Walker, J.,
after stating tbe ease: There is but a single point for us to decide in this case, and that is whether there is any evidence, even a scintilla, of the prisoner’s guilt. This is sometimes, and, we may say, quite often, a difficult question to answer, the difference between some evidence, though slight, and no evidence, requiring in many instances very fine discrimination. "We may say with certainty that evidence which merely shows it possible for the fact in issue to be as alleged, or which raises a mere conjecture that it is so, is an insufficient foundation for a verdict, and should not be left to the jury.
S. v. Vinson,
68 N. C., 335;
Brown v. Emsey,
81 N. C., 245;
S. v. Christmas,
101 N. C., 749;
S. v. Costner,
127 N. C., 566;
S. v. Lytle,
117 N. C., 799;
S. v. Carmon,
145 N. C., 481;
S. v. Walker,
149 N. C., 527. We said in
Byrd v. Express Co.,
139 N. C., 276: “Judges are no longer required to submit a case to the jury merely because some evidence has been introduced by the party having the burden of proof, unless the evidence be of such a character as that it would warrant the jury to proceed in finding a verdict in favor of the party introducing such evidence.
Cobb v. Fogalman,
23 N. C., 440;
Wittkowsky v. Wasson,
71 N. C., 451;
Sutton v. Madre,
47 N. C., 320;
Pettiford v. Mayo,
117 N. C., 27;
Lewis v. Steamship Co.,
132 N. C., 904. In the last cited case the subject is fully discussed by
Connor, J.,
and the cases collected. It all comes to this, that there must be legal evidence of the fact in issue and not merely such as raises a suspicion or conjecture in regard to -it. The plaintiff must do' more than show the possible liability of the defendant for the injury. He must go further and offer at least some evidence which reasonably tends to prove every fact essential to his success.” So it was held in
Campbell v. Everhart,
139 N. C., 503, 516: “The sufficiency of evidence in law to- go to the jury does not depend upon the doctrine of chances. However confidently one, in his own affairs, may base his judgment on mere probability as to a past event, when he assumes the burden of establishing such event as a proposition of fact and as a basis for the judgment of a court, he must adduce evidence other than a majority of chances that the fact to be proved does exist. It must be more than sufficient for a mere guess, and must be such as tends to actual proof. But the province of the jury should not be invaded in any case, and when reasonable minds, acting within the limitations prescribed by the rules of law, might reach different conclusions, the evidence must be submitted to the jury,” citing authorities. It will not do, -it is conceded, to convict any man of a crime upon mere conjecture, or even the strongest suspicion, if it does not rise to the dignity and certainty of legal proof which excludes all reasonable doubt of his guilt. But we are not embarrassed in this case by the necessity of resorting to nice refinement in our reasoning, or
any fine-spun distinction between wbat .is
some
and wbat is
no
evidence, for tbe facts and circumstances bere do not approach tbe border line separating tbe one from tbe other.
Where there is no direct proof of tbe commission of tbe criminal act by tbe prisoner, and we must have recourse to circumstantial evidence, it is proper to consider tbe motive to do tbe act, if be bad it, as one of tbe links in tbe chain of proof. This was decided in
S. v. Addons,
138 N. C., 688, 697, in this language: “When tbe evidence is circumstantial, the proof of a motive for committing tbe crime is relevant, and sometimes is important and very potential, as it may carry conviction to the minds of tbe jurors, when otherwise they would not be convinced. This is all that is meant by tbe Court in tbe cases cited by counsel.
S. v. Green,
92 N. C., 779. Murder may be committed without any motive. It is tbe intention deliberately formed, after premeditation, so that it becomes a definite purpose to kill, and a consequent killing without legal provocation or excuse, that constitutes murder in the first degree. Tbe existence of a motive may be evidence to show tbe degree of tbe offense, or to establish tbe identity of tbe defendant as tbe slayer, but motive is not an essential element of tbe crime, nor is it indispensable to a conviction of tbe person charged with its commission.” Citing
S. v. Wilcox,
132 N. C., 1143;
S. v. Adams,
136 N. C., 620. The prisoner bad tbe motive to commit this crime, because be so declared himself. Tbe deceased had been bis paramour; be was infatuated with her and jealous of her husband. She bad frequently been bis companion and was seen with him by tbe neighbors. He was with her shortly before she -disappeared to be seen alive no more. Tbe evidence fairly warrants tbe inference that be was tbe last person who was with her just before her death. A few days after she was last seen on Sunday, 2 January, or Monday, 3 January, 1916, be inquired of Fannie Eullebrew where Easter Grimes was, and when she replied that she did not know, and asked him if be knew, be, at first, said, “No,” but immediately corrected himself and then' admitted that be was joking when he said “No,” and that be did know, but would not tell her, lest she might tell it to some one else. Tbe. jury -might well conclude from this admission that be knew where she was, and, if so, that be knew she was then dead and where her body lay. If this be-true, and be bad knowledge then of her death, which was a violent one, it would not be unreasonable or unsafe to infer that be was present when she was killed. But this is not by any means all of tbe evidence pointing to tbe prisoner as her slayer. He treated this serious matter with some levity, and talked a great deal in a light vein. This may have been merely characteristic of his race, or idle and frivolous talk; but it is not inconsistent with the cold-heartedness and manifest indifference with which be bad
threatened her life if slie dare return to ber husband at Rocky Mount. In tbis connection bis last words to Fannie Killebrew after talking about tbe shoes are significant: “Don’t you know, I almost forsaken my wife for
that
woman ? I would suffer in bell before I would let ber go back to Her husband. "When you bear she is dead, you will know damned well who did it.” He bad given ber tbe shoes as bis mistress, and was determined, and so warned ber, that she should not attempt a return to ber husband, where she belonged, except at the cost of her life. All this means that if she started back to Rocky Mount, where her husband lived, he would kill ber first and then pull the shoes from her feet, and that is what was done. She was on her way back to ber husband and had gone one mile or more when be executed bis threat by killing her, dragging her'body into the woods, and then taking her shoes off and dropping one of them neax where her body lay.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Walker, J.,
after stating tbe ease: There is but a single point for us to decide in this case, and that is whether there is any evidence, even a scintilla, of the prisoner’s guilt. This is sometimes, and, we may say, quite often, a difficult question to answer, the difference between some evidence, though slight, and no evidence, requiring in many instances very fine discrimination. "We may say with certainty that evidence which merely shows it possible for the fact in issue to be as alleged, or which raises a mere conjecture that it is so, is an insufficient foundation for a verdict, and should not be left to the jury.
S. v. Vinson,
68 N. C., 335;
Brown v. Emsey,
81 N. C., 245;
S. v. Christmas,
101 N. C., 749;
S. v. Costner,
127 N. C., 566;
S. v. Lytle,
117 N. C., 799;
S. v. Carmon,
145 N. C., 481;
S. v. Walker,
149 N. C., 527. We said in
Byrd v. Express Co.,
139 N. C., 276: “Judges are no longer required to submit a case to the jury merely because some evidence has been introduced by the party having the burden of proof, unless the evidence be of such a character as that it would warrant the jury to proceed in finding a verdict in favor of the party introducing such evidence.
Cobb v. Fogalman,
23 N. C., 440;
Wittkowsky v. Wasson,
71 N. C., 451;
Sutton v. Madre,
47 N. C., 320;
Pettiford v. Mayo,
117 N. C., 27;
Lewis v. Steamship Co.,
132 N. C., 904. In the last cited case the subject is fully discussed by
Connor, J.,
and the cases collected. It all comes to this, that there must be legal evidence of the fact in issue and not merely such as raises a suspicion or conjecture in regard to -it. The plaintiff must do' more than show the possible liability of the defendant for the injury. He must go further and offer at least some evidence which reasonably tends to prove every fact essential to his success.” So it was held in
Campbell v. Everhart,
139 N. C., 503, 516: “The sufficiency of evidence in law to- go to the jury does not depend upon the doctrine of chances. However confidently one, in his own affairs, may base his judgment on mere probability as to a past event, when he assumes the burden of establishing such event as a proposition of fact and as a basis for the judgment of a court, he must adduce evidence other than a majority of chances that the fact to be proved does exist. It must be more than sufficient for a mere guess, and must be such as tends to actual proof. But the province of the jury should not be invaded in any case, and when reasonable minds, acting within the limitations prescribed by the rules of law, might reach different conclusions, the evidence must be submitted to the jury,” citing authorities. It will not do, -it is conceded, to convict any man of a crime upon mere conjecture, or even the strongest suspicion, if it does not rise to the dignity and certainty of legal proof which excludes all reasonable doubt of his guilt. But we are not embarrassed in this case by the necessity of resorting to nice refinement in our reasoning, or
any fine-spun distinction between wbat .is
some
and wbat is
no
evidence, for tbe facts and circumstances bere do not approach tbe border line separating tbe one from tbe other.
Where there is no direct proof of tbe commission of tbe criminal act by tbe prisoner, and we must have recourse to circumstantial evidence, it is proper to consider tbe motive to do tbe act, if be bad it, as one of tbe links in tbe chain of proof. This was decided in
S. v. Addons,
138 N. C., 688, 697, in this language: “When tbe evidence is circumstantial, the proof of a motive for committing tbe crime is relevant, and sometimes is important and very potential, as it may carry conviction to the minds of tbe jurors, when otherwise they would not be convinced. This is all that is meant by tbe Court in tbe cases cited by counsel.
S. v. Green,
92 N. C., 779. Murder may be committed without any motive. It is tbe intention deliberately formed, after premeditation, so that it becomes a definite purpose to kill, and a consequent killing without legal provocation or excuse, that constitutes murder in the first degree. Tbe existence of a motive may be evidence to show tbe degree of tbe offense, or to establish tbe identity of tbe defendant as tbe slayer, but motive is not an essential element of tbe crime, nor is it indispensable to a conviction of tbe person charged with its commission.” Citing
S. v. Wilcox,
132 N. C., 1143;
S. v. Adams,
136 N. C., 620. The prisoner bad tbe motive to commit this crime, because be so declared himself. Tbe deceased had been bis paramour; be was infatuated with her and jealous of her husband. She bad frequently been bis companion and was seen with him by tbe neighbors. He was with her shortly before she -disappeared to be seen alive no more. Tbe evidence fairly warrants tbe inference that be was tbe last person who was with her just before her death. A few days after she was last seen on Sunday, 2 January, or Monday, 3 January, 1916, be inquired of Fannie Eullebrew where Easter Grimes was, and when she replied that she did not know, and asked him if be knew, be, at first, said, “No,” but immediately corrected himself and then' admitted that be was joking when he said “No,” and that be did know, but would not tell her, lest she might tell it to some one else. Tbe. jury -might well conclude from this admission that be knew where she was, and, if so, that be knew she was then dead and where her body lay. If this be-true, and be bad knowledge then of her death, which was a violent one, it would not be unreasonable or unsafe to infer that be was present when she was killed. But this is not by any means all of tbe evidence pointing to tbe prisoner as her slayer. He treated this serious matter with some levity, and talked a great deal in a light vein. This may have been merely characteristic of his race, or idle and frivolous talk; but it is not inconsistent with the cold-heartedness and manifest indifference with which be bad
threatened her life if slie dare return to ber husband at Rocky Mount. In tbis connection bis last words to Fannie Killebrew after talking about tbe shoes are significant: “Don’t you know, I almost forsaken my wife for
that
woman ? I would suffer in bell before I would let ber go back to Her husband. "When you bear she is dead, you will know damned well who did it.” He bad given ber tbe shoes as bis mistress, and was determined, and so warned ber, that she should not attempt a return to ber husband, where she belonged, except at the cost of her life. All this means that if she started back to Rocky Mount, where her husband lived, he would kill ber first and then pull the shoes from her feet, and that is what was done. She was on her way back to ber husband and had gone one mile or more when be executed bis threat by killing her, dragging her'body into the woods, and then taking her shoes off and dropping one of them neax where her body lay. He knew that she had gone to Rocky Mount on the first Sunday in January, for be told Eliza Powell so, and tbis shows that he must either have gone with her for tbe one mile, or that be overtook ber, after be had discovered ber whereabouts, and then slew ber, as she was doing what he had forbidden her to do on pain of her life. It makes little or no difference which version is the true one, whether he went with her or caught up with her on her way to her husband’s home. The fact that he was with her at the time is the material and vital one. He told Rosa Hart that Easter was not in Rocky Mount, and he knew where she was. How could he know she had not reached Rocky Mount, but was killed on her way to the place, unless he was with her ? He knew that she had started for her husband’s home, and there is no evidence that any one else was with her or knew where she had gone. This evidence points strongly to the prisoner as her guilty companion in her last moments. But why is not his own words to Fannie Killebrew and Rosa Hart substantially a confession of bis guilt or at least of bis presence when and where the homicide was committed
%
He admitted when Easter was lying dead in the woods that he knew where she was, and he told Fannie Killebrew, “When you bear she is dead, you will know damned well who did it,” and be said tbis because he had threatened to kill her if she went to her home with the shoes, and his neighbors knew of his threat. Therefore, it was that be said to one of them, “You will know who committed the deed when you bear of her being dead,” meaning , without any doubt, that he had done it, as Easter was then dead. If she had been killed after he made these statements, the evidence would still be strong, but being dead at tbe time, his words amount to a present confession of his guilt, and not merely to a threat of committing tbe act in tbe future.
The prisoner, as a witness in his own behalf, denied that he had said to the State’s witnesses what they testified that he- did. The evidence
offered by him, except bis own denial of tbe charge, is not necessarily inconsistent witb tbe fact tbat be killed Easter Grimes. It does not account for bis presence elsewhere for tbe whole period of time during which tbe homicide may have been committed, and besides it was tbe province of tbe jury to decide whether the evidence was true. It does not appear tbat any other person bad any motive to commit tbe crime, or tbe opportunity, but, on tbe contrary, tbe combination of motive, threat, time, place, and circumstances, as detailed by tbe witnesses, all tend to establish tbe guilt of tbe prisoner.
Brown v. State,
141 Ga., 5.
There was no error in overruling tbe motion to nonsuit and submitting tbe case to tbe jury upon tbe evidence. . *
No error.