SCHUDSON, J.
¶ 1. Ondra Bond appeals from the judgment of conviction for intimidation of a witness, party to a crime, habitual criminality, following a jury trial, and from the order denying his postconviction motion. He argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his statement in response to a police officer's remark to him, while in custody and before being advised of his Miranda1 rights. Bond contends that, under Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), and State v. Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d 272, 423 N.W.2d 862 (1988), the officer's remark was the functional equivalent of interrogation and, therefore, his incriminating response should have been suppressed. Bond is correct and, accordingly, we reverse.2
[636]*636I. BACKGROUND
¶ 2. The facts relevant to resolution of this appeal are undisputed. Bond's two brothers and a third man were scheduled for a preliminary hearing on February 21, 1997, on drug charges flowing from an undercover investigation. Three of the officers involved in the investigation were Ronald Taylor (known as "Stoney" in the undercover work), Raymond Taylor (known as "Ray-Ray" in the undercover work),3 and Detective Rayford Weston.
¶ 3. Two days before the preliminary hearing, Detective Weston received two threatening calls on the FBI-issued cell phone that Officer Taylor and Officer Taylor had been using exclusively for their undercover [637]*637investigation. Seven months later, answering the prosecutor's questions at Bond's trial, Detective Weston testified:
A: Sometimes drug dealers call whenever they want to. It's not a science, and they don't call when they normally should, they call whenever it's time to call. The phone rang at 11:20 [p.m.]. I answered the phone.
Q: Now, when you answered the phone in your undercover capacity and [on] an undercover F.B.I. ... phone, I am sure you [didn't] answer the phone[, "]Detective Weston.["]
A: No, I just say yeah. That's the way I answer all phones. I'm pretty rude.
Q: Specifically, you don't want to give away your identity when you answer that phone?
A: Exactly.
Q: And you say some nondescript yeah. And what kind of answer [did] you get from the caller?
A: The caller said is this Ray-Ray. I said who's calling, and we had ... a brief conversation.
Q: Did the caller ever identify himself?
A: No, not at all.
Q: When this caller called, was there any recognition of his voice on this first call at 11:20 p.m.?
A: No.
Q: And at first did it just sound like somebody calling for Ray-Ray?
A: Yes. I thought it was another drug dealer . . . trying to get ahold of. .. Ray or Ron Taylor.
[638]*638Q: After a short time in this first call, were things said that you took special note of and later put into a report?
A: Yes.
Q: And what was that and why did you put it into a report?
A: Well, I perceived them as threats. I've worked narcotics a long time. . . . I've been a police officer long enough, and even without being a police officer, I've heard threats. I know what a threat is, and I interpreted what I heard over the phone as ... a threat to kill a person they thought was a drug dealer or a witness in court.
Q: Now, going specifically to the first phone call, what was the first indication you had that this was becoming threatening?
A: ... [T]he caller said I know who you are and ... I know where you live. Don't be in court on Friday.
Q: Do you know whether or not the caller was assuming that you were Ray-Ray or had you already said that you're not Ray-Ray?
A: The caller was assuming that I was Ray-Ray. That was my interpretation, yes.
Q: Because you didn't say let me get him, you said who is this?
A: I said who is this, yes.
Q: Okay. And was there ever anything said about snitching on the part of this caller?
A: Yeah. The caller said I know you snitched. Don't be in court on Friday, things of that nature, yes.
[639]*639Q: Based upon your experience in working in the drug area, what is normally meant by the word snitch?
A: Working as an informant or somebody that helps the police with information.
Q: That wouldn't be a normal term that somebody would use to refer to an undercover officer. Would it?
A: No, it would not be.
Q: And there [were] some references to where somebody other than you lived?
A: Yes. He said I know where your parents live_ I know who you are. Don't be in court on Friday, things of that nature.
Q: ... [T]his was the only Friday drug case that you had going at that time?
A: That's correct.
Q: Can you estimate about how long this first telephone call lasted?
A: It didn't last very long. It was probably less — I don't know. I would be guessing, but a minute or so. I didn't time it.
Q: And then do you know how that call ended? Did one of the two of you hang up?
A: Yeah. I just hung up, and the phone rang about 3 minutes later. I recognized the same voice again.
Q: And are you sure it was the same caller 3 minutes later?
A: I'm positive it was the same person.
[640]*640Q: What sorts of comments were made during the second call?
A: Pretty much of the same tone. I know who you are. What is up with your boy Ston[e]y. Ston[e]y is the name that Ronald Taylor was using during this undercover investigation.
Q: Now, who first mentioned the name Ston[e]y, you or the caller?
A: The caller. It [sic] didn't give out any information at all. That's typical. I don't try to obtain information. I done [sic] give it.
Q: Was there again reference made specifically to the Friday court appearance?
A: Yes. Don't be in court on Friday. I know where your family lives. . . . [H]e made a statement to the effect why you snitching to the white man and things of that nature.
Q: Okay. Were there any specific threats of violence made against either the person he thought was Ray-Ray or against Ston[e]y?
A: Yes. He threatened to kill Ston[e]y. Don't be in court on Friday, I'll kill you.
Q: Did you ever ask the caller to identify himself?
A: I asked several times. The caller wouldn't say. The caller said you know who I am. I'm the man behind the man, and things — cryptic things like that the caller would say.
Q: During the course of this whole couple month long drug investigation, had you heard anybody else use that phraseology, I'm the man behind the man?
A: No, not at all.
Q: Did you find that to be somewhat distinctive or unusual?
[641]*641A: Yeah, I thought it was distinctive and unusual, sure.
Q: Did you put that into a written report after receiving this call?
A: Yes, I did.
¶ 4. Two days after receiving the threatening calls, Detective Weston, Officer Taylor, and Officer Taylor, all wearing plain clothes to maintain their undercover identities, were at the preliminary hearing court. Detective Weston observed Bond sitting at the defense table in the courtroom and also milling around with others in the lobby outside the courtroom. In the lobby, Detective Weston saw Bond and Officer Ronald Taylor in conversation and, Detective Weston testified at Bond's trial, when he heard Bond's voice he "recognized it right away" as the person who had made the threatening calls. Detective Weston also testified:
When I heard the voice initially [in the lobby conversation with Officer Ronald Taylor], I was sure that was the voice, but I wanted to give him the benefit of the doubt, and I stood around, and I wanted to hear Mr. Bond talk some more just to reaffirm the voice, and I was positive it was the voice I heard.
After recognizing Bond's voice, Detective Weston notified Officer Taylor and Officer Taylor that Bond was the person who had made the calls. Bond was then arrested. He did not resist but, Detective Weston testified, "some of the individuals that he was with came over and they got loud ... and started causing a disturbance in . . . the lobby of the preliminary court." Responding to the prosecutor's questions at Bond's trial, Detective Weston further explained:
[642]*642Q: This arrest took place right out in the public access corridor?
A: That's correct.
Q: And did Mr. Bond ask anything as you advised him or Ston[e]y advised him that he was under arrest?
A: He kept asking, well, why am I under arrest. And we kept telling him, we will tell you in a few minutes. We didn't want to blurt it out in front of everybody. He kept asking me what am I here for, why are you arresting me, where are you going, things of that nature.
Q: Did you begin to walk him toward the elevator?
A: We walked him toward an elevator, and actually ended up walking him from . . . the Criminal Justice Facility [where the preliminary court was located] to the Milwaukee Police Department, so we walked him down State Street, which is about a block or so.
Q: And this is before the actual case is called for preliminary hearing?
A: That's correct.
Q: And did anybody respond in any way to Ondra Bond's question about why am I under arrest?
A: Sure. He kept asking why he was under arrest, and Officer Taylor I believe — Ron Taylor told him that you're under arrest and I'll tell you what it's for in a minute. And Mr. Bond said, oh, you're the man, and Taylor real quickly said, no, I'm the man behind the man, and he says, oh, that is what this is about.
¶ 5. Officer Ronald Taylor also testified at Bond's trial, clarifying that after Bond said, "You're the man," it was Officer Raymond Taylor who responded, "No, [643]*643you're the man behind the man," and that Bond immediately replied, "Ah, so that's what this is about."4 Additionally, under cross-examination, when' asked the meaning of the phrase "the man behind the man," Officer Ronald Taylor testified:
A: [T]he man behind the man . . . would possibly be . .. I'm the man who does the dirty work, I'm the muscle; it could mean . . . that you are humbling yourself, no, I'm not the man, you the man. I'm just the man behind the man; it could mean... either or.
Q: Okay. Which one of those meanings was the one that you understood . . . Ray Taylor to mean when he said to Mr. Bond that, I'm the man behind the man? If it wasn't any one of those, that's okay, too. But did you understand it to have any one of [644]*644those particular meanings when you heard him say it?
A: When. . . Mr. Bond said. . . you're the man, and [Raymond] Taylor said, no, I'm the man behind the man?
Q: Yeah.
A: I think that statement was-and this is just my opinion-was designed to-to elicit a response from Mr. Bond.
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 6. At Bond's trial, as soon as the prosecutor, in his opening statement, referred to Bond's statements upon being arrested, defense counsel interrupted: "Excuse me. I object. I believe this is post-custody/pre-Miranda that he's commenting on. He's never indicated he was going to use any of that in this case and I object and move that it be stricken." The trial court, however, did not rule on counsel's objection, merely stating: "Just move on. Let's go ahead." When defense counsel continued to object to the prosecutor's opening statement and its references to Bond's questions "like why are you arresting me, what's going on," the trial court again did not rule but "noted [the objection] for the record." The prosecutor continued, specifying that "when Officer Taylor tells Ondra Bond you're the man behind the man, Ondra Bond responds . . . oh, that's what this is all about."
¶ 7. The record confirms that the prosecutor had failed to advise defense counsel or the trial court of the State's intention to use Bond's statement, made in response to Officer Raymond Taylor's statement, in its case in chief. Prior to trial, the trial court neither held a [645]*645Miranda-Goodchild hearing5 nor made any record of whether Bond would have challenged or stipulated to the introduction of his statement.6 Ultimately, how[646]*646ever, the parties agreed to allow the trial court to decide Bond's motion to suppress the statement, based on the trial testimony.7
[647]*647¶ 8. Denying suppression of Bond's statement, the trial court provided no explanation but simply concluded that Bond's response "was not under interrogation, that it was a spontaneous statement, and voluntary statement." Bond argues that, under Innis and Cunningham, Officer Raymond Taylor's remark, "No, you're the man behind the man," was the functional equivalent of interrogation and, therefore, that his response, "Ah, so that's what this is about," should have been suppressed. We agree.
II. DISCUSSION
¶ 9. In Innis, the Supreme Court "address[ed] for the first time the meaning of 'interrogation' under Miranda v. Arizona." Innis, 446 U.S. at 297. Innis, arrested for kidnapping, robbery, and murder, had been advised of his Miranda rights three times and had invoked his right to counsel. See id. at 294. While riding in the back seat of a squad car, Innis heard the two officers in the front seat discussing the possibility that a little girl from a school for handicapped children near the scene of the crime might find the gun the murderer had hidden and kill herself. See id. at 294-95. Innis interrupted the conversation and revealed the location of the gun. See id. at 295.
¶ 10. Innis contended that the officers' conversation constituted interrogation and, therefore, that under Miranda, because he was in custody and had invoked his right to counsel, the interrogation violated his right against compulsory self-incrimination. See id. [648]*648at 297-98. Rejecting Innis's argument, the Supreme Court declared:
We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. ... A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Id. at 300-02 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote, the Supreme Court provided further guidance that, as we will explain, is significant in the instant appeal:
This is not to say that the intent of the police is irrelevant, for it may well have a bearing on whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response. In particular, where a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one which the police should have known was reasonably likely to have that effect.
Id. at 302 n.7.
[649]*649¶ 11. Determining that the Rhode Island Supreme Court had erred "in equating 'subtle compulsion' with interrogation," see id. at 303, the Supreme Court concluded:
The case thus boils down to whether, in the context of a brief conversation, the officers should have known that [Innis] would suddenly be moved to make a self-incriminating response. Given the fact that the entire conversation appears to have consisted of no more than a few offhand remarks, we cannot say that the officers should have known that it was reasonably likely that Innis would so respond. This is not a case where the police carried on a lengthy harangue in the presence of the suspect. Nor does the record support [Innis's] contention that, under the circumstances, the officers' comments were particularly "evocative." It is our view, therefore, that [Innis] was not subjected by the police to words or actions that the police should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from him.
Id.
¶ 12. In Cunningham, our supreme court quoted Innis extensively and "appl[ied] the Innis test," see Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 281, to decide whether "confronting [a] defendant -with physical evidence of a crime [is] the functional equivalent of interrogation so that subsequent statements of the defendant must be suppressed if made prior to receiving a Miranda warning," see id. at 273. Cunningham, arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm and resisting an officer, was in custody but had not yet been advised of his Miranda rights. See id. at 275. After a police officer displayed a revolver to him, advised him that it had been found under the mattress in his bedroom, and [650]*650then said to another officer, " 'This was apparently what Mr. Cunningham was running into the bedroom for,'" Cunningham made an incriminating statement. See id.
¶ 13. Applying the Innis test, the supreme court endeavored to give it further definition, explaining:
[Innis] implies an objective foreseeability test. The test is whether an objective observer could foresee that the officer's conduct or words would elicit an incriminating response. Another way of stating the objective foreseeability test is to ask whether the police officer's conduct or speech could reasonably have had the force of a question on the suspect.
Id. at 278. Additionally, in words that carry important implications for the instant case, the supreme court elaborated, "An officer's specific knowledge about the suspect may indicate that the officer should have known his or her conduct or words would have had the force of a question on the suspect." Id. And, of equal significance, the supreme court further explained, "If an impartial observer perceives the officer's purpose to be something other than eliciting a response, the suspect is also likely to view the officer's purpose that way." Id. at 280.
¶ 14. On appeal, the parties note the dearth of Wisconsin case law on the Innis/Cunningham issue. They agree that Bond's case presents a rare opportunity to evaluate whether certain police conduct or comment constitutes the functional equivalent of interrogation. The parties acknowledge that the facts of Bond's case, in several respects, are distinguishable from those in Innis and Cunningham. The parties also acknowledge that some of those distinguishing factors support Bond, while others would seem to favor the [651]*651State. We acknowledge that both parties have presented reasonable arguments. We conclude, on the basis of certain significant facts and several critical passages in Innis and Cunningham, that Bond's arguments prevail.8
¶ 15. In determining whether police conduct or comment constitutes the functional equivalent of interrogation, "[e]ach case must be considered upon its own facts." See Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 274. "The determination of whether the facts of the case satisfy the legal standard articulated in Innis is a question of law" reviewed independently on appeal. See id. at 282. Here, five key factors link significantly to the Innis/ Cunningham standards and support Bond's position.
¶ 16. First, both Innis and Cunningham explain that "the term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (footnote omitted; emphasis added); see Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 277 (quoting Innis). Here, [652]*652unquestionably, the words, "No, you're the man behind the man," were not words "normally attendant to arrest and custody."
¶ 17. Second, both Innis and Cunningham emphasize that because "police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02; Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 277-78 (quoting Innis). Further, in a footnote immediately following this passage, the Supreme Court added, "Any knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important factor in determining whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.8; see Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 279 (citing and paraphrasing Innis). Similarly, Cunningham explained, "An officer's specific knowledge about the suspect may indicate that the officer should have known his or her conduct or words would have had the force of a question on the suspect." Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 278. Here, unquestionably, Officer Raymond Taylor's "specific knowledge" about Bond and the words Bond used in the threatening calls enabled him to utilize "a particular form" of speech that elicited Bond's incriminating response.9
[653]*653¶ 18. Third, both Innis and Cunningham explain that in determining whether police should have known that their words or actions were "reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response," we "focus[ ] primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect," see Innis, 446 U.S. at 301; Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 277 (quoting Innis), but we do not ignore "the intent of the police," see Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 n.7. Innis declared that "the intent of the police . . . may well have a bearing on whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response." Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 n.7. And Cunningham provided the measure for that intent: "If an impartial observer perceives the officer's purpose to be something other than eliciting a response, the suspect is also likely to view the officer's purpose that way." Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 280. Here, unquestionably, Officer Ronald Taylor was not "an impartial observer." Thus, all the more powerfully, his perception that Officer Raymond Taylor's comment "was designed ... to elicit a response from Mr. Bond" is compelling.
¶ 19. Fourth, in Innis, the Supreme Court concluded that the officers' conversation did not constitute interrogation, in part because the conversation "consisted of no more than a few offhand remarks," and those remarks were not "particularly 'evocative.'" See Innis, 446 U.S. at 303. In Cunningham, the supreme [654]*654court concluded that the officer's conduct and words did not constitute interrogation, in part because they were not even as provocative as those in Innis. See Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 283. Here, by contrast, while Officer Raymond Taylor's remarks were few, they drew force from his specific knowledge of Bond, they were anything but "offhand," and, indeed, they were "particularly 'evocative'" or provocative.10
¶ 20. And fifth, while in both Innis and Cunningham police officers were talking to each other in the presence of their suspects, here Officer Raymond Taylor spoke directly to Bond, eliciting his incriminating response.
¶ 21. Still, the State emphasizes that the police comments here, like those in both Innis and Cunningham, were brief; the police did not "carr[y] on a lengthy harangue." See Innis, 446 U.S. at 303. We understand that. But "[e]ach case must be considered upon its own facts," Cunningham, 144 Wis. 2d at 274, and, somewhat ironically perhaps, the length of the Taylor/Bond exchange actually supports Bond's position. After all, Officer Raymond Taylor needed no lengthy discussion to elicit Bond's response. Speaking directly to Bond, [655]*655with knowledge of the words of the threatening calls, Officer Taylor was able to confront Bond immediately with the specific words that would elicit Bond's incriminating response. As the prosecutor contended in his closing argument, as soon as Bond heard Officer Taylor's words:
[H]e understands why he's under arrest. He says, oh, that's what this is all about. Just like that, it erased his doubts of exactly what he was being arrested for, because he had made those phone calls, was well aware of those phone calls. So it should erase any last vestige of doubt any of us might have had before that happened.
¶ 22. Thus, in this case, the brevity of the conversation confirms the evocative and provocative power of Officer Raymond Taylor's comment. To conclude otherwise would be to discount the claim of a defendant simply because he or she quickly succumbs to an effective police technique. That would indeed " 'place a premium on the ingenuity of the police to devise methods of indirect interrogation, rather than to implement the plain mandate of Miranda.'" See Innis, 446 U.S. at 299 n.3 (quoted source omitted).
¶ 23. The State also argues that if the trial court erred by not suppressing Bond's statement, the error was harmless. The State contends that "[e]ven without introducing Bond's response to Officer Taylor's remark, the state could have presented evidence that Bond stopped asking questions about why he was arrested as soon as Officer Taylor said, 'You're the man behind the man.'" Thus, the State maintains, "This evidence, combined with Detective Weston's positive identification of Bond's voice as that of the anonymous [656]*656caller, and evidence that Bond kept following Officer Ronald Taylor while he waited to testify against Bond's brothers at their preliminary hearing, was-strong proof of guilt, albeit circumstantial."
¶ 24. A trial court error is not harmless if "there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction." See State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985). To establish that the error in this case was harmless, the State, as "beneficiary of the error," bears the burden "to establish that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction." See id.
¶ 25. Notably, the State does not contend that its evidence would have been sufficiently strong to support a harmless error argument if neither Bond's statement nor his silence would have been admitted. The reason is clear. Bond was prosecuted under two alternative theories: (1) that he made the threatening calls; and (2) that if he did not make the calls, he knew about them and, as party to the crime, aided and abetted the intimidation when he came to court two days later. Thus, as Bond accurately argues, proof of his "awareness of the telephone threat was necessary to establish criminal liability" under either theory.
¶ 26. The State does not disagree. In fact, in the trial court, the prosecutor, seeking admission of Bond's statement, asserted that Bond's response to Officer Raymond Taylor indicated awareness of the telephone threat "which is a critically relevant issue for the jury to consider." In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that "[t]his would be a much, much harder case if it was only about a voice I.D."
¶ 27. Not surprisingly, therefore, the State, pursuing its harmless error argument on appeal, [657]*657maintains only that Bond's silence — that is, his failure to continue asking why he had been arrested once he heard "You're the man behind the man" — would have effectively substituted for his suppressed response to Officer Raymond Taylor's remark. The State's argument has no merit. Evidence of Bond's silence would have been no more admissible than evidence of his response. "The prosecution may not... use at trial the fact that [a defendant] stood mute ... in the face of accusation." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 n.37.
¶ 28. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to suppress Bond's statement, and that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
By the Court. — Judgment and order reversed and cause remanded with directions.