State v. Boles

240 A.2d 920, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 22, 1967 Conn. Cir. LEXIS 210
Connecticut Appellate Court·Decided December 13, 1967·No. File No. CR 6-50614·Published·Cited by 13 cases

Opinion

Levister, J.

The defendant is charged by information with breach of the peace in violation of General Statutes § 53-174; violation of an executive order under special law (New Haven Spec. Laws § 21; 13 Conn. Spec. Laws 395 § 13); and disorderly conduct in violation of General Statutes § 53-175. The defendant has moved to quash or dismiss the information filed against him.

In support of his motion, the defendant has presented four propositions, all of which, if sustained, would render the information against him null and void. These four propositions are as follows: (1) The mayor of New Haven did not have the power to impose a curfew, and his attempt to do so was a nullity. (2) The curfew was void because it failed to make exceptions for reasonable and necessary activity, thereby denying personal liberty without due process of law. (3) There was inadequate notice given of the imposition of a curfew, and a conviction, therefore, would deny due process of law. (4) The curfew and the provisions under which curfew violations are being prosecuted are unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, void.

These claims will he considered in the same order in which they were presented.

[24] I

There is no question that the power of the mayor to impose a curfew must he found either in a state statute or the charter of the city of New Haven. It is also clear that the New Haven charter does not explicitly empower the mayor to impose a curfew. Under the provisions of § 6 of the New Haven charter, the mayor is the chief executive and administrative officer of the city. He is empowered by § 7 to have and exercise certain powers of appointment and administration, including (§ 7 [h]) “all other executive and administrative powers conferred by the laws of the state upon any municipal chief executive, except as otherwise provided in this charter.”

Special laws confer upon the mayor the power to assume control of the police and fire forces in a time of emergency and to exercise all of their powers in enforcing the law; New Haven Spec. Laws § 20 (1); 13 Conn. Spec. Laws 394 § 12 (1); to exercise all the powers conferred upon the sheriffs in suppressing riots; New Haven Spec. Laws § 20 (2); 13 Conn. Spec. Laws 394 § 12 (2); and to request the assistance of the national guard. New Haven Spec. Laws § 20(3); 13 Conn. Spec. Laws 395 § 12(3). Hindering, obstructing, resisting or abusing the mayor in the execution of his office is punishable by fine or imprisonment. New Haven Spec. Laws § 21; 13 Conn. Spec. Laws 395 § 13.

As stated above, under the provisions of § 20 (2) of the New Haven Special Laws (Conn. Spec. Laws 394 § 12 [2]), the mayor may exercise all the powers conferred upon sheriffs in suppressing riots. Thus, when the mayor does exercise authority pursuant to this special law, he obviously stands in the shoes of the sheriffs. We now must determine the source and extent of the sheriffs’ powers. G-eneral Stat[25] utes § 6-31 provides as follows: “Each sheriff may execute in his county all lawful process directed to him, shall be conservator of the peace and may, when necessary, with force and strong hand, suppress all tumults, riots, unlawful assemblies and breaches of the peace and may raise the power of the county and command any person to assist him in the execution of his office.” It is common and public knowledge that on the days that the mayor imposed a curfew, the city of New Haven was rocked asunder by tumultuous and riotous conditions: looting and destruction of property were prevalent; and the general welfare of the entire city was seriously threatened. It was such circumstances that were envisioned by the General Assembly of the state of Connecticut when it enacted § 20 (2) of the New Haven Special Laws (13 Conn. Spec. Laws 394 § 12 [2]) and General Statutes § 6-31. It seems clear that under these two statutory provisions, and in view of the circumstances then prevailing, the mayor acted within his authority. Indeed, failure to have so acted might well have been considered a dereliction of duty.

It is to be noted that under § 20 (3) of the New Haven Special Laws (13 Conn. Spec. Laws 395 § 12 [3]) the mayor could have requested assistance from the national guard. But recent outbreaks of riots across the width and breadth of this land have taught us the sad and painful lesson that whenever such assistance has been sought and received, the bad situations inevitably became worse before they got better.

In Newark, in Detroit, in Birmingham, in Milwaukee, and in Watts, hundreds of lives were lost and millions of dollars in property destroyed, and in each case outside assistance was sought and received. In New Haven not one life was lost and [26] there were very few incidents of personal injury. Property damage was kept at a minimum.

It appears that the mayor did have the power to impose a curfew, and since he did it by so declaring on each day that a curfew was necessary, it likewise appears that he exercised his proper authority wisely:

II

The gravamen of the defendant’s second contention is that in order for the curfew to be valid it should have contained “built-in exceptions” for reasonable and necessary activity and, failing this, it constituted a denial of personal liberty without due process of law. Under usual and normal circumstances and as a general proposition, this may be true. But the circumstances existing at the time were not usual, nor were they normal.

The defendant cites in his brief Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508, and quotes, in part, this passage: “ ‘The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.’ ” What the defendant overlooks is that how drastic the means can be and still remain within the bounds of what may be deemed permissible largely depends upon the nature of the circumstances provoking the abridgment. The Aptheker case involved the issuance or refusal of passports to Communists or Communist sympathizers or those suspected of being so. This is far different from a curfew designed to prevent or contain a riot. Our constitution is not a static document, “for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should [27] be otherwise.” Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387; State v. Hillman, 110 Conn. 92, 105.

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State v. Boles, 240 A.2d 920, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 22, 1967 Conn. Cir. LEXIS 210 (Colo. Ct. App. 1967).

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