court’s brief discussion assumes that the Oregon Constitution requires warnings:
“We allowed review in this case primarily to determine, under the Oregon Constitution, the admissibility for impeachment purposes of a defendant’s statement once the statement had been suppressed because of a failure to give Miranda warnings. We do not reach that issue.” 307 Or at 425. (Emphasis supplied.)
That passage confirms that Article I, section 12, requires warnings — under some circumstances.
Defendant asserts, and the dissent agrees, that State v. Magee, supra, provides a new standard for determining when the police are required by Article I, section 12, to give a person Miranda warnings before questioning: when the situation involves “compelling” conditions. He derives that argument from the Supreme Court’s discussion of “full custody” in Magee:
“We asked the parties to discuss the term ‘full custody’ as a concept that might be applicable to this case, and they helpfully did so. * * * The concept of ‘full custody’ is important and useful in the sense that it informs officers of a point at which no further question about the need to warn a detained person [210]*210arises; the term describes a sufficient but not a necessary condition. Its usefulness ends when it shifts attention away from the effect of questioning in another form or setting that judges would and officers should recognize to be ‘compelling’ to a debate whether the setting meets a judicial concept of ‘full custody.’ ” 304 Or at 265.
However, the discussion about “compelling” conditions is dictum, because the court held that
“[w]hen this defendant was told by an officer investigating assault charges that he could not leave the police station because he was involved in the fight, this constituted ‘custody’ adequate to require a warning before questioning.” 304 Or at 266.
The concurrence also recognized that the defendant was in custody within the meaning of the federal cases. 307 Or at 267 (Carson, J., concurring).
The last quoted passage did not establish a new standard for when the Oregon Constitution requires warnings. Read in context, the court was describing that “level of custody” which gives rise to warnings and explaining how it derived a requirement that the police give Miranda warnings to a person who is in custody from the words of Article I, section 12, which prohibits “compelled” testimony. However, the court’s analysis still focused on whether the situation involved custodial interrogation in determining that the police should have given the defendant warnings before questioning him. State v. Magee, supra, 304 Or at 266.
The court later confirmed that State v. Magee, supra, did not eliminate the requirement of “custody.” The opinion in State v. Vu, supra, assumes that warnings are required only when a defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation:
“Whatever may have been the status of defendant at the time he responded to the officer’s question, it did not rise to the level of custody requiring Miranda warnings.” 307 Or at 425. (Emphasis supplied.)
We next must decide what the court meant by “the level of custody requiring Miranda warnings.” State v. Vu, supra, 307 Or at 425. The court has described the concept of “full custody” this way:
[211]*211“The concept obviously includes extended official detention in a cell or another enclosure, with or without booking or deprivation of personal belongings. But an enclosure is not essential; one would hardly dispute that a person handcuffed on the street or in his own home is in ‘full custody.’ ” State v. Magee, supra, 304 Or at 265.
See also State v. Smith, supra, 301 Or at 702 (Jones, J., concurring). That view is similar to the test for determining when a person is in “custody” under federal law, which is
“whether ‘a reasonable person in defendant’s situation would have understood himself [under the totality of the circumstances] to be in custody or under restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest.’ ” State v. Sadler, 85 Or App 134, 735 P2d 1267, modified on reconsideration 86 Or App 152, 154, 738 P2d 601 (1987), citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420, 441-42, 104 S Ct 3138, 82 L Ed 2d 317 (1984).
That test is a useful starting point for determining whether Article I, section 12, requires the police to give warnings in a particular situation.
The facts in State v. Vu, supra, and State v. Magee, supra, are also instructive. In Vu, after approaching the car and while checking the defendant’s license, the officer “received additional radio information identifying the vehicle used in connection with [a] shooting and an Asian male as driver of the vehicle.” 307 Or at 421. That information changed what had begun as an ordinary traffic stop into a stop based on the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed a crime. He then asked the defendant if he knew anything about “a problem” at the scene of the shooting; the defendant answered, “No.” 307 Or at 421. Immediately before or after asking that question, the officer told the defendant to place his hands on the steering wheel. 307 Or at 422 n 2. Notwithstanding the stop, the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed a crime, and the question about the shooting, the court held that the defendant’s status “did not rise to the level of custody” requiring warnings under Article I, section 12. 307 Or at 425.6 In contrast, in Magee, the [212]*212defendant was at the police station and was told that he was not free to leave. Before being questioned, he was placed in a separate room and was told to take a seat. 304 Or at 263.
Here, up to three officers were present during the period that they detained defendant, the officers did not immediately return defendant’s identification to him, the stop occurred at a remote location, and some of the questioning took place in an officer’s truck. On the other hand, the stop occurred along a public road, defendant consented to continue the questioning in the officer’s truck, only one officer was present during that questioning, the entire encounter lasted only about 30 minutes, the officers told defendant several times that he was not under arrest, and they never handcuffed him or suggested that he could riot leave. In fact, the officer allowed defendant to leave after questioning him. The questioning was not so prolonged, pressured, or police-dominated as to become tantamount to an arrest.7 Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in defendant’s situation would not have understood himself to be in custody or under restraints comparable to those associated with formal arrest. Therefore, the officers did not violate Article I, section 12, by failing to give defendant Miranda warnings before questioning him.
Defendant makes a passing claim that warnings were required under the Fifth Amendment. Federal law requires Miranda warnings when a person is subjected to “custodial interrogation.” Here, defendant was not in custody under federal staridards. Berkemer v. McCarty, supra; see also United States v. Quinn, 815 F2d 153 (1st Cir 1987).
Affirmed.