State v. Bostick

District Court of Appeal of Florida

State v. Bostick

745 So. 2d 496, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 15591, 1999 WL 1049566

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedNovember 22, 1999

DocketNo. 99-479

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 745 So. 2d 496 (State v. Bostick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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State v. Bostick, 745 So. 2d 496, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 15591, 1999 WL 1049566 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The state appeals an order suppressing cocaine and a handgun from the an automobile driven by the defendant, Joseph Bostick. We reverse. The 'defendant lacked standing to challenge the seizure of these items of evidence from the car, because the car was stolen. See Rafeas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); State v. Singleton, 595 So.2d 44 (Fla.1992). The defendant contends that ownership of the car was established only by the officer’s radio check of the vehicle identification number, and that the state failed to present any nonhearsay evidence that the car had been stolen. This argument incorrectly reverses the burden of proof. A defendant who moves to suppress evidence on the ground that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment has the burden of establishing that he or she has standing to object to the seizure. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960); see generally, Rafeas; Singleton.

Reversed.

ERVIN, LAWRENCE and PADOVANO, JJ., CONCUR.

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PER CURIAM.

The state appeals an order suppressing cocaine and a handgun from the an automobile driven by the defendant, Joseph Bostick. We reverse. The 'defendant lacked standing to challenge the seizure of these items of evidence from the car, because the car was stolen. See Rafeas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); State v. Singleton, 595 So.2d 44 (Fla.1992). The defendant contends that ownership of the car was established only by the officer’s radio check of the vehicle identification number, and that the state failed to present any nonhearsay evidence that the car had been stolen. This argument incorrectly reverses the burden of proof. A defendant who moves to suppress evidence on the ground that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment has the burden of establishing that he or she has standing to object to the seizure. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960); see generally, Rafeas; Singleton.

Reversed.

ERVIN, LAWRENCE and PADOVANO, JJ., CONCUR.

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745 So. 2d 496, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 15591, 1999 WL 1049566, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-bostick-fladistctapp-1999.

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