State v. Bohach

2024 Ohio 389

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 5, 2024
• Docket: 3-23-28 3-23-29
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Bohach, 2024-Ohio-389.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT CRAWFORD COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 3-23-28 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

JACOB BOHACH, OPINION

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 3-23-29 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

Appeals from Crawford County Municipal Court Trial Court Nos. 23 CRB 250 and 23 CRB 252

Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Cause Remanded in Case No. 3-23-28

Judgement Affirmed in Case No. 3-23-29

Date of Decision: February 5, 2024

APPEARANCES:

Howard A. Elliott for Appellant

Thomas F. Meagher V for Appellee Case Nos. 3-23-28 and 3-23-29

ZIMMERMAN, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jacob K. Bohach (“Bohach”), appeals the June 8,

2023 judgment entries of sentence of the Crawford County Municipal Court. For

the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

{¶2} These cases stem from Bohach’s unwanted presence at the Pine Crest

Mobile Home Community (“Pine Crest”) in Crestline, Ohio. On February 6, 2023,

Officer Ryan Novik (“Officer Novik”) of the Crestline Police Department notified

Bohach (in writing) that he was prohibited from entering Pine Crest after his former

paramour, Hailey DeLong (“DeLong”), (along with the management of Pine Crest)

requested law enforcement to instruct Bohach as such. Specifically, when Officer

Novik informed Bohach that he “is not to be on [Pine Crest] property any longer,”

Bohach acknowledged that he understood the directive. (May 5, 2023 Tr. at 66).

{¶3} On March 21, 2023, Officer Logan Knipp (“Officer Knipp”) of the

Crestline Police Department was dispatched to Pine Crest after DeLong reported

that Bohach appeared at her residence. Officer Knipp “was advised by dispatch that

[Bohach] was headed westbound on Middletown Road,” which is where Officer

Knipp located Bohach. (Id. at 103). On March 25, 2023, Officer Knipp “was

dispatched to [Pine Crest], again, [regarding Bohach] trespassing, and [Officer

Knipp] made contact with him on Middletown Road.” (Id. at 114).

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{¶4} On March 27, 2023, Bohach was charged by complaint in case number

23 CRB 250 with a single count of criminal trespass in violation of R.C.

2911.21(A)(1), a fourth-degree misdemeanor. That same day, Bohach was also

charged by complaint in case number 23 CRB 252AB with obstructing official

business in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A), a second-degree misdemeanor, and

criminal trespass in violation of R.C. 2911.21(A)(1), a fourth-degree misdemeanor.

On April 5, 2023, Bohach appeared and entered pleas of not guilty in both cases.

{¶5} After a jury trial on May 5, 2023, the jury found Bohach guilty of all

counts alleged in the complaints. On May 31, 2023, the trial court sentenced Bohach

to 30 days as to the criminal-trespass charge in case number 23 CRB 250. (Case

No. 23 CRB 250, Doc. No. 24). In case number 23 CRB 252AB, the trial court

sentenced Bohach to 90 days in jail as to the obstructing-official-business charge

and to 30 days in jail as to the criminal-trespass charge. (Case No. 23 CRB 252AB,

Doc. No. 34). The trial court ordered Bohach to serve the sentences consecutively

for an aggregate sentence of 150 days in jail.

{¶6} Nevertheless, due to his disruptions of the proceedings, the trial court

found Bohach in direct contempt of court during his sentencing hearing. As a result,

the trial court ordered Bohach to serve 10 and 30 days in jail as to each finding of

direct contempt, respectively. The trial court further ordered Bohach to serve the

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10- and 30-day jail sentences consecutively to the 150-day consecutive sentence

imposed by the trial court for an aggregate sentence of 190 days in jail.1

{¶7} Bohach filed his notices of appeal on June 23, 2023 (in case number 23

CRB 252AB) and June 27, 2023 (in case number 23 CRB 250), respectively. This

court consolidated the cases for purposes of appeal. Bohach raises two assignments

of error for our review, which we will discuss together.

First Assignment of Error

The failure to admit that you had violated statute does not constitute an act sufficient to support a conviction for obstruction of official business, accordingly the conviction herein must be reversed, and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Second Assignment of Error

The conviction herein is not supported by the manifest weight of the evidence nor is there sufficient evidence to support a conviction without the identification of the Defendant as the offender, and accordingly, the conviction herein must be reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

{¶8} In his assignments of error, Bohach argues that his obstructing-official-

business and criminal-trespass convictions are based on insufficient evidence and

are against the manifest weight of the evidence.2 In particular, in his first assignment

of error, Bohach argues that his obstructing-official-business conviction is based on

1 The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence on June 8, 2023. 2 Bohach does not challenge his findings of contempt.

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insufficient evidence. In his second assignment of error, Bohach specifically

disputes the issue of identity as to his criminal-trespass convictions.

Standard of Review

{¶9} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are

clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389

(1997). Thus, we address each legal concept individually.

{¶10} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at

trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average

mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio

St.3d 259 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional

amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997). Accordingly,

“[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “In deciding if the

evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the

credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact.” State v.

Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120570 and C-120571, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33,

citing State v. Williams, 197 Ohio App.3d 505, 2011-Ohio-6267, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.).

See also State v. Berry, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-12-03, 2013-Ohio-2380, ¶ 19

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(“Sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy rather than credibility or weight

of the evidence.”), citing Thompkins at 386.

{¶11} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the

manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record,

“‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of

witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier

of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that

the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387,

quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing

court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating

to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass,

10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard,

“[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the

conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v.

Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v.

Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶12} We will begin by reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

Bohach’s criminal-trespass and obstructing-official-business convictions. Bohach

was convicted of criminal trespass under R.C. 2911.21(A)(1) and obstructing

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official business under R.C. 2921.31(A). R.C. 2911.21 sets forth the offense of

criminal trespass and provides, in its relevant part, that “[n]o person, without

privilege to do so, shall * * * [k]nowingly enter or remain on the land or premises

of another.” R.C. 2911.21(A)(1). “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose,

when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain

result or will probably be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B).

{¶13} However, Bohach does not dispute the evidence concerning the

underlying elements of the offenses of which he was convicted; instead, he disputes

the issue of identity as to his convictions. Compare State v. Missler, 3d Dist. Hardin

No. 6-14-06, 2015-Ohio-1076, ¶ 13. Thus, we will address only the identity element

of the offense. Accord id. “‘It is well settled that in order to support a conviction,

the evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant

as the person who actually committed the crime at issue.’” Id., quoting State v.

Johnson, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 13 JE 5, 2014-Ohio-1226, ¶ 27.

{¶14} In support of his sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, Bohach

argues that a rational trier of fact could not have found that he was the person who

criminally trespassed at Pine Crest. The record belies Bohach’s argument.

Importantly, the State presented direct evidence that Bohach was the person who

criminally trespassed at Pine Crest. Decisively, Officer Knipp identified Bohach as

the person seen in the Ring-doorbell-camera video on March 21 and 25, 2023.

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{¶15} Specifically, Officer Knipp testified that he obtained the video

recording from the Ring-doorbell camera from the residence adjacent to DeLong’s

residence. He identified State’s Exhibit A as the video recording from the Ring-

doorbell camera and testified that “[t]he clothes that the individual in [the] video

[was] wearing” “match the clothes that [were] being worn by Mr. Bohach” when

Officer Knipp stopped him on March 21, 2023. (May 5, 2023 Tr. at 112). Likewise,

Officer Knipp testified that “the person in the video [was] wearing the same clothes

that Jacob Bohach was wearing on” March 25, 2023. Accordingly, contrary to

Bohach’s argument on appeal, the State presented direct evidence tying him to Pine

Crest. Therefore, based on our review of the record, a rational trier of fact could

have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Bohach was the person who criminally

trespassed. Thus, the record supports that Bohach’s criminal-trespass convictions

are based on sufficient evidence.

{¶16} Having concluded that Bohach’s criminal-trespass convictions are

based on sufficient evidence, we turn to Bohach’s obstructing-official-business

conviction. Obstructing official business is defined by R.C. 2921.31, which

provides, in its relevant part, that “[n]o person, without privilege to do so and with

purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any

authorized act within the public official’s official capacity, shall do any act that

hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the public official’s

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lawful duties.” R.C. 2921.31(A). “A person acts purposely when it is the person’s

specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a

prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender

intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender’s specific intention to engage in

conduct of that nature.” R.C. 2901.22(A).

{¶17} To violate the obstructing-official-business statue, a defendant must

engage in an affirmative or overt act. State v. Pierce, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-

36, 2017-Ohio-4223, ¶ 12. In other words, a person “‘cannot obstruct official

business by doing nothing.’” Id., quoting Garfield Hts. v. Simpson, 82 Ohio App.3d

286, 291 (8th Dist.1992). Importantly, the “mere failure or refusal to respond to an

officer’s request does not constitute obstructing official business.” State v. Crowell,

189 Ohio App.3d 468, 2010-Ohio-4917, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). See also Pierce at ¶ 12

(noting that the “[f]ailure to give the police requested information is generally

viewed as an omission rather than as an overt act”).

{¶18} In this case, Bohach argues that his obstructing-official-business

conviction is based on insufficient evidence because “there is no evidence

whatsoever that [he] impeded [law enforcement’s] investigation” by stating that “he

had not been on the property when [law enforcement] believed he had been.”

(Appellant’s Brief at 8). The State disagrees and argues that Officer Knipp’s

testimony “that the answer to the whereabouts of [Bohach] did hinder his

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investigation” is sufficient evidence that Bohach obstructed official business. In

other words, the State contends that Bohach’s denial to Officer Knipp that he had

trespassed at Pine Crest is sufficient evidence that he hampered or impeded Officer

Knipp’s performance of his duties.

{¶19} Based on our review of the record, we agree that the State did not

present sufficient evidence that Bohach hampered or impeded law enforcement’s

investigation. That is, we conclude that the State presented insufficient evidence

that Bohach—without privilege, or with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the

law enforcement officer’s investigation—impeded Officer Knipp’s performance of

his duties by refusing to admit that he criminally trespassed at Pine Crest. See State

v. Casey, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27210, 2017-Ohio-848, ¶ 31. Critically,

Bohach’s refusal to admit that he trespassed does not constitute an overt act that

hampered or impeded Officer Knipp from performing his duties. See Middletown

v. Hollon, 156 Ohio App.3d 565, 2004-Ohio-1502, ¶ 34 (12th Dist.). See also State

v. Prestel, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20822, 2005-Ohio-5236, ¶ 16 (noting that “the

mere refusal to cooperate with police and provide identification upon request does

not constitute obstructing official business”). In other words, Bohach’s lie to

Officer Knipp did not actually hamper or impede Officer Knipp’s investigation.

Indeed, this was made clear by Officer Knipp’s testimony on cross-examination.

Nevertheless, even though Officer Knipp admitted on re-direct examination that

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lying to a law enforcement officer can hamper or impede an investigation, there was

no evidence presented connecting Officer Knipp’s testimony to his investigation of

Bohach for criminal trespassing. Consequently, Bohach’s obstructing-official-

business conviction is based on insufficient evidence.

Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶20} Nonetheless, since Bohach’s criminal-trespass convictions are based

on sufficient evidence, we turn to his argument that his criminal-trespass

convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Similar to his

sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, Bohach challenges the evidence identifying

him as the person who criminally trespassed at Pine Crest. Specifically, Bohach

argues that the evidence identifying him as the criminal trespasser weighs against

his conviction because “no testimony was offered concerning any similarity in the

clothing, or * * * the shape, height, weight or any other descriptive elements

depicted in the camera scene that might match [Bohach].” (Appellant’s Brief at 9).

{¶21} Contrary to Bohach’s argument, the evidence we summarized in our

sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis supporting Bohach’s criminal-trespassing

conviction is weightier than the evidence against those convictions. Notably,

Bohach overlooks Officer Knipp’s testimony identifying him as the person seen in

the Ring-doorbell-camera recording. Moreover, the jury heard DeLong’s testimony

that she received a call from a neighbor on March 21, 2023 “to let [her] know that

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[Bohach] was actually outside walking around [her] trailer * * * .” (May 5, 2023

Tr. at 137). DeLong testified that, in response to the notification from her neighbor,

she saw Bohach “already walking on Middletown,” so she “yelled for him just to

see what he was wanting, he turned around and looked at [her], but then he just kept

on walking.” (Id. at 138).

{¶22} In this case, “the jury was free to believe or disbelieve all, part, or none

of the testimony of the witnesses presented at trial.” State v. Erickson, 12th Dist.

Warren No. CA2014-10-131, 2015-Ohio-2086, ¶ 42. Indeed, “a conviction is not

against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the jury believed the

prosecution testimony.” Id. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury did not clearly

lost its way and create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that Bohach’s criminal-

trespassing convictions must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Consequently,

Bohach’s criminal-trespassing convictions are not against the manifest weight of

the evidence.

{¶23} Based on the foregoing, Bohach’s first assignment of error is sustained

and his second assignment of error is overruled.

{¶24} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the

particulars assigned and argued in appellant’s second assignment of error, we affirm

the judgments of the trial court in case numbers 23 CRB 250 and 23 CRB 252AB.

Having found error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars assigned and

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argued in his first assignment of error, we reverse the judgment of the trial court in

case number 23 CRB 252AB and remand for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Cause Remanded in Case No. 3-23-28

Judgment Affirmed in Case No. 3-23-29

MILLER and WALDICK, J.J., concur.

/hls

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