Hull, J.
After a trial to the court, the defendants were found guilty of operating their vessels in Connecticut waters for more than sixty days without being properly numbered and registered, in violation of General Statutes § 15-144 (h).1 Each was fined one hundred [419]*419dollars. The cases were consolidated for appeal. From the judgment rendered, the defendants have appealed, claiming (1) that the evidence presented was insufficient to find violations of the statute, (2) that the defendants were not afforded their sixth amendment rights, (3) that General Statutes § 15-142 et seq. is “not fairly apportioned,” (4) that federally documented vessels are not subject to state imposed requirements of payment of local taxes as a precondition to registration, (5) that the tax imposed by General Statutes § 15-142 et seq. is violative of the United States constitution as a tonnage tax, (6) that the imposition of [420]*420a use tax in this instance is an ad valorem tax, and (7) that administrative remedies need not be exhausted in this case.2
The pertinent facts are as follows. The defendant Edward Bondi was at all relevant times the president of Bondi Partners, a Delaware corporation. That corporation purchased the vessel Bachelor Three in April, 1985, in Boston, Massachusetts, for $260,000. Neither sales nor use tax was paid on the boat. The Bachelor Three was documented for pleasure by the federal government on November 13, 1985.
Bruce Gagliardi, a boat patrol officer for the department of environmental protection (DEP), recorded in his official record that the Bachelor Three was docked in Connecticut waters for more than sixty days without proper numbering and registration. On August 4, 1985, and August 11,1985, a DEP boat patrol officer issued summonses to Bondi for violations of General Statutes § 15-144 (h). Bondi was tried separately for each violation.
The defendant Jack Parascondola was at all relevant times the president of Lady, Inc., a Delaware corporation. The corporation purchased the vessel Tender Lady in New York for $69,000. Neither sales nor use tax was paid on the boat. The Tender Lady was documented for pleasure by the federal government on February 14, 1984. Gagliardi recorded that the Tender Lady was docked in Connecticut waters for more than sixty days. A DEP boat patrol officer issued a summons to Parascondola on August 4, 1985, for violating General Statutes § 15-144 (h).
[421]*421I
The defendants’ first claim challenges the sufficiency of different portions of the evidence. They assert that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the vessels had been “in operation” as required by General Statutes § 15-144 (h). The defendants, however, failed to preserve this portion of their sufficiency of the evidence claim by neglecting to raise it at trial or claim it for review under the narrow “exceptional circumstances” doctrine of State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 69-71, 327 A.2d 576 (1973). We therefore decline to review the defendants’ claim of error. See State v. Vasquez, 9 Conn. App. 648, 654, 520 A.2d 1294 (1987).
The defendants also claim that the evidence was insufficient to establish that their vessels were present in Connecticut waters for more than sixty days in a calendar year.3 They maintain that their vessels were not subject to the numbering and registration requirements of General Statutes § 15-142 because of the insufficiency of the evidence concerning the amount of time their vessels were in Connecticut waters.
With respect to Bondi’s boat, a determination that the evidence in this area was insufficient would have [422]*422no effect. The sixty day presence in Connecticut waters rule is significant only when the boat in question already has been issued a valid certificate of number either by the federal government or by another state. Without such documentation and a certificate of number, the mere presence of a vessel in Connecticut waters, regardless of the duration, would require proper registration with numbering by the state. See General Statutes § 15-142. Bondi’s boat had no documentation and no certificate of number,4 and thus was in violation of General Statutes §§ 15-142 and 15-144 (h) regardless of the amount of time it was actually in Connecticut waters.
With respect to Parascondola’s boat, we find that there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the court’s finding that his vessel was present in Connecticut waters for more than sixty days. “[T]he inquiry into whether the record evidence would support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ‘does not require a court to “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence . . . established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ... ‘Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .’” (Emphasis in original; citation omitted.) State v. Scielzo, 190 Conn. 191, 197, 460 A.2d 951 (1983), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).
Boat patrolman Gagliardi testified for the state that he visited various marinas daily and recorded the presence of unregistered vessels. His records and testimony establish that Bondi’s boat was in Connecticut waters [423]*423for seventy-six days in 1984, and that Parascondola’s boat was present for sixty-six days during that same period.
We cannot review the credibility of a witness’ testimony. That prerogative rests within the exclusive purview of the trier of fact. State v. Crump, 201 Conn. 489, 491, 518 A.2d 378 (1986). The trial judge chose to accept Gagliardi’s accounting of the events. Thus, there is a sufficient evidentiary basis in the record to support the trier’s determination that Parascondola’s vessel was present in Connecticut waters for more than sixty days.5
II
The defendants’ second claim is that their sixth amendment right to cross-examine witnesses was abridged because they were not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine Gagliardi concerning his refusal to testify in three trials that occurred subsequent to the close of the present cases. The defendants did cross-examine Gagliardi, but did not, and could not cross-examine him regarding testimony he did not give.
The defendants cite no authority for the proposition that their sixth amendment rights extend to proceedings against other defendants that have not yet transpired. In light of the defendants’ complete failure to provide any legal precedent for their claim, we will not review it.
III
The defendants’ next claim is that General Statutes §§ 15-142 through 15-144 are unconstitutional because boat registration is made contingent upon payment of [424]*424a use tax that violates the commerce clause6
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Hull, J.
After a trial to the court, the defendants were found guilty of operating their vessels in Connecticut waters for more than sixty days without being properly numbered and registered, in violation of General Statutes § 15-144 (h).1 Each was fined one hundred [419]*419dollars. The cases were consolidated for appeal. From the judgment rendered, the defendants have appealed, claiming (1) that the evidence presented was insufficient to find violations of the statute, (2) that the defendants were not afforded their sixth amendment rights, (3) that General Statutes § 15-142 et seq. is “not fairly apportioned,” (4) that federally documented vessels are not subject to state imposed requirements of payment of local taxes as a precondition to registration, (5) that the tax imposed by General Statutes § 15-142 et seq. is violative of the United States constitution as a tonnage tax, (6) that the imposition of [420]*420a use tax in this instance is an ad valorem tax, and (7) that administrative remedies need not be exhausted in this case.2
The pertinent facts are as follows. The defendant Edward Bondi was at all relevant times the president of Bondi Partners, a Delaware corporation. That corporation purchased the vessel Bachelor Three in April, 1985, in Boston, Massachusetts, for $260,000. Neither sales nor use tax was paid on the boat. The Bachelor Three was documented for pleasure by the federal government on November 13, 1985.
Bruce Gagliardi, a boat patrol officer for the department of environmental protection (DEP), recorded in his official record that the Bachelor Three was docked in Connecticut waters for more than sixty days without proper numbering and registration. On August 4, 1985, and August 11,1985, a DEP boat patrol officer issued summonses to Bondi for violations of General Statutes § 15-144 (h). Bondi was tried separately for each violation.
The defendant Jack Parascondola was at all relevant times the president of Lady, Inc., a Delaware corporation. The corporation purchased the vessel Tender Lady in New York for $69,000. Neither sales nor use tax was paid on the boat. The Tender Lady was documented for pleasure by the federal government on February 14, 1984. Gagliardi recorded that the Tender Lady was docked in Connecticut waters for more than sixty days. A DEP boat patrol officer issued a summons to Parascondola on August 4, 1985, for violating General Statutes § 15-144 (h).
[421]*421I
The defendants’ first claim challenges the sufficiency of different portions of the evidence. They assert that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the vessels had been “in operation” as required by General Statutes § 15-144 (h). The defendants, however, failed to preserve this portion of their sufficiency of the evidence claim by neglecting to raise it at trial or claim it for review under the narrow “exceptional circumstances” doctrine of State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 69-71, 327 A.2d 576 (1973). We therefore decline to review the defendants’ claim of error. See State v. Vasquez, 9 Conn. App. 648, 654, 520 A.2d 1294 (1987).
The defendants also claim that the evidence was insufficient to establish that their vessels were present in Connecticut waters for more than sixty days in a calendar year.3 They maintain that their vessels were not subject to the numbering and registration requirements of General Statutes § 15-142 because of the insufficiency of the evidence concerning the amount of time their vessels were in Connecticut waters.
With respect to Bondi’s boat, a determination that the evidence in this area was insufficient would have [422]*422no effect. The sixty day presence in Connecticut waters rule is significant only when the boat in question already has been issued a valid certificate of number either by the federal government or by another state. Without such documentation and a certificate of number, the mere presence of a vessel in Connecticut waters, regardless of the duration, would require proper registration with numbering by the state. See General Statutes § 15-142. Bondi’s boat had no documentation and no certificate of number,4 and thus was in violation of General Statutes §§ 15-142 and 15-144 (h) regardless of the amount of time it was actually in Connecticut waters.
With respect to Parascondola’s boat, we find that there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the court’s finding that his vessel was present in Connecticut waters for more than sixty days. “[T]he inquiry into whether the record evidence would support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ‘does not require a court to “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence . . . established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ... ‘Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .’” (Emphasis in original; citation omitted.) State v. Scielzo, 190 Conn. 191, 197, 460 A.2d 951 (1983), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).
Boat patrolman Gagliardi testified for the state that he visited various marinas daily and recorded the presence of unregistered vessels. His records and testimony establish that Bondi’s boat was in Connecticut waters [423]*423for seventy-six days in 1984, and that Parascondola’s boat was present for sixty-six days during that same period.
We cannot review the credibility of a witness’ testimony. That prerogative rests within the exclusive purview of the trier of fact. State v. Crump, 201 Conn. 489, 491, 518 A.2d 378 (1986). The trial judge chose to accept Gagliardi’s accounting of the events. Thus, there is a sufficient evidentiary basis in the record to support the trier’s determination that Parascondola’s vessel was present in Connecticut waters for more than sixty days.5
II
The defendants’ second claim is that their sixth amendment right to cross-examine witnesses was abridged because they were not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine Gagliardi concerning his refusal to testify in three trials that occurred subsequent to the close of the present cases. The defendants did cross-examine Gagliardi, but did not, and could not cross-examine him regarding testimony he did not give.
The defendants cite no authority for the proposition that their sixth amendment rights extend to proceedings against other defendants that have not yet transpired. In light of the defendants’ complete failure to provide any legal precedent for their claim, we will not review it.
III
The defendants’ next claim is that General Statutes §§ 15-142 through 15-144 are unconstitutional because boat registration is made contingent upon payment of [424]*424a use tax that violates the commerce clause6 and supremacy clause7 of the federal constitution.
With respect to the defendants’ commerce clause claim, we need not reach the question of the statute’s constitutionality because the defendants did not prove that their vessels were engaged in interstate commerce.
The defendants cite State v. Zach, 198 Conn. 168, 502 A.2d 896 (1985), and Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 1076, 51 L. Ed. 2d 326, reh. denied, 430 U.S. 976, 97 S. Ct. 1669, 52 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1977), in support of their contention. In Complete Auto Transit, Inc., the United States Supreme Court set out a four-prong analysis to aid in the determination of whether there exists an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.8 The analysis cannot be done, however, without some showing that interstate commerce exists in this case. The only evidence in the record concerning the use of the vessels was that they were used exclusively for pleasure. Bondi never asserted that his vessel was engaged in any form of [425]*425interstate commerce. Parascondola stated at trial that his vessel was chartered for pleasure fishing. He offered no evidence, however, in support of that contention. “We believe that more than a bald assertion is necessary to sustain the [burden of proving] that these vessels were engaged in interstate commerce.” State v. Zach, supra, 181; see also Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 165-66, 103 S. Ct. 2933, 77 L. Ed. 2d 545, reh. denied, 464 U.S. 909, 104 S. Ct. 265, 78 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1983). Absent such evidence, we will not consider a claim that the commerce clause was violated.
IV
The defendants’ next argument is that federally documented vessels are not subject to state imposed requirements of payment of use tax as a precondition to registration. As the record indicates that only Parascondola’s vessel was federally documented at the time the summonses were issued, we will consider this claim only as to him.
The defendants presume, in making their argument, that the payment of the use tax must be made before registration can be obtained. An analysis of the statutory scheme makes evident, however, that payment of the use tax may not be required before registration is permitted. The defendants are obliged to file a use tax return pursuant to General Statutes § 12-414 (2). Even if the defendants considered that the use tax was not warranted, the return should have been filed. The use tax provisions then furnish two avenues for contesting payment. First, the defendants had the option of filing a use tax return detailing the reasons that no tax was payable. If the commissioner then determined, to the contrary, that a deficiency assessment was warranted; see General Statutes § 12-415; the defendants could seek reassessment; see General Statutes [426]*426§ 12-418 (1); and appeal a further adverse decision directly to the Superior Court. General Statutes § 12-422.
The second option would be to file a return, pay the use tax, and then seek a refund. General Statutes § 12-425 (2). If the commissioner refused to refund the amount paid, the decision could be appealed to the Superior Court. General Statutes § 12-422.
In light of that statutory scheme, it is evident that the payment of local taxes is not necessarily a precondition to registration of a vessel. The defendants’ claim must therefore fail.
V
The defendants next claim that the application of a use tax against their boats is tantamount to the imposition of an impermissible tonnage tax. Article one, § 10, clause 3, of the United States constitution provides that “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay on Duty of Tonnage . ...” In Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 265-66, 56 S. Ct. 194, 80 L. Ed. 215 (1935), the United States Supreme Court defined the duty on tonnage as follows: “[T]he prohibition against tonnage duties has been deemed to embrace all taxes and duties regardless of their name or form, and even though not measured by the tonnage of the vessel, which operate to impose a charge for the privilege of entering, trading in, or lying in a port. ...” (Citations omitted.)
Once again the defendants ignore the statutory scheme involved here. They have not proved that they will ever have to pay that tax. The statutory scheme provides for exceptions to the requirement that use tax be paid on vessels in Connecticut waters for more than sixty days. “ ‘Determination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate [427]*427adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.’ International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224, 74 S. Ct. 447, 98 L. Ed. 650 (1954). In the absence of weighty countervailing circumstances, facial invalidation of a statute is improvident. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501-502, 105 S. Ct. 2794, 86 L. Ed. 2d 394 (1985).” Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Assn. of the United States, Inc. v. O’Neill, 203 Conn. 63, 75, 523 A.2d 486 (1987).
As the defendants have not paid the tax, and have not shown that they will ever be required to pay the tax, this claim is not ripe and will not be considered by this court.
For the same reason, we do not address the defendants’ claim that imposition of a use tax in this instance is an ad valorem tax.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.