Peters, C. J.
This case comes to us, by way of reservation, as a multifaceted challenge to the constitutional and statutory validity of legislation colloquially known as Lemon Law II that establishes arbitration panels for the settlement of disputes between consumers and manufacturers of new motor vehicles. The plaintiffs, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., and a number of individual motor vehicle manufacturers and importers,1 brought an action in six [65]*65counts2 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from Public Acts 1984, No. 84-338, codified as General Statutes §§ 42-181 through 42-184, both in its initial form and as amended in 1985. The complaint named as defendants the governor, William A. O’Neill, and other governmental officials and agencies charged with enforcing the act.3 State Representative John J. Woodcock III, a legislative sponsor of Lemon Law II, was permitted to intervene as a party defendant. At the joint request of all the parties, the trial court, Satter, J., granted a motion for reservation upon stipulated facts to have this court resolve nine questions of law about the validity of the statutes in question.4 Because we conclude that the questions were improvidently reserved, we remand the case for trial.
[66]*66All of the plaintiff manufacturers and importers extend express written warranties to the retail purchasers of their cars. Although these warranties vary in scope and in duration, they all conform to the same general pattern. For new vehicles, and/or selected components, the warrantors promise to pay for repair or replacement of defective factory materials or workmanship during a stipulated warranty period. The warranty period ranges from a minimum of twelve months or [67]*6712,000 miles (whichever occurs first) to a maximum of five years or 50,000 miles. The warranty may also contain a provision for a deductible.
Informal dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve consumer complaints about consumer products received federal encouragement in 1975, when Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Pub. L. No. 93-637, title I, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq., and especially § 2310 (a). The federal trade commission has adopted standards for the operation of informal dispute settlement mechanisms. 16 C.F.R. § 703 et seq. In response, the plaintiffs Chrysler Corporation and Ford Motor Company have established their own informal dispute settlement mechanisms for the settlement of disputes with consumers regarding applicable warranties, among other matters. In addition, the Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc., administers an “Auto Line” dispute settlement mechanism which fourteen other manufacturers offer to consumers.
In 1982, the Connecticut legislature enacted Public Acts 1982, No. 82-287 (Lemon Law I). That act is codified as General Statutes § 42-179.5 For consumer [68]*68buyers of new motor vehicles, the act provides supplemental remedies of repair, replacement and refund to facilitate the enforcement of express warranties [69]*69made by the manufacturers of such vehicles. These supplemental remedies come into play whenever a manufacturer or authorized dealer, after a reasonable number of repair attempts, is unable substantially to conform a new vehicle to the terms of the express warranty. The validity of Lemon Law I is not an issue in the present litigation.
[70]*70In 1984, the legislature enacted Public Acts 1984, No. 84-338 (Lemon Law II), now codified as General Statutes §§ 42-181 through 42-184. The purpose of Lemon Law II is to provide, for consumer purchasers of new motor vehicles, an alternative to civil litigation. The key provision is § 42-181,6 which authorizes the department of consumer protection to establish “an independent arbitration procedure for the settlement of disputes between consumers and manufacturers of [71]*71motor vehicles which do not conform to all applicable warranties under the terms of section 42-179.” Whether to invoke arbitration under the act is a deci[72]*72sion for the consumer: only the consumer may initiate arbitration proceedings, and the consumer may decide whether to accept the decision of the arbitration panel. [73]*73General Statutes § 42-181 (b), (c). Once a consumer has brought a grievance to the statutory arbitration panel, the manufacturer must cooperate, in good faith, with all aspects of the arbitration procedure. General Statutes §§ 42-181 (b), (c) and 42-184. The department of consumer protection has promulgated the necessary regulations, effective December 18,1984, to create the automobile dispute settlement panels mandated by Lemon Law II. Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 42-1-181 et seq.
The legislature amended both Lemon Law I and Lemon Law II in 1985, when it enacted Public Acts 1985, No. 85-331, codified as General Statutes § 41-179a and as amendments to §§ 42-179, 42-181, 42-182 and 42-185. The amendments, in addition to making a number of procedural changes, empowered the attorney general to certify a manufacturer’s informal dispute settlement mechanism as complying with 16 C.F.R. § 703 et seq., thus avoiding the state’s arbitration panels under Lemon Law II. To date, no manufacturer has obtained such certification. A report of the attorney general that has been made an exhibit criticizes existing private programs for, inter alia, their “exclusion of consequential damages” from the arbitration process.
The state has begun to implement and enforce Lemon Law II according to its terms. Arbitration panels have heard and resolved numerous consumer complaints pursuant to the applicable statutory and regulatory pro[74]*74visions. Examination of the available documentation concerning the decisions of the arbitration panels, contained in exhibit M, indicates that these arbitration proceedings appear to have been conducted and concluded, in large part, without their participants having raised any of the questions of constitutional validity and statutory conflict that the present plaintiffs are pursuing in this case.
With respect to each of the fourteen exhibits that accompany the stipulation,7 each party has reserved the right to challenge the relevancy of its contents to the issues raised by the reservation. The plaintiffs, furthermore, “expressly do not stipulate to the truth or accuracy of any of the information or statements contained in Exhibits A through N.” In effect, therefore, the stipulation furnishes us with no binding particulars about the nature of the consumer disputes whose arbitrability these plaintiffs resist, or about the arbitral remedies previously sought or awarded.
The stipulation as a whole, therefore, is simply a request for advice about the facial validity of Lemon Law II. The reserved questions raise a number of serious issues about the validity of Lemon Law II under [75]
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Peters, C. J.
This case comes to us, by way of reservation, as a multifaceted challenge to the constitutional and statutory validity of legislation colloquially known as Lemon Law II that establishes arbitration panels for the settlement of disputes between consumers and manufacturers of new motor vehicles. The plaintiffs, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., and a number of individual motor vehicle manufacturers and importers,1 brought an action in six [65]*65counts2 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from Public Acts 1984, No. 84-338, codified as General Statutes §§ 42-181 through 42-184, both in its initial form and as amended in 1985. The complaint named as defendants the governor, William A. O’Neill, and other governmental officials and agencies charged with enforcing the act.3 State Representative John J. Woodcock III, a legislative sponsor of Lemon Law II, was permitted to intervene as a party defendant. At the joint request of all the parties, the trial court, Satter, J., granted a motion for reservation upon stipulated facts to have this court resolve nine questions of law about the validity of the statutes in question.4 Because we conclude that the questions were improvidently reserved, we remand the case for trial.
[66]*66All of the plaintiff manufacturers and importers extend express written warranties to the retail purchasers of their cars. Although these warranties vary in scope and in duration, they all conform to the same general pattern. For new vehicles, and/or selected components, the warrantors promise to pay for repair or replacement of defective factory materials or workmanship during a stipulated warranty period. The warranty period ranges from a minimum of twelve months or [67]*6712,000 miles (whichever occurs first) to a maximum of five years or 50,000 miles. The warranty may also contain a provision for a deductible.
Informal dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve consumer complaints about consumer products received federal encouragement in 1975, when Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Pub. L. No. 93-637, title I, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq., and especially § 2310 (a). The federal trade commission has adopted standards for the operation of informal dispute settlement mechanisms. 16 C.F.R. § 703 et seq. In response, the plaintiffs Chrysler Corporation and Ford Motor Company have established their own informal dispute settlement mechanisms for the settlement of disputes with consumers regarding applicable warranties, among other matters. In addition, the Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc., administers an “Auto Line” dispute settlement mechanism which fourteen other manufacturers offer to consumers.
In 1982, the Connecticut legislature enacted Public Acts 1982, No. 82-287 (Lemon Law I). That act is codified as General Statutes § 42-179.5 For consumer [68]*68buyers of new motor vehicles, the act provides supplemental remedies of repair, replacement and refund to facilitate the enforcement of express warranties [69]*69made by the manufacturers of such vehicles. These supplemental remedies come into play whenever a manufacturer or authorized dealer, after a reasonable number of repair attempts, is unable substantially to conform a new vehicle to the terms of the express warranty. The validity of Lemon Law I is not an issue in the present litigation.
[70]*70In 1984, the legislature enacted Public Acts 1984, No. 84-338 (Lemon Law II), now codified as General Statutes §§ 42-181 through 42-184. The purpose of Lemon Law II is to provide, for consumer purchasers of new motor vehicles, an alternative to civil litigation. The key provision is § 42-181,6 which authorizes the department of consumer protection to establish “an independent arbitration procedure for the settlement of disputes between consumers and manufacturers of [71]*71motor vehicles which do not conform to all applicable warranties under the terms of section 42-179.” Whether to invoke arbitration under the act is a deci[72]*72sion for the consumer: only the consumer may initiate arbitration proceedings, and the consumer may decide whether to accept the decision of the arbitration panel. [73]*73General Statutes § 42-181 (b), (c). Once a consumer has brought a grievance to the statutory arbitration panel, the manufacturer must cooperate, in good faith, with all aspects of the arbitration procedure. General Statutes §§ 42-181 (b), (c) and 42-184. The department of consumer protection has promulgated the necessary regulations, effective December 18,1984, to create the automobile dispute settlement panels mandated by Lemon Law II. Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 42-1-181 et seq.
The legislature amended both Lemon Law I and Lemon Law II in 1985, when it enacted Public Acts 1985, No. 85-331, codified as General Statutes § 41-179a and as amendments to §§ 42-179, 42-181, 42-182 and 42-185. The amendments, in addition to making a number of procedural changes, empowered the attorney general to certify a manufacturer’s informal dispute settlement mechanism as complying with 16 C.F.R. § 703 et seq., thus avoiding the state’s arbitration panels under Lemon Law II. To date, no manufacturer has obtained such certification. A report of the attorney general that has been made an exhibit criticizes existing private programs for, inter alia, their “exclusion of consequential damages” from the arbitration process.
The state has begun to implement and enforce Lemon Law II according to its terms. Arbitration panels have heard and resolved numerous consumer complaints pursuant to the applicable statutory and regulatory pro[74]*74visions. Examination of the available documentation concerning the decisions of the arbitration panels, contained in exhibit M, indicates that these arbitration proceedings appear to have been conducted and concluded, in large part, without their participants having raised any of the questions of constitutional validity and statutory conflict that the present plaintiffs are pursuing in this case.
With respect to each of the fourteen exhibits that accompany the stipulation,7 each party has reserved the right to challenge the relevancy of its contents to the issues raised by the reservation. The plaintiffs, furthermore, “expressly do not stipulate to the truth or accuracy of any of the information or statements contained in Exhibits A through N.” In effect, therefore, the stipulation furnishes us with no binding particulars about the nature of the consumer disputes whose arbitrability these plaintiffs resist, or about the arbitral remedies previously sought or awarded.
The stipulation as a whole, therefore, is simply a request for advice about the facial validity of Lemon Law II. The reserved questions raise a number of serious issues about the validity of Lemon Law II under [75]*75the federal and state constitutions, as well as a possible statutory conflict between Lemon Law II and the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. General Statutes § 4-166 et seq.
The propriety of a reservation which seeks an adjudication of constitutional questions in a factual vacuum is always doubtful. Only recently, this court reviewed at length the discretionary prudential concerns which generally counsel against such an undertaking. State v. Zach, 198 Conn. 168, 176-78, 502 A.2d 896 (1985), and cases there cited; see also J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law (2d Ed. 1983) pp. 72-74; L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978) § 3-13. A party mounting a constitutional challenge to the validity of a statute must provide an adequate factual record in order to meet its burden of demonstrating the statute’s adverse impact on some protected interest of its own, in its own particular case, and not merely under some hypothetical set of facts as yet unproven. Whether a case comes to us by way of reservation or after a final judgment, the rule is the same. We do not give advisory opinions, nor do we sit as roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of legislative enactments. “Determination of the scope and constitutionality of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial function.” International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224, 74 S. Ct. 447, 98 L. Ed. 650 (1954). In the absence of weighty countervailing circumstances, facial invalidation of a statute is improvident. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501-502, 105 S. Ct. 2794, 86 L. Ed. 2d 394 (1985).
Without an adequate factual record, the issues concerning the constitutional validity of Lemon Law II are [76]*76not ripe for review. The problem we face is illustrated by the parties’ conflicting positions about the first issue that has been reserved to us: does Lemon Law II violate the portion of article first, § 19, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended, which provides that “the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate”?
The basic principles that govern the scope of article first, § 19, are well established. The right to a jury trial is measured by a historical test. “[A]s to cases triable to the jury prior to the constitution of 1818, and extant at the time of its adoption, the right may not be abolished.” Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 298, 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041, 96 S. Ct. 763, 46 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1976); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Spring Brook Dairy, Inc., 135 Conn. 294, 297, 64 A.2d 39 (1949). Causes of action that are essentially cognizable at law are triable to a jury, while actions that are essentially equitable are not. United States Trust Co. v. Bohart, 197 Conn. 34, 44-45, 495 A.2d 1034 (1985); Franchi v. Farmholme, Inc. 191 Conn. 201, 209-11, 464 A.2d 35 (1983). This distinction is easier to state than to apply, especially when legal and equitable issues are combined in a single action. “Where incidental issues of fact are presented in an action essentially equitable, the court may determine them without a jury in the exercise of its equitable powers .... Where, however, the essential basis of the action is such that the issues presented would be properly cognizable in an action of law, either party has a right to have the legal issues tried to the jury, even though equitable relief is asked in order to give full effect to the legal rights claimed.” National Bank of Commerce of New London v. Howland, 128 Conn. 307, 310, 22 A.2d 773 (1941). Application of these principles to a particular controversy requires an analysis of the pleadings as a whole. In that analysis, “[t]he form [77]*77of the relief demanded is not dispositive.” United Stales Trust Co. v. Bohart, supra; Franchi v. Farmholme, Inc., supra.
The cause of action whose essential nature we are asked to assess is the complaint of a consumer who invokes Lemon Law II to avail himself of an arbitral forum to hear his dispute with the manufacturer of a new motor vehicle. The plaintiffs maintain that such a consumer complaint is essentially a cause of action for breach of an express warranty. Whether a warranty claim is viewed as a contract action, a tort action, or a hybrid of the two; Johnson v. Healy, 176 Conn. 97, 100, 405 A.2d 54 (1978); such a matter has always been triable to a jury. Bailey v. Nichols, 2 Conn. (Root) 407 (1796). Because the issues that come before the statutory arbitration panels are substantially the same as those that would have been triable at law, the plaintiffs argue that, even as a statutory cause of action, a consumer complaint under Lemon Law II must respect the plaintiffs’ right to a jury trial.
The defendants do not dispute the proposition that a common law action to recover damages for breach of an express warranty would have been a legal action triable to a jury prior to 1818. Rather, their argument is that Lemon Law II does not “track” this common law action. They maintain that the provisions of the Lemon Law follow, instead, the essential outlines of a bill in equity for specific performance of a contract or for rescission and restitution. Such equitable actions do not require a jury trial even if ancillary monetary damages are awarded. United States Trust Co. v. Bohart, supra.
In our analysis of the causes of action that Lemon Law II authorizes to be brought to arbitration panels, we are of course handicapped by having no stipulated facts about the contents of the pleadings that the panels [78]*78have entertained. In these circumstances, we are left with a facial appraisal of the applicable statutory provisions. The section of Lemon Law II that describes the remedies that arbitrators may order is § 42-181 (c). This section gives arbitration panels wide-ranging discretion to fashion “appropriate remedies, including, but not limited to one or more of the following: (1) Repair of the vehicle; (2) Replacement of the vehicle with an identical or comparable new vehicle acceptable to the consumer; (3) Refund of the full contract price, plus collateral charges as specified in subsection (d) of . . . section 42-179; (4) Reimbursement for expenses and compensation for incidental damages as specified in subsection (d) of . . . section 42-179; (5) Any other remedies available under the applicable warranties, section 42-179, this section and sections 42-182 to 42-184, inclusive, or the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975), 15 USC 2301 et seq., as in effect on October 1, 1982.” The refund and reimbursements authorized by § 42-179 (d) include: “The full contract price ... all collateral charges, including . . . sales tax, license and registration fees . . . finance charges . . . and all incidental damages as defined in section § 42a-2-715, less a reasonable allowance for the consumer’s use of the vehicle.” Incidental damages, in turn, are defined in § 42a-2-715, which is part of the Uniform Commercial Code, as including “expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected . . . and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach,” subject to diminution by a reasonable allowance for use value.
The expansive nature of this statutory authority for remedial action leaves considerable room for variation in actual practice. The briefs of the parties, and their oral arguments in this court, make it apparent that they [79]*79take distinctly different views of how arbitration panels operate in fact, and especially of the remedies that are likely to be sought and awarded. The plaintiffs focus on the monetary relief that is afforded by way of a “refund” and note that a claim for such relief closely resembles a monetary action for breach of warranty. The defendants, by contrast, emphasize the centrality of “repair” and “replacement” as specific enforcement of the terms of the plaintiffs’ warranties. Starting from these different points of departure, the parties disagree strenuously about what is essential and what is ancillary to the claims that Lemon Law II authorizes arbitration panels to decide. Absent a factual record, this is a disagreement that we cannot resolve.
Because of the nature of the remedy that the act characterizes as a “refund,” if indeed that remedy is regularly invoked by Lemon Law II arbitration panels, the plaintiffs’ argument that the act impairs their right of access to trial by jury presents an extremely close question that cannot be dismissed out of hand. We note that the attorney general has himself emphasized that the availability of adequate compensatory damages is essential to a viable alternative dispute resolution mechanism. We note further that Lemon Law II invites a comparison to relevant provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, when, in § 42-179 (d), it expressly incorporates the code’s definition of incidental damages. Under article 2 of the code, a buyer’s right to recover the purchase price of goods rightfully returned to the seller has never been characterized as an equitable remedy. The code speaks of specific performance only with regard to a buyer’s entitlement to receive the goods that were promised. General Statutes §§ 42a-2-711 (2), 42a-2-716. For a buyer who rightfully rejects or revokes acceptance of a seller’s tender of goods, the right to recovery of the purchase price is not a claim for rescission and may be tried to a jury. General Statutes [80]*80§ 42a-2-711 (2); Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 172 Conn. 112, 119-20, 374 A.2d 144 (1976); and compare General Statutes § 42a-2-718 (2); Barco Auto Leasing Corporation v. House, 202 Conn. 106, 114-16, 520 A.2d 162 (1987).
Review of this serious challenge to the constitutional validity of Lemon Law II requires an adequate factual record. Without a finding of whether particular arbitration proceedings, or arbitration proceedings in general under Lemon Law II, essentially rely on requests and awards for refunds, we lack a basis for determining the extent to which the proceedings authorized by Lemon Law II are essentially legal or essentially equitable. Because it would be improvident to resolve this crucial issue on the present record, and because disposition of this issue may obviate the need to address the other questions that have been reserved to us, we conclude that it is inappropriate for us to respond to any part of the reservation. It no longer appears, as Practice Book § 4147 (formerly § 3133) requires, that the present determination of these questions “would be in the interest of simplicity, directness and economy of judicial action.” See State v. Zach, supra, 178; State v. Sanabria, 192 Conn. 671, 684, 474 A.2d 760 (1984); Rothkopf v. Danbury, 156 Conn. 347, 350, 242 A.2d 771 (1968).
We do not answer the reserved questions; the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
No costs will be taxed to any party.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.