[Cite as State v. Blanton, 2015-Ohio-4620.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MARION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 9-15-07
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
BOBBIE NICOLE BLANTON, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 14-CR-249
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: November 9, 2015
APPEARANCES:
Kevin Collins for Appellant
Raymond A. Grogan Jr. for Appellee Case No. 9-15-07
ROGERS, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Bobbie Blanton, appeals the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Marion County convicting her of obstructing justice
and sentencing her to 18 months of community control. On appeal, Blanton
argues that the trial court erred by (1) entering a verdict that was not supported by
sufficient evidence; (2) entering a verdict that was against the manifest weight of
the evidence; (3) allowing the prosecutor to ask improper questions to potential
jurors during voir dire; and (4) refusing to use Blanton’s suggested jury
instructions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
{¶2} On May 28, 2014, the Marion County Grand Jury returned a one count
indictment against Blanton charging her with one count of obstructing justice in
violation of R.C. 2921.32(A)(1), a felony of the fifth degree. Blanton pleaded not
guilty to the charge.
{¶3} On August 14, 2014, Blanton filed a motion to dismiss the charge1 and
suppress any and all evidence that was obtained by law enforcement officials. She
withdrew her motion to suppress on October 9, 2014.
{¶4} The matter proceeded to a jury trial on October 28, 2014 and lasted for
two days. During voir dire, the prosecutor asked the potential jurors, “Okay.
Generally speaking, if I were to say that - - Would you generally agree that people
1 Because there is no indication in the record that the trial court ruled on Blanton’s motion to dismiss before proceeding to trial, we presume the court overruled it. Georgeoff v. O'Brien, 105 Ohio App.3d 373, 378 (9th Dist.1995).
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who lie to police officers should be prosecuted for that?” Oct. 28, 2014 Trial Tr..,
p. 23. Blanton’s counsel objected to this question on the grounds that it went to an
ultimate issue of the case. The trial court overruled the objection. Next, the
prosecutor asked, “Does everybody agree that people who lie to a police officer
should be prosecuted for that? Any - - I need a yes or no. Generally speaking yes,
okay? All right. Does anybody hold the opinion if somebody lies to a police
officer, it’s just part of the police officer’s job, and they have to deal with?” Id. at
p. 24. Again, Blanton’s counsel objected and requested a continuing objection
regarding this line of questioning. The court proceeded to overrule the objection.
After the jury was impaneled, Blanton’s counsel moved for a mistrial based on the
prosecutor’s improper line of questioning, which was denied.
{¶5} Jason Peterson was the first witness to testify on behalf of the State.
Peterson testified that he works for the Marion Municipal Court as a deputy bailiff.
As part of his normal day to day duties, Peterson stated that he works in the clerk’s
office. Peterson identified a felony complaint for a Mr. William Blanton
(“William”), which charged William with one count of domestic violence, a
felony of the fourth degree. Peterson also identified a felony arrest warrant in
William’s name. In the warrant, William was described as being five foot five
inches tall, 140 pounds, with blonde hair and blue eyes. Both the complaint and
warrant were later admitted into evidence.
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{¶6} Julie Kagel was next to testify. Kagel testified that she was the
Marion County Clerk of Courts and had been so for approximately 15 years.
Specifically, she was responsible for keeping the records for the county common
pleas court’s general and criminal divisions. Kagel identified a judgment entry of
sentencing out of the Common Pleas Court of Marion County, which was filed on
July 21, 2014. The entry stated that William was found guilty of one count of
domestic violence. The entry was later admitted into evidence.
{¶7} Officer Rob Musser of the Marion Police Department was the next
witness to testify on behalf of the State. Officer Musser testified that he was
working on May 22, 2014. On that evening, Officer Musser stated that he went to
767 W. Center St. in Marion, Ohio to arrest William. He explained that the Center
Street address was the one listed on the arrest warrant. Officer Musser testified
that he and two additional officers, Officer Kindell and Lieutenant Bayles, all
arrived at the house at the same time.
{¶8} Upon arriving at the address, Officer Musser stated that he went to the
southwest side of the house, where the back door was located. He added that
Blanton exited out the back door and the two engaged in a conversation. Officer
Musser testified that he informed Blanton that they were there to arrest William.
He also asked Blanton if William was in the house, and she replied no. Officer
Musser added that he asked Blanton if she knew of William’s whereabouts, and
she indicated that he was somewhere on a nearby street. Blanton also told Officer
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Musser that she was alone in the house at that time. Officer Musser testified that
he explained to Blanton that she would be charged with obstructing justice if
William was in the house, and Blanton indicated that she understood. After the
conversation, Officer Musser stated that Blanton returned to the house. Officer
Musser testified that he was informed that one of the other officers had seen an
individual matching William’s description in the house while Officer Musser and
Blanton were talking.
{¶9} Officer Musser testified that ultimately the decision was made to enter
the house. However, they waited approximately 45 minutes for the dog warden to
show up because the officers observed large dogs inside the house that appeared to
be aggressive. Officer Musser explained that periodically he or one of the other
officers would knock on the door and say “William, come out. We know you’re
in there.” Id. at p. 138.
{¶10} Once the dog warden arrived, Officer Musser stated that they
breached the house through a back garage door. He testified that William came
out and was arrested.
{¶11} On cross-examination, Officer Musser testified that Blanton refused
to allow the officers into her home and demanded to see a warrant. Officer
Musser admitted that he never showed Blanton any kind of warrant. Further, he
added that had the dogs not been there, then the officers would have gone into the
house right after the decision to breach was made. He also admitted that Blanton
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in no way hindered them from entering the home. Rather, any delay was only
caused by the concern of the dogs.
{¶12} Officer Michael Kindell of the Marion Police Department was the
next witness to testify. Officer Kindell testified that he was working on May 22,
2014, when he was dispatched to 767 W. Center Street to assist Officer Musser.
He stated that both Officer Musser and Lieutenant Bayles were at the scene when
he arrived. Officer Kindell explained that he was responsible for securing the west
side of the house to make sure no one tried to escape from that side. From his
position, Officer Kindell was able to see the inside of the house through a window.
He testified that the lights were on inside the house, which allowed him to see
clearly into the house.
{¶13} While looking through the window, Officer Kindell stated that he
observed an individual matching William’s description. Specifically, he testified
that “The physical description of William was a very short man with short
blondish hair. And that’s exactly the description of the male that was sitting
there.” Id. at p. 168. He then relayed this information to Lieutenant Bayles.
Officer Kindell added that he observed Blanton walk directly past William after
her conversation with Officer Musser concluded.
{¶14} At the conclusion of Officer Kindell’s testimony, the State rested.
Afterwards, Blanton’s counsel moved for an acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29. The
motion was overruled by the trial court.
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{¶15} Jeffrey Reed was the first witness to testify on behalf of Blanton.
Reed testified that he was employed by the Marion County Adult Probation
Department and served as a cognitive behavior therapy specialist. He added that
he “teach[es] thinking for change classes and [the department’s] victim awareness
class and [he] also do[es] some intensive supervision.” Id. at p. 195. Reed stated
that he had previously supervised William.
{¶16} Reed explained that if a probationer wanted to leave the state of Ohio
then he or she would have to contact the probation department for approval. He
testified that William was granted several travel permits that allowed William to
drive to Kentucky to work.
{¶17} William was the next witness to testify. William testified that he was
currently incarcerated due to his conviction for felony domestic violence. He
explained that the conviction stemmed from a May 10, 2014 incident. After the
altercation, William explained that he traveled down to Kentucky for work.
{¶18} While in Kentucky, William stated that he received a phone call from
Blanton telling him that he needed to come back to Marion to face the felony
domestic violence charge. He added that no one else contacted him regarding the
charge and that Blanton convinced him to return and turn himself in to police.
William testified that he went to the 767 W. Center Street address on the night of
May 22, 2014 to talk to Blanton about the domestic violence charge.
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{¶19} On cross-examination, William admitted that he told Officer Kindell
on the night of the domestic violence incident that he was living at 767 W. Center
Street with Blanton. William clarified that by “living” he meant that he would
spend several nights a week at Blanton’s. He also claimed that there was no way
Officer Kindell could have seen him inside the house the night he was arrested.
William stated that after Blanton finished talking with Officer Musser she told
William that the police were looking for him. In addition to the domestic violence
charge, William admitted that he had been convicted of possession of cocaine and
burglary.
{¶20} Tonya Rischel was the next witness to testify on Blanton’s behalf.
Rischel testified that she was a legal assistant for attorney Tom Matthews. Her
responsibilities included “tak[ing] care of answering phones, faxes, E-mailing,
typing documents, filing.” Id. at p. 219. Rischel testified that Blanton had made
an appointment to see Matthews on May 23, 2014 regarding William. She stated
that Blanton had previously called to make an appointment for William to see
Matthews on May 19, 2014, but she later had it rescheduled to the May 23 date.
{¶21} Gwen Chestnut was the next witness to testify. Chestnut stated that
she was employed by the Marion County Prosecutor’s Office and worked as a
victim advocate. She testified that she was assigned to be Blanton’s advocate in
the domestic violence case. Chestnut stated that she met with Blanton on at least
two occasions to discuss the case. She explained that Blanton wanted a civil
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protection order, previously issued against William and listing her as the victim,
terminated.2 Additionally, Blanton expressed her wishes that they could come up
with a way for William to turn himself into police so he would not lose his job.
{¶22} Bailey Witzell was the next witness to testify. Witzell testified that
she is Blanton’s daughter and currently lives with Blanton. She explained that
William is not her biological father, but rather her stepfather. Witzell testified that
she accompanied her mother to the meeting with Chestnut. She stated that during
this meeting Blanton kept “[a]sking how does [Blanton] help to get William back
and turn him in to his attorney the next day, if the charges would get dropped in
the [civil protection order.]” Id. at p. 240. She added that Blanton owns two dogs:
a pit bull and a pit bull/boxer mix.
{¶23} Officer Chris Walker of the Marion City Police Department was the
last witness to testify. Officer Walker testified that his primary responsibility was
to serve as a dispatcher. He stated that he was working on May 22, 2014. Officer
Walker testified that all the officers involved in the arrest of William arrived at the
scene separately, but within 10 minutes or so from each other.
{¶24} At the conclusion of Officer Walker’s testimony, Blanton rested. At
that time, Blanton’s counsel renewed the motion for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R.
29, which was overruled by the trial court.
2 Although a civil protection order was eventually served to William, no order was served prior to the date of his arrest. The meeting between Chestnut and Blanton occurred before the arrest date, therefore no civil protection order was effective at that point.
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{¶25} Prior to closing arguments, Blanton’s counsel objected to the jury
instructions in the case. Specifically, counsel argued that the jury should be
instructed that an essential element of obstructing justice, where the basis is
harboring or concealing, is that the defendant’s actions “in fact hindered or
reasonably could have said to have hindered the discovery, prosecution, conviction
or punishment or apprehension of [a potential felon.]” Oct. 29, 2014 Trial Tr., p.
3. In addition, counsel argued that the jury should be instructed that an oral
misstatement is not punishable conduct under the law. The trial court overruled
these objections.
{¶26} After deliberating, the jury returned with a verdict of guilty as to the
sole charge of obstructing justice. They further found that the crime committed by
William was a felony. The trial court issued an entry on January 16, 2015,
sentencing Blanton to a period of 18 months of community control.
{¶27} Blanton filed this timely appeal, presenting the following
assignments of error for our review.
Assignment of Error No. I
THE RECORD CONTAINS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE IN VIOLATION OF R.C. 2921.32(A)(1).
Assignment of Error No. II
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE IN VIOLATION OF R.C.
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2921.32(A)(1) IS CONTRARY TO THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.
Assignment of Error No. III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BY PERMITTING THE STATE TO ASK IMPROPER QUESTIONS DURING VOIRE [SIC] DIRE.
Assignment of Error No. IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BY REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE AS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
{¶28} In her first assignment of error, Blanton argues that the trial court
erred by entering a verdict that was not supported by sufficient evidence.
Specifically, Blanton argues that that State failed to present evidence as to the
degree of culpability requirement. Further, she argues that the State failed to
present evidence that her conduct consisted of anything more than an unsworn oral
misstatement. Finally, Blanton argues that the State failed to present evidence that
her actions actually hindered the police. We disagree.
{¶29} When an appellate court reviews the record for sufficiency, the
relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Monroe,
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105 Ohio St.3d 384, 2005-Ohio-2282, ¶ 47. Sufficiency is a test of adequacy.
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997), superseded by constitutional
amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997).
Accordingly, the question of whether the offered evidence is sufficient to sustain a
verdict is a question of law. State v. Wingate, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26433, 2013-
Ohio-2079, ¶ 4.
{¶30} Blanton was charged with one count of obstructing justice under
R.C. 2921.32(A)(1). R.C. 2921.32(A)(1) states,
(A) No person, with purpose to hinder the discovery, apprehension, conviction, or punishment of another for crime * * * shall do any of the following:
(1) Harbor or conceal the other person * * *[.]
“A person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention to cause a
certain result * * *.” R.C. 2901.22(A). Additionally, “ ‘Intent lies within the
privacy of an individual’s own thoughts and is not susceptible of objective proof.’
” State v. Davis, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-06-56, 2007-Ohio-4741, ¶ 33, quoting
State v. Harris, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-04-34, 2006-Ohio-1396, ¶ 48, citing State v.
Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 60 (1995). As a result, intent can be proven by the
surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. Id.
{¶31} “Harboring” is defined as “[t]he act of affording lodging, shelter, or
refuge to a person, esp. a criminal or illegal alien.” Black’s Law Dictionary 831
(10th Ed.2014). Other courts have found that “[h]arboring or concealing requires
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an overt act that does in fact hinder the discovery or apprehension of the person
sought by the police.” State v. Blackson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 17971, 1997 WL
89218, *2 (Feb. 26, 1997), citing State v. Connor, 81 Ohio App.3d 829, 832 (9th
Dist.1992); see also State v. Cooper, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2005-A-0025,
2006-Ohio-869, ¶ 24; State v. Davis, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 99AP-1428, 2000
WL 1455680, *6 (Sep. 28, 2000). Finally,
The gist of [obstructing justice] is not the hindering of the police but, rather, harboring or concealing another with a purpose to hinder his apprehension or discovery. It is the act of harboring or concealing with the purpose of hindering his discovery or apprehension that constitutes the crime. It is not necessary that harboring or concealing be sufficiently successful to prevent the discovery or apprehension of the suspect for any prolonged period of time.
State v. Claybrook, 57 Ohio App.2d 131, 135 (10th Dist.1978).
{¶32} Blanton argues that oral misstatements are not punishable conduct
under R.C. 2921.32(A)(1). In contrast, the State argues that Blanton’s statements
constituted lies, which were intended to hinder the police and the apprehension of
William, and are punishable conduct under R.C. 2921.32(A)(1). Blanton argues
that since the State relied solely upon Blanton’s statements to Officer Musser, the
State failed to present sufficient evidence to support a conviction. Both parties
miss the point. Blanton has not been charged under R.C. 2921.32(A)(5) with
making false statements and thereby hindering the discovery or apprehension of
William. Rather, she was charged with harboring or concealing William pursuant
to R.C. 2921.32(A)(1), which has no prerequisite of misstatements or false
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statements. The evidence demonstrates that William was in her residence and
being afforded with “lodging, shelter, or refuge,” in other words, she was
physically harboring William. The misstatements or false statements are simply
further evidence of her intent to conceal William’s whereabouts, and hinder or
delay his apprehension. It is her intent, or purpose, that is at issue, not the content
of her false statements. Given that this case involved the physical harboring of an
individual, it would be improper for us to decide the issue of whether oral
misstatements are punishable under R.C. 2921.32(A)(1). Compare State v.
Hough, 48 Ohio App.2d 304, 310 (1st Dist.1976) (finding that oral statements can
constitute harboring or concealing absent the defendant physically harboring the
individual sought by authorities).
{¶33} Although other courts have found that harboring or concealing
requires some actual hindrance, which resulted from the defendant’s conduct, we
decline to adopt this requirement. Rather, we find that the true heart of obstructing
justice pursuant to 2921.32(A)(1) is the defendant’s intent to hinder the
apprehension or discovery, etc. of a person believed to have committed a crime.
See Claybrook, 57 Ohio App.2d at 135 (A requested jury instruction, which the
jury must find the defendant not guilty if the police were not hindered by the
defendant’s conduct, would have confused the jury.). Noticeably, any requirement
that a defendant’s conduct hinder the police is absent from the statutory language
of R.C. 2921.32. Contrast this statute with R.C. 2921.31(A), which explicitly
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requires that a defendant’s conduct either “hamper[] or impede[] a public official
in the performance of the public official’s lawful duties.”
{¶34} Recently, this court expressed its refusal to read into a statute an
element that was not present. State v. Faber, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-01, 2015-
Ohio-3720, ¶ 36 (finding that R.C. 2921.31 does not require that police officers
give a command – either audibly or visibly). Similar to our reasoning in Faber,
the language of R.C. 2921.32 does not require that the defendant’s conduct
actually hinder the apprehension or discovery of the harbored individual, and,
therefore, the State was not required to prove any actual hindrance.
{¶35} Considering whether the State presented sufficient evidence to
convict Blanton of obstructing justice, we review the following testimony. At
trial, Detective Musser testified that he went to 767 W. Center Street in Marion,
Ohio to arrest William. Peterson and Kagel testified that at the time of the arrest,
William had a pending charge of felony domestic violence. After looking around
the outside of the house, Officer Musser explained that he encountered Blanton
who had just exited from the back door. Detective Musser informed Blanton of
why they were there and asked her if William was in the house, and she said no.
He next asked her if she knew where William was, and Blanton said somewhere
on a nearby street. She also told Officer Musser that she was alone in the house.
Officer Musser testified that he warned Blanton that she could be charged with
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obstructing justice if she was lying and she indicated that she understood. He
added that she did not allow them into the house when he asked.
{¶36} During Officer Musser’s conversation with Blanton, Officer Kindell
testified that he observed a male figure inside the house that matched William’s
description. Further, he stated that he observed Blanton walk right past William
and witnessed the two engage in a brief conversation upon her return to the house.
Officer Kindell concluded that he relayed this information to Lieutenant Bayles.
The police breached the home, found William, and arrested him.
{¶37} Testimony was elicited from Chestnut, Blanton’s advocate in
William’s domestic violence case, which suggested Blanton did not want William
to get arrested and lose his job. Moreover, Chestnut indicated that Blanton wanted
William to turn himself in to the police. Chestnut testified that the two discussed
the best way for William to address the situation without getting into more trouble.
This was seemingly confirmed by both Witzell, who was at this meeting, and
Rischel, who testified that Blanton had set up an appointment with an attorney to
discuss bringing William into the police station.
{¶38} Upon review of the record, we find that any rational trier of fact
could have found that Blanton was guilty of obstructing justice beyond a
reasonable doubt. William was charged with domestic violence, a felony.
Blanton knew about the crime as she was the victim of the domestic violence
charge. Additionally, she spoke with Chestnut about the charge and how William
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could take care of it. Blanton clearly knew that police would be looking for
William since she was looking for a way in which to bring him in on his own
terms. Further, she told Officer Musser that William was not in the house, stated
that he was somewhere on a neighboring street, and that she was alone. Nothing
Blanton told Officer Musser was the truth.
{¶39} Additionally, although Blanton argues that her intent was always to
help facilitate William’s surrender, her actions seem to draw the opposite
conclusion. She argues that she lied to police because she wanted William to be
able to turn himself in the following morning with the hope that he would not lose
his job. By doing so, she deliberately attempted to delay William’s apprehension
until a later time. Thus, her argument has no merit. Since the State can prove
intent via the surrounding facts and circumstances, we find that any rational trier
of fact could have found that Blanton possessed the requisite degree of culpability.
{¶40} Finally, Blanton argues that the evidence was insufficient to show
some form of hindrance. As stated supra, the State was not required to prove that
the police officers were actually hindered by Blanton’s actions.
{¶41} After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of obstructing justice beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶42} Accordingly, we overrule Blanton’s first assignment of error.
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{¶43} In her second assignment of error, Blanton argues that her conviction
for obstructing justice is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We
disagree.
{¶44} When an appellate court analyzes a conviction under the manifest
weight standard, it “sits as the thirteenth juror.” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387.
Accordingly, it must review the entire record, weigh all of the evidence and its
reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine
whether the fact finder “clearly lost its way” in resolving evidentiary conflicts and
“created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st
Dist.1983). When applying the manifest weight standard, a reviewing court
should only reverse a trial court’s judgment “in exceptional case[s]” when the
evidence “weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id. at paragraph three of the
syllabus.
{¶45} Having disposed of Blanton’s sufficiency arguments, we similarly
reject her manifest weight arguments. Blanton makes the same arguments as to
her manifest weight claim that she made regarding her sufficiency claim. We have
already found that the State presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction.
Further, the jury heard the testimony of several individuals involved in the case.
Blanton has failed to point to any error on behalf of the jury other than its ultimate
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decision. “On the trial of a case, either civil or criminal, the weight to be given the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the
facts.” State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus.
After a thorough review of the record, we cannot say that this is the exceptional
case where the trier of fact lost its way and committed a miscarriage of justice by
finding Blanton guilty of obstructing justice.
{¶46} Accordingly, we overrule Blanton’s second assignment of error.
{¶47} In her third assignment of error, Blanton argues that she suffered
prejudice as a result of the trial court’s decision to allow the State to ask improper
questions during voir dire. We disagree.
{¶48} We initially note that Blanton has failed to cite any legal authorities
to support her third assignment of error. This violates App.R. 16(A)(7), which
requires that the appellant provide “[a]n argument containing [her] contention * *
* with citations to the authorities * * * on which appellant relies.” Although
App.R. 12(A)(2) gives us the authority to disregard this assignment of error, we
elect to address it in the interests of justice. See State v. Thomas, 3d Dist. Mercer
No. 10-10-17, 2011-Ohio-4337, ¶ 25.
{¶49} Blanton essentially argues that the prosecutor committed
prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire. Prosecutorial misconduct will only be
found if statements made by a prosecutor were improper and if those statements
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prejudiced the defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Brady, 3d Dist. Marion No.
9-03-27, 2003-Ohio-6005, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Williams, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos.
02AP-730, 02 AP-731, 2003-Ohio-5204, ¶ 52.
{¶50} Blanton complains that the following statements made by the
prosecutor were improper: “Would you generally agree that people who lie to
police officers should be prosecuted for that?” Oct. 28, 2014 Trial Tr., p. 23;
“Does everybody agree that people who lie to a police officer should be
prosecuted for that? Any—I need a yes or a no. Generally speaking, okay? All
right. Does anybody hold the opinion if somebody lies to a police officer, it’s just
part of the police officer’s job, and they have to deal with [sic]?” Id. at p. 23-24.
{¶51} Blanton argues that these statements were improper because she was
charged under subsection (A)(1), which required the State to prove that she
harbored or concealed William, and that oral misstatements are not punishable
conduct. We find that the prosecutor’s statements were improper. By asking the
potential jurors whether they believed that all people who lie to police officers
should be prosecuted, the prosecutor implied, and the potential jurors could have
inferred, that all false statements made to police officers are punishable conduct.
This is not a correct statement of the law, and, therefore, the statements were
improper.
{¶52} The next question is whether these statements prejudiced Blanton’s
substantial rights. In her brief, Blanton failed to show how she was prejudiced by
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the prosecutor’s statements. Although it is certainly possible for a defendant in a
similar case to be substantially prejudiced, the facts in this case do not rise to such
a level of prejudice. Specifically, the jury instructions did not include any
statement regarding the criminality of false statements made to police officers.
Rather, the jury was instructed to find whether Blanton harbored or concealed
William. Because the jury was not instructed that false statements require a
conviction, we find that any error in permitting the improper questions during voir
dire was harmless in this case.
{¶53} Accordingly, we overrule Blanton’s third assignment of error.
{¶54} In her fourth assignment of error, Blanton argues that she was
prejudiced by the trial court’s decision not to instruct the jury according to
Blanton’s suggested instructions. Specifically, she argues that the jury should
have been instructed that the “State had to prove, inter alia, that [Blanton]
harbored or concealed William through conduct which went beyond a mere oral
misstatement and that she did in fact hinder, or can reasonably be said to have
hindered, the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of
William.” (Appellant’s Brief at 12). We disagree.
{¶55} “A trial court’s instructions to a jury must correctly, clearly, and
completely state the law applicable to the case.” State v. Orians, 179 Ohio App.3d
701, 2008-Ohio-6185, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.), citing State v. Thomas, 170 Ohio App.3d
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727, 2007-Ohio-1344, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.). Additionally, when an appellate court
reviews jury instructions, it must examine the specific charge at issue in the
context of the entire charge, and not in isolation. State v. Thompson, 33 Ohio
St.3d 1, 13 (1987). Jury instructions fall under a trial court’s discretion, which
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St.2d
266, 271 (1981). An abuse of discretion connotes that the trial court’s decision
was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio
St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶56} Here, the trial court’s instructions to the jury read, in relevant part,
The offense charged in the indictment is as follows: Count one, obstructing justice, revised code section 2921.32[(A)(1).] The defendant is charged with the offense of obstructing justice in count one of the indictment.
Before you can find the defendant guilty of obstructing justice, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 22nd day of May, 2014 and in Marion County, Ohio the defendant did, A, with purpose to hinder the discovery or apprehension of William Blanton for a crime; B, harbor or conceal William Blanton; and, C, the crime committed by William is a felony.
Oct. 29, 2014 Trial Tr., p. 53-54. These instructions are nearly identical to that of
the model jury instructions. See Ohio Jury Instructions, CR Section 521.32
(2015). Additionally, we note how the jury could be confused given the
instruction that there must actually be hindrance. See Claybrook, 57 Ohio App.2d
at 135.
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{¶57} Because we have found that the State need not prove either of the
facts alleged by Blanton, as stated supra, and that the jury instructions were nearly
identical to the model instructions, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion when it refused to provide the requested jury instruction.
{¶58} Accordingly, we overrule Blanton’s fourth assignment of error.
{¶59} Having found no error prejudicial to Blanton, in the particulars
assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
PRESTON, J., concurs.
SHAW, J., concurs in Judgment Only.
/hlo
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