HICKS, J.
The defendant, Brandon Bilodeau, appeals his conviction of assault by a prisoner. See RSA 642:9 (2007). He argues that the Superior Court {Mangones, J.) erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to the police. We affirm.
The following facts are supported by the record. On January 4,2007, the defendant, an inmate in the Secure Psychiatric Unit at the State Prison, was accused of stabbing a fellow prisoner. The next day, two state police detectives investigated the stabbing and sought to interview the defendant. He refused to speak to the detectives and asked for an attorney. On [761]*761January 9 and January 12,2007, the defendant sent “inmate request slips” inquiring about the status of the investigation and whether the State planned to pursue charges against him. The second slip read, “What is the current status of the incident. . . ? No one has answered any requests in regards to this matter and I don’t know if I should seek outside legal counsel. Please let me know what is going on.” One officer responded to the note — a response that the defendant characterizes in his brief as “[m]inimal.”
On March 19, 2007, prison officials called the detectives to advise them that the defendant wished to speak with them. They returned to the prison to interview the defendant. The detectives read the defendant his Miranda rights from a standard form. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444-45 (1966). The defendant stated he understood them and wanted to waive them. He then signed a form waiving his rights. Subsequently, he confessed that he had stabbed a fellow prisoner in the back with a sharpened toothbrush. Near the end of the fifteen-minute interview, one of the detectives wrote a summary of the defendant’s statement on the waiver form, and read it to the defendant. The defendant then signed the statement.
At no point before or during this interview did the detectives inquire as to the defendant’s mental health either from the defendant or the medical staff at the prison. The detectives testified that the defendant appeared “lucid” and that he spoke “pretty articulately].” Specifically, one detective testified that the defendant “knew what he wanted to say, how he wanted to say it. You know, he seemed fine to me .... I didn’t have any reason to believe he wasn’t there of his own accord.” The other detective testified that he had known the defendant for fourteen years and had no concerns about the defendant’s demeanor.
The defendant moved to suppress the oral and written statements, arguing that he did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights, and that his statements were involuntary under the Due Process Clause of the New Hampshire Constitution. He presented evidence that upon admittance to the Secure Psychiatric Unit, he suffered from depression, suicidal ideation, hallucinations, mood disorders, and an antisocial personality disorder. To treat these conditions, the defendant was receiving five medications daily at the time of his confession. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion.
On appeal, the defendant contends that his statements were involuntary and, therefore, their admission at trial violated his due process rights under the New Hampshire Constitution. See N.H. CONST, pt. I, art. 15. Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides that “[n]o [762]*762subject shall be... compelled to accuse or furnish evidence against himself’ and guarantees every citizen due process of law. Id. For a statement to be admissible at trial, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary. State v. Rezk, 150 N.H. 483, 486 (2004). Whether a statement is voluntary is a question of fact for the trial court to determine. State v. Hammond, 144 N.H. 401, 404 (1999). We will not reverse the trial court’s determination unless the manifest weight of the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State is to the contrary. Rezk, 150 N.H. at 486.
No single definition of voluntariness exists that can be mechanically applied. State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 747 (1984). The focus of the inquiry is “whether the actions of an individual are the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.” Hammond, 144 N.H. at 405 (quotation omitted); Damiano, 124 N.H. at 747. The decision to confess “must be freely self-determined.” In re Wesley B., 145 N.H. 428,430 (2000) (quotation omitted). A confession cannot be “the product of a will overborne by police tactics, or of a mind incapable of conscious choice.” Hammond, 144 N.H. at 405 (quotation omitted).
The Due Process Clause of the State Constitution requires that we make a determination of voluntariness in light of “the totality of all surrounding circumstances.” Rezk, 150 N.H. at 487 (quotation omitted). We analyze “both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the defendant argues that his psychiatric condition combined with subtle police coercion made his statements involuntary. He also contends that the State did not “verify a rational thought process” or establish that the defendant had “any ability to exercise meaningful discretion with the police.”
Under the Due Process Clause, we consider a person’s mental or developmental condition if it impairs his capacity for self-determination or his ability to resist police coercion. In re Wesley B., 145 N.H. at 430-32. The defendant may not be able to “make a meaningful choice” to confess or may have a heightened vulnerability to what otherwise would be acceptable police tactics. Id. at 431 (quotation omitted); see State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390, 400-01 (1992) (“[Pjroof of a deranged or deficient mental state may be highly significant in determining whether any given police conduct was overbearing in its effect.” (quotation omitted)). Mental illness, however, “does not, as a matter of law, render a confession involuntary.” Hammond, 144 N.H. at 405 (quotation omitted). The trial court still must determine “whether, given the totality of the circumstances, the defendant’s state[763]*763ments were the product of a rational intellect and a free will.” In re Wesley B., 145 N.H. at 431 (quotation omitted).
The trial court, after listening to the testimony of the officers, reviewing medical files provided by the defendant, and reading the defendant’s communications with prison authorities, found that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s statements were voluntary based upon the totality of the circumstances. In its analysis, the trial court acknowledged that the defendant was housed in the psychiatric treatment unit at the time of the alleged crime and that he received medication for his psychiatric condition. Nevertheless, the trial court found that the defendant “was well able to sufficiently process information and make choices” and had the ability “to consider his legal rights and his options, including whether to waive his rights.”
Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the State. See Hammond, 144 N.H. at 405. There was evidence that the defendant’s mental condition did not critically impair his capacity for self-determination and that his will was not overborne. See id.
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HICKS, J.
The defendant, Brandon Bilodeau, appeals his conviction of assault by a prisoner. See RSA 642:9 (2007). He argues that the Superior Court {Mangones, J.) erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to the police. We affirm.
The following facts are supported by the record. On January 4,2007, the defendant, an inmate in the Secure Psychiatric Unit at the State Prison, was accused of stabbing a fellow prisoner. The next day, two state police detectives investigated the stabbing and sought to interview the defendant. He refused to speak to the detectives and asked for an attorney. On [761]*761January 9 and January 12,2007, the defendant sent “inmate request slips” inquiring about the status of the investigation and whether the State planned to pursue charges against him. The second slip read, “What is the current status of the incident. . . ? No one has answered any requests in regards to this matter and I don’t know if I should seek outside legal counsel. Please let me know what is going on.” One officer responded to the note — a response that the defendant characterizes in his brief as “[m]inimal.”
On March 19, 2007, prison officials called the detectives to advise them that the defendant wished to speak with them. They returned to the prison to interview the defendant. The detectives read the defendant his Miranda rights from a standard form. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444-45 (1966). The defendant stated he understood them and wanted to waive them. He then signed a form waiving his rights. Subsequently, he confessed that he had stabbed a fellow prisoner in the back with a sharpened toothbrush. Near the end of the fifteen-minute interview, one of the detectives wrote a summary of the defendant’s statement on the waiver form, and read it to the defendant. The defendant then signed the statement.
At no point before or during this interview did the detectives inquire as to the defendant’s mental health either from the defendant or the medical staff at the prison. The detectives testified that the defendant appeared “lucid” and that he spoke “pretty articulately].” Specifically, one detective testified that the defendant “knew what he wanted to say, how he wanted to say it. You know, he seemed fine to me .... I didn’t have any reason to believe he wasn’t there of his own accord.” The other detective testified that he had known the defendant for fourteen years and had no concerns about the defendant’s demeanor.
The defendant moved to suppress the oral and written statements, arguing that he did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights, and that his statements were involuntary under the Due Process Clause of the New Hampshire Constitution. He presented evidence that upon admittance to the Secure Psychiatric Unit, he suffered from depression, suicidal ideation, hallucinations, mood disorders, and an antisocial personality disorder. To treat these conditions, the defendant was receiving five medications daily at the time of his confession. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion.
On appeal, the defendant contends that his statements were involuntary and, therefore, their admission at trial violated his due process rights under the New Hampshire Constitution. See N.H. CONST, pt. I, art. 15. Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides that “[n]o [762]*762subject shall be... compelled to accuse or furnish evidence against himself’ and guarantees every citizen due process of law. Id. For a statement to be admissible at trial, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary. State v. Rezk, 150 N.H. 483, 486 (2004). Whether a statement is voluntary is a question of fact for the trial court to determine. State v. Hammond, 144 N.H. 401, 404 (1999). We will not reverse the trial court’s determination unless the manifest weight of the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State is to the contrary. Rezk, 150 N.H. at 486.
No single definition of voluntariness exists that can be mechanically applied. State v. Damiano, 124 N.H. 742, 747 (1984). The focus of the inquiry is “whether the actions of an individual are the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.” Hammond, 144 N.H. at 405 (quotation omitted); Damiano, 124 N.H. at 747. The decision to confess “must be freely self-determined.” In re Wesley B., 145 N.H. 428,430 (2000) (quotation omitted). A confession cannot be “the product of a will overborne by police tactics, or of a mind incapable of conscious choice.” Hammond, 144 N.H. at 405 (quotation omitted).
The Due Process Clause of the State Constitution requires that we make a determination of voluntariness in light of “the totality of all surrounding circumstances.” Rezk, 150 N.H. at 487 (quotation omitted). We analyze “both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the defendant argues that his psychiatric condition combined with subtle police coercion made his statements involuntary. He also contends that the State did not “verify a rational thought process” or establish that the defendant had “any ability to exercise meaningful discretion with the police.”
Under the Due Process Clause, we consider a person’s mental or developmental condition if it impairs his capacity for self-determination or his ability to resist police coercion. In re Wesley B., 145 N.H. at 430-32. The defendant may not be able to “make a meaningful choice” to confess or may have a heightened vulnerability to what otherwise would be acceptable police tactics. Id. at 431 (quotation omitted); see State v. Chapman, 135 N.H. 390, 400-01 (1992) (“[Pjroof of a deranged or deficient mental state may be highly significant in determining whether any given police conduct was overbearing in its effect.” (quotation omitted)). Mental illness, however, “does not, as a matter of law, render a confession involuntary.” Hammond, 144 N.H. at 405 (quotation omitted). The trial court still must determine “whether, given the totality of the circumstances, the defendant’s state[763]*763ments were the product of a rational intellect and a free will.” In re Wesley B., 145 N.H. at 431 (quotation omitted).
The trial court, after listening to the testimony of the officers, reviewing medical files provided by the defendant, and reading the defendant’s communications with prison authorities, found that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s statements were voluntary based upon the totality of the circumstances. In its analysis, the trial court acknowledged that the defendant was housed in the psychiatric treatment unit at the time of the alleged crime and that he received medication for his psychiatric condition. Nevertheless, the trial court found that the defendant “was well able to sufficiently process information and make choices” and had the ability “to consider his legal rights and his options, including whether to waive his rights.”
Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the State. See Hammond, 144 N.H. at 405. There was evidence that the defendant’s mental condition did not critically impair his capacity for self-determination and that his will was not overborne. See id. On January 5, 2007, one day after the alleged stabbing, the defendant invoked his Miranda rights when the officers sought to interview him. One of the detectives testified that the defendant chose not to speak with him, stating that “he wanted to talk to an attorney but at some point in the future he may want to speak to us.” The defendant also sent two “inmate request slips” on January 9 and January 12 inquiring about the ongoing investigation, even asking if he “should seek outside legal counsel.” While admittedly occurring two months before the March 17,2007 interview at issue, these actions indicate that the defendant understood his basic legal rights and could make a meaningful choice whether to invoke them.
The events surrounding the defendant’s interview on March 19, 2007, also evidence that the defendant’s decision to confess was “freely self-determined.” Wesley B., 145 N.H. at 430 (quotation omitted). The interview only occurred after the defendant sent a message through prison personnel that he wished to speak with the detectives. The detectives responded to this request, went to the Secure Housing Unit where the defendant was held, and interviewed the defendant in the attorney conference room. At the start of the interview, the detectives read the defendant his Miranda warnings line by line from a standard form which he signed. The defendant wrote “yes” on the form next to the questions, “Do you understand each of these rights?” and “Understanding these rights are you willing to answer questions?”
[764]*764While compliance with Miranda does not conclusively establish the voluntariness of a later confession, it is one factor that a trial court can consider. See State v. Rodney Portigue, 125 N.H. 352, 364 (1984). Police officers do not have to engage a defendant in a discussion of what those rights mean to verify that a defendant understands them, although this may be good practice when the officers know of a defendant’s mental condition. Cf. State v. Dumas, 145 N.H. 301, 303 (2000). The length of the interview was neither inordinate nor oppressive. Cf. State v. Spencer, 149 N.H. 622, 629 (2003); Hopkins v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579, 584-85 (5th Cir.) (holding confession involuntary because defendant isolated for fifteen days and interviewed nine times during that period), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 968 (2003). The interview lasted only fifteen minutes and the defendant confessed immediately.
This case differs from Wesley B., where we held the trial court erred in admitting the inculpatory statement of an eleven-year-old boy with “low average intelligence” who was questioned for over two hours without the presence of legal counsel or a guardian. Wesley B., 145 N.H. at 431. In Wesley B., the juvenile’s “will was overborne” rendering his confession involuntary. Id. at 432. Unlike in Wesley B., the defendant here did not deny the stabbing in the face of continued police questioning. Id. at 432. He confessed immediately and freely. A corrections officer also testified that the defendant asked him, “[H]ow bad did If... that guy up?” after the interview. The detectives here also testified that the defendant appeared “lucid” and spoke “pretty articulate[ly],” whereas the juvenile in Wesley B. was “ ‘slow,’ fidgety, and had trouble paying attention.” Id. at 431. Here, unlike in Wesley B., we cannot say that the superior court’s finding was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State.
The defendant argues that the detectives used “subtle coercion” that, combined with his mental condition, overbore his will. The defendant points to the fact that he sent two inmate request slips inquiring about the possibility of charges in January 2007 and received only a “[m]inimal” response to one of them. While that response may have been “minimal,” it did not, as the defendant argues, “forc[e] the defendant to speak with the officers to get the minimal information he desired.” There was “nothing coercive, deceptive or overbearing in the police’s conduct.” Hammond, 144 N.H. at 405 (quotation omitted) (statement voluntary of a defendant suffering from depression, conducted in a cold parking lot by an officer who was a friend, partially because there was “nothing coercive, deceptive, or overbearing in the police’s conduct”); see Chapman, 135 N.H. at 400-01 (confession voluntary where the police knew the defendant was intoxicated but did not take advantage of the defendant’s intoxication). At no point did [765]*765the two detectives make any direct or implied promises in order to obtain the statement from the defendant. Cf Rezk, 150 N.H. at 491 (confession involuntary where induced by specific promise of leniency).
In sum, based upon our review of the trial court’s determination of voluntariness, construed in the light most favorable to the State, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.
Affirmed.
DALIANIS, J., concurred; DUGGAN, J., concurred specially; BRODERICK, C.J., dissented.