State v. Boatright
This text of 399 S.E.2d 57 (State v. Boatright) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Linda Boatright was indicted by the January 1989 term of the Grand Jury of Roane County on four counts, all related to one incident involving Triazolam, which is classified under W. Va. Code, 60A-2-210 [1987], as a Schedule IV controlled substance. The circuit court dismissed the indictment holding that the statute was unconstitutional because the State Board of Pharmacy, which recommended an amendment to W.Va.Code, 60A-2-210 [1987], failed to follow the procedures outlined in W. Va. Code, 60A-2-201 [1985]. 1 On appeal, the State argues that the statute is constitutional because it was properly adopted by the legislature and is clear and unambiguous. Because we agree with the State that the statute is not unconstitutional for this reason, we reverse the circuit court.
The indictment arose out of an alleged incident at the Roane County Jail on December 19, 1988. Ms. Boatright allegedly delivered a bag of items for an inmate, which contained 30 pills of Triazolam concealed inside a bottle of body powder. Ms. Boatright filed a motion to dismiss the indictment alleging that W. Va. Code, 60A-2-210 [1987], was unconstitutional because of. irregularities in its enactment. The alleged irregularities concerned the State Board of Pharmacy and its recommendation to the legislature to amend W.Va.Code, 60A-2-210, by including Triazolam as a controlled substance. Triazolam was designated as a controlled substance under federal law. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 811, 812; 21 C.F.R. 1308.-14 [1990]. Ms. Boatright alleges that the State Board of Pharmacy failed to hold regular meetings and that the board gave no reason to the legislature for its recommendation to include Triazolam.
I
In Syllabus Point 1, State v. Elder, 152 W.Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968), we stated:
Courts always endeavor to give effect to the legislative intent, but a statute that is clear and unambiguous will be applied and not construed.
The statute in question is our Uniform Controlled Substances Act, in particular W.Va.Code, 60A-2-210 [1987], which was amended in 1987 to include the drug Triaz-olam in the list of Schedule IV controlled substances. 2 . W. Va. Code, 60A-2-210 [1987], states in pertinent part:
*29 (a) The controlled substances listed in this section are included in Schedule IV.
(b) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances, including its salts, isomers and salts of isomers whenever the existence of such salts, isomers and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation: ...
(47) Triazolam.
The language of the statute is plain and simple and the intent of the legislature to include Triazolam is clear and unambiguous. We always endeavor to give effect to plain language of the statute.
Ms. Boatright does not argue that W.Va.Code, 60A-2-210 [1987] is facially flawed. Rather she argues that the State Board of Pharmacy did not follow the procedures outlined in W.Va.Code, 60A-2-201 [1985] and, therefore, its recommendation that Triazolam be included as a Schedule IV controlled substance renders the inclusion of Triazolam unconstitutional. Her argument is without merit, because the legislature by amending the statute showed its intent to include Triazolam as a controlled substance. In Syllabus Point 4, State v. Grinstead, 157 W.Va. 1001, 206 S.E.2d 912 (1974), we held:
The constitutional prerequisite to a valid statute is that the law shall be complete when enacted.
In Grinstead, we found the attempt to adopt “future laws, rules or regulations of other states, or of the federal government, or of its agencies” to be unconstitutional “as an unlawful delegation of the legislative power.” Syllabus Point 1, in part, Grinstead, supra. In the present case, the legislature specifically acted and approved an amendment to our Controlled Substances Act, which among other changes included Triazolam as a Schedule IV controlled substance.
One canon of statutory construction is to follow the statute’s plain, unambiguous language. “When the statute is unambiguous on its face, there is no real need to consider its legislative history.” Cooper v. Tazewell Square Apartments, Ltd., 577 F.Supp 1483, 1487 (W.D.Va.1984) rev’d. on other grounds, Kennedy v. Block, 606 F.Supp. 1397 (W.D.Va.1985); Brown v. Porcher, 502 F.Supp. 946, 955-56 n. 17 (D.S.C.1980), aff'd. as modified, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.1981) cert. denied 459 U.S. 1150, 103 S.Ct. 796, 74 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1983). In Syllabus Point 4, State ex rel. West Virginia Housing Development Fund v. Copenhaver, 153 W.Va. 636, 171 S.E.2d 545 (1969), we held:
A fact once determined by the legislature, and made the basis of a legislative act, is not thereafter open to judicial investigation.
See State ex rel. Ginsberg v. Naum, 173 W.Va. 510, 318 S.E.2d 454 (1984).
“Under the West Virginia Constitution, Article VI, Section 1, and Article V, Section 1 — the latter insuring separation of powers among the legislative, the executive and judicial branches of government — enactment of criminal statutes is solely a legislative function. (Citations omitted).” Grinstead, 157 W.Va. at 1013, 206 S.E.2d at 920. The legislature can suggest procedures to receive recommendations for proposed laws in order to expedite its processes. However, only the legislature possesses the sole power to make laws. Even it is not an absolute or unlimited power, for example, the West Virginia Constitution, Article VI, sets forth the procedures that the legislature must follow and the legislature cannot “give away or sell the discretion of subsequent legislatures in respect to matters, the government of which from the very nature of things must vary in varying circumstances.” State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 134 W.Va. 278, 293, 58 S.E.2d 766, 775 (1950) rev’d. on other grounds, 341 U.S. 22, 71 S.Ct. 557, 95 L.Ed. 713 (1951).
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399 S.E.2d 57, 184 W. Va. 27, 1990 W. Va. LEXIS 192, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-boatright-wva-1990.