State v. Boyle

2025 Ohio 860

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 14, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-59
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Boyle, 2025-Ohio-860.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT GREENE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 2024-CA-59 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2013 CR 0042 : DAVID C. BOYLE : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :

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OPINION

Rendered on March 14, 2025

DAVID C. BOYLE, Pro Se Appellant

MEGAN A. HAMMOND, Attorney for Appellee

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EPLEY, P.J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant David C. Boyle appeals from a judgment of the Greene

County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the State’s motion to strike his “Manifest

Weight of the Evidence Motion” and “Motion for Change of Venue.” For the reasons that

follow, the judgment of the trial court will be reversed, and the case will be remanded for -2-

further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In 2013, Boyle was indicted on 16 counts of rape involving his daughter. Prior

to trial, he reached an agreement with the State under which he pled guilty to six counts

of rape in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining counts. There was no agreement

as to sentencing. The trial court accepted Boyle’s guilty pleas, sentenced him to an

aggregate prison term of 40 years, and designated him a Tier III sex offender. We affirmed

on appeal. State v. Boyle, 2014-Ohio-1271 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 3} Since his conviction, Boyle has filed numerous motions with the trial court,

and when unsuccessful, he has appealed. See State v. Boyle, 2018-Ohio-3284 (2d Dist.);

State v. Boyle, 2022-Ohio-2165 (2d Dist.); State v. Boyle, 2023-Ohio-3390 (2d Dist.). On

August 19, 2024, he filed two motions with the trial court which are the genesis of this

appeal – a “Manifest Weight of the Evidence Motion” and a “Motion for Change of Venue.”

In response, the State filed a motion to strike, arguing that Boyle’s motions were legal

nullities and that, even if the court were to accept the motions as post-conviction relief

petitions, they would be time-barred by R.C. 2953.21(A)(2). The trial court agreed with

the State that the motions were legal nullities and struck them from the record.

{¶ 4} Boyle has appealed, raising two assignments of error.

II. Post-Conviction Motions

{¶ 5} In his first and second assignments of error, Boyle argues that the trial court

should not have granted the State’s motion to strike, especially because it failed to

address the merits of his claims. We agree. -3-

{¶ 6} In August 2024, Boyle filed motions with the trial court, which were both

irregular in some way: a “motion for change of venue” and a “manifest weight of the

evidence motion.” The motion dealing with venue was irregular given this case’s

procedural posture, as that motion should have been made in the trial court prior to trial,

and the manifest weight of the evidence motion was irregular because it closely

resembled an appellate assignment of error related to evidence presented at trial

(although there was no trial in this case). However, “[c]ourts may recast irregular motions

into whatever category necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the motion

should be judged.” State v. Schlee, 2008-Ohio-545. In this case, the State believed

Boyle’s motions to be some sort of post-conviction relief petitions, and the trial court

seemed to agree.

{¶ 7} A post-conviction relief petition “is a means by which the petitioner may

present constitutional issues to the court that would otherwise be impossible to review

because the evidence supporting those issues is not contained in the record of the

petitioner’s criminal conviction.” State v. Clark, 2017-Ohio-120, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). A post-

conviction proceeding is a civil attack on a criminal judgment and is not an appeal from

the criminal conviction. State v. Wells, 2008-Ohio-4932, ¶ 1 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 8} The State’s argument in its motion to strike (which the court adopted in its

decision) was that because there was no relief the court could grant Boyle, his motions

were “legal nullities” and thus should be stricken from the record. We disagree with this

reasoning. Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) defines “nullity” as “something that is

legally void.” And in turn, “void” is described as having “no legal effect.” Id. A legal nullity -4-

has also been described as “something that never occurred.” (Citations omitted).

Abdulshafi v. Abdulshafi, 2020-Ohio-2692, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.). Case law examples of legal

nullities are: a non-attorney filing a complaint in court (DiPaulo Indus. Dev., LLC v. Blair

& Latell Co., LPA, 2014-Ohio-4317, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.)); post-dismissal motions (Wheller v.

Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr., 2004-Ohio-2769, ¶ 1 (4th Dist.)); reconsideration of a final

judgment (Wiltz v. Clark Schaefer Hackett & Co., 2011-Ohio-5616, ¶ 37 (10th Dist.)); and

an unaccepted contract offer (Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 81

(2013) (Kagan, J. dissenting)). So, while the State may not have thought highly of the

legal merits of Boyle’s motions, that did not mean they were nullities, i.e., “something that

never occurred.”

{¶ 9} Moreover, while we agree with the State and the trial court that the motions

were irregular and best categorized as petitions for post-conviction relief, “[i]t is always

preferred that cases be decided on their merits[.]” Sovey v. Lending Group of Ohio, 2005-

Ohio-195, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.). See also State v. O'Banion, 26 Ohio App.2d 285, 286 (1st Dist.

1970) (finding the trial court erred by striking the defendant’s post-conviction motion

without determining its validity); First Union-Lehman Bros.-Bank of Am. Commercial

Mtge. Trust v. Pillar Real Estate Advisors, Inc., 2014-Ohio-1105, ¶ 15 (“A court should

proceed with the understanding that it is preferable to decide cases on their merits rather

than on procedural grounds.”); State v. Montavon, 1938 WL 3004 (2d Dist. Jan. 13, 1938).

Where, as here, the motions (albeit irregular) were properly before it, the trial court erred

in failing to decide them on their merits.

{¶ 10} Because Boyle’s motions were not “legal nullities” and because the trial -5-

court should have decided the motions on their merits instead of striking them, we sustain

Boyle’s assignments of error.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 11} The judgment of the trial court will be reversed, and the case will be

remanded for further proceedings.

LEWIS, J. and HANSEMAN, J., concur.