[183] BREWER, J.
The state appeals pretrial orders suppressing evidence and granting defendant’s motion for return of seized property. Defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit delivery of marijuana for consideration, ORS 475.862, manufacture of marijuana within 1,000 feet of a school, ORS 475.860(1), delivery of marijuana within 1,000 feet of a school, ORS 475.860(1), and possession of marijuana, ORS 475.864. Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress and to controvert, as well as a motion to require the state to produce seized items for inspection by the defense, and a motion for return of seized items, described in more detail in the discussion below. The trial court granted the motions in pertinent part, and the present appeal ensued. ORS 138.060(l)(c). We conclude that the trial court properly suppressed the evidence in question and ordered the return of monies seized from defendant’s safe deposit box. Accordingly, we affirm.
The state makes two arguments. First, the state argues that defendant’s statutory rights under the banking privacy laws, former ORS 192.550 to 192.595,1 were not violated when a bank employee turned over defendant’s financial records to a police officer, which, in turn, led to the seizure of defendant’s safe deposit box containing a significant amount of cash. Second, the state argues that defendant did not establish a due process violation based on the destruction of exculpatory evidence when the state converted the cash that had been found in defendant’s safe deposit box into a check and deposited it in an interest-bearing account. As explained below, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the violation of defendant’s rights under the banking privacy laws entitled defendant to suppression of all evidence pertaining to the safe deposit box. Accordingly, we need not address the state’s arguments concerning the alleged destruction of exculpatory evidence.
In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we view the record, and all the inferences that it [184] will support, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, if there is constitutionally sufficient evidence in the record to support them. State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 74-75, 854 P2d 421 (1993). In the absence of express findings, we presume that the trial court decided factual issues in a manner consistent with its ultimate conclusions. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487, 443 P2d 621 (1968). There are no significant factual disputes at issue here, at least with regard to the dispositive questions relating to the banking privacy laws.
On May 22, 2008, Officer Conner of the Drug Enforcement Section of the Oregon State Police executed a search warrant — not the warrant at issue in the present appeal — at defendant’s residence. In the course of doing so, Conner found more than eight pounds of marijuana, more than $11,000 in cash, and records indicating that defendant had approximately $80,000 in a checking account at the Community Bank. On May 23, 2008, Conner sent to the Joseph Branch of the Community Bank a “Notice of Intent to Seize Bank Accounts” listed under defendant’s name.2
Later that day, Conner received a call from a bank employee telling him that defendant was there seeking access to his safe deposit box, and asking Conner if “the notice of intent to seize also was for the safe deposit box.” Conner replied to the bank employee, “Yes, everything that is in [defendant’s] name we need to seize at this point through the State Police.”
On May 29, 2008, in anticipation of applying for the search warrant at issue here, Conner went to the Community [185] Bank and spoke with an operations supervisor, Johnson, “got the actual address for where the safe deposit box was held,” and “asked her for the number on the safe deposit box so I could specify the safe deposit box that we wanted to search.” Johnson provided that information, which Connor then incorporated into an affidavit in support of a search warrant, along with details of his training and experience, to support a conclusion that individuals who traffic in drugs often secrete proceeds of their drug crimes in safe deposit boxes.
On May 30, 2008, Conner obtained a search warrant authorizing him to seize the specified safe deposit box. Pursuant to that warrant, Conner seized the safe deposit box, determined that it had a large amount of cash in it, and transported it to his office. At some point thereafter, another officer’s drug-detection dog alerted to the safe deposit box. On July 29, 2008, defendant filed a motion requiring the state to produce for inspection various items seized, including the safe deposit box with the cash in it. The following day, the state converted the cash into a cashier’s check and deposited it into a bank account. Defendant thus was not afforded an opportunity to inspect the cash in the safe deposit box.
As pertinent to this appeal, defendant’s motion to suppress and controvert was based on the theories that (1) the bank turned over his financial records — in particular, details about the existence of and details about his safe deposit box — in violation of Oregon’s banking privacy laws, former ORS 192.550 to 192.595; and (2) the state’s disposal of the cash contained in the safe deposit box violated his due process rights. The trial court agreed with defendant on both points, and accordingly, granted defendant’s motion to suppress all evidence pertaining to the safe deposit box and ordered the return of money seized from the safe deposit box.
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[183] BREWER, J.
The state appeals pretrial orders suppressing evidence and granting defendant’s motion for return of seized property. Defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit delivery of marijuana for consideration, ORS 475.862, manufacture of marijuana within 1,000 feet of a school, ORS 475.860(1), delivery of marijuana within 1,000 feet of a school, ORS 475.860(1), and possession of marijuana, ORS 475.864. Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress and to controvert, as well as a motion to require the state to produce seized items for inspection by the defense, and a motion for return of seized items, described in more detail in the discussion below. The trial court granted the motions in pertinent part, and the present appeal ensued. ORS 138.060(l)(c). We conclude that the trial court properly suppressed the evidence in question and ordered the return of monies seized from defendant’s safe deposit box. Accordingly, we affirm.
The state makes two arguments. First, the state argues that defendant’s statutory rights under the banking privacy laws, former ORS 192.550 to 192.595,1 were not violated when a bank employee turned over defendant’s financial records to a police officer, which, in turn, led to the seizure of defendant’s safe deposit box containing a significant amount of cash. Second, the state argues that defendant did not establish a due process violation based on the destruction of exculpatory evidence when the state converted the cash that had been found in defendant’s safe deposit box into a check and deposited it in an interest-bearing account. As explained below, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the violation of defendant’s rights under the banking privacy laws entitled defendant to suppression of all evidence pertaining to the safe deposit box. Accordingly, we need not address the state’s arguments concerning the alleged destruction of exculpatory evidence.
In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we view the record, and all the inferences that it [184] will support, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, if there is constitutionally sufficient evidence in the record to support them. State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 74-75, 854 P2d 421 (1993). In the absence of express findings, we presume that the trial court decided factual issues in a manner consistent with its ultimate conclusions. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487, 443 P2d 621 (1968). There are no significant factual disputes at issue here, at least with regard to the dispositive questions relating to the banking privacy laws.
On May 22, 2008, Officer Conner of the Drug Enforcement Section of the Oregon State Police executed a search warrant — not the warrant at issue in the present appeal — at defendant’s residence. In the course of doing so, Conner found more than eight pounds of marijuana, more than $11,000 in cash, and records indicating that defendant had approximately $80,000 in a checking account at the Community Bank. On May 23, 2008, Conner sent to the Joseph Branch of the Community Bank a “Notice of Intent to Seize Bank Accounts” listed under defendant’s name.2
Later that day, Conner received a call from a bank employee telling him that defendant was there seeking access to his safe deposit box, and asking Conner if “the notice of intent to seize also was for the safe deposit box.” Conner replied to the bank employee, “Yes, everything that is in [defendant’s] name we need to seize at this point through the State Police.”
On May 29, 2008, in anticipation of applying for the search warrant at issue here, Conner went to the Community [185] Bank and spoke with an operations supervisor, Johnson, “got the actual address for where the safe deposit box was held,” and “asked her for the number on the safe deposit box so I could specify the safe deposit box that we wanted to search.” Johnson provided that information, which Connor then incorporated into an affidavit in support of a search warrant, along with details of his training and experience, to support a conclusion that individuals who traffic in drugs often secrete proceeds of their drug crimes in safe deposit boxes.
On May 30, 2008, Conner obtained a search warrant authorizing him to seize the specified safe deposit box. Pursuant to that warrant, Conner seized the safe deposit box, determined that it had a large amount of cash in it, and transported it to his office. At some point thereafter, another officer’s drug-detection dog alerted to the safe deposit box. On July 29, 2008, defendant filed a motion requiring the state to produce for inspection various items seized, including the safe deposit box with the cash in it. The following day, the state converted the cash into a cashier’s check and deposited it into a bank account. Defendant thus was not afforded an opportunity to inspect the cash in the safe deposit box.
As pertinent to this appeal, defendant’s motion to suppress and controvert was based on the theories that (1) the bank turned over his financial records — in particular, details about the existence of and details about his safe deposit box — in violation of Oregon’s banking privacy laws, former ORS 192.550 to 192.595; and (2) the state’s disposal of the cash contained in the safe deposit box violated his due process rights. The trial court agreed with defendant on both points, and accordingly, granted defendant’s motion to suppress all evidence pertaining to the safe deposit box and ordered the return of money seized from the safe deposit box.
As an initial matter, we note what is not at issue in this case. The pertinent events described above occurred as a result of Conner’s issuance of a “Notice of Intent to Seize” that he issued to defendant’s bank, citing ORS 131.561, a provision of the criminal forfeiture law. The state does not assert that ORS 131.561, or any other provision of the criminal forfeiture laws, see ORS 131.550 through 131.604, authorized the disclosure of defendant’s financial records or seizure of [186] defendant’s safe deposit box, or that the criminal forfeiture laws in any way override the banking privacy laws. The question presented, then, is simply whether defendant is entitled to suppression of the evidence pursuant to former ORS 192.590(5), which provided that “[ejvidence obtained in violation of [former] ORS 192.550 to 192.595 is inadmissible in any proceeding.” See State v. McKee, 89 Or App 94, 99, 747 P2d 395 (1987) (“[U]se of evidence obtained in violation of ORS 192.550 to ORS 192.595 in an affidavit for a search warrant is prohibited by ORS 192.590(5).”).
Former ORS 192.555 (2007) provided:
“(1) Except as provided in ORS 192.557, 192.559, 192.560, 192.565, 192.570 and 192.585 or as required by ORS 25.643 and 25.646 and the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, ORS 98.302 to 98.436 and 98.992:
“(a) No financial institution shall provide any financial records of any customer to a state or local agency.
“(b) No state or local agency shall request or receive from a financial institution any financial records of customers.
“(2) Subsection (1) of this section shall not preclude a financial institution, in its discretion, from initiating contact with, and thereafter communicating with and disclosing customer financial records to:
“(a) Appropriate state or local agencies concerning any suspected violation of the law.”3
We conclude that none of the statutory exceptions listed in subsection (1) of that statute applies in the present circumstances. The state asserted before the trial court, and continues to assert on appeal, that the bank’s disclosure of the existence and details of defendant’s safe deposit box was authorized by former ORS 192.555(2)(a). It argues that the bank’s receipt of the “Notice of Intent to Seize” that Conner faxed on May 23 gave the bank reason to suspect a violation of the law, former ORS 192.555(2)(a), and, therefore, the bank was not precluded by that statute from contacting Conner (a representative of an “[appropriate state or local [187] agenc[y]”) concerning the “suspected violation of the law.” We emphasize that the state does not assert — nor does the record support the inference — that any employee or agent of the bank had any reason independent from the “Notice of Intent to Seize” that the bank had received from Conner to suspect defendant of any violation of the law. As explained below, we conclude that the state’s proposed interpretation of the exception set out in former ORS 192.555(2)(a) is incorrect.
In interpreting a statute, our task is to determine the legislature’s intent by examining the text of the statute in context, as well as, if necessary, legislative history and applicable canons of statutory construction. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). The terms “financial institution,” “financial records,” “state agency” and “local agency” are defined by former ORS 192.550. It is undisputed that the bank is a “financial institution” and that, when it disclosed the existence of and details about defendant’s safe deposit box, it disclosed “financial records.” It also is undisputed that Connor, the recipient of that information, was an officer of a “state agency.”
Beyond those defined terms, we give words of common usage their plain and ordinary meaning. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). The dispositive question is whether the bank was permitted by former ORS 192.555(2) to disclose defendant’s financial records to Conner because the circumstances fell within the exception “concerning any suspected violation of the law.” “Concerning” means “relating to : regarding, respecting, about.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 470 (unabridged ed 2002). Thus, the disclosure of the financial records must be “regarding” or “about” the suspected violation of the law. “Any” is “used as a function word especially] in interrogative and conditional expressions to indicate one that is not a particular or definite individual of the given category but whichever one chance may select” or “used as a function word to indicate a positive but undetermined number or amount.” Id. at 97. “Suspected” is the past participle of “suspect,” and means “that one suspects or has a suspicion of.” Id. at 2303. “Suspect,” in turn, has several potential definitions that could apply here:
[188] “2: to imagine (one) to be guilty or culpable on slight evidence or without proof <~ one of a theft> <~ one of giving false information) < no one had hitherto ~ed him of statecraft— John Buchan> 3: to imagine to be or be true, likely, or probable : have a suspicion, intimation, or inkling of: surmise <we never - the disease because the attack amounts to nothing more than a bad headache — Monsanto Mag.> <when I know that he is honest and ~ that he is right — H. L. Mencken>.”
Id.
It follows from the ordinary meanings of those terms that, in order to fall within the exception of former ORS 192.555(2)(a), the bank’s disclosure of customer’s financial records must be in regard to the suspected violation of the law. Thus, for example, a bank officer who observed a customer commit a traffic infraction in the bank’s parking lot would not be justified under this subsection in turning over that customer’s financial records to law enforcement, because the financial records would not be “concerning” the observed violation of the law.
The more challenging textual question is what to make of the term “suspected.” As noted, one may “suspect” something “on slight evidence or without proof,” or on the basis that it is “true, likely, or probable.” That is, the word “suspect” does not necessarily indicate the quantum of suspicion that is necessary, and, unlike, for example, the term “reasonable suspicion,” there is no well-established legal meaning that informs that question. In this case, however, we need not determine the quantum of suspicion contemplated by the statute, because the dispositive issue here is not how much suspicion was involved, but who must have that suspicion. The phrasing of the statute does not indicate who must have the suspicion — it merely indicates that a bank may disclose financial records of a customer “concerning any suspected violation of the law.” Defendant argues that the bank itself must independently suspect a violation of the law in order for this exception to make sense in light of the other provisions of the banking privacy laws. The state, by contrast, takes the position that a bank, having knowledge that a state agency “suspect[s] * * * violation of the law” and is interested in the financial records of a bank’s customer, may [189] provide the financial records to the state agency based on the state agency’s suspicion.
We reiterate that the record does not indicate that anyone at the bank actually had any independent suspicion of any violation of the law; the only pertinent evidence in the record came from Conner, and the state introduced no testimony or other evidence from any bank employee concerning the bank’s contacts with Conner or with defendant. Thus, the only inference that this record can support is that Conner relayed his suspicion that defendant was suspected of a violation of the law (by way of giving the bank the “Notice of Intent to Seize” that referenced a criminal forfeiture statute), and the bank’s actions were based on Conner’s suspicion, not on the independent suspicion of anyone employed at the bank.4
We conclude that the more natural reading of the text of the statute is that the bank (through one or more of its agents) must have an independent suspicion and that the suspicion of law enforcement agents cannot substitute for such an independent suspicion.5 There are two textual clues in ORS 192.555 that point in that direction. First, subsection (2) only parallels the prohibitions listed in subsection (1) with respect to a bank. That is, subsection (2) provides an exception to subsection (l)(a)’s prohibition on a financial institution providing financial records to a law enforcement agency. There is no comparable exception to (l)(b), which precludes a state or local agency from requesting or receiving such records except as specifically provided by the statutes listed in subsection (1). That is, a law enforcement agency may not [190] avoid the strictures of subsection (1) based on “any suspected violation of the law,” former ORS 192.555(2)(a). Second, the exception found in subsection (2)(a) does not preclude a bank “from initiating contact with, and thereafter communicating with and disclosing customer financial records” “concerning any suspected violation of the law.” (Emphasis added.) That provision appears to contemplate circumstances in which a bank seeks out law enforcement authorities concerning a suspected violation of the law, not circumstances where law enforcement seeks out the bank and informs it that the law enforcement agency suspects a violation of the law. In light of those textual clues, we conclude that the most plausible reading of the text of former ORS 192.555(2)(a) is that it concerns circumstances in which a financial institution develops an independent suspicion of a violation of the law, not circumstances in which a law enforcement agency conveys to a financial institution its own suspicions concerning a violation of the law.
Our examination of the pertinent statutory context reinforces that conclusion. Former ORS 192.559 allowed state courts to seek financial records of individuals who had requested or received court-appointed counsel. Former ORS 192.560 permitted a financial institution to disclose financial records of a customer “when the customer has authorized such disclosure as provided in this section.” Former ORS 192.570 permitted a financial institution to disclose financial records pursuant to a lawful search warrant. Former ORS 192.565, which has potential application to the facts of this case but was not utilized here, provided:
“(1) A financial institution may disclose financial records of a customer to a state or local agency, and a state or local agency may request and receive such records, pursuant to a lawful summons or subpoena, served upon the financial institution, as provided in this section or ORS chapter 25.